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ABSTRACT 
Paradigms of housing policies in developing countries have undergone significant changes since 
the 1940s in the post-colonial era. The involvement of international development agencies such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations with their substantial financial and technical resources 
have engendered a conventional narrative of the hegemony of paradigms sponsored by these 
agencies. It is in this light that the “enabling principles” of housing policy emerged as the 
dominant policy discourse from the 1980s. This housing paradigm -“enabling shelter policies” –
was actively promoted by the World Bank and the United Nations, acting through its housing 
agency the UN-Habitat, for adoption by developing countries to reform their housing sectors 
from the 1980s. One of the main instruments of the enabling principles was the withdrawal or 
contraction of the state from direct housing development in preference for private sector-led and 
community initiatives in housing development. Government involvement in direct development 
of housing was conceived to be an ineffective policy choice which had little geographic impact 
and therefore had to give way to a systematised approach to housing delivery. Ghana was one of 
the first African countries to adopt these principles for the reform of the housing sector in the 
country. Two decades later, it has been observed that the government was making housing policy 
choices that contradicted the ethos of the enabling principles. In particular it was observed that 
the state was re-engaging in direct housing development. In the light of the past conception of 
these activities as being defective policies, their re-emergence was characteristic of policy 
“reversionism”. This concept of policy reversionism is adopted from theories of theology and 
criminal justice (where it is known as recidivism) in which processes of reform or progression 
are reversed. The question explored by the thesis is why housing policy reversionism was 
emerging and what were the generating factors. 
The thesis draws on a critical realist perspective to deconstruct the conventional narratives about 
the homogenous state and the hegemony of international agencies such as the World Bank and 
the UN in the advancement of “unproblematic” enabling principles through which the housing 
sector reforms were designed and implemented. In doing so the thesis established the 
heterogeneity of the state driven by competition for domination by sectoral, intra-state as well as 
supra-state interests. In this process, hegemony becomes vulnerable to manipulation as these 
principles were translated or “indigenised”. Furthermore it is established that this nuanced 
perspective is further complicated by a dialectical relationship between the contexts of events 
and prevailing material conditions and the actions taken by policy agents. These complexities 
layered the housing policy sphere in ways that masked the primary motivations of class interests 
and political legitimisation underpinning the incidence of reversionism. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The housing sector in developing countries is faced with several difficulties, especially in 
relation to the requisite devices that appropriately respond to the needs of the poor. These 
difficulties arise from the balance of varying housing preferences within each country and the 
financial resources that are available within the economy to meet needs accruing from such 
preferences. Housing preferences can be wide-ranging and are shaped by a number of factors 
including household income and size, and the type of economic activities households are 
engaged in. In this respect, the housing needs of the poor and the opportunities available to 
them to meet these needs are critical. The technical expertise available to governments in the 
design and implementation of public policies is also critical to the quality and effectiveness of 
housing policies. The challenge is for governments in developing countries to evolve 
mechanisms that effectively address the concerns and inadequacies in the sector, especially as 
they pertain to the poor. As a result, a variety of strategies have been designed in the past to 
unravel the low-income housing quandary. Inevitably, the state has been engaged directly and 
indirectly in the development and allocation of housing, with such involvement subjected to 
academic and practitioner interrogation. The results of these interrogations have 
demonstrated that such state involvement has been frequently ineffectual and often biased in 
favour of the upper classes of society. Consequently, in pursuit of more effective housing 
policy responses, the role of the state in housing in developing countries has been the subject 
of considerable critical attention.  Periodically the interrogation of the role of the state in 
housing has led to policy and institutional reforms that have defined and addressed the 
functional role of the state and of other actors in the housing sector.  
A case in point is the new sets of policies that emerged from the work of the World 
Bank and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) – later known as UN-
2 
 
Habitat – during the 1980s. These new policies were encapsulated in a broad set of principles 
labelled the ―enabling housing principles‖. The enabling housing principles were proffered as 
a systemized response that would replace the prevailing largely state-led project-based 
approaches and generate a greater impact in the efforts to address housing problems. It was 
envisaged that this systematized approach would remove the constraints to, and enhance the 
incentives for, the participation of non-state actors in housing production and allocation 
(World Bank, 1993; UNCHS, 1996). With a few exceptions the direct development of 
housing by the state had proved to be inadequate in meeting the needs of society and in 
particular, those of the poor households
1
. Where state houses were built they rarely reached 
the poor for whom most of such interventions were supposedly intended (World Bank, 1993; 
Choguill, 2007) and in any case the supply of such houses fell way short of needs. The UN, 
for example, estimated that at the beginning of the new millennium public housing amounted 
to no more than 10% of the total production of the housing stock in most developing 
countries (Keivani and Werna, 2001a). Similarly, the World Bank articulated an 
interpretation of the enabling principles in a set of norms – ―Dos and Don‘ts In Enabling 
Housing Markets to Work‖ – to guide reforms of the housing sector (World Bank, 1993:46). 
Generally, these norms had a link to the neo-liberal ideology of the World Bank materialised 
in the Structural Adjustment Programme that favoured market agents over the state as the 
primary agents for production. Notwithstanding the origin of the enabling principles certain 
core features pertained, one of which is the expectation that governments would generally 
refrain from directly constructing housing
2
. Another essential feature of the enabling 
principles is the demand for refraining from evictions, especially in slum and squatter 
communities. Slum clearances and mass eviction policies have been found to be a frequent 
                                                 
1
 Public housing have been ‗successful‘, albeit with significant investment of public funds in Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Israel (UNCHS, 1996; Mohd et al, 1996; Tan and Sock–Yong, 1991 as cited in Keivani and Werna, 
2001a). 
2
 The UN however permitted direct state involvement in housing where markets failed in low-income housing.  
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but inappropriate response to housing produced by the low-income which are deemed 
―below-standard‖. Certainly, advocates of market interventions consider evictions as 
obstructive to developing property rights necessary for enhanced housing production by 
lower-income households, while others have viewed the issue from a rights-based perspective 
deeming evictions to be infringements of the fundamental rights of affected households 
(COHRE, 2000:18). In particular, the UN has been a front line campaigner of this rights 
approach, creating a platform through its conferences for the articulation of such rights 
(Tosics, 1997). Slum clearance policies have also been condemned for their ineffectiveness in 
resolving housing problems for the urban poor (Turner, 1976; World Bank, 1986; Hardoy and 
Satterthwaite, 1989; UN Millennium Project. 2005). As a result slum evictions are frowned upon 
within the body of the enabling strategy framework. 
The enabling principles of housing policy have been implemented in many 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and arguably can be said to have 
been widely applied as part of the market orthodoxy that dominated public policy discourse 
in most developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Upon the adoption of the enabling 
principles, it was expected that government activities in housing production and allocation 
would decline and be transformed into those of overall regulator of the sector and facilitator 
for other agents deemed to be more efficient in housing development. Additionally evictions 
and slum clearances would be minimised as much as possible. It is in this vein that Ghana 
adopted the enabling principles of housing policy. The experience of the application of the 
enabling principles in Ghana however has produced outcomes contrary to those envisaged by 
proponents of this policy, particularly the two principal actors – World Bank and the UN. 
This departure from the expected outcomes is a matter central to understanding the dynamics 
of housing policy making and implementation in a developing country context.  
4 
 
Beyond the immediate results of the reforms, recent government housing initiatives in 
Ghana – in the aftermath of policy reforms that applied the enabling principles – have 
initiated state re-engagement with direct construction of housing and appear to reverse the 
enabling principles. To appreciate this apparent policy reversal it is important to understand 
the historical context of housing policies in Ghana and in particular the impetus for the 
enabling reforms. From the onset of the post-colonial experience, public policy on housing 
focused almost exclusively on government-built housing. However, beginning in 1987, the 
government initiated,
3
 as part of the overarching Structural Adjustment Programme, actions 
to reform the housing sector and change the structural relations in the housing sector. In the 
budget statement of 1987 it was acknowledged that government housing development had not 
matched (growing) demand and the government indicated its intention to harness private 
resources to engender cost reductions of housing development in order to promote housing 
affordability for ―working people‖. This took the form of tax incentives, privatization and 
institutional reforms, and rationalizing land management practices. Public housing agencies 
were to be subjected to organisational review, essentially to wean them off public subsidies 
and, for some, divest them of public ownership. Public housing projects initiated in the 1960s 
and 1970s and abandoned due to shortage of funds were to be resuscitated and transferred to 
the private sector. By introducing these fiscal measures, the government was signalling its 
intention to stimulate private participation in housing. This indicative policy stance was 
reinforced in the economic policy of the following year
4
 which clearly underlined the 
subscription to market-led housing policy. Initiatives designed to consolidate this 
subscription comprised fiscal incentives for both suppliers and buyers of real estate property 
which were embedded in the ‗Housing Sector Reforms Programme‘ of 1988 (World Bank 
Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990) and  included: a 10% reduction in corporate tax for 
                                                 
3
 1987 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana. 
4
 See 1988 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of Government of Ghana. 
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real estate companies, a 50% tax-deductible allowance for real estate investment, a five-year 
tax moratorium for real estate companies with a further two-year moratorium for loss 
recovery, exemption from stamp duty on real estate property acquisitions, and a three-year 
public investment programme in infrastructure development for housing estates. Given these 
initiatives and their pursuit during the 1980s and 1990s, the post-2000 re-engagement of the 
state in direct housing provision was a stark reversal of the enabling principles. 
1.2 The “contradiction” of state re-engagement in direct housing delivery and evictions 
Housing remains one of the most urgent problems facing the country and government is collaborating 
with the private sector to find a proper solution.
5
 
 
Mr. Speaker, in fulfilment of the NPP Manifesto of Housing the People and the realization of His 
Excellency the President‘s vision for the housing sub-sector, Government will provide ¢150 billion to 
the Ministry of Works and Housing to commence the construction of low cost housing throughout the 
country.
 6
  
 
These two contrasting statements made within the space of three weeks in February 2005 
heralded the initiation of the reversal of the enabling principles of housing policy. At the time 
of the announcement of this new ‗Affordable Housing Programme‘, the enabling principles 
had been the principal discourse of housing policy in developing countries, including Ghana, 
for nearly twenty years (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2006). About the same 
time in 2005 when the Minister for Finance was making the announcement of the state‘s re-
engagement in direct delivery of housing through the Affordable Housing Programme, the 
Housing Minister announced further measures that reinforced the perception of a reversal of 
the enabling principles with the declaration of the government‘s intention to reduce the cost 
of housing finance for lower-income households through subsidies on the interest rates 
(Ghana News Agency, 2005
7
). As part of the Affordable Housing Programme, an 
                                                 
5
 President J.A. Kuffour, State of the Nation address, First Session of the Fourth Parliament February 3, 2005. 
6
 Kwadwo Baah Wiredu (Minister for Finance and Economic Planning) Presentation of the Budget Statement 
and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2005 Financial Year presented to Parliament On 
Thursday, 24
th
 February, 2005. At the time the exchange rate of the local currency the Cedi was US$1.0 to 9,000 
Cedis and therefore amounted to the equivalent of US$16.7 million. 
7
 ―Government to subsidise mortgage purchase‖ Ghana News Agency 23rd February 2005. 
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architectural firm – Modula Grupp – was contracted to design the proposed developments 
and public lands were secured for three housing development sites
8
. The Ministry of Finance 
released a third of the budgeted US$45 million to start the construction, and a supplementary 
budget equivalent to an additional US$33 million was further secured. In November 2005, 
construction of the first phase that would develop 113 blocks of one to two-bedroom flats 
was initiated, purportedly aimed at low-income households. According to the Housing 
Minister, the new initiative was intended to ―to give meaning to….. [the]plan of ensuring that 
people of low-level income groupings owned their houses‖9. In this regard the proposed final 
prices for the developments were set at the equivalent of US$10,000 and US$ 13,400 for one 
and two-bedroom flats respectively. A number of reasons were put forward for the inception 
of this policy of state delivery. The Housing Minister drew attention to the rapid rise in urban 
populations and its impact on housing needs of the towns and cities, using reference to the 
high housing demand levels presumed to range between 500,000 and 700,000 to justify state 
re-engagement. With a purported annual supply level ranging between 25,000 and 40,000 and 
an annual need of 70,000 housing units, the action of the direct government involvement was 
deemed by politicians to be a rational response to bridging the gap between supply and 
demand.  
 Although historically, slum clearance policies have been minimal in Ghana, a sudden 
surge in its incidence from 2000 reinforced the perception of contradictory housing policy. In 
May 2002, the city authorities together with the central government gained notoriety when 
action was taken to evict 30,000 households in a slum called ―Old Fadama‖ or ―Sodom and 
Gomorah‖ – perhaps typifying the extent of dereliction – in Ghana‘s capital of Accra. This 
intended act was condemned by a number of international agencies including the UN and the 
Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) (COHRE, 2004; du Plessis, 2005:13). 
                                                 
8
 These sites were in Borteyman, Kpone and Asokore Mampong located on the fringes of the three main cities 
of Accra, Tema and Kumasi, respectively. 
9
 ―Housing is a critical issue facing Government - Minister‖ Ghana News Agency 16th November 2005. 
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Subsequently, several evictions have either occurred or been threatened in Accra and other 
urban centres of the country. The evictions and clearances have targeted or affected slum 
settlements of different sizes ranging from entire communities, neighbourhoods, to individual 
houses
10
 in spite of the solicitations of the UN acting through its anti-eviction advocacy 
campaign group, the Action Group Against Forced Evictions (AGFE). Clearly, the pattern 
emerging suggests a push for slum clearance explicitly or implicitly where the government 
remains silent in the face of evictions by other public agencies and local authorities.  
1.3 Conceptualising  the housing policy reversal 
The re-engagement of the state in the direct construction of housing in the Affordable 
Housing Programme ran counter to the hitherto prevailing ethos of the enabling principles. 
Indeed the reversal of enabling reforms can be seen as tantamount to the incidence of 
reversionism or recidivism in theological and criminal justice theories respectively. A 
reversionist is defined as ―a person who advocates reverting to the conditions, customs, 
ideals, etc., of an earlier era‖11. In theology reversionism is viewed as the process of 
backsliding of a Christian, after having been reformed. This entails a voluntary reversion to 
practices of a pre-reform state after rejecting the fundamental doctrines that underpin their 
reformation. Similarly, recidivism in criminal justice refers to the process of ―reversion of an 
individual to criminal behaviour after he or she has been convicted of a prior offense, 
sentenced, and (presumably) corrected‖ (Maltz, 2001:1). Similarly, it is defined elsewhere as 
―a tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behaviour; especially: relapse 
                                                 
10
Some of the notable slum locations in which evictions have taken place or been threatened by government 
agencies including the local governments include the Accra Railway Corridor, ―Abuja‖, ―Neoplan Station‖, 
Ministries, Arts Centres, and ―Legion Village‖ all in Accra, ―Aboabo Dagomba Line‖ and ―Race course‖ in 
Kumasi, Rails Ano in Sekondi-Takoradi, ―Ashaiman Tulaku‖ in Tema. The evictions in Kumasi were 
implemented in spite of significant lobbying by various groups. The Mayor of Kumasi was invited to and 
attended the 3
rd
 World Urban Forum organized by UN-Habitat in June 2006 to acquaint herself with best 
practices and yet returned to instruct the demolitions. In addition, from late 2009 the government announced a 
policy of no tolerance for buildings sited in water course ways and empowered local authorities to initiate 
housing demolition and all these demolitions are ongoing at the time of concluding the thesis. 
11
 Source: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reversionism?qsrc=2446, date sourced: 23
rd
 November 2005. 
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into criminal behaviour‖12. Although recidivism has been criticized for its methodological 
difficulties (Beck, 2001), it nonetheless has conceptual features analogous to the housing 
practice being studied in this thesis. Therefore drawing on this conceptual outlook, housing 
policy in Ghana, in the context of the emerging practice of the state to re-engage in direct 
development after the enabling reform process had repudiated this policy, can thus be 
conceived as a process of housing policy reversionism
13
. The paradox is, however, that in 
Ghana, while a socialist inclined military administration initiated the enabling market-based 
reforms from 1985 to 2000, a market-liberal leaning civilian administration undertook or 
supported their reversal from 2002. The market-friendly credentials of this civilian 
administration were well established: it claimed for example that its era was a ―golden age of 
business‖ and adopted the mantra ―the business of government is to govern and not business‖. 
However, in an economic policy statement of 2001, this same civilian government announced 
its intention to ―step up its facilitation role with emphasis on land acquisition and provision 
of basic infrastructure facilities to support housing development‖14. In addition it promised 
support for the private sector in securing a US$50 million financing as part of a ―Housing the 
People‖ scheme focusing on low-income housing and urban renewal. Significantly, the 
intention was also expressed to source another credit of US$50 million for ―land servicing 
                                                 
12
 Meriam-Webster‘s Online Dictionary, Source: http://mw1.m-w.com/dictionary/recidivism; date sourced: 12th 
January 2008. 
13
 The incidence of reversals of the enabling principles of housing policy after a period of implementing policy 
reforms based on these principles occurred not only in Ghana. Evidence suggests similar practices in other 
African countries such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. In all these countries housing sector reforms 
subscribing to the enabling principles have been rolled back in one way or other.  The most documented 
incidence of policy reversal is that of Zimbabwe – not least because of the notoriety occasioned by Operation 
Murambatsvina and Operation Garikai launched in May 2005 in which the government sponsored housing 
demolitions that affected 500,000 people and subsequently initiated the direct construction of replacement 
housing through the military and youth brigades (Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the 
Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in 
Zimbabwe, 2005) . 
14
 2001 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of Government of Ghana; page 50. 
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development and construction of rental and home ownership housing‖ with no indication of 
the principal agent that would be utilizing those funds
15
.  
1.4 Research Question 
The re-entry of the state into public housing as well as the resort to other actions that 
are contrary to the housing reforms based on the enabling principles has barely been 
acknowledged by academics and policy makers in Africa and this, in part at least, accounts 
for the lack of research on the topic. Indeed, even in the limited discussions of government 
participation in public housing delivery, the critical juncture of the adoption of enabling 
reforms is very often glossed over (Keivani &Werner, 20001a; 2001b; Angel, 2000); rather 
the activities of the state are considered as though part of an uninterrupted continuum, 
without reference to the major disjuncture occasioned by the adoption of enabling principles 
or by the disjuncture occasioned by the reversal of these principles. These policies of state 
participation in direct construction in themselves are not new since they were the norm in the 
early post-independence era for virtually all developing countries (Turner, 1976; Hardoy & 
Satterthwaite, 1989). What is surprising is that they are being reverted to at this stage when 
such policies have earlier been declared to be inappropriate (World Bank, 1993; UNCHS, 
1990a). The re-emergence of government housing after the experience of reforms based on 
enabling principles, demonstrates clearly that the issue of urban housing in most developing 
countries is presently at a ponderous juncture in both theory and praxis. Suffice to say this 
situation of housing policy reversal begs critical examination. 
A principal aim of this thesis is to interrogate and develop an historical explanation of 
the Ghanaian experience of housing reversionism; to this end the main research questions can 
be framed as: 
                                                 
15
 This was later clarified by the Vice President Aliu Mahama in a speech during the celebration of the 10
th
 
anniversary of the Home Finance Company Ltd. (the only mortgage bank at the time). The Vice President 
indicated that the funds would be used by the Ministry of Works and Housing to provide serviced plots for 
which ―low-income‖ workers would be allowed to develop their own housing.  
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 What are the conditions and dynamics generating the recourse to policy actions that 
contradict and reverse the housing sector reforms based on enabling principles? 
Given the contingent relation of the incidence of housing policy reversal to the antecedent 
implementation of the enabling principles, a review of the experience of the housing policy 
reforms in Ghana is imperative. In this regard, the conditions and actions preceding the 
reforms are outlined to contextualise the reform imperative and generate an understanding of 
the rationale for the introduction of the reforms. Following this, the experience of 
implementing the housing reforms based on the enabling principles is catalogued in order to 
develop a framework for a comparison of design intentions with implementation outcomes. 
This serves to unravel the underlying dynamics and impetus which fuelled the policy 
outcomes. In the light of the foregoing, the research was driven by the following additional 
questions; 
 How were the enabling principles underlying the housing sector reform policies 
conceived, designed and implemented in the case of Ghana? 
 What were the actions and material conditions that engendered recourse to the 
enabling principles of housing policy in the sector reforms, and how were these 
framed? 
 What actors were involved in shaping the housing sector reforms and what interests 
were involved? 
 How did these interests intersect with the prevailing conditions?  
 What narratives were proffered to validate the adoption of the enabling principles and 
how did these narratives influence social practices? 
 What actions, material conditions and interests are generating the recourse to policies 
contradicting the enabling principles? 
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In the light of the primary roles of the World Bank and the UN in the evolution of the 
enabling principles, coupled with the level of influence these agencies wield, this incidence 
of reversal of the enabling principles clearly elicits a reflexive look. It is important to 
understand how the ideology of the enabling principles of housing policy underpinning the 
sector reforms has been appropriated from international discourse, reformulated and 
translated to the local level, what outcomes emerged and whether these outcomes have 
featured in the observed policy reversal.  
Over the past half-century, major housing polices and programmes in developing 
countries have been influenced by orthodoxies practiced in developed countries and been 
either implemented wholly, or partially re-formulated. Throughout this study, emphasis is 
placed on unravelling the complexities of the encounters of local policy actors with the 
orthodoxies generated by global agents such as the World Bank and the UN. These 
orthodoxies have entered local policy making spaces through the facilitation of ―development 
assistance‖ and ―technical assistance‖ programmes from the international development 
agencies. The World Bank, for example, lent a total of US4.4 billion and US$ 8.8 billion
16
 for 
the periods between 1972-1987 and 1987-2003 respectively as assistance to housing sector 
programmes in developing countries (Kalarickal, 2006). This lending was accompanied by 
conditionalities mandating specific policy choices. From the mid-1980s onwards, such 
assistance was accompanied by conditional subscription to policy reforms. These conditions, 
framed as the enabling principles, required the adoption of market practices by the housing 
sector. In this process the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in developed 
countries influenced and guided the implementation of the enabling principles, and have been 
used to explain (albeit not without controversy) non-converging outcomes. The outcomes of 
the implementation of the enabling principles have rarely yielded the envisaged results 
                                                 
16
 The shelter lending portfolio comprises site and services, slum upgrading, housing policy, housing finance 
and disaster relief. Infrastructure loans embedded in these components included loans made for energy and 
mining, global information / communication technology and transport. 
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especially for the poor. The ineffectual outcomes of the enabling principles have challenged 
international development agencies, such as the World Bank and the UN, as well as 
researchers and practitioners to reflect on the lessons emerging from the assistance 
programmes (UN-Habitat, 2006; Buckley and Kalarickal (eds), 2006; Zanetta, 2004). 
Furthermore, the many incidences of reversal of the enabling principles attests to the fact that 
developing countries‘ experience of implementing housing policies deriving from these 
orthodoxies are not necessarily consistent with the development trajectories experienced by 
the developed countries. The observed reversal reflects the different dynamics at work which 
need to be examined properly. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to develop a new 
understanding of the factors that influence local decision-making in housing in Ghana by 
tracing recent past and present housing policy trajectories. The study thereby attempts to 
construct a framework for analysing the paths of intersection and disjuncture between local 
and global policy influences. It is intended through a case study of Ghana to proffer insights 
into the dynamics of housing policy design and implementation in developing countries 
within the context of policy discourses originating from the international agencies.  
1.5 Relevance of the study 
Why is it necessary to explore the rationale for and mechanisms of housing policy in 
Ghana? One answer would be that we do not know enough of the workings of these 
mechanisms of policy making in housing, especially how principles developed by 
international agencies are appropriated and how they filter into the local decision making 
structures. The ways in which such principles are received and treated influence the extent of 
the convergence of their design and the implementation outcomes. These ways are channelled 
by the structure of the power relationships between the local housing sector policy actors and 
the international agents promoting the principles. Such policy making processes must not be 
treated as an unproblematic or impenetrable ―black box‖. In this respect, this thesis is about 
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the politics of reforms and the order of influence of political agents within the multi-tiered 
arena of actors ranging from the international level to the local level.  
Additionally, by extrapolating the trajectory of the principles and values manifesting 
as policy orthodoxy of housing, the thesis attempts to throw light on the use of ―knowledge‖ 
in policy making in the housing sector. In this respect, Gilbert (2002b:1912) argues that, with 
reference to housing, there is inadequate information on governments‘ knowledge 
development processes in an era when knowledge dissemination is at the heart of the work of 
the international agencies, particularly the World Bank. That the World Bank, for example, 
under the Presidency of James Wolfensohn recast itself as the ―Knowledge Bank‖ in 1996 
(World Bank, 1997), is testament to efforts at immunizing these normative approaches from 
being construed as political. Similarly, the UN has long postured itself as an eminent 
repository of knowledge with substantial flagship publications attesting to its industry in 
knowledge generation and dissemination. This thesis, in developing our understanding of the 
pathways by which knowledge enters into countries and the treatment given to it by 
recipients, challenges the ‗objectification‘ and ‗political neutralisation‘ of knowledge, 
arguing that the World Bank (and other global agencies), through the leverage if its research 
and financial capacity to induce specific policy choices by other actors such as local 
bureaucrats, converts knowledge into a political tool. Knowledge can be used to compel 
specific actions that are not always in tandem with the innate desires of those charged with 
the local implementation of policies. In this respect, knowledge becomes an effective tool for 
coercion. This study thus permits research into the effects of power in its transitive and 
intransitive manifestations. Furthermore, the thesis‘ focus on the multi-tiered framework of 
intergovernmental relations in housing enables the examination of how narratives engage and 
intersect and how they are manifesting in the political sphere. This thesis –through a case 
study of Ghana – thus adds to the understanding of the mechanisms of the penetration of 
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hegemonic narratives in the internal social, political and economic arrangements of 
developing countries. Specifically, the thesis provides opportunity to elaborate on the multi-
tiered dynamics of power in housing policy framework of Ghana that has largely remained 
under-researched. In the process, the thesis identifies points of divergence of theoretical 
constructs from the reality of housing policy in developing countries.  
The divergence between the outcomes of implementing internationally developed 
principles and the envisaged results suggests that if there was adequate knowledge about how 
such frameworks function in local contexts, promoters of such principles and values would be 
more measured in their expectations. In this respect, increased emphasis would be placed on 
understanding the nature of the relationship between contextual framework and the power of 
agency and its effect in the application of such orthodoxies. It is naïve to assume that local 
housing policy agents and contexts will assimilate, un-doctored, orthodoxies framed by 
knowledge external to the local polity. The processes and effects of the interpenetration of 
orthodoxies on the local policy arena can engender an array of outcomes in varying 
combinations. In housing this can lead, on the one hand, to the maintenance of status quo 
conditions that fosters perpetual marginalization of already vulnerable groups such as the 
urban poor. On the other hand, the entry of hegemonic discourse can set off revolutionary 
changes to undermine the pre-existing privileged order with the effect of inducing resistance 
in the attempt of such disenfranchised interest groups to (re)assert control. The ways through 
which global orthodoxy seeks a local policy agenda foothold is a question for all, and this 
thesis contributes to the development of our understanding of such processes. In this respect, 
the critical contribution of this thesis to knowledge is in the empirical evidence produced to 
unravel the observed reversal of the enabling principles of housing policy. 
With respect to Ghana specifically and developing countries in Africa where most 
housing reforms were implemented within the framework of the neoliberal structural 
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adjustment regime, the thesis makes additional contribution in furthering our understanding 
of how the dynamics of the material conditions, contexts and social practices combine with 
the interests and actions of actors to undermine the hegemony of international agencies such 
as the World Bank. In this process this thesis throws light on the multiplicity of actors and 
interests in housing policy formulation as well as the relative priority accorded to housing in 
the context of decision making and project implementation.  
The results of this research point to the need for a guarded approach to projecting 
housing policy outcomes as these local factors have more weight in shaping the outcomes 
than the purported influence and power of the international development agencies such as the 
World Bank and the UN as conventionally expected. Typically research on housing policy in 
Ghana, and Africa for that matter, construes the state to be a homogenous entity and the 
government to be persuaded about the importance of the sector in its priorities. However as 
this thesis suggests, the state is a conflicted site of interest groups competing for space, 
attention and resources to pursue private interests. In this competition, housing as a priority of 
the state is not fixed notwithstanding the needs of the people, but rather becomes subsumed in 
these interest groups‘ competitions. Lastly, the thesis shows that for Ghana the relationship 
between the political class and the bureaucrats working in the policy sectors as well as in 
policy implementation agencies, and other factors such as length of tenure of the political 
appointee and how the office holder derives their power, are critical in shaping the path of 
particular housing policies and programmes.  
1.6  Limits to the study 
The scope of this study is quite expansive given the elements that constitute the 
enabling principles. For this reason the thesis focused on the aspect of government re-
engagement in direct housing activities alone. Cognisance was taken of the diversity of 
interests ranging from the multi-national to the national level at the sector levels. Other 
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significant elements of housing policy reversionism such as evictions did not form part of the 
issues that were analysed in this thesis. In part, evictions have been occasioned by failure to 
adhere to planning standards and building codes. This tier of local interests draws in 
considerations of much lower scale of localised interests and contexts which may not 
necessarily converge with the interests, motives and conditions driving or restraining the 
functioning of national level policy. Additionally it was felt that the consideration of the 
issues of evictions introduced other dimensions of housing rights which went far beyond the 
research objective of determining the nature of the conditions and dynamics generating the 
recourse to housing policy reversionism. Lastly the consideration of the word limits imposed 
by the thesis‘ framework rules constrained the consideration of these issues of evictions. It is 
envisaged that these considerations of evictions would constitute the next phase of the 
research after the current work has been completed. 
1.7   Structure of thesis 
As noted, this thesis stands out because of its recognition and analysis of the 
conditions, context and rationale for state direct re-engagement in housing development after 
housing sector reforms that sought to curtail that very action. This perspective is overlooked 
in the reviews of the experience of the enabling principles of housing policy. As a result 
contemporary housing policy reviews, are not considerate of the nature of the penetration of 
the enabling principles of housing policy into the local policy agenda and its impact on 
prevailing power relations in the housing sector. Nor are these reviews, for the most part, 
concerned with either the interpretation or influence of the adoption of enabling reforms on 
social practice, nor with the reversal of the policy reform ethos. The following chapters will 
examine the research question of the dynamics and context of the incidence of reversal of the 
enabling principles of housing policy through an analysis of the published literature, 
documentary evidence and data gathered from the field.  
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Chapter 2 presents the theoretical basis for the approach adopted in carrying out this 
thesis and introduces the methodology employed. I note the difficulty accessing data in 
matters related to policy because of its inherent political nature and the difficulties in 
extracting information from respondents who were often reluctant to talk openly and freely 
about their experiences and interpretation of events.   
In Chapter 3, I review the origination of the enabling principles in the post-colonial 
era of developing countries from the perspective of the two main advocates, the World Bank 
and the UN. In the process attention is drawn to key nuanced differences between these 
agencies with respect to the origination of the enabling principles, methodological approaches 
and operationalisation of the terms for subscribing to these principles. In Chapter 4, I review 
the conventional narrative of the state as the entity tasked to develop policies and point to the 
inherent weakness of this analytical approach. I observe the centrality of the state in 
production relations in the conventional characterisation of the post-colonial state in 
developing countries and the attendant neoliberal critique of this role of the state. I propose 
the de-construction of the state taking into account the diversity of interests constituting the 
state. By taking into account such diversity, it becomes possible to distinguish the forces 
underlying the impetus for specific policy choices. On this basis I submit a stylised narrative 
of the state of Ghana taking into account the political leadership and their respective 
dispositions. This foregrounds the discussions on the housing sector in Ghana in the post-
colonial period in the following chapters. 
Chapters 5 to 7 present the findings from the field stratified into the pre-reform, 
reform and post-reform periods. This temporal stratification was undertaken on the advice of 
focus groups in Ghana assembled to assist with the field work. Chapter 5 reviews the pre-
existing housing practices of Ghana prior to the reform, drawing attention to practices in land 
and housing that reduced opportunity for the market to function effectively. However, a 
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narration of public housing policy prior to the reforms reveals that respective governments 
discounted the opportunities inherent in traditional housing practices in meeting the needs of 
the poor. Chapter 6 is an extensive elaboration of the design intentions and outcomes of the 
implementation of the enabling principles of housing policy in the context of Ghana. Lastly 
Chapter 7 discusses the conditions and actions that permit recourse to re-engagement into 
direct housing by the Ghanaian government. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions drawn from 
this study and a set of recommendations for consideration.  
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Chapter 2 – Research Design 
2.1  Introduction 
Generally, the research approach to be adopted is dependent on the type of research 
question driving the study. As has been indicated in the preceding chapter, this study seeks to 
catalogue the design, implementation and outcomes of housing policies antecedent to reforms 
based on the enabling principles, the actions and outcomes of the reforms and their aftermath. 
It is intended to generate an understanding of the dynamics and the underlying rationale for 
the observed outcomes of housing policies within the overarching framework of the 
interrelations between context (or structure) and the actions of agents (or agency). In this 
regard, the approach of this study is important for its consideration of the spectrum of 
interests and contexts that range from local to international. Similar considerations of the 
intersecting local and international interests and contexts taking account of ideological and 
political motives has been used recently in researching housing outcomes of Argentina, 
Mexico and Zimbabwe (Zanetta, 2004; Ramsamy, 2006). The study of housing policies and 
outcomes in the context of the enabling principles thus, takes account of the actions of the 
agents involved, the context and construction of the problems occasioning the reforms, the 
means by which this problematic gets on to the agenda, the design and representation of 
solution narratives, as well as the mechanisms through which the narratives are applied.  
This study therefore lends itself to qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
view qualitative research as that which primarily generates understanding through 
interpretive frameworks, that is, work that provides alternative interpretations of 
phenomenon. They note that qualitative research ―consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that make the world visible.......This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them‖ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 3). Furthermore, they 
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differentiate qualitative research from quantitative research in respect of its emphasis on 
―processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined or measured ....in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency‖ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:10). However, in a 
complimentary manner, they posit the emphasis of quantitative research to be ―measurement 
and analysis of causal relationships between variables, not processes‖. Cresswell (1998: 15-
18) takes this argument further. He suggests that qualitative studies are best suited where the 
research seeks to explore an issue because there is insufficient information about the 
condition of the issue; that is ―variables cannot be easily identified, theories are not available 
to explain behaviour of participants....and theories need to be developed‖(Cresswell, 1998: 
15). Furthermore, qualitative studies recognize the need to develop detailed perspectives of 
the subject and call for the recognition of the researcher‘s role as one of an ―active learner 
who can tell the story from participants view rather that as an‘ expert‘ who passes judgment 
on participants‖. In this regard, the qualitative researcher ―builds a complex holistic picture, 
analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural 
setting‖. This is an important consideration of qualitative research in the sense that the 
researcher has to be self-conscious and take necessary measures to restrict one‘s personal 
views from interfering with the subject of research. In this respect, I undertook this research 
bearing these in mind and therefore attempted to discount my own personal views as an 
expert in order to record and report truthfully the views of the respondents of my research as 
well as represent the accurate context of the material conditions of the housing sector and the 
macro-economy within which policies were decided and actions taken to implement them. 
2.2. Research Paradigm 
According to Guba and Lincoln (as noted in Mikkelsen, 2005: 127) ―No inquirer 
ought to go about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm 
informs and guides his or her approach‖ (1994:116). The research paradigm is defined as the 
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―basic belief system or world view that guides the investigator, not only in choice of method, 
but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways‖ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:105)17. 
Accordingly, the research paradigm represents ―the net that contains the researcher‘s 
epistemological, ontological and methodological premise‖ (Denzin & Lincoln 2003:33). 
Mikkelsen (2005) elaborates in asserting that all research should be driven by three ‗meta-
science‘ questions – namely the ontological question, epistemological question and the 
methodological question referring respectively to how reality is conceived or the nature of 
reality, what is to be regarded as valid or acceptable knowledge of such reality and the 
mechanisms for extracting such knowledge. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) extend Mikkelsen‘s 
observations in suggesting that the qualitative research process which involves Mikkelsen‘s 
three inter-connected activities, identifies the researcher as a socially impacted subject 
undertaking research on other subjects through peculiar means. They note that:  
The gendered, multi-culturally situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a 
framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that he or she then 
examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis) (Denzin & Lincoln 2005: 21)
18
. 
Hay (2002:63) formats a schema depicting the relationship between these fundamental 
elements of the research as sequential and directional in the sense that ontology precedes 
epistemology which precedes methodology (Figure 2.1). This schema implies that the 
researcher is not neutral to the research process. The researcher may have personal 
dispositions that may bias the outcomes unless explored and, as much as possible, 
neutralised. Therefore, to carry out this research, it is imperative to explore and justify my 
personal view of what constitutes reality and through that clarify the ways in which the 
knowledge of this reality can be known and how this research operationalised the means for 
obtaining such the knowledge.   
 
                                                 
17
 As noted in Mikkelsen (2005:127). 
18
 See also Blaikie (1993). 
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Figure 2.1: Ontology, epistemology and methodology: a directional dependence (Adopted from Hay, 2002:64) 
 
2.3. The Research Question and the Research Model 
This study in examining the trajectory of succeeding housing policies in the pre-
reform, reform and post-reform eras, challenges the narrative that presents succeeding 
policies as arising from a consensual desire for improvement of a neutral ‗problem‘. In this 
respect, the ways in which issues gain attention in the policy agenda are seen as contested and 
not through a logical and value-free process. At junctures of decision-making, alternative 
issues compete for policy attention and the ultimate policy choices reflect the narrative of the 
dominant interests emerging from the clash of discourses (Jacobs et al, 2003). In this regard, 
this thesis does not purport neutrality of the state and its functionaries, nor of international 
organisations including the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) in the formulation of 
housing policies. If policy is a decision-making outcome of contested claims and not an 
objective response to a technical ―problem‖, then this study is about power and its 
manifestation in social actions. The research goal of explaining housing policy outcomes is a 
study of how power is differentially applied by competing interests in the context of 
compelling and obstructive conditions in framing housing problems and solutions. Embedded 
in this is a question of the balance of the dialectical relationship between the extenuating 
conditions and the actions of the interest group(s), the legitimating framework for specific 
policy choices and the narratives deployed in this legitimation.  
Ontology Epistemology Methodology 
What‘s out there to 
know about? 
What can we (hope) 
to know about it? 
How can we go about 
acquiring that knowledge? 
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According to Bhaskar (1989:2) every philosophy, discourse or practical activity 
presumes an ontology or general account of the world in one way or another. These are 
realism, empiricism, pragmatism and idealism or, as conceptualised by Bryman (2001:16-18), 
constructionism or constructivism and objectivism. Objectivism infers ―an ontological 
position that implies that social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our 
reach or influence‖. This implies that reality or the social world as a neutral entity can exist 
to the exclusion of the observer or researcher and knowledge of this reality can be 
independently assessed. Conversely, constructivism is the ontological position in which 
occurrences and their meanings are constantly being ―‗created‘ and accomplished by social 
actors‖ (Mikkelsen, 2005: 137; Bryman, 2001: 18). This position opposes objectivist 
ontology in the underlying assumption that the observable world as the only reality is 
constituted by and emanates from the interaction of social actors with meanings constantly 
evolving from this interaction of agents.    
In respect of epistemology or what constitutes valid knowledge, a number of positions 
allied to different ontological persuasions exist. According to Mikkelsen (ibid), the most 
common epistemological positions are positivism, intepretivism and critical realism. As noted 
earlier, the researcher‘s ontology helps to shape the epistemological position, although 
caution must be taken not to conflate these foundational elements: ontology is not reducible 
to epistemology (Hay, 2002:63). The three positions are briefly described in the next section, 
following which their relevance to the research questions of this thesis are discussed. The 
study does not intend to undertake a comparison of the merits of the different ontological and 
epistemological positions. However, it examines the positions most advantageous in 
answering the research question.  
Arguably positivism is a stance whose definition is contested, has variable slants and 
can be misconceived, for which reason it has been called ―a slippery and emotive term‖, 
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―nebulous‖ and considered ―pejorative‖ (Silverman, 2006:38; 1997:13, Bryman, 2001:12). 
Nonetheless, some elements of positivism are un-contested and permit its characterization. 
Travers (2001: 10) points to positivism‘s central assumption that ―it is possible to describe 
the world objectively, from a scientific vantage point‖. Positivism assumes ―patterns and 
regularities, causes and consequences in the social world‖ (Mikkelsen, 2005: 135). This 
approach appropriates the use of natural sciences‘ research methods, particularly the 
underlying deductive logic, to be applied in the study of social practices. Positivism utilizes 
hypothesis that can be tested through the collection and analysis of extensive empirical data 
for the validation of theories. The positivist approach aspires to universal laws through the 
generalisability, reliability and representativeness of its findings (Travers, 2001). In respect of 
this research, positivism implies the search for the cause of observed outcomes through 
evident ―hard facts‖ waiting to be discovered. A positivist approach would thus attribute the 
observed outcomes of the housing policies to be independent of the actions and interactions 
of the actors within the housing policy arena including the World Bank, UN, the Ministry of 
Works and Housing, the local authorities and the communities. Additionally, the positivist 
approach would seek to explain the outcomes by establishing correlations between variables 
such as income levels of poor households, cost of urban land, and the private sector‘s 
financial capacity and production levels to deliver down market activities. The positivist 
approach is implicit in much of the housing research in developing countries, particularly in 
African countries (Malpezzi et al, 1985; Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987a; 1987b; Strassman and 
Blunt, 1994; Ikejiofor, 1997; Konadu-Agyeman, 2001; le Blanc, 2005) and is particularly 
dominant, albeit implicit, in housing research related to Ghana (Malpezzi, Tipple & Willis; 
1989, 1990; Willis, Malpezzi, & Tipple, 1990; Tipple, Korboe & Garrod, 1997; Tipple et al, 
2000
19
; Sinai, 2001a & b; Fiadjoe, Houston & Godwin, 2001; Asabere, 2007).   
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 Most of these reports and papers by Malpezzi, Tipple, and Willis were either directly or derived from 
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Lawson (2003) catalogues the main arguments set out against the positivist approach 
to housing research based on Blaikie‘s (1993) interpretation of historical and contemporary 
debates. Firstly, social science is essentially different from the natural sciences in respect of 
the complexity of the behaviour of the subjects under study. The behaviour of human beings 
is conditioned by, and yet impacts upon, the environment and culture of the society they 
inhabit. In the same vein, society is not composed of distinct, atomised and unrelated entities 
available for hypothetical research but rather comprise interacting individuals affected by the 
social relations and material conditions leading to irregular behavioural patterns. The 
irregularities arise from the changes in historical trajectories and cultural practices. Lawson 
stresses that ―The laws (events regularities) of Positivism cannot universally apply: patterns 
of behaviour can be changed by human action, which is both socially constructed, materially 
constrained and changes over time and space‖ (Lawson, 2003: 14). Human beings are 
strategically calculating subjects capable of taking different directions in the face of the 
combination of specific material conditions and inherent structural relations. Consequently, 
positivism‘s ―experimental method to human behaviour is artificial ..... and overly simple‖. 
The last criticism relates to the position of the researcher in relation to the researched subject. 
Positivism places the researcher as an objective observer recording the self-evident patterns 
of behaviour, thereby denying the implicit biases inherent in the researcher which can affect 
the research subject.  
Intepretivism on the other hand, privileges the actions and relations of actors to 
produce meanings and generate causes. It posits that the actions of social actors are 
foundational in constructing reality, making it inappropriate to adopt the methods of the 
natural world to explain the social world (Bryman, 2001). The actors‘ experience of meaning 
captured though interpretation and attribution is an important site for study in intepretivism 
                                                                                                                                                        
commissioned research work by the World Bank on Ghana‘s housing sector prior to the inception of the housing 
sector projects that implemented the enabling reforms.  
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and explanations can be rendered by examining the interactions of social actors. To some 
interpretivists, all reality is subjective and multiple and cannot be objectively discovered. The 
researcher is required to appreciate this condition in conducting social research (Travers, 
2004). However, this position is now being revised by the view that it is rather access to the 
material world that is mediated through communication – language and discourse (Jacobs et 
al, 2004). Although Schwandt (2000) elaborates the differences between interpretivism, 
hermeneutics and social constructivism
20
, it nonetheless shares a common focus on human 
interaction and has been conjoined by some as interpretivist-constructivist epistemology 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).On the basis of this epistemological approach, this thesis in  
examining housing policy outcomes would limit itself to the interaction between the different 
actors – staff and consultants of World Bank and UN, local bureaucrats, political appointees, 
community members, and so on. The understanding of the enabling principles held by these 
interest groups deriving from the interactional encounters between them would be viewed as 
an important platform shaping the adoption of the reforms. The housing reforms would be 
characterised as the contest of the discourse of non- or minimalist state housing practices 
against the discourse of state-centrality in resolving the dire material conditions of housing in 
society. The outcomes would be explained by examining the ascendancy of the advocates of 
interventions as opposed to those of regulatory reforms. Although it has gained some utility 
in the European context (Clapham, 1997; Jacobs et al, 2004), the constructivist epistemology 
in housing research has rarely been used in developing countries and particularly for African 
countries (Moyo, 2005).  
Somerville and Bengtsson (2002) arguing from a ―contextualised rational action‖ 
standpoint criticize interpretive-constructivism as suffering ―subjectivist fallacy‖ because of 
its absolute disavowal of objective reality independent of human agency of any kind. They 
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 The key difference that Schwandt (2000) elaborates is on the position of the researcher in relation to the 
researched subject – whether the researcher plays any role in the formulation of meaning in extracting the 
research subject‘s perspective.  
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criticize constructivism‘s relational production of reality such as ―the problem‖, ―my 
interests‖ and ―solution talk‖, seen as moves in discourse, to the detriment of discourses of 
―rights‖, ―duties‖, ―justice‖. They note that  
If human interests are no more than moves in discourse, then why should we be concerned about social 
injustice at all? (Somerville & Bengtsson, 2002: 122) 
Furthermore, they accuse constructivism of making substantial leaps in logic from the stance 
of the world being constructed to the conclusion that ―referents (such as the self) are 
constructed or constituted through discourse‖. By this reasoning, discourse is constitutive as 
it is only through discourse that referents are generated and not the other way round, a case of 
―linguistic reductionism‖. They characterise this approach as strong constructivism, accusing 
it of being foundationalist and therefore paradoxical, by construing representation to be the 
actual reality, a criticism endorsed by Schwandt (2000). Strong constructivists further deny 
the influence of material conditions and any changes to such conditions on the meanings and 
consequently actions of social actors (Sayer, 2000).  By admitting only socially constructed 
reality, this epistemology is devalued in its disregard of structural factors – visible or not to 
the actor or researcher – and in not acknowledging the effect on the observed outcomes. 
Structural influences can dominate and frame actor motivations and need to be taken into 
account. Therefore, to examine causality without reference to underlying structural influences 
is a superficial approach to explaining the assertion of power. Lastly, Somerville and 
Bengtsson (2002) raise issues with the constructivist epistemological position for the 
constraints it imposes on the researcher moving from discourse to agency. 
 The last epistemological position to be considered is that of realism (and the 
associated critical realism variant) which premises social actions within the context of 
structural relations and advocates the recognition of both to discover causality. Contrary to 
positivism and interpretive–constructivism, realism does not privilege exclusively either the 
meanings or empirical observations as the cause of human behaviour. According to Sayer 
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(2000:3) ―social science is neither nomothetic (that is, law-seeking) nor idiographic 
(concerned with documenting the unique)‖. Whereas recourse to methods of natural science 
research holds that some parts of objects can be observed empirically or fixed experimentally 
in order to examine and explain particular occurrences and understand their causes, the same 
cannot be said about the social world which is open and dynamic. Dynamism in the social 
world implies that it is not possible to produce generalisable and predictable behaviours and 
outcomes. In realism, the world comprises more than what can be observed or experienced 
that can be affected by subjective differences and multiple perspectives. Realism 
acknowledges the influence of underlying structures, understood to be sets of internal 
relations existing between material conditions and social practices. Within these relations the 
interaction between the necessary and contingent features of the structures imposes variable 
effects that make social practice unpredictable. As a result, social structures have emergent 
powers conditioned by complex interaction of contingent factors and that can produce 
peculiar outcomes. Therefore, reality is not the taken-for-granted practices but is rather 
layered and invisible to the observer and not easily predictable. Critical realism categorically 
distinguishes the ―real‖, ―actual‖, and ―empirical‖. The real is said to be ―whatever exists, be 
it natural or social‖ irrespective of its perceptibility to the observer. The real is also deemed 
to be ―the realm of objects, their structures and powers, .... they have causal powers … and ... 
passive powers ‖, that engender particular trajectories of actions and generate propensities for 
specific outcomes. Whereas necessary relations ensure specific outcomes, contingent 
relations engender potential for particular outcomes. In this regard, the ―actual‖ refers to the 
actions and outcomes when the contingent relations are activated. The ―empirical‖ is the 
realm of experience of either the real or the actual (Sayer, 2000:11-12). Thus to explain social 
practice, realists advocate the unravelling of these deep-lying features to reveal these 
emergent causal powers, a process referred to as recovery of ontological depth. According to 
29 
 
Lawson (2003: 16), ―It must engage the critical imagination to abstract geo-historical 
internal relations that form causal mechanisms operating in the context of contingently 
related conditions‖. Accordingly, housing is characterised as a ―complex of dynamic, 
underlying and interrelated social relations‖ (Lawson, 2003: 16).  
Realism is not without its criticism, key among which is the accusation of its 
―objectivist fallacy‖. It is claimed that it suffers ontological dualism whereby it admits that 
both real and experienced world exists distinctively and separately. Furthermore, it is deemed 
that realism suffers from the primary problem of mis-characterization, denoted as ―category 
mistake‖ of agency as an object rather than a process. Thus realism is seen to ―tend to 
objectify what are not objects. In linguistic terms, they mistake verbs for nouns‖ (Somerville 
& Bengtsson, 2002: 122).  
Another critique of realism is that of incoherence between the ontological duality it 
espouses and the attendant analytical methods in addressing the question of structure and 
agency (Hay, 2002).  Whilst seeking to transcend the duality of structure and agency, Hay 
(2002) argues that Giddens‘ structuration theory, as an example of realism, is however 
entrapped by its resort to an analytical dualism. The argument is based on the single 
analytical focus given to the duality of structure. The error is made in the analytical approach 
presuming a constrained observer with a fixed viewpoint and thus unable to capture both 
structure and agency at the same time. In this respect, using the analogy of a coin with the 
structure and agency argument being the different sides, the analytical paradox is seen in the 
notion that the observer is hindered ―confined as we are to view the world from one side of 
the coin or other at any given moment‖ (Hay, 2002: 120-121). This analytical handicap is 
expressed in the demand for ―methodological bracketing‖ of one aspect – such as strategic 
conduct – when considering another aspect of an issue, such as institutional context. 
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This thesis focuses on the assimilation of received norms, encapsulated in the 
enabling principles of housing policy, through the interpretive frames of local policy actors 
conditioned by context. The potential outcomes of this process are varied as a result of the 
differing influences which cannot be determined by observable traits. Recourse to observable 
evidence or the representation accorded to these practices by the policy actors cannot thus 
deliver the required explanations for the outcomes. By discarding the notion of an objective 
and independent and value-free housing problem in Ghana, the research approach adopted in 
this thesis discounts an objectivist ontological position for a subjectivist one. The housing 
reforms are outcomes generated through two mechanisms of dialectically reinforcing factors. 
Firstly, the interactions of various agents engaged in determining what should be considered 
as the housing problems and the consequent policy response can produce the observed 
outcomes. Agents‘ perspectives shaped through interactions are an important focus of this 
study as these perspectives are differentially impacted by the interpretation of the enabling 
principles of housing policy promoted by the UN and World Bank. Given the origination of 
the enabling principles within the corridors of these international agencies (see Chapter 3), 
the treatment of these received principles and values and their corresponding representation 
by policy actors is crucially important in developing an understanding of the trajectories that 
subsequently evolved.  
Secondly, the interactions of the policy agents do not occur in a vacuum but instead 
emanate from and are embedded in the socio-historical context within which these 
interactions are situated. Whatever actions different actors took were in part dictated by the 
context of the relations between them. Given the different conditions of engagement between 
agents from national and international institutions in the design and implementation of the 
enabling principles, the structural relationships between the functionaries of the World Bank 
and the UN on one hand and the local political, bureaucratic and low-income poor classes, on 
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the other is central to the analysis. Satterthwaite (2001: 137) indicates that the nature of 
international development agencies is such that they require local agencies to operationalize 
their programmes and their effectiveness is contingent on their local partners, especially 
government organisations. However, the local agents are themselves subject to a spectrum of 
influences not exclusively managed by the international organizations.  
By acknowledging the dialectical complexity of the housing policy process and in 
particularly the contestable entry of the enabling principles, this study is adopting an 
approach that examines and interprets structural relations and actions; as Heinhelt (2005:1) 
observes, ―policies cannot effectively be considered separately from their related historical 
and locational structures and actor constellations related to them‖. On that basis, the housing 
policies are subject to both structural and agential considerations. On the basis of the 
foregoing, this study adopts the realist epistemology. 
(Critical) Realism derives from and has been situated in the long-standing debates 
over the influence of structure or agency in observed outcomes that have traditionally 
polarised the social science community. Although this argument has not been settled one way 
or the other, there has been an increasing clamour against perpetuating the divide and for 
returning to ―the most basic of ontological principles, those concerning the relationship 
between the actor and the context‖ (Hay, 2002:115). The proponents and practitioners of the 
―return to ontology‖ argument include Anthony Giddens, Margaret Archer (all cited in Hay, 
2002); Roy Bhaskar (1989), and Andrew Sayer (2000). Realists have not arrived at the 
persuasion of the conjunctive relationship between structure and agency based on the 
convergence of positivism and interpretivism. Neither has realism ignored the merits and 
demerits of either of them. Indeed, these advocates have developed realism as an argument 
for a third way by interrogating the entire spectrum and nature of positivism and 
interpretivism. Realism asserts the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. In 
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the process, critical theory has been streamlined to integrate both structural and agential 
perspectives into a coherent analytical framework (Hay, 2002). Realism shares a belief with 
positivism in the existence of reality, but departs in how this reality can be accessed. It 
understands that this reality can be accessed if the structures generating the events and 
discourses emanating from them are identified (Bhaskar, 1989:2; Sayer 2000)
21
. The critical 
approach is seen to go ―beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the material 
world in order to help people change conditions and build a better world for themselves‖ 
(Neuman, 2003:81).  Realism also espouses reflexivity by the researcher in relation to the 
researched. Researchers must examine and be aware of the biases that they bring to the 
conduct of the study.  Realism‘s tenets have implications for the methodology in conducting 
research which will be discussed in the next section.  
2.4.  The Data Gathering Process 
Data collection in developing countries and especially in Africa is ridden with 
difficulties as a result of underdeveloped records management systems. However, having 
lived and worked in Ghana all my life, I was aware of the potential difficulties that I would 
encounter, especially related to motives underlying policy actions that went back over two 
decades. However, my experience in undertaking this research also drew my attention to the 
fact that research related to policy can be even more hazardous than would be the case 
elsewhere. As I have come to appreciate, policy means politics and politics, be it 
contemporary or historical accounts, can be very controversial and perceived as dangerous 
for respondents tasked to reflect on and articulate opinions. In Ghanaian society, emerging 
from military rule to democratic constitutional rule, people and organisations from whom 
information is required are often not too keen to candidly share information and opinions for 
reasons that I have come to appreciate as self-preservation. In spite of the cloud of 
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respectability accorded to Ghana, especially by western societies for its achievements in 
democracy, there is a pervasive sense of arbitrary use of power by the political class.  
The principal obstacle to the free sharing of views was the respondents‘ genuine fear 
of victimization for expressing honest opinions about policies, past or present. This risk of 
victimisation is a perceptible factor that can not be discounted. It had the effect of denying, 
delaying or restricting my access to respondents and institutional sources. A principal lesson 
learnt in the data collection for this research has been the importance of diffusing fears and 
guaranteeing protection. I also found value in recourse to multiple sources to securing 
information on any particular event or incident. The practical experience of data triangulation 
has shown me in greater detail the significance of its merits than the literature on research 
methods could ever have taught me. On the down side, this has also led to instances of data 
overload which has required the investment of time in sifting through review and discarding 
of information that was not relevant or helpful.  
Access to the organizations and informants was helped by my familiarity with some 
of these organizations as a result of my earlier work as a consultant for the UN-Habitat in 
implementing a slum upgrading project in Ghana. This generated both opportunity and threat 
for my data collection. On one hand, being a consultant of the international organisations 
such as the UN provides access to the highest offices (up to the Presidency) and consequently 
places one in a position of higher power in relation to bureaucrats and community groups. 
Furthermore, the assignation as an ―international expert‖ by reason of this association with an 
international organisation is an intimidating position for bureaucrats. To this extent, 
respondents could be very economical with information. On the other hand, this position 
enabled me to get access to documents that ordinarily would not be given out by civil 
servants. As my association with the UN project ended before the start of this post-graduate 
research work, this distinction was clarified for informants wherever I went for information in 
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an attempt to free the selected respondents from any inhibitions. Due to the need for repeat 
visits to informants and organizations, the field work took a total of seven months to 
conclude. 
At the start of the field work, I identified and assembled distinct sets of people into 
focus groups to discuss the outline of the research and the related requirements of the field 
work. Selection of the participants in these focus groups was based on their expert knowledge 
of the thematic areas which was validated in my initial consultations with housing, local 
governance and policy experts known to me from my professional work in Ghana. The 
themes were identified on the basis of the preliminary reading of housing reforms. The focus 
groups were organised according to the following themes: housing, housing finance, local 
governance, land management and administration, World Bank projects, UN projects, private 
real estate developers, planners in central and local government, general policy experts, and 
lastly a low-income community group in Tema. It took six weeks starting from the second 
week of August 2006 to the end of September 2006
22
 to organise the focus group discussions 
because of difficulties experienced in synchronising the availability of the different experts. 
The focus group discussions also suffered from frequent interruptions as participants often 
left the meetings shortly to attend to urgent matters. However most participants did return to 
the discussions to contribute meaningfully to the discussions as the reasons for which they 
excused themselves were resolved by telephone. With the exception of two discussions, I 
conducted all the (ten) focus group discussions in the conference room of the Institute of 
Local Government Studies because of its location on the periphery of the capital. The motive 
was to draw the participants away from their respective work places as much as possible in 
order to minimise interruptions as well as provide a neutral location for the discussions. For 
the community group I undertook the focus group discussion in their own community built 
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meeting facility. Lastly, I met with the focus group of housing experts in the conference room 
of the Ghana Institute of Architects.    
Prior to undertaking data collection, preliminary consideration was given to the nature 
of the research question and its imperatives for the field exercise in a focus groups discussion 
with housing bureaucrats. Through these discussions it was decided to establish a temporal 
stratification in order to chart policy developments before, during and after the reforms and 
thereby unravel underlying structures and its associated changes. Focus on this stratification 
was informed by the desire to establish the social practices and the context prevailing in these 
periods in order to understand the generative conditions and actions underlying reversionism. 
The pre-reform era was important in developing an appreciation of the prevailing conditions 
and state of the housing sector and especially of the elements of these conditions that were 
deemed as problematic thereby necessitating reforms. Identifying these conditions enabled an 
examination of the underlying and predisposing structural causes and to what extent the 
reform activities addressed these conditions. The examination of the reform era then enabled 
me to identify and assemble all actions that were undertaken under the aegis of the reforms. 
These facts facilitated the determination of the impetus for those actions and how those 
actions allied with the enabling principles. By distinctly compartmentalizing the reform era, I 
was able to review its outcomes in the light of expectations and the actual activities that 
transpired. Having delineated the reform period from the post-reform era, I was able to then 
identify the material conditions and processes for which reason the reform outcomes were 
legitimated. In this regard, the discourse was carefully examined to understand the rhetorical 
tools utilized to legitimatize outcomes.  
This temporal stratification which established the boundaries of the three periods 
however faced the challenge of determining the specific point in time when the reforms 
began and ended. This was resolved following guidance from the focus group discussions 
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with housing experts who were involved in the pre-reform, reform and post-reform era. It was 
concluded that the housing sector reforms begun with the invitation by the state of 
international agencies to support the urban and housing sectors following the inception of the 
Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes. Furthermore, following the direction by 
the housing focus group, the end of the reform programme was fixed to the end of the World 
Bank‘s Urban II programme in 2000, which also coincided with the unique occurrence of the 
first ever democratic political transition in Ghana. Cognisance was taken of this political 
transition and its impact on the continuities and discontinuities in policies. In the light of the 
foregoing, the pre-reform era could be considered to be the post-colonial period up to 1984, 
followed by the reform era spanning 1984 to 2000 and the post-reform era from 2000 to the 
present (2009).  
In respect of the reform era, although the timelines appeared to be quite clear, my 
attention was drawn to three distinct patterns in the reform trajectories based on the category 
of sponsors and advocates of initiatives. In this regard, the reform trajectories were driven by 
the efforts of the (i) World Bank, (ii) the UN (that is, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Centre on Human Settlements (UNCHS)), and lastly (iii) the 
local policy community that originally comprised, predominantly, bureaucrats of the Housing 
Ministry; latterly the local housing policy community was taken over by the public pension 
funds, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). I was made aware, and 
therefore took account, of the overlap of the activities in these distinct agency trajectories and 
also an overlap in the established temporal boundaries. Thus, although classified into pre-
reform, reform and post-reform eras, the activities led by these three key policy actors in the 
housing and urban development sectors were not entirely fixed within distinct boundaries. 
Having established the external and internal dimensions of the research, I turned my 
attention to identifying sources for collecting data covering these three (pre-reform, reform 
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and post-reform) policy periods. These were disaggregated on two operational levels – 
vertically and horizontally. On the one hand, data was gathered from organisations taking 
account of the vertical spectrum of interest ranging from the international, national, and local 
levels. International organisations identified were mainly the World Bank and the UN-
Habitat. At the national level, key sources of information included the Ministry of Works and 
Housing (MWH) from which housing sector policies directly emanates. In addition, the 
Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development (MLGRD), the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MOFEP), and the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) 
were identified as sites for information on policy decisions. The Ministry of Finance, for 
example, is the sector ministry in charge of managing the macro-economy and supervises the 
disbursement of annual budgetary funds. As a result, it has an important role in determining 
the nature of the financial resources available for any sector, and in respect of this study, the 
housing sector. An important overlap that was taken into account was the operation of the 
identified international organisations at the national level; the World Bank Country Office 
and the Office of the UN-Habitat Programme Manager. Lastly, at the local level, I focussed 
on the local government of Accra with the functionaries of the selected departments as the 
sources of information reflecting their front line role in housing. These departments included 
the Town and Country Planning Department, Metropolitan Engineer‘s Office, Metropolitan 
Development Planning and Coordinating Unit, and the Metropolitan Coordinating Director‘s 
Office. I contacted and interviewed representatives from these offices together with the Chief 
Executive form the Metropolitan Statutory Planning Committee (in charge of approving 
development control). Accra was chosen because it has a pioneering role and torchbearer 
effect on urban development in Ghana. 
In terms of the horizontal disaggregation of data sources, I focussed on the sub-sectors 
of housing namely land management, land-use planning and development control, housing 
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finance, building materials, and housing development. Given the predominant interest of this 
study in policy, I focused my initial attention on public agencies in these sub-sectors. In 
doing so, I observed that some public organisations involved in some aspect of housing 
policy in one way or the other, had become defunct. This was the case in respect of the main 
state-owned mortgage bank – Bank for Housing and Construction (BHC) – which emerged in 
the early 1970s but had collapsed by the end of the housing sector reforms in 2000. Similarly, 
the first publicly owned housing finance agency – the First Ghana Building Society – had 
become virtually moribund by the 1990s and was effectively under administration at the time 
of the data collection. These institutions were incapable of providing the documentation that I 
required. To circumvent this hurdle, I tracked the former management staff of these 
institutions and obtained some documentation that they had personally retained. Similarly in 
housing delivery, two pre-reform public housing development companies – Real Estate 
Development Company Limited (REDCO), a subsidiary of BHC, and the State Construction 
Corporation – had been liquidated. Their demise was not critical to obtaining the necessary 
data for this study since the  State Housing Company (SHC)  - as the first ever public housing 
organisation - sufficed in the extrapolation of historical and contemporary data regarding 
government policy towards housing development. SHC in particular had been engaged in 
nearly all housing programmes of the state prior to the inception of the reforms. In addition, it 
was an important player in the reform era, although its institutional charter changed during 
the reforms. It still retains a significant role as a housing developer, albeit without any state 
subventions for its activities. 
I undertook several key informant interviews and focus group discussions after 
identifying the sources of information. Focus group discussions and preliminary discussions 
were held very early in the research to identify key informants. For the World Bank in 
particular, most of the key informants were staff and consultants who came from 
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Washington. Checks showed that virtually all but one of the participants in the World Bank 
component of the reforms had long left their posts. Using different means including internet 
searches and tracking through the most recent publications of these informants, I was able to 
obtain the latest addresses of some of them and established contact. Unfortunately, virtually 
all of them were in disparate locations such as Romania, Jordan and USA (Minnesota) where 
they could not be physically reached given the significant budgetary constraints. The 
alternative of using emails to send interview questions did not yield any positive response. 
However, through participation in the 3
rd
 World Urban Forum in Vancouver
23
 from the 19
th
 
to the 23
rd
 June 2006 appointments for interviews were secured with a couple of informants 
from the World Bank. As a result, I visited the World Bank offices in Washington in June 
2006 where I met with the Senior Economist of the Bank who had been involved in the 
Ghana housing reform project. Following an interview on the subject he also compiled and 
gave to me the project reports that the Bank had in its archives which had not been available 
at the Ghana country office of the Bank. 
Other interviews secured during the Vancouver conference were with additional 
informants from UN-Habitat, who, though not directly conversant with the peculiar situation 
of Ghana, were nonetheless informative in discussing the conceptual issues of enabling 
housing policies. The interviews with the UN-Habitat informants were facilitated by the 
launch at the Conference of the UN‘s publication reviewing the global application of the 
enabling policies (UN-Habitat, 2006). The reflection on the enabling reforms and a special 
Expert Group Meeting on innovating financing of slum upgrading held as part of forum, to 
which I was invited as a former consultant, created the appropriate platform for engaging 
these informants in their natural domain. 
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for the UN on urban issues and also as a platform for engaging stakeholders of the urban agenda in constructive 
debates. Subsequently the forum has been held biannually in Barcelona (2004), Vancouver (2006) and Nanjing 
(2008).  
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The search for documentary data, especially related to policy rationale at each 
juncture of policy change, compelled me to go beyond these listed organisations to other 
sources such as the National Archives, the libraries of the University of Ghana and the 
Faculty of Planning Department and the archives of newspapers, in particular the publicly 
owned newspaper, Daily Graphic
24
 and the Ghana News Agency. However, recourse to the 
other newspaper sources became necessary following the limited access provided by the 
National Archives in spite of assurances and accompanying proof that the use of the 
requested materials was solely for academic purposes. Again, this experience emerged as the 
manifestation of the perceived fears of bureaucrats. In the light of such fears by bureaucrats, I 
had to use the newspaper reports of housing related news that I had obtained from the 
archives of the press houses as supplementary evidence in examining the research questions. 
In respect of other archival searches, I secured materials from the headquarters of the World 
Bank in Washington during my research visit in June 2006, related to their participation of 
the reforms. I was given access to documents such as internal memos and staff appraisal 
reports and evaluation reports of projects and given permission to use the information therein. 
In the process of identifying and collecting the requisite reports it became obvious that most 
of the agencies in Ghana I was researching did not have the reports I needed. However some 
retired staff of these agencies were able to provide me with the reports as they had made 
personal copies of such reports of work they had been involved in prior to retirement. 
I also undertook three observational surveys to confirm the influence of the public 
pension funds on the initial housing development activities of private sector developers after 
the inception of the housing reforms, the penetration of international housing development 
companies, and ground the anecdotal evidence of the scale of growth of the private sector 
developers. The first survey was necessitated by evidence suggesting that locational decisions 
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by the nascent private sector developers emerging from the housing reforms were predicated 
on similar decisions of the public pension funds, centred on the sites of their first mass 
housing development programme. The second survey aimed to establish the relative degree 
of penetration of international housing development companies in the housing market of 
Ghana, using Accra because of its torch-bearing role in the urban spectrum. The need for this 
survey was generated by the implicit assumptions of ―free‖ markets underlying the neo-
liberalism ethos of the housing reforms pursued in Ghana. The last field survey sought to 
determine the scale of housing development activity by private sector housing developers, 
(inclusive of local and international developers) by comparing the survey results of Grant 
(2005) with my own survey undertaken two years later.   
Lastly, I undertook a variant of discourse analysis in the post-reform era through an 
examination of the speeches and statements of the key actors in the NPP administration in 
order to establish the meanings and representations utilised by these actors to legitimise their   
actions. Mikkelsen (2005) describes the utility of discourse analysis thus:  
The essence of discourse analysis is …… concerned with the interpretation of human action, …based 
primarily on text and talk analysis…….People use discourse to do things – to offer blame, to make 
excuses, to present themselves in a positive light  (Mikkelsen, 2005: 186) 
Gregory (2005) also notes that  
discourses are regulated: discourses have coherence and systematicity, though they be (and usually are) 
contradictory and are marked through their own ―‖regimes of truth‖, that police the boundaries between 
inside and outside – to legislate inclusions and exclusions – and to establish criteria for acceptability. 
….. they enable us to understand ―how what is said fits into a network that has its own history and 
conditions of existence‖ (Barrett 1992 cited in Gregory, 2005: 180)  
The discourse analysis was necessitated by the need to understand their intentions of the key 
policy actors and also because language is an instrument of the articulation of power. The 
actions of the key policy actors including the characterisation of the sector and other actors 
within provided key learning in the thesis. In this respect, I reviewed extensively the speeches 
and statements of the key actors in housing, particularly the Minister for Works and Housing 
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to understand the language and interpretations given for the policy actions taken in the post-
reform era.  
In all, a total of thirty-five interviews and ten focus group discussions
25
 were held 
with the interviews averaging ninety minutes and the focus group discussions also taking one 
hour. In conducting the interviews and focus group discussions, notes were taken of the 
responses and these were backed by tape recordings that were transcribed after.  
The thesis has focused on the housing interventions adopted by the government, the 
UN and the World Bank in the reform and post-reform eras. As a result the geographic focus 
of the study was limited to the key cities of Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tema and 
Tamale which happen to be the primary cities of Ghana. This focus is premised on the history 
of Ghana‘s post-colonial housing policy context in which there has been a preponderance of 
interventions in these cities and virtually nothing in other towns or in the rural sectors.  
2.5. Ethical Considerations 
In conducting this research, reviewing government housing policies, the key ethical 
consideration prior to the field work was transparency about my identity as the researcher and 
the purpose of the research and its attendant disclosure. Identity disclosure was deemed 
particularly important, especially in relation to the civil servants because of the work I had 
been involved in earlier as a consultant of the UN in the Slum Upgrading Facility (SUF). This 
former position had placed me in a position of power over such respondents in the context of 
that former relationship having being accorded the status of one with privileged knowledge. 
This privileged position had to be deconstructed in order to obtain information that was not 
coloured by this power relationship. To do this, I undertook an initial round of introductory 
meetings with all respondents prior to, and separate from, the first interviews. During these 
meetings, issues discussed were not related to the research subject per se but rather covered 
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 See Annex 1 and 2 for list of interviewees, composition of focus groups and general guidelines of interview.  
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social issues that were intended to reassure the respondents and prepare them for the actual 
interviews scheduled for later dates. 
However, during the data collection conducted in the field it became abundantly clear 
that civil and public servants in particular were very reticent in discussing their views of the 
reforms and other allied policies in spite of the assurances and disclaimers. Six of such public 
servants requested outright that their names not be disclosed in the dissertation. Four of such 
respondents requested that tape recordings be turned off preferring only notes to be taken. 
One civil servant accepted to be interviewed only during the weekends and in locations far 
from his/her work environment. This is a similar dilemma to that which Gilbert (2002a: 307-
308) faced in conducting a study on the power relations revolving around the role of the 
World Bank and allied organisation in fashioning housing subsidy policies in Chile. Whereas 
Gilbert chose not to attribute the responses he obtained in his work, the approach adopted in 
this research is to protect the identity of the respondents by attributing quotation to the office 
instead of the name of the officer holder. Furthermore, in listing the respondents in the 
annexure of the dissertation, some of the names are not indicated. Rather the position and 
thematic sector of such respondents are disclosed. 
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Chapter 3 – The World Bank and the UN in the Trajectory of the Enabling 
Principles of Housing Policy  
3.1  Introduction 
In developing countries, the experience of implementing housing policy reforms 
based on the enabling principles has produced results that do not always converge with the 
envisaged outcomes. The differences in outcomes are as much a reflection of the different 
contexts in which they were applied as they are a commentary on the differential effects 
produced by the actors‘ skills, interests and interactions to pursue them as desirable 
aspirations.  To examine the experience of the housing sector reforms in Ghana, it is 
important to understand the principles that were being implemented. These were framed as 
the enabling principles of housing policies advocated by the World Bank and the UN. In the 
foregoing chapter, I sought to establish the trajectory of the enabling principles of housing 
policy and contextualise its emergence and evolution in order to understand the underlying 
dynamics at work in its implementation. To initiate the study of this trajectory, I outline in the 
following chapter the status quo of the housing policy discourse of most developing countries 
in the post-colonial period. Although the timing of the arrival of formal independence for 
developing countries varies, I have adopted the 1940s as the inception point for this post-
colonial assessment as this signified the point at which the majority of developing countries 
began to emerge from colonial rule. Drawing from secondary literature, it is observed that the 
status quo of post colonial housing policy discourse predominantly favoured government 
constructed housing based on building codes and planning standards that derived from the 
colonial era with antecedents from the countries of the colonial masters. Such houses were 
unaffordable for the majority of the society and yet favoured by governments partly because 
of the symbolism effect they generated which served, in part, to neutralise criticism. The 
corollary of this default housing policy was the non-acceptance of housing developed outside 
of these standards and codes and the recourse to demolition of settlements dominated by non-
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conforming housing. However, intellectual engagements particularly emanating from housing 
research in Latin America confirmed the ineffectiveness of the default housing policy of 
government built housing and slum demolitions. The recognition of the ineffectiveness of the 
government built housing compelled a rethink of this approach and generated new 
prescriptions for reforming the default housing policies. These elicited changes to the 
conventional roles of the state and low-income households and proffered site and services, 
and slum upgrading interventions. 
In the rethinking that ensued, dual pathways emerged from the UN and the World 
Bank respectively, as they became the main agencies leading the process of reforming the 
former policy. Both agencies, at different times, adopted the site-and-services and slum 
upgrading approaches. However, the new interventions encountered a robust Marxist critique 
based on ideological differences. This generated a long running debate from the 1970s 
labelled the ―Self-help housing debates‖. The basis of the Marxist critique was the implicit 
class bias of capitalist societies in the choice of site-and-services and slum upgrading as the 
policy intervention for low-income households because of its perceived exploitation of lower 
classes through the lowering of labour reproduction costs. In spite of the rigour of the 
debates, it dwindled into a stalemate and irrelevance partly because it was at cross-purposes 
and partly because it was overtaken by events of the 1980s with the return to dominance of 
conservative thinking and the demise of communism. Besides the Marxist critique, the site-
and-services and slum upgrading approaches were also criticised for their limited impact. The 
site-and-services and slum upgrading approaches were unsuccessful in scaling up, replicating 
or achieving cost recovery of any appreciable level even though planning and building 
standards had been lowered from the original default housing policy state of government 
housing. This generated a renewed quest for reforms that culminated in the enabling 
principles of housing policies. 
46 
 
The entry of both the World Bank and the UN into housing policy assistance was 
characterised by debates, events, interests and were tentative partly due to internal debates 
and disagreements among staff regarding the appropriate way to engage in the housing sector. 
However, I argue that they share no further similarities in their trajectories towards the 
enabling principles. The marked trajectories of the World Bank and the UN in the evolution 
of the enabling principles of housing reforms translate into differing emphases and nuances in 
conceptualisation and operationalisation that characterised their respective approaches to 
implementation. Although these differences do not oppose each other directly on identified 
analytical levels of methodologies and operationalisation, they nonetheless engendered 
distinct articulations in the design and implementation of housing sector reforms.  
Methodologically, the UN advanced an inductive albeit unilinear policy process 
framed as the ‗National Shelter Strategies‘ (UNCHS, 1990a26). On the other hand, reflecting 
its more conservative foundation, the World Bank utilised a deductive approach that favoured 
policy tools readily disposed to market activities. For example, land titling initiatives received 
preferential attention over land use planning and cooperative approaches. Operationally, the 
temporal context of the structural adjustment policies foreshadowed and influenced the 
implementation of the World Bank‘s perspective of the enabling principles in the sense that 
the tool of policy-reform conditionalities used in the former were also applied to the latter. I 
argue that, under the World Bank, subscription to the enabling principles was mandated by 
the conditions attached to loans provided by the Bank. However this subscription could mask 
the realistic disposition of the local policy actors as these conditionalities represented a force 
of coercion for specific policy choices. Upon the withdrawal of such coercion imposed 
through the policy-reform conditionalities, the deeper-lying realistic disposition of the local 
policy actors would re-emerge. Therefore under the World Bank arrangements, the 
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 Global Shelter Strategy, paragraph 35. 
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subscription to the enabling principles could be superficial. On the other hand, the UN 
resorted to technical convictions and moral suasion to promote voluntary subscription to the 
enabling principles. The UN applied instruments such as conferences, flagship reports and 
advocacy campaigns such as global awareness campaigns to promote its activities. On that 
basis, the UN‘s operational approach required strongly committed policy actors with 
appropriate powers to initiate and sustain housing reforms based on the UN‘s version of 
enabling principles. The UN‘s position was weakened by its inability to sanction non-
compliance. In conclusion, the chapter underlines the complexities of the enabling principles 
from their origination to implementation which confronted policy makers and the need to 
unravel these complexities to understand the emergent outcomes following on the 
implementation of the enabling principles. 
3.2  The Public Housing Status Quo and the Self-Help Housing Debates 
Prior to the involvement of international development agencies in the housing policies 
of developing countries, national housing policies featured the government as a direct 
provider, although the effect of such action was very marginal to total housing demand. 
Government attitudes to housing constructed by the poor, who were mostly unable to afford 
even the cheapest options provided by the state, was either indifference or repression or 
oscillated between these two positions (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989: 15). Direct housing 
development by the state was constructed to building standards and planning codes deriving 
from frameworks imposed by colonial authorities. In practice state-built housing benefited 
the elite and public servants rather than the poor households it ostensibly targeted. As a 
result, state housing policies were contradictory, paradoxically constraining housing 
opportunities of the low-income households in spite of contrary claims (World Bank, 1975). 
This counterfactual logic underpinning conventional housing policies in the developing 
countries prevailed until the involvement of international agencies such as the World Bank 
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and the UN highlighted new theoretical and policy alternative (Turner, 1976; Wegelin, 1978; 
Pugh 2001).  
Direct public housing was unsustainable and its inadequacies became evident, falling 
short of delivering the required housing for low income households and thus necessitating 
conceptual rethinking. At the core of the new thinking was the recognition that public funds 
were limited and were incapable of meeting the housing needs of the entire society. 
Furthermore, it became clear that low-income households had financial and material 
resources that could be contributed to housing development. Lastly, government could vastly 
improve the rate of housing delivery by lowering the planning standards and building codes 
and permitting the beneficiary households to build for themselves. This was conceptualised 
as the assisted self-help or site-and-services approach to housing (Harris, 1998)
27
. The 
underlying principle of site-and-services is to guarantee a minimum yet adequate standard in 
housing by lowering the existing building requirements and planning codes thereby 
effectively lowering the overall cost of housing and in turn improving access to housing for 
low-income households. This approach also guaranteed security of tenure to beneficiaries in 
the belief that it would induce the progressive improvement of housing.  
Reviews of the site and service projects however found them to be unaffordable for 
the target households, inequitable in the distribution of benefits, incapable of recovering 
costs, and maintaining unsustainable levels of subsidies, all of which constrained replication 
and scaling up (Mayo & Gross, 1987: 305). As a result of their peripheral locations, site-and-
services effectively displaced the poor from the city centre and imposed additional transport 
costs even though they moved to new, higher quality sites. As a result, the slum upgrading 
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 Harris (1998) argues that the emergence of this concept has been wrongly attributed to its application in post-
second World war and especially in developing countries. He traces this concept to Sweden in 1904 and 
thereafter other European countries as well as the USA. He states that aided self-help or site and services 
emerged in reaction to the high demand generated after the end of the First World War. Harris & Giles (2003: 
183) note that although these two terms implied the same approach, aided self-help was in common use until the 
1970s when site-and-services became popular.  
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concept emerged, favoured by international development agencies such as the UN and the 
World Bank. Slum upgrading inserted non-existent, or upgraded existing poor, infrastructure 
such as ―on-site sanitation (private or public latrines), water supply (usually standpipes), 
access roads and footpaths, street drainage, public lighting, solid waste collection, some 
community facilities‖ in already established settlements and sometimes formally regularized 
occupancy (Kessides, 1997: 4). Some level of tenure security was provided in the upgrading 
approach ranging from certificates of occupation, resident permits, conditional stay grants 
and other intermediate forms of recognition of occupation. Werlin (1999) notes that slum 
upgrading was less expensive compared to site and services. Findings by Churchill (1980; 
cited in Werlin, 1999: 1524) of ratio of cost differences between slum upgrading, site-and-
services and conventional public housing in the order of $38: $1000 – $2,000: $10,000. 
However, the new thinking in housing – site-and-services and slum upgrading – 
generated a critique from some Marxists opponents, culminating in long running debate - the 
―Self-help housing debates‖ between advocates and opponents of assisted self-help housing 
interventions (Jenkins et al, 2007). In sum, advocates, led by John Turner, viewed state 
assistance in self-help activities as a rational approach to ensuring incremental improvement 
of housing by low-income households. Based on evidence from research especially in Latin 
America, these new approaches made it imperative to revise the conceptualisation of housing 
as an object to a subjective one which changed progressively according to the phase of 
development and income and resource means of the household. Turner argued against direct 
housing construction by the State and for household autonomy, within limits, in the 
development of housing. The limits recognised the State‘s relatively better capacity to 
develop basic infrastructure, and its authority in rule making over other facets of the housing 
process such as finance and building materials (Turner, 1976; Gilbert & Gugler 1992:118). 
Through such instruments, the State could minimise insecurities felt by squatters which 
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constrained them from improving their housing conditions. On the other hand, households 
were better placed to articulate their preferences, being aware of their means. Household 
decision-making was more effective than the centralised decision-making, also referred to as 
―heteronomous systems, to address the housing needs of the poor. Houses delivered through 
centralised systems limited the adaptability of the dwelling for functions other than shelter 
and therefore its desirability by low-income households. That freedom of choice and its 
derivative dweller control in decision making was essential in housing for the low-income 
households which required government assistance or facilitation found in site-and-services 
and slum upgrading, and not substitution found in public housing projects (Turner, 1976). 
On the other hand, opponents, based on Marxist critiques of assisted self-help housing 
and led by Rod Burgess
28
 viewed state-assisted housing to be ideologically disingenuous, 
masking the implicit class bias of capitalist societies. The Marxist view opined that capitalist 
formation in developing countries adapted pre-capitalist activities such as traditional housing 
construction practices and settlement planning of low-income households and re-articulated 
them in new subordinate and exploitative relations. Firstly, the dominant capitalist classes 
were able to reduce the cost of labour reproduction by utilising unpaid or low-paid low-
income labour in assisted self-help housing. This condition of self-help housing extended the 
working hours of the poor beyond the normal working day. Secondly assisted self-help 
housing promoted the commodification of low-income housing and thereby opened 
opportunities for the operation of market relations at such levels. By formalising through state 
participation the informality of the pre-capitalist traditional self-help housing approach, 
capitalist societies open the space for the dominant classes, owning lands and controlling 
finance, to assert their power. This further engendered the extraction of rent from the 
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 Jenkins, Smith and Wang (2007: 164) indicate that the Marxist critique took its cue from the dependency 
theorists of Latin America with Emilio Pradilla as one of the pioneers of this critique. Rod Burgess brought this 
critique into the Anglophone literature. 
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underclass and thereby regulated the life of the underclass (Marcussen, 1990; Jenkins et al, 
2007); 
State self-help housing programmes are integrated with the interests of those fractions of capital tied to 
state housing and cheapened not by the elimination of their profits but because they involve the unpaid 
labour of their future owners. They do not eliminate the participation of ground rents, profits on 
productive capital and interests on finance capital in the final price of the house produced. Although the 
state can reduce the final price by ceding to the beneficiary a part of the ground rents and part of the 
interest on its own capital (in the form of subsidized interest rates), it cannot eliminate or minimize 
their participation in the way achieved in the artisanal form. State self-help housing projects therefore 
transmit to the final price of the house the greater part of the dramatic increases derived from land 
speculation and the explosion in global and national interest rates (Burgess, 1985: 278). 
Furthermore, it was argued that self-help housing ultimately failed to facilitate housing for 
low-income households with the insertion of tenure regularisation with its associated costs 
that traditional housing practices excluded (Jenkins et al, 2007). Additionally, by emphasising 
the commercial values of housing, economic incentives were generated for houses developed 
for low-income households in site and services schemes which then rationalised the 
extraction of such commercial values at the least cost to the original low-income 
beneficiaries. Consequently, it was argued that the expectation in self-help housing that 
beneficiaries would undertake housing improvements for its social value was illogical as it 
did not appreciate the inherent incentives to realise the intrinsic commodity value.  
In capitalist societies, ―all housing objects‖ are commodities. The self-help housing system is a variant 
form of petty commodity production functioning within a total system of production where 
industrialized production is dominating and the petty commodity form is dependent. Even when people 
build their own houses with discarded materials, they are commodity producers: the builder could 
realize the value embodied in the building by putting it on the market, and he will not invest more 
labour and materials in the house than he believes will be recoverable on the housing market. The idea 
that people may build houses just in order to satisfy their social and cultural needs without regards to 
the general laws of commodity production is a theoretical misconception, and an ideological 
smokescreen. The same is true of the idea that the State would give support to people‘s self-help 
activities. In Marxist analysis squatter housing built under the self-help form of petty commodity 
production is understood to be uniformly of an extremely poor quality. All in all advocacy of self-help 
is exposed as economically unrealistic, politically reactionary and as ideological bluff (Marcussen, 
1990: 11) 
The debate on state-assisted self-help was criticised as being at cross-purposes, ―between two 
different epistemologies, which moreover produced a widening gap between theory and 
practice‖ (Nientied & Van der Linden, 1985 cited in Marcussen 1990:12). Jenkins et al 
(2007) described the debate as a non-debate because of a lack of alternative solutions in the 
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Marxist critique. In the light of the influence of the empirical evidence from Lima, Peru on 
Turner‘s views (Harris, 1998; Bromley, 2003; Harris, 2003; Harris & Giles, 2003) it is 
unclear the extent to which the pervasive ideological divide between liberalism and Marxism 
at the time affected Turner‘s early views on assisted self-help housing29. Marcussen (1990) 
pointed to later global events of the 1980s and 1990s to note the blurring of the ideological 
divide underlying the Turner-Burgess debate. Whereas former socialist countries were 
experiencing conflicts and contradictions of re-emerging ethnicity and clientelism, a capitalist 
country like Iran had undergone a revolution. Emerging economies in the Asian region were 
experiencing varying economic transformations with differing housing outcomes from 
capitalist transformation to entrenched third world conditions (Marcussen, 1990: 12). The 
Marxist view dwelt on abstract theoretical notions, distinguishing between the economic 
(market value) and social (use-value). It also lacked a critical analysis of the state thereby 
denying the reality of the complexity of the state. Furthermore, vested interests of elites 
fuelled the objection to site and services schemes because it challenged existing structures of 
privilege (Jenkins et al, 2007). Marcussen (1990), as well as, Keivani and Werner (2001a) 
proposed an analytical framework that recognised the various mechanisms by which housing 
was developed and allocated in developing countries.  
The debate also did not take into account the differences between the espoused 
principles of assisted self-help housing and the experiences emerging from the 
implementation of these principles. Rodell and Skinner (1983) noted that this difference arose 
from the difficulties governments encountered in operationalising the ―dweller control‖ 
principle because it implied concession of power by some interest groups and the acceptance 
of ―a realignment of their old influence‖ (Rodell & Skinner 1983: 14). Kessides (1997: 7) 
notes that very few of slum upgrading and site and services projects piloted through the 
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 Jenkins et al, (2007: 172) note that Turner shifted his position in the 1990s from a focus on the household to 
that of the community as the critical instigator in assisted self-help activities. They discussed how the fall of 
socialism culminated in Turner highlighting the market efficiency of the capitalist system. 
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support of the World Bank were expanded by country governments because ―domestic 
political commitment to alleviating urban poverty through such efforts weakened in some 
countries‖. Accordingly, dweller control in assisted self-help housing was conceptually 
redefined as direct labour by low-income households to preserve the dominant interest groups 
priorities and assuage any anxieties (Rodell & Skinner, 1983). Other criticisms of assisted 
self-help and slum upgrading derived from the operational difficulties of these approaches to 
achieving cost recovery and scaling up (World Bank, 1993). In the longer term, negative 
outcomes such as gentrification, declining maintenance and inequitable gender distribution of 
benefits were evident (Jenkins et al, 2007). There was concern that site-and-services 
remained project-focused benefitting small geographic locations. On the other hand, 
structural constraints such as inefficient land markets and poor building technologies 
persisted (Kessides, 1997; World Bank, 1993, Choguill, 1995).  
The self-help debate was inconclusive and inevitably overtaken by events of the 
1980s with the collapse of communism (and by extension the diminishing of Marxist 
thought) and the rise of neo-liberalism. In parallel, the theoretical construct underlying self-
help was overtaken by the development of ―enabling principles‖ for housing policy and 
reforms. The trajectory of housing programmes in developing countries became increasingly 
dominated by the two main international agencies, the World Bank and the UN. The two 
agencies pioneered the enabling principles from the late 1970s onwards, although not always 
in cooperation. The perspective of the enabling principles of housing policy as a generic 
framework, limits the recognition of its divergent antecedents in the World Bank and the UN 
and the associated differences that exist. However, these differences fundamentally influence 
the design, implementation and outcomes of policy reforms based on the enabling principles. 
These differences also affected the working relations between these agencies and the 
countries implementing enabling reform policies. The respective approaches of these 
54 
 
agencies also had a significant effect on what outcomes were produced in projects involving 
the two agencies separately or jointly. Strassman (1997) draws attention to the differences 
between the UN and the World Bank which are ―generally hidden [to the public] but familiar 
to members of the ‗development set‘‖ – that is staff and consultants in international 
development organisations (Strassmann, 1997:1730).  Focusing on the nature of the 
relationship between the two organizations helps to draw out the potential for variable 
outcomes of projects involving the two. McAuslan (1997) asserts that there is as much a need 
to focus on the ―inter- and intra-bureaucracy relationships [of the two agencies] as on the 
substance of programme, for ….. the two are inseparably intertwined‖ (1997:1727). 
3.3 The UN in Housing Assistance in Developing Countries 
The UN‘s first formal housing policy assistance was a refugee support programme in 
1944. However, it was not until 1946 that the UN framed the conceptual basis for its 
interventions after the incorporation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Arku & 
Harris, 2005). The ILO had a long standing concern for housing as an employment generating 
sector focusing on ―vocational training and labour productivity in the building industry‖, as 
well as housing cooperatives (Harris & Giles, 2003: 172). By 1953, ILO had embraced self-
help housing. Subsequently, the UN also accepted the assisted self-help housing approach, 
albeit with some reservations from within
30
. By the 1960s, the concept of assisted self-help 
had become the default policy advice proffered by the UN
31
. According to Harris & Giles 
(2003), the UN‘s initial work in housing also emphasised missions to newly independent 
countries to generate policy advice based on findings from field research. One of such 
missions was undertaken in Ghana upon the request of the country‘s first post-colonial 
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 Agencies such as the Economic Commission for Africa opposed the new approach preferring to focus on the 
improving efficiency of the building industry (Harris and Giles, 2003) 
31
 Harris and Giles (2003: 177) reports that 5 out of 19 projects identified under the first five-year programme of 
actions (1961 to 1965) of the UN in housing targeted self-help initiatives. On the other hand 2 of the 19 projects 
also aimed to improve efficiency of the building industry.  
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government and is discussed in Chapter 5. Generally, the key ideas that shaped the UN‘s 
approach in housing assistance to developing countries evolved from field research from the 
late 1940s into the 1960s (Harris, 1998). These findings then filtered into principles put 
forward for discussion and validation during UN conferences and meetings. This is one of the 
instruments utilised by the UN to assist developing countries in housing – namely, global 
declarations and conferences. The use of conferences and declarations derived from the 
structure of the UN organisation which relies primarily on consensus among member 
countries to generate agreements. This decision-making arrangement materialises through the 
meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council or specially-themed conferences by 
the UN‘s agencies32. The conferences are touted for stimulating conceptual and policy 
debates and facilitating changes in discourse and paradigms. 
As ―town meetings of the world‖, they are arenas for discussion and the production and exchange of 
information. Not only do they take stock of existing knowledge, they also generate new knowledge 
which may lead to the acceptance of new international norms. As incubators of ideas and agenda 
setters, UN global conferences have thus contributed to paradigmatic changes in development 
thinking……. UN global conferences have drawn attention to emerging issues that transcend national 
boundaries, thus serving as early warning mechanisms for the international community. …… UN 
global conferences have contributed [to] changing and mobilising public opinion by triggering the 
emergence of informal transnational ―networks of concern‖ linked to one another….. Global 
conferences have in particular brought civil society organizations in to the process of policy 
deliberations and formulation, through the concurrent participation of NGOs in national delegation or 
in parallel side events and ―forums‖ (Fomerand, 2003: 8-10) 
The assisted self-help housing (or site-and-services approach as it became conventionally 
known in the 1970s) was discussed extensively in the first UN Conference on Human 
Settlement held in 1976. This conference focused attention on the inadequacy of the public 
housing approach and slum eradication programmes. The new perspective of assisted self-
help featured significantly in the conference declaration, known as the Vancouver 
Declaration and Plan of Action. Recommendations for site and services were more than those 
for the efficiency of the building industry which focused only on enabling private developers‘ 
technical capacity.  
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 Fomerand (2003: 7-8) identifies 28 distinctly themed conferences of the UN from inception to 2003.  
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The informal sector should be supported in its efforts to provide shelter, infrastructure and services, 
especially for the less advantaged
33
  
Providing sites and services specifically for construction by the informal sector, and taking the informal 
sector's spatial and locational requirements into account in all sites and services schemes
34
 
National housing policies must aim at providing adequate shelter and services to the lower income 
groups........ include serviced land supplied on a partial or total subsidized basis
35
  
A major part of housing policy efforts should consist of programmes and instruments which actively 
assist people in continuing to provide better quality housing for themselves, individually or co-
operatively‖
36
 
Provision of infrastructure, on a partially or totally subsidized basis, in conjunction with shelter being 
provided by the people for themselves‖
37
 
The claims of the critical influence of such conferences have been contested as some have 
noted their ambiguous outcomes. Reflecting the ambiguity of such UN conferences, different 
perspectives are presented in the review of the second UN Conference on Human Settlements 
held in Istanbul in 1996 (Strassman, 1997; Satterthwaite, 1997; Tosics, 1997). For example, 
referring to this conference, Strasmman (1997) observes the organisers‘ avoidance of debates 
in the quest for harmony as well as conference fatigue among donor agencies which 
dampened creativity and constrained research funding. On the other hand, Tosics‘s (1997) 
experience of the same conference differs as he notes the emergence of incisive discussions 
in spite of his personal scepticism. Satterthwaite (1997) straddles these extremes by pointing 
to useful conceptual discussions about sustainability which however lacked details about the 
operational aspects in the recommendations. Typically, UN conferences had technical and 
political ends and the critique of Strassman (1997) points to how overbearing political 
interests constrained rigorous debates. Substantive issues such as the right to housing were 
opposed and blurred in non-committal language due to the political interests of the USA. 
Similarly the Vatican and religious interests successfully opposed abortion rights.  
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 Vancouver Declaration Recommendation C.8 (b) 
34
 Vancouver Declaration Recommendation C. 8 (c) (iii) 
35
 Vancouver Declaration Recommendation C. 9 (b) and (c) (i) 
36
 Vancouver Declaration Recommendation C. 10 (b) 
37
 Vancouver Declaration Recommendation C. 10 (c) (iii) 
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International conferences have an overriding goal of harmony, the avoidance of embarrassing fights, 
stalemates and walkouts. (p. 1729) ........... Not much can be learned from harmony craving statements 
that sound like political propaganda in one-party states (Strassman 1997: 1737) 
Lastly the UN advanced its housing assistance work in developing countries through 
the research activities it undertook and the resulting flagship reports. Flagship reports 
presenting the synthesis of such research work became a very important tool for 
disseminating good practices and for advocacy purposes. These flagship reports provided 
important inputs into international discussions and made contributions to thematic debates 
(Fomerand, 2003). However, the practical value of these flagship reports is in doubt due to 
uncertainty regarding their impact. 
The extent to which UN flagship reports contribute to a better appreciation of the challenges arising 
from globalization and the liberalization of the world economy and offer credible alternatives to 
existing national and international policies remains uncertain” (Fomerand, 2003: 15). 
 
3.3.1  The UN’s Shift to “Enabling Principles” 
From 1980 onwards, the UN considered the worsening of the housing conditions of 
the urban poor.
38
 By 1982, the issue of housing was raised as a global concern for the plight 
of the homeless following the passing of UN Resolution A/RES/37/221 in December 1982. 
This resolution set 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) (UN, 
1982) and sought to galvanize action by governments, non-governmental organizations and 
all other interest groups towards the development of innovative housing solutions
39
. It was 
established that there was the need for comprehensive approaches to housing to which end 
The Global Shelter Strategy (GSS) to the Year 2000 was conceived in 1986, launched a year 
later through UN Resolution 42/191 passed on 11
th
 December 1987 and formally adopted by 
the UN General Council in 1988. The GSS articulated, for the first time, the multi-faceted 
                                                 
38
 Various resolutions passed in 1980 and 1981 all discussed the need to stimulate activities towards resolving 
problems such as homelessness. A special purpose agency – the United Nations Centre on Human Settlements 
(UNCHS) – was established in 1978 after the Vancouver Conference to track the conference recommendations 
as well as monitor global housing policy trends. 
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 These included a series of ―Public Hearings‖ conducted by the UN‘s World Commission on Environment and 
Development in locations such as Nairobi, Sao Paolo and Jakarta. This led to the publication of ―Our Common 
Future‖ in 1987, a manifesto on the sustainability theme including aspects of housing and human settlements. 
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nature of housing and in particular recognised the economic characteristics of housing. The 
report of the Commission on Human Settlements, the agency overseeing the UN Centre for 
Human Settlements (UNCHS) noted,  
The multi-dimensional nature of the shelter problem, which has its main roots in poverty and, in many 
countries, is aggravated by the scarcity of resources, inadequate institutional capacities and the lack of 
a legal and financial framework for the alleviating the problem (Commission on Human Settlements 
Resolution 10/1Paragraph 18). 
Multiplier effects of shelter development, based on the full mobilization of local resources, and their 
importance to the economic development of a country, and the lost opportunities for development 
represented by the neglected shelter sector (Commission on Human Settlements Resolution 
10/1Paragraph 20). 
This acknowledgement of the multi-dimensional nature of the housing problem, as well as the 
multiplier effect of housing, in effect re-conceptualised the problem of housing. In this new 
perspective on housing, slums were symptomatic of underlying structural distortions in 
housing. Structural distortion occurred in the factors determining the supply and demand of 
housing including land, finance, planning regulations, and incomes. To unravel the 
underlying structural causes adversely affecting housing therefore required addressing the 
whole spectrum of factors determining the supply and demand for housing. This marked the 
inception of the enabling principles in housing policy. The UN‘s conception of the enabling 
principles was clearly articulated in the Global Shelter Strategy putting the emphasis on 
community engagement and the onus of choice on households (Keivani & Werner, 2001a; 
Jenkins et al, 2007). 
The adoption of an enabling approach whereby the full potential and resources of all actors in the 
shelter production and improvement process are mobilised; but final decision on how to house 
themselves is left to the people concerned (Paragraph 14 of Global Shelter Strategy as cited  in UN-
Habitat, 2006:20) 
The UN‘s conception of enabling principles of housing policy acknowledges a direct 
interventionist role for the state in the event of the failure of the market to ensure adequate 
and equitable housing supply: 
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The objective of "facilitating adequate shelter for all" also implies that direct government support 
should mainly be allocated to the most needy population groups
40
. 
……..  governmental intervention may be required, in many instances to remove or offset market 
imperfections, and in some specific cases, a policy may be justified to meet the social welfare 
requirements of the very poor and destitute
41
. 
The Global Shelter Strategy which articulated the UN‘s perspective of the enabling principles 
of housing policy also set out a detailed methodology for the design of ―National Shelter 
Strategies‖ through which the enabling principles could be realised. The specific steps to 
develop the National Shelter Strategies included the establishment of a task force and a 
steering committee, housing and infrastructure needs assessment with estimated associated 
costs, and the identification of alternative housing options and standards to meet the needs of 
various household groups. In addition, the framework dictated the key steps to be taken 
towards the formulation of an action plan including the assignment of responsibilities. It was 
noted that;  
A plan of action must be prepared in consultation and partnership with non-governmental 
organizations, people and their representatives, which: 
(a) Lists the activities that are the direct responsibility of the public sector;  
(b) Lists the activities to be taken to facilitate and encourage the other actors to carry out their 
part of the task; 
(c) Outlines resource allocation to the aforementioned activities; 
(d) Outlines the institutional arrangements for the implementation, co-ordination, monitoring 
and review of the strategy; 
(e) Outlines a schedule for the activities of the various agencies. 
(Plenary Meeting of Commission on Human Settlements, Resolution 11/2 on 11
th
 April, 1988)  
In calling for such methodological rigour, the UN effectively set out the implementation 
framework of the enabling principles of housing policy and following the publication of the 
Global Shelter Strategy by the UN, this methodological approach proved to be central in 
subsequent declarations (UNCHS, 1990a; 1995; 1996; 1997).  
 
                                                 
40
 UN Resolution 43/181 passed on 20
th
 December 1988; ―Global Shelter Strategy to the Year 2000‖, Annex 
Paragraph 4. 
41
 GSS Paragraph 54; (cited in UN-Habitat, 2006: 20). 
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3.4   The World Bank in Housing Assistance in Developing Countries  
The World Bank entered housing policy assistance for developing countries following 
substantial intellectual reflection. It was internally divided between mainstream classical 
economists favouring trickle-down approach and development economists and urban 
practitioners inclined to direct housing interventions as a tool of poverty reduction which 
ultimately dominated. The main policy instruments were site and services, and upgrading.  
upgrading squatter settlements can be a low-cost and practical approach to low-income shelter. 
Upgrading legalizes the settlement, and provides security of tenure (McNamara, 1981: 327 cited in 
Ramsamy, 2006: 88)  
The key principles underlying the poverty reduction approach were affordability, cost 
recovery and replicability (World Bank, 1993: 54). The critics of this approach within the 
World Bank as well as the financiers had to be assured that these projects were ―avoiding the 
self-perpetuating expansion of unaffordable government subsidies in the budget of developing 
countries‖ (Ramsamy, 2006: 90). In the first period of housing lending, from 1972 to 198142, 
the World Bank supported 79 site and services and upgrading projects at a cost of US$2.301 
billion (Kalarickal, 2006: 13)
43
. However, the site and services and upgrading interventions 
were criticised by some staff of the World Bank and practitioners based on problems in the 
design and implementation. These included land acquisition, indiscriminate and very high 
subsidies, dislocation, relocation costs, demolition of usable low-income housing stock, 
increasing costs for the poor to access work locations, poor cost recovery, benefit leakage 
(Keare & Paris, 1982; Kalarickal, 2005; Ramsamy 2006). As a result, steps were taken to 
reform housing lending by the World Bank.  
Beginning in 1982, the World Bank lending shifted from site and services to housing 
finance interventions with a project in Zimbabwe. According to the World Bank (1993), the 
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 The distinction is made in setting 1981 as the end of this phase of lending as the World Bank initiated a new 
type of lending it labelled the policy based lending (Kalarickal, 2006: 15) 
43
 62 shelter projects were approved by the World Bank between 1972 to June 1981 amounting to US$2 billion 
Ramsamy (2006: 93) 
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policy change was seen as an opportunity to gain access into the broader financial structures 
of the economy to tackle obstacles directly impacting housing.  
A well-functioning housing finance system was seen as contributing to financial sector objectives 
through improved domestic resource mobilization, and to fiscal objectives by making subsidies more 
transparent and better targeted (World Bank, 1993: 55). 
By reforming housing finance, governments would be able to address problems in supply of 
credit for housing and the economy at large, as well as, better targeting in the use of 
subsidies. Indeed, housing finance reform was deemed critical as it had become apparent that 
systemic arrangements for consistent credit mobilization and supply to ensure affordable 
housing were non-existent (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005:237). Additionally, housing finance 
improvements would go further than the previous geographically-limited site and services 
and upgrading approaches. The turn to housing finance reforms was also induced by the 
election of ideologically conservative governments in the US, UK and (West) Germany 
between 1979 and 1981; and their influence in the return of conservative economic thinking 
within the World Bank. Conservatives claimed that developing countries were failing because 
of discordant structural relations leading to inefficient markets and called for such countries 
to undergo structural adjustment reforms. The structural adjustment reforms sought the roll-
back of the state in production in favour of the private sector. Thus, the state had to disengage 
from direct economic activities, ―both in terms of its ownership of industries, financial 
institutions and marketing agents and of its regulatory activities in trade, industry, 
agriculture, credit and foreign investment‖ (Mosley et al, 1991a:11). From this time, urban 
interventions by the Bank also turned to urban management, emphasising efficiency in public 
service delivery over equity-based urban poverty reduction of the 1970s (Jenkins et al, 2007). 
In housing finance, the private sector was replacing state-owned banks and banking 
practices were also being deregulated to improve competition. Experiences from the US and 
Western Europe also influenced the World Bank‘s housing finance reforms. A global survey 
observed obstructions to growth which included ―credit controls‖, ―limits on the terms for 
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loans‖, and ―public ownership of the financial institutions‖ (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005: 
237). Restricted sub-markets and indiscriminate off-budget subsidies further reinforced the 
problem (Boleat, 1985). In the US, some savings and loans banks went into crises because of 
the mismatch between the tenor of savings and loans. In Europe, dedicated housing banks 
were found to be stifling credit. Under-recovery of loans resulting from below market interest 
rates and monopolies created unsustainable housing systems in developing countries. The 
evidence from the deregulation of the financial markets of Western European suggested that 
capital flows increased very significantly after the deregulation measures were implemented. 
Consequently, the World Bank instigated deregulation and liberalization of housing finance 
systems in developing countries. 
3.4.1   The World Bank’s Shift to “Enabling Principles”  
The housing finance interventions advocated by the World Bank appeared to be a 
temporal punctuation in the neoliberal return within the Bank. Accordingly, when the Bank 
articulated its sector policy paper ―Housing: Enabling Markets to Work (1993)‖ there was no 
pandering or wavering about the philosophical direction of the Bank. It noted that ―the 
housing sector performance is fundamentally shaped by market forces‖ and went on to 
articulate a predominantly economic perspective in analyzing housing conditions in 
developing countries. The World Bank‘s enabling markets strategy was intrinsically 
embedded in the over-arching neo-liberalism underpinning the structural adjustment reforms. 
In this regard, issues of liberalization, privatisation and deregulation remained prominent 
themes in the World Bank‘s articulation of its perspective of the enabling principles. Overall, 
the Bank listed seven instruments necessary for efficient functioning of the housing markets, 
three instruments affecting demand-side, three affecting supply- side and one targeting the 
overall sector. On the demand side, the Bank posited the development of property rights and 
mortgage finance systems as well as the rationalization of government subsidies. On the 
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supply side, the instruments were listed as follows: provision of infrastructure, regulating 
land and housing development, and organizing the building industry. The seventh instrument 
straddled both housing supply and demand, espousing the development of an institutional 
framework for managing the sector. Table 3.1 below presents the list of instruments and 
constituent activities comprising these enabling principles.  
Table 3.1: World Bank’s Enabling Housing Markets 
A. Demand-side instruments A. Supply side instruments 
Developing property rights Providing infrastructure for residential land 
development 
Establish and enforce laws ensuring rights to own 
and freely exchange properties 
Coordinate effectively infrastructure 
agencies to focus on efficiency-oriented 
servicing of existing and undeveloped land Divest public housing through markets to 
residents or others 
Administer registration of land and house Improvement in cost recovery  
Broaden property rights to poor through tenure 
regularization in squatter settlements 
Community participation in  infrastructure 
planning and implementation 
Regularize insecure tenure Pursue private provision option 
Developing mortgage finance Regulating land and housing development 
Create healthy and competitive mortgage lending 
institutions 
Balance costs and benefits of regulations 
influencing urban land and housing markets 
especially land use and building Underpin collateral security by enforceable land 
title and foreclosure laws 
Foster innovative arrangements for providing 
greater access to housing finance by the poor 
Remove regulations which hinders housing 
supply 
Rationalizing subsidies Organizing the building industry 
Integrate reforms with financial sector Create greater competition in the building in 
the building industry Avoid rent control at all cost 
Dual security for borrowers and lenders through 
indexation 
Reducing trade barriers that apply to housing 
inputs 
Ensuring public subsidies programmes are: Removing constraints to the development 
and use of local building materials  of appropriate and affordable scale; well-
targeted; measurable; and transparent avoids 
distorting the market 
 focused on households than housing units 
Sector-wide instrument 
Developing institutional framework for managing the housing sector 
Create or strengthen institution mechanisms which can oversee and manage the performance of 
the sector as a whole 
 Devise institutional mechanisms to collect, analyse, interpret and publish data on 
the performance of housing sector and distinct outcomes for poor 
Coordinate all public policy bodies with influence on housing sector 
Articulate linkage between housing and macro-economy in planning  
Develop long term housing sector development plan in association with central planning agency  
Craft national and municipal level participatory housing policy platforms for stakeholders 
(public agencies, private sector, NGOs, CBOs and civil society. 
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Review effects of regulations on housing and undertake regulatory reforms 
Conduct housing policy research 
Canvassing interest groups and decision makers for sectoral improvements 
Develop coordinating and supervisory framework for  
 Private sector-delivered housing finance 
 Effective targeting of poor with appropriate mortgage lending 
 Instigating institutional linkage to Ministry of Finance and Central Bank 
Pool and coordinate infrastructure agencies to enhance aggregate serviced land supply 
Regulatory review and proposal of legislation  
Ensure that policies and programs benefit the poor and elicit their participation 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (1993: 38-44) 
It is illustrative of the weakness of the underlying conservatism of the World Bank‘s enabling 
principles of housing policy that little consideration was given to disaggregating the state and 
identifying the role of vested interests in the prevailing state of affairs. It was presumed in the 
World Bank‘s perspective of the enabling principles that market relations would be capable 
of unravelling such challenges. For example, calling for regularising the land tenure of slum 
dwellers and squatters discounted vested interest groups such as land owners who risked 
significant loss of potential windfalls from speculation. To induce the participation of such 
vested interests in housing reforms based on these enabling principles, compensation for the 
potential loss was critical. However nothing was articulated in this respect. Moreover, the 
World Bank‘s approach presumed integrity and neutrality of the state when in reality the state 
was neither homogenous nor apolitical.  
In the light of the foregoing, some key differences emerge from diverging conceptions 
of enabling principles by the World Bank and the UN that must be taken into consideration in 
order to appreciate the context and conduct of the World Bank and the UN in the 
implementation of housing reforms. These differences are outlined in the following sections 
under headings of ―conceptual‖, ‗methodological‘ and ‗operational‘. 
3.5   Conceptual Differences: Communities versus markets 
One of the most significant differences between the UN and World Bank related to 
the conceptual development and interpretation of ―enabling‖ as it defined the parameters for 
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establishing the principal actors and agents to be targeted, addressed or overlooked by policy 
that evolved out of the process. Furthermore the significance of this conceptual difference is 
in its effect of determining the trajectory of the methodological and operational differences 
that flowed from it. Smith (1999) and Wils and Helmsing (2001) provide extensive 
discussions of the conceptual differences between the UN and the World Bank in the 
definition and interpretation of the ―enabling‖ principles and the discussion that follows takes 
its root and departures from these principal analyses. The conceptual differences between the 
UN and the World Bank emerge from their respective positions taken on the constitutive and 
distinct social formations that characterise society and the relationships that exist between 
these social formations. The distinct formations comprise the state, civil society and markets 
with each also comprising their respective organisational and institutional elements.  
Generally, as noted earlier in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1, both the UN and the World 
Bank were dissatisfied with the orthodoxy of slum upgrading and site and services. However 
deriving from the Marxist critique of the slum upgrading and site and services orthodoxy 
which perceived the state and market as mutually reinforcing instruments for the exploitation 
of the poor or in this case civil society, by the elites, policy reforms were necessitated to cure 
the challenge of state failure in the delivery of housing. Smith (1999) notes the Marxists‘ 
proposed cure to this challenge, in spite of  a lack of evidence of its efficacy, to be the 
―elimination of the market‖ in order to dissolve the ―penetration of civil society by the 
market‖ (Smith, 1999: 36-37) and the expansion of socialism. On the basis of the foregoing 
and deriving from the deployment of three analytical perspectives – namely, the ―empirical‖, 
referring to the pre-existing conditions, the ―normative‖ referring to the proposed cure, and 
the ―policy‖ referring to the mechanics of reform – two additional trajectories emerge.  
Firstly, the ―third sector‖ approach privileged a civil society- orientation, proposing 
policies that diffuse civil society and empower the emergent interlocutors such as NGOs and 
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other non-state actors. This empowerment was intended to facilitate local solutions to be 
developed by these interlocutors and was characterised as ―enabling‖. This was the 
conceptual approach adopted by the UN which underpinned its community orientation and 
initially discounted the role of markets. Wils and Helmsing (2001:9) note that this community 
perspective underpinned the UN‘s derivative Community Development Programme (CDP), 
clearly articulating the elements of community participation and management to be central to 
the intervention. 
 Secondly, the World Bank adopted the neo-liberal trajectory that conceived the 
empirical perspective of society to be over-regulating markets leading to constraints of 
market supply to civil society and inequitable redistribution from the state directly to civil 
society. The normative perspective envisaged minimum regulation of the markets enabling 
improvements of market supply to civil society and the establishment of safety nets for those 
incapable of market participation. Wils and Helmsing (2001) note how the two perspectives – 
community and markets – contradict each other thus: 
Important areas of contact and potential conflict between CE and EM relate to the restructuring of 
public sector delivery of basic infrastructure and services…….. governments in many countries 
increasingly decentralise the creation and management of basic infrastructure and services to markets 
in order to achieve more efficient and more demand-driven service delivery and to stimulate private 
sector growth………….As governments decentralise more to markets, the domain for community 
management of basic infrastructure and services may actually shrink and the relationships between 
communities and governments may undergo important changes. For example, policies and proposals 
for community management of basic services put forward with the aim to replace inadequate public 
sector delivery, may now have to compete with proposals for private sector based delivery. If and when 
governments in particular countries have decentralised responsibilities for service delivery to the 
private sector and by-passed, for good or bad reasons, communities to organise delivery themselves, 
these communities would need to develop new strategies towards governments to ensure their access to 
the new private sector based services. In such a context, communities would also need to develop new 
responses towards the new private sector service providers. (Wils and Helmsing, 2001:12-13) 
However, it is acknowledged that the relationship between communities and markets are not 
always ―clear and straightforward‖ (Wils and Helmsing, 2001: 13) pointing to an ambiguous 
pattern of instances of positive and negative relations between pursuits privileging markets 
and communities. Annex 3b presents the schematic representation developed by Smith of the 
conceptual differences  
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3.6 Methodological Differences: Unilinear Dogma versus Deductive Hegemony  
The UN‘s methodological approach to the enabling housing principles was 
conceptually formulaic in its insistence on the development of National Shelter Strategies. 
This approach is systematic and unilinear, detailing specific steps to be taken towards the 
development of National Shelter Strategies. The prominence given to these methodical steps 
was reflected in project reviews the UN conducted on countries that utilised their assistance 
for housing sector reforms such as Barbados, Kenya, Jamaica and Zimbabwe where the 
analysis focused on compliance with the methodological approach (UNCHS, 1990b). As a 
result, processes appeared more important than theories which were rarely recognised, let 
alone tested, in UN approaches. 
The World Bank, on the other hand, had a different but similarly dogmatic 
methodological approach in its perspective of the enabling principles. The World Bank‘s 
conservative ideology inevitably fixed the conceptual instruments of the enabling principles 
to elements of privatisation, commercialisation, deregulation and decentralisation within a 
framework that privileged market relations. McAuslan‘s (1997) account of the Urban 
Management Programme (UMP), a joint initiative of the World Bank and the UN from 1986 
exemplifies this deductive approach by the World Bank. The UMP highlighted the strategic 
role of cities in developing countries and aimed to empower them, with the support of donors 
and other stakeholders, to inculcate sustainable management practices (Mabogunje, 2005). 
The deductive approach privileged land registration and this subsequently featured in the 
advice on land management, without regard to the merit of findings from field research;  
the particular emphasis in the World Bank‘s contribution to the land component was, however land 
registration and information with little work being commissioned from, as opposed to about, 
developing countries. This was a characteristic of the World Bank‘s approach to the UMP: developing 
countries were to be recipients of policy advice, not co-contributors (McAuslan, 1997: 1709). 
A similar experience of disregard for the merits of field research unfolded in South Africa‘s 
post-Apartheid formulation of a policy on municipal infrastructure that the World Bank 
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participated in (Tomlinson, 2002). In this case, the World Bank prepared the entire municipal 
infrastructure policy paper on the basis of a pre-conceived framework, or ―model‖ 
(Tomlinson, 2002: 381), that was not responsive to the local context
44
. Although the World 
Bank‘s housing policy advice was supported by theoretical constructs, it is arguable that these 
constructs were highly influenced by policy trajectories of Western countries. Such 
theoretical constructs were developed by a small circle of Bank staff and consultants from 
consulting firms based in Washington such as Abt Associates and PADCO, as well as from 
ideologically conservative economists in leading economics departments of universities in the 
USA (Pugh, 1997a; 1997b). Thus, irrespective of the contexts, the World Bank approach 
favoured a deductive approach with a homogenous view of the housing sector. For example, 
(as noted earlier) in the land sub-component of housing, the Bank proffered land titling as the 
key to increasing land supply. On the other hand, the Bank was critical of other tools such as 
land use planning and cadastral developments. McAuslan (1997) notes that in the UMP, the 
World Bank-appointed team leader abhorred land use planning, an abhorrence that McAuslan 
notes also reflected in the World Bank team‘s collective frustrations with the UN team 
because of the latter‘s focus on land use planning in the UMP. It was felt that this focus was 
delaying the overall programme of the UMP and Washington did not want planning to be the 
central message of the UMP (McAuslan, 1997: 1709). 
The antipathy of the Bank …… towards land-use planning acted as a de facto veto on any publication 
within the UMP of any of the UNCHS-produced background papers on the subject.‖ (McAuslan, 
1997:1710) 
The antipathy to land-use planning derived from the perception of existing zoning regulations 
as costly and unrealistic, which fuelled informal and illegal developments (Mayo et al, 1986: 
200). Zoning regulations could lead to rent seeking and corruption if the infrastructure for 
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 The World Bank‘s approach to deductive policy advice evolved in the 1990s leading to its‘ rebranding as the 
―Knowledge‖ Bank. Researchers point to the 1998 World Development Report which was aptly titled 
―Knowledge for Development‖ as the turning point in this approach. This new turn led to the establishment of 
the Global Development Network (GDN) which serves as the platform generating the substantial volume of 
research that has been supported by the World Bank since then (Stiglitz, 1999; Stone, 2001).   
69 
 
enforcement was weak (Deininger & Binswanger, 1999: 263), as it usually was in developing 
countries. Whereas the World Bank objected to existing zoning regulations because of its 
potential to restrain housing developments and its related capacity to create artificial land 
shortages, it acknowledged the utility of zoning to protect ecologically sensitive areas (World 
Bank, 1993: 33). In terms of housing development, the World Bank privileged the private 
sector over all other agents. Similarly, improving nascent local building materials industry 
was rarely promoted whereas price deregulation regimes created by trade liberalisation 
policies ensured increased building material imports, mostly from western markets. The 
developmental aspects of local industrialisation plans had been cast aside in the new 
neoliberal policies. 
3.7 Operational Differences: Conditional Reform versus Voluntary Adoption  
Further differentiating the respective approaches of the World Bank and the UN was 
the temporal context of their advancement. As has been noted earlier, the World Bank‘s 
perspective of the enabling principles evolved in tandem with the structural adjustment 
programmes. Participating countries in such programmes were compelled to initiate macro-
economic as well as sectoral reforms in exchange for urgently needed funding to pay 
imminent debts or to bridge critical fiscal gaps in development budgets. Given the high level 
of indebtedness of developing countries and their critical need for aid, and the World Bank‘s 
command over significant financial resources, its influence was considerable in leveraging 
specific policies. This instrument of policy conditionality in the architecture of international 
finance was thus very important for neoliberal policy choices and institutional changes 
(Mosley et al, 1991a; Nelson, 1996). The imposition of conditional policy reform to aid under 
structural adjustment foreshadowed the World Bank‘s enabling principles, consequently 
generating a similar posture in the Bank‘s housing policy support to developing countries. As 
a result there was an element of compulsion in the World Bank-sponsored housing reforms. 
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The down side to induced reform is that the coerced subscription to the enabling principles 
belies the true disposition of local policy actors. In the absence of such coercion, it is feasible 
that local policy actors may revert to their deeper lying predilections. This suggests that 
reversal of the enabling principles of housing policy can be explained as a manifestation of a 
pre-disposition that re-asserts itself after the release from the compulsion to reform. 
Recognizing this weakness of conditionalities, Nelson (1996) enjoins international 
organisations to review and reform their approach to policy change; 
External agencies seeking to support and encourage further reform also must reconsider their strategies 
and techniques. ........... External agencies seeking to encourage reforms must also alter their approach. 
Conditions attached to aid in general are less effective in promoting institutional reforms than 
stabilization or liberalization measures..................It is much more difficult to measure progress on most 
institutional reforms. Moreover, there is a mismatch between the incentives provided by non-project 
loans and the agents who must take action and run risks to carry out institutional reforms. ............ 
.......many of the agencies and officials involved in institutional reforms see little gain to their agencies 
or themselves from the aid provided contingent on the reforms (Nelson, 1996: 1556- 1557). 
On the other hand, the UN utilised conferences, declarations, public sensitisation, 
advocacy campaigns and events to appeal to technocratic sensibilities and moral suasion for 
the adoption of its propositions. Commitment or subscription by member countries to the 
principles articulated by the UN in these approaches occurs voluntarily. Thus, although the 
UN set out the enabling principles as a normative framework, its adoption was voluntary with 
no compulsion for compliance. Furthermore, even where these principles were voluntarily 
accepted, no sanctions could be applied for modification or discontinuation. Therefore, the 
impetus for change had to emerge out of a deep conviction among local policy actors of the 
appropriateness of principles espoused under the global pacts. However, where no such 
embedded conviction and powers existed among local policy actors, purported voluntary 
subscription run the risk of distortion either to suit local interests or as a result of 
misunderstanding of the concepts of the pact. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Clearly, the enabling principles underpinning housing policies and reforms emerged 
from complex antecedents within the intellectual community, as well as at the international 
political level. These antecedents were frequently non-converging and subsequently infused 
the design of the enabling principles with nuances that are important considerations in any 
examination of housing policy reforms. In the light of the critical roles of the World Bank 
and the UN in the evolution of these principles, their respective organisational ethos asserts 
influences that pervade the design of these principles. As a result, the World Bank‘s 
perspective of the enabling principles is heavily influenced by the ideological bent of neo-
liberalism, whereas the UN‘s perspective of the enabling principles was laced with a 
methodological fervour. Furthermore, the World Bank proffered a deductive approach to 
policy implementation, applying theoretical frameworks. On the other hand, the UN‘s 
preference for inductive approaches implied it facilitated housing reforms without specific 
theoretical bias. The socio-economic context of the period had a particular influence on the 
World Bank‘s approach as the use of policy reform conditionalities occurred within the 
parallel structural adjustment reforms; they were extended into the housing support 
programmes. The conditionalities approach overlaid the implementation of the World Bank‘s 
perspective of the enabling principles with a coercive imperative. Countries utilising World 
Bank support in housing thus necessarily had to undertake measures even if unpopular. On 
the other hand, the UN lacked this coercive apparatus relying on the strength of the 
arguments to convince member countries into voluntary adoption. As noted by Mukhija 
(2001), 
―It would be much simpler for policy-makers if enabling consisted of decentralisation, privatization, 
deregulation and demand-driven development. However, the conceptual validity of a simplistic 
approach is questionable. Enabling is a complicated task with paradoxical policy demands on 
governments. …….. .................. But policy-makers need more empirically based observations of how 
private market actors operate…… there are limitations to the role of private actors. They need to profit, 
and they can be risk-averse. Not only do they need institutional support; in the absence of 
institutionalised incentives, they are unlikely to play a role in housing the poor. Enabling housing 
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provision is much more complicated than a simplistic enthusiasm for markets. Housing provision 
through market mechanisms is likely to be paradoxical and may require seeming policy 
contradictions….. For policy makers, it is important to recognise the complexities involved in 
providing housing for low-income group.‖ (Mukhija (2001:804) 
The implication of these considerations is that housing policy makers in developing countries 
confronted a range of possibilities in adopting the enabling principles. In the light of these 
complexities, the question arises as to how housing policies and reforms were designed and 
implemented in Ghana. However, to answer this requires an appreciation of the existing 
policy structures. In this respect, the theoretical framework of the state is examined in the 
following section to set the context for a deeper analysis of Ghana‘s housing policy reforms.  
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Chapter 4 – Unravelling the “State” 
 
4.1   Introduction 
An analysis of the motives and conditions shaping the design and outcomes of the 
housing reform policies espoused by the World Bank and the UN, as well as subsequent 
housing policy actions taken by the state, requires an understanding of the nature of the state 
in which the enabling principles of the housing reforms were received and processed.  In this 
Chapter, recognising that housing policies are situated within the larger context of national 
development, I start by discussing the two meta-narratives of development constructed in 
international intellectual circles and coinciding with the onset of the post-colonial evolution 
of developing countries. These narratives of development essentially constructed a binary 
policy framework which posited a ‗state-led thesis‘ of the development economists against a 
‗market-led thesis‘ of the neo-classical economists. The state-led thesis viewed the state as a 
distinct entity and the main agent of production and distribution. On the other hand, the 
market-led thesis considered the society to consist of atomised agents taking decisions on 
their respective needs whose fulfilment generated a market that had rules and norms. I note 
the adoption of the state-led thesis as the basis for the early post-colonial economic policies 
in most developing countries. However, the outcomes of these state-led policies in most cases 
deviated from what was envisaged as a result of the interaction of the prevailing logics of the 
political framework with adverse material conditions of these countries. To explain these 
deviations the state was typically conceptualised, especially in western literature (Chazan, 
1992; Riddle, 1992; Bratton & van der Walle; 1994; Eyoh, 1996) as a neo-patrimonial one. In 
this perspective, state power was deployed for the primary benefit of the elite. This provided 
the opportunity for the advocates of the market-led thesis to proffer new prescriptions that 
required the state to withdraw from production. I argue that the perspective of the state, 
particularly in African countries as neo-patrimonial, was analytically very limited in its 
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explanation of the deviation from the envisaged outcome. It did not capture the underlying 
dynamics generated by the observed non-converging outcomes of the state-led development 
thesis. Therefore the subsequent prescription of market-led thesis and its attendant 
requirement of state withdrawal were similarly flawed in their analysis of the state. I go 
further to make the case that the meta-narratives of development put forward arguments that 
were undiscerning of the heterogeneity of interests embedded in the conception of the state. 
The recognition of this heterogeneity draws attention to the range of outcomes that could 
emerge from the interaction of the diverse interests within the state and society respectively 
and provide the requisite tools to analyse policy change. Bearing in mind the aim of this 
thesis of assessing housing reforms whose principles were generated by the World Bank and 
the UN, I extend the argument of this chapter to take account of the participation of agents 
and resources of these international agencies as a further tier of interests, besides the local 
interests that influence policy choices and outcomes in analysing their engagement with the 
local policy framework.  
The approach outlined above allows for the examination of internal and external 
considerations or ―decision calculus‖ of policy makers in undertaking reforms. I use the 
notion of ―decision calculus‖ in this thesis to mean the set of considerations borne out of the 
local and international contexts and conditions as well as the strategic imperatives that 
impose questions of contemporary and future legitimacy on the policy actors. The decision 
calculus of policy actors accommodates both the structural conditions that potentially can 
shape the choices available to the actors, and the strategic interests, manifest or not, that 
emanate from an internalised prioritisation process.  The decision calculus is thus a complex 
and dynamic platforms that interrogates material conditions and strategic interests and 
generates choices and actions of the policy actors. Examining the decision calculus requires 
an examination of the prevailing contexts and conditions and extrapolating the priorities of 
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policy actors through the speeches. By examining the decision calculus, it becomes possible 
to crystallise the underlying motives for specific policy choices. On that basis it can be 
inferred that the outcomes of reforms have the potential for considerable variety given the 
diverse range of influence and considerations.  For this reason singular analytical 
perspectives focusing on local or international levels alone, such as the dependency theory 
deployed by Konadu-Agyeman (2001), fail in their analysis of housing and urban 
development in Ghana.  
To conclude this Chapter I undertake a review of post-colonial political economy of 
Ghana drawing attention to the diverse relationships between the ruling classes in charge of 
the state apparatus, mainly consisting of the political appointees and top bureaucrats as well 
as other interest groups. The relationships are determined by logics that were generated by 
the combination of ideology, economic contexts and class preferences. On that basis I 
observe that although ideology prefaced most policy choices, political legitimacy was the 
underpinning rationale which explains why contradictions occasionally emerged. In this 
context, I define political legitimacy as the deployment of actions by operatives of the state 
using rules of the game, formally written or informally pervasive in the conduct of behaviour 
and relationships which construe such actions as valid and persuade society to accept such 
political actions to have been taken in the interest of the citizenry. According to Stone 
(2002:285), ―rules derive their enormous power from legitimacy, the quality of being 
perceived as good and right by those whose behaviour they are meant to control. Legitimacy 
binds rule-follower to rule-maker‖. Political legitimacy can thus be coerced or extracted from 
the society through patronising actions of those who control the tools of state. Arts, et al 
(2000) indicate that  
The rules of the game delineate a policy domain, i.e. they define the possibilities and constrains for 
policy agents to act within that domain. As such, these rules determine how politics is played, which 
norms are legitimate, and how policy outcomes are achieved. …..… In fact these rules generate the 
definition of meaningful and justified circumstances ….. In short, the rules of the game encompass all 
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modes of production and interpretation of meaningful and legitimate conduct in ….. policy 
arrangements. (Arts, et al, 2000: 61-62)   
The political legitimacy rationale shaped the relationship between the ruling class and various 
interest groups – local and international – in differential ways. Clearly the differential 
relationships were an outcome of the articulation of power within the state and society. For 
that reason, housing policies (and the related reforms) were not an expression of ideological 
or technical rationalisation alone, but more a response to the imperatives for political 
legitimacy, given the objective conditions of the economy and the subjective penetration of 
societal interests. 
4.2 Constructing the State – The modernisation and economic growth imperative 
The prevailing perspective of the state in developing countries, particularly in Africa, 
has been shaped by the modernisation thesis manifested in the quest for ―development‖. This 
perspective views the post-colonial world as a linear historical-social-economic analytical 
construct through which all societies progress according to the model of the historical 
formation of capitalism in the western world. Modernisation had sociological, 
anthropological, political and economic dimensions (Kilson, 1963). Modernisation espoused 
a unilinear, unidirectional and irreversible social mobility process that would transform 
simple primordial societies into contemporary complex ones akin to western societies. The 
economy would change from antiquated subsistence agriculture to technologically driven 
industrial manufacturing. Illogical communitarian cultural practices would give way to 
utilitarian rationality of atomised ―maximisers‖. Furthermore, organically evolving feudal 
administration that arbitrarily ruled society through unregulated mechanisms would pave the 
way for structured liberal democratic governance. In this regard, developing countries in 
general were part of the post-colonial ―backward, underdeveloped, emergent, poor‖ (Hettne, 
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1995: 36) societies facing a socio-economic and politico-administrative gap bridged by the 
―rationality of modernisation‖ (Sylvester, 2000: 705) 
The political sociology parallel of modernisation was distinctly elaborated by Max 
Weber‘s proposition of a singular trajectory of political administration based on the 
Eurocentric model evolution of governance in Europe from the middle ages of feudalism to 
the liberal democratic rule from the twentieth century onwards. In the Weberian model, 
Western European political modernisation evolved from primitive patriarchism that had no 
administrative structures, through peasant patrimonialism, that maintained patronage-
dependent administration, to rational-legal modern bureaucracy. This transition occurred with 
changes in religion, science and the socio-economic structure of the society and generated 
values, capacities and actions culminating in the development of societies of rationality and 
balanced interests. In such modern societies, formalised rules and processes legitimised 
professionalism, specialisation and hierarchy in the establishment of a meritocratic 
bureaucracy (Delany, 1963). Although Weber disclaimed the universality of this model, it 
nonetheless permeated considerations of other regions and countries beyond the original 
context of Europe in the discourse of development in post-colonial countries, particularly in 
Africa (Sangmpam, 1993). 
The modernisation thesis obtained significant mileage through the support of Western 
institutions and international development agencies such as the World Bank. The notion of 
modernisation was articulated in economic development theories, programmes and projects 
designed to achieve the desired goals of progress. W.W. Rostow‘s ―The Stages of Economic 
Growth‖ (1960), one of the most explicit articles of faith of the modernisation manifesto, 
reiterated the underlying belief in a singular trajectory for development. Hettne (1995: 39) 
notes that the leading thinkers of development economics essentially believed in state 
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intervention or economic planning instead of the market focus of neoclassical economists
45
. 
This legitimised state interventions in development activities in one way or the other 
(characterised as a social engineering project) to ensure that the requisite productivity and 
growth conditions were fulfilled (Hettne, 1995). As a result, irrespective of the particular 
emphasis by development economics pioneers
46
 – direct engagement of under-utilised factors 
of production (Keynes
47
), productivity-enhancing growth based on physical capital 
investments or the ―big push model‖ (Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse), or import-substituting 
industrialisation (Prebisch, Singer) – the state was the driver. Although it has been argued 
elsewhere that these normative development models were assimilated rather than foisted on 
developing countries because they fitted their existing power structures (Hettne, 1995), such 
theories provided the intellectual legitimisation of the policy of state centrality in 
development in post-colonial countries
48
.  
Even though state-led development in the 1960s led to economic growth, the benefits 
of such growth were observed to be inequitable, prompting criticisms. However this critique 
and the alternate reformulations of development theory proffered in lieu of state-led 
development approaches, initially did not directly address the issue of how political 
legitimacy was derived within the state in developing countries. As a result, none of the 
alternate development theories put forward structurally altered the role of the state. Thus 
theories of dependency (Baran, 1973; Chilcote, 1974), as well as the human capital formation 
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 The ascendance of development economics and the emergence of the post-colonial nationhood that the period 
1960 to 1970 was labelled as the ―First Development Decade‖. 
46
 The names of the pioneers in development economics, listed as T. P. Bauer, C. Clark, A. O. Hirschman, A. 
Lewis, G. Myrdal, R. Prebisch, P. N. Rosenstein–Rodan, W. W. Rostow, H. W. Singer, and J. Tinbergen 
emerged from a series of public lectures devoted to their work and organised by the World Bank. It is 
noteworthy that Keynes was omitted from this list. Hettne argues that ultimately his work had least relevance to 
historical experience of the West, yet its dominance converged with the emergence of post-colonial developing 
countries and the concerns for their transformation in the 1940s (Hettne, 1995: 38–39). 
47
 According to Hettne (1995) this proposal originally related to short term stabilisation need in economic 
management during contractions and arose from considerations of the 1930s Depression. 
48
 Arku (2004) notes that at different stages in the 1950s and 1960s, the government of Ghana sought the views 
of the likes of Arthur Lewis, Dudley Seers and Albert Hirschman, leading development economists at the time. 
Others named include Nicholas Kaldor. K. N. Raj, and H. C. Bos in this set of government advisors. Yet as will 
be discussed later, the nationalist government‘s quest for modernisation through such advice was also a tool for 
political legitimation in the face of internal intellectual opposing perspectives at the time.  
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thesis and the basic needs approach (World Development Report, 1985, Arku, 2004) all 
maintained the centrality of the state, thereby contributing to the ossification of the political 
structures. In this respect, the emergence of state owned housing corporations in the post-
colonial era was an extension of the logic of modernisation. This also underpinned the 
preference in state housing policies for ―modern‖ materials and technology imported from the 
west in place of the traditional typologies. The retention of colonial-era Western oriented 
building regulations and planning standards found in building codes and planning guidelines 
respectively was similarly validated by this logic (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989). 
4.2.1  The “Big Man” Politics of patronage and corruption  
The underlying logic of the post-colonial state in most African developing countries was 
manifested in a typological style of governance characterised as neo-patrimonialism lacking 
the elements of a modern state as espoused in the Weberian model. Many authors were 
emphatic that virtually all African countries exhibited some attributes of neo-patrimonialism 
deriving from a variety of conditions that ranged from historical to the contemporary 
(Theobold, 1982; Clapham, 1985; Chazan, 1992; Riddel, 1992; Bayart, 1993; Tordoff, 1993; 
Chabal, 1994; Bratton & van der Walle; 1994; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Mamdani, 1996; 
Herbst, 2000).  
Most regimes in sub- Saharan Africa operate some type of patron-client system. They provide their 
supporters and other members of the elite or potential competitors with jobs (including many specially 
created), import quotas, contract allocations, access to government projects, funds for the military and 
police, as well as parastatal organisations (Riddell, 1992: 62) 
It was argued that political power in Africa manifested in a more personalised style of 
leadership by state functionaries that mirrored Weber‘s characterisation of patrimonial rule. 
Under such rule, the person of the office holder and not the office or the formal rules 
governing the exercise of the authority of the office dictated the approach to governance. 
Rulers claimed a right to resources of the state that could be allocated through their personal 
discretion. Positions in public administration depended on relationships with the ruler and 
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benefits could be extended to patrons without accountability. In the contemporary 
manifestation of patrimonial attributes in post-colonial countries, the rights were negotiated 
through patronage thus labelled ―neo-patrimonial49‖ rule. This personalised approach was 
conceptualised as the ―Big Man‖ politics (Sandbrook & Oelbaum, 1997). This system of ―big 
men‖ penetrated the society and manifested at all levels of society where state power could 
be exercised (Bayart, 1993). In this system, the ―Big Man‖ obtained legitimacy in society by 
allocating access to public resources to patrons and sponsors seen as the primary constituents 
in exchange for maintaining the ruling class in power. In some cases, public resources were 
indirectly used by the ruling class only as an incentive for maintaining political stability. 
However this was difficult to differentiate from the corrupt appropriation of public resources 
by the ruling class given that the ultimate benefits in the former arrangement nonetheless 
accrued to the ruling class personally. Under neo-patrimonialism other interests in society 
besides those of the ruling class were precluded from decision making and rather 
compensated, co-opted or repressed. Articulation by different interest groups such as private 
capital, organised labour, urban and rural groups on public policy diminished through 
pacification or coercion. Often, the ruling class virtually silenced the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary through co-optation. In some instances labour and business groups were co-opted in 
corporatist compacts through fiscal incentives and rewards such as import licences, business 
operating permits and tax waivers. In other circumstances, they were selectively intimidated 
and repressed through the use of the coercive powers of the state.  In most developing 
countries, this resulted in military dictatorships or single-party rule. Although this 
characterisation of the governance approach in Africa coincided with early stage post-
colonial rule, this perception persists in contemporary times. However, new perspectives have 
                                                 
49
 The term ―neo-patrimonialism was coined by S.N. Eisenstadt (Thomas, 2007:734 footnote 28). 
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emerged to proffer alternative rationalisation for the observed governance practices 
characterised as neo-patrimonialism, and these perspectives are presented in the next section. 
4.2.2  The perspective of neo-patrimonialism as a public finance tool 
Weber‘s characterisation of patrimonialism existed in some form in most countries 
with traditional rule in which the society exchanges its acceptance of leadership for the 
provisioning of some social goods. The society accepts the extraction of resources whereas 
the leadership accepts the responsibility for providing these goods. Such exchanges became 
routinised in cultural practices perceived as neo-patrimonialism. Herbst (2000) makes the 
case that patrimonial practices were imbibed from the pre-colonial era and reinforced during 
the colonial era. One area in which patrimonial practices were incorporated from pre-colonial 
era through to post-colonial era is in the administration of taxes. Pre-colonial states, in 
whatever forms they existed, taxed trade in lieu of personal or land taxes because of the 
political geography – low land values in excess supply coupled with low-density and 
dispersed settlements. Tributes raised from conquered lands could be (and often were) limited 
by frequent challenges to sovereign authority over such territories from either external 
aggressors or rebellious subjects. Notwithstanding the limited accountability, the indirect 
taxation methods nonetheless facilitated the accrual and redistribution of resources by the 
pre-colonial state. Colonial authorities adopted similar methods by establishing commodity 
marketing boards and export taxes to accrue revenue for their metropolitan enterprise. In this 
way, substantial resources were generated ranging between one-third and two-thirds of all 
revenues (Herbst, 2000: 116-117). However, the commodity marketing boards‘ price 
regulation obstructed the development of indigenous capitalism. For example, when world 
prices for cocoa peaked in the 1920s, the benefits were not transferred to the farmers 
(Konadu-Agyeman, 2001). At independence these structures were transferred to the new 
nations – highly dependent on indirect taxation of trade with minimal accountability. The 
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trade-off for state legitimacy therefore was in the expected state-administered disbursement 
of economic, social and political goods. 
4.2.3  The perspective of neo-patrimonialism as an effect of colonialism  
Colonialism had an impact on the existing social order which culminated in the 
reconfiguration of the pre-colonial society and in part also explains the substance of neo-
patrimonialism. According to Chabal (1994), anthropologists did not appreciate the ways in 
which African societies evolved in response to colonialism. Although pre-colonial wars for 
territorial domination prevailed, the territorial structures were hardly enforced or policed. 
Herbst (2000) concurs, adding that the large expanses of land and small populations in 
dispersed settlements in pre-colonial Africa created administrative problems for even the 
more powerful kingdoms. However colonialism constructed new boundaries that welded 
together tribal and ethnic groups into distinct territories not necessarily subscribed to by these 
groups. In order to enforce colonial power and preserve the resource extraction imperative, 
patrimonialism manifested in selective material inducements and coercion of different 
interests to contain the agitations against colonialism‘s arbitrary political geography. The 
varied application of patronage maintained old or created new inter-tribal hegemonies. The 
overarching concern for servicing the metropolitan economy of the North constrained 
colonial administrators from developing systematic and universal approaches to 
development.
50
 Indeed, the indirect rule system adopted by the British using intermediaries to 
govern their colonies typified the ambivalent colonial concern for nation building (Ndulu & 
O‘Connel, 1999:49). Thus patrimonialism was institutionalised as an instrument of civic 
administration by which statehood was maintained among non-consenting ethnic groups.   
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 Tordoff (1993: 121-2) notes that at the turn of the century, colonial officers working in the colonies were very 
few. However getting to the end of the colonial era, efforts were made at developing a more comprehensive 
public administration system in British and French colonies.  
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4.2.4 The perspective of neo-patrimonialism as a state-building imperative 
It has been argued that the nationalist leaders who led the anti-colonial movements 
and ultimately took over power after colonialism were themselves groomed through the 
instruments of colonialism – Western education and religion – to imbibe the principles and 
practice of their peculiar approach to governance. Therefore these new nationalist leaders had 
very little realistic experience in constructing statehood and modernising their societies. As a 
result, the administrative systems put in place by the previous colonial enterprise did not 
transform but rather stalled and as administrative inertia set in, the new leaders resorted to the 
neo-patrimonial practices to ensure development (Young, 2004). Furthermore the 
mobilisation of the productive – economic and political – forces in society to pursue the state-
building and economic development imperative found merit in centralising the state in 
production and allocation decisions. In this respect, political plurality constituted a 
dissipation of resources and energy critical for development and state-building. As a result, 
liberal pluralism was discouraged as the government executed the state-building and 
economic development agenda with little tolerance for opposition. Thus political 
convergence was sought which evolved into authoritarianism using the coercive power of the 
state. Julius Nyerere, first president of Tanzania and a key anti-colonial leader in Africa, 
unambiguously underlined the state-building rationale for authoritarianism; 
The new nations of the African continent are emerging today as the result of their struggle for 
independence. This struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic one which necessarily 
leaves no room for difference (in ―The African and Democracy‖ cited in Herbst, (1993:97) 
Tordoff (1993: 123) and Konadu-Agyeman (2001:29) argue, generally and particularly for 
Ghana respectively, that colonial rulers restrained indigenous capital accumulation thereby 
constraining the creation of a pluralist-capitalist society. The existence of a very small class 
of private entrepreneurs at independence permitted the political class the leeway to craft an 
active role for the state in capital accumulation for national development. In the face of 
perceived paucity of domestic capital and national economic vulnerability of the new states, it 
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became imperative to assert and consolidate state viability through state-led policies. 
Furthermore the pre-requisites for constructing the state demanded centralising political 
authority to mobilise mass subscription to the (inherited) territorial construct, to define the 
subjects of this geopolitical order, and to structure and legitimize the relationship between 
leaders and subjects. At the same time, the need to generate economic growth required ―new 
instruments and rationales for re-ordering production, allocation of resources and extraction 
of surplus‖ (Eyoh, 1996: 45-46). This arrangement necessitated privileging particular 
interests in society and consequently engendering conflicts that would disproportionately 
affect ―social classes, regions and cultural groups‖. Chabal (1994) notes the turn in the 
rhetoric of nationalist government to justify authoritarian rule; 
. ………. As the assumption that modernization meant Westernization was shattered in post-colonial 
Africa, so the nationalist vision was revised. The traditions of African politics were re-examined in the 
search for a key to an understanding of the vagaries of modern politics. The colonial system was now 
claimed by the post-nationalist to have bequeathed a legacy of unworkable political practices which 
went against the African ‗genius‘. If consensus was the African way, one-party states were natural and 
elections mere formalities. If traditional solidarity still prevailed, trade-unions could only be divisive 
(Chabal, 1994:45-46; emphasis added) 
Notwithstanding the justifications for neo-patrimonialism, the re-emergence of the 
neoclassical economists in dominating the debates on development in the 1980s led to the 
denigration of the observed governance practices in developing countries, especially in 
Africa. This subsequently led to calls for economic and political reforms which are examined 
in the next section. 
4.3  Neutering state “legitimacy” by the “counter revolution” – the roll back 
As has been indicated in Chapter 2, the return to neoclassical economics, labelled ―the 
counter-revolution‖ and its focus on the logic of markets and free trade gained traction with 
the election of conservative governments in the US, UK and Germany between 1979 and 
1981. In Chapter 2, I focused on the effect of this paradigmatic change on the lending 
activities of the World Bank in housing. In this section I focus on the effect of this change on 
neoclassical thought on the question of state legitimacy and its instruments. As I have noted 
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previously the application of development economics views in legitimising state-led 
development in the early post-colonial era had contributed to the ossification of the political 
structures in the responses to internal and external interests. Given the preference for market 
agents as the sole legitimate entities for production allocation and re-distribution, the 
fundamental posture of the advocates of neoclassical economics in the 1970s, spearheaded by 
the World Bank and the IMF, was antithetical to the logic of state-led development. The 
principal instrument formulated to achieve the goals of neoclassical economists in the 
counter-revolution – the ―Structural Adjustment Programme‖ (SAP) – clearly sought to 
deconstruct state-led development arrangements. SAPs were conceived during the crisis 
events of the late 1970s that had engulfed most developing countries, especially in Africa. 
The crises had antecedents in the worsening international terms of trade and scandalous 
economic and social policy choices of African governments from the late 1960s onwards. In 
summary the primary events that fuelled the crisis of the 1970s included among others 
significant rises in global oil prices, sharp falls in export commodity prices, reckless increases 
in military expenditure by developing countries, and severe famines. These incidents 
combined to cause sharp rises in foreign debt (US$ 9.02 billion in 1970 to US$ 49.6 billion in 
1978) and increased demand for food imports of non-oil exporting countries (US$ 1.9 billion 
in 1973 to US$ 6 billion in 1980) (Owusu, 2003: 1656-1657; Mosely et al, 1991a). These 
events had significant adverse and unequal social and geographic impacts within and between 
countries, putting most African countries in political peril (Riddle, 1992; Hettne, 1995).  The 
crises generated a clear rationale for characterising the prevailing governance practices as 
―bad governance‖ or being emblematic of ―soft‖ or ―weak states‖ and created the platform 
upon which the World Bank and its allies designed programmes to detach the state from its 
dominant position in development. The strength of a state is measured by the capacity to 
internally assert its legitimacy and externally cohere against implosion or the erosion of its 
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sovereignty (Sangmpam, 1993). A weak state experiences a reduced ability to deliver on its 
mandate of generating and equitably allocating social, economic and political goods to the 
polity. The weak state is seen to be controlled by a range of forces from within and without 
that transfer these social, economic and political goods inequitably and consequently result in 
the disengagement of significant sections of the polity from the control of the state. In this 
respect it was observed that weak states lost institutional authority and were deemed to have 
failed to become de-institutionalised (Sangmpam, 1993). By characterising the crisis-hit 
developing countries as weak states, the World Bank and their allied neoclassical economists 
were successful in compelling economic and political reforms to disengage the state. 
In the early 1980s the initial focus of the reforms of the state was getting ―prices 
right‖ by deregulating monetary policies that affected interest rates, foreign exchange and 
trade; and reducing the size of the state to suit its limited role in the economy, failed to 
achieve the goals of improving economic recovery and subsequently necessitated the 
expansion of the neoclassical prescriptions of reforms to policy making. It was observed that,  
policy reforms alone would not suffice to activate markets because a supportive array of political, 
administrative, legal, and economic institutions was lacking. African states would therefore need the 
will and capacity to tackle "deep" institutional restructuring as well as policy reform (Sandbrook, 1995: 
278). 
The institutional reforms required would need to go beyond reducing the size of the 
bureaucracy; 
Markets could not work their magic in the absence of social peace and political stability, a range of 
reliable physical and social infrastructure, a disciplined and expert Weberian-type bureaucracy, 
functioning financial institutions, the rule of law, and a predictable and non-confiscatory tax system. If 
these conditions do not exist, then the state must create them (Sandbrook, 1995: 279; emphasis added).  
Szeftel (2000) notes the concern of the World Bank (1999) about the weak governance in 
African countries and that 'internal checks and balances within government need to be 
stronger', and 'anti-corruption laws must be adequately enforced, the key "watchdog" 
institutions made strong and sufficiently funded, and corrupt practices visibly punished' 
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(Szeftel, 2000: 290)
51
. It is on this basis that reforms were canvassed by international 
development agencies such as the World Bank. Measures advocated in this respect included 
the passage of anti-corruption legislation, de-politicization of policy making, improvements 
in public administration practices, and reduction of the public sector through retrenchment 
and privatization, and lastly decentralisation. Resulting from these reforms new public 
administration approaches have evolved in institutional forms in charge of specific policy 
spheres such as monetary regulation, elections, public procurement, and public expenditure 
monitoring. The World Bank‘s so called good governance principles from the 1980s 
conceived the reformed state to be; 
epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a 
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil 
society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law (World Bank, 1999 cited 
in Thomas, 2007: 729)  . 
The state in most African countries thus underwent structural transformation under the 
guidance of the World Bank in particular. In spite of the reforms the neoclassical counter 
revolution was subjected to rigorous critique, partly because of the failure to achieve the 
envisaged results of the reforms, and this critique is discussed in the following section. 
4.3.1  Critique of the “Counter Revolution”– inspired reforms  
Even though the neoclassical economics thought ascended in the 1980s, shored by the 
economic and political crises in developing countries in general and Africa in particular, it 
nonetheless received a lot of criticisms. Bracking (2003) argues that conceiving the state 
through neoclassical lenses takes away from the opportunity to re-conceptualize the 
governance approach in the context of the imperative for affirmative action necessary to 
reverse inherent structural biases from the colonial era. Using case examples of South Africa 
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 This concern led to the establishment of the Capacity Building and Implementation Division in Washington 
and jointly with the UNDP established the Africa Capacity Building Initiative in Harare, Zimbabwe (Sandbrook, 
1995:279). Similarly the emergence of transnational organisations such as Transparency International (TI) with 
substantial financial grants from donor agencies like the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) 
and the World Bank as well as the proliferation of local civil society organisations in Africa engaged in the 
issues of popular participation, accountability and human rights were prompted by such concerns.  
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and Zimbabwe, she contests the mainstream view of neo-patrimonialism based on its 
omission of this aspect of legitimacy. She argues in the cases of both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe
52
 that the historically entrenched social inequalities legitimize state-driven 
redistribution mechanisms for redressing the ―incapacity of the ―self-regulating market‖‘ 
(Bracking, 2003: 29). 
The theory of patrimonialism has difficulty in distinguishing between the legitimacy of re-distribution 
and the illegitimacy of corruption, since it assumes that patrimonialism is an essentialist structural 
failure of the state. Instead, the 'problem' of redistribution would seem to revolve around the legitimacy 
of method – empowerment, indigenisation, or kleptocracy – and the political negotiations within 
society which contextualise it. ……. The patrimonialism and corruption of African polities is often 
seen as embedded in the inability of African state personnel to break away from personal relationships 
in society, or to state regulators' inability to leave the 'free' market to its own autonomous regulation. 
There is a continuous reference to the ideal-form of divide between the public and the private of the 
European liberal state, never mind that this itself is an imagined one…….....Theorising African states 
in terms of patrimonialism has undoubtedly produced insights about state class formation and the 
structural risk of corruption. However, the theory is insufficient in an important respect: its failure to 
analyse redistributive economic exchange outside an assumed framework of illegitimacy……. 
Redistribution of wealth in sub-Saharan Africa has been restricted by ideas of the inalienable nature of 
private property and fears of financial collapse if government attempt to change property 'rights'…….. 
My point is a minor one, which is that each instance of redistribution is specific to the context in which 
legitimacy is negotiated, not the 'given' dysfunction that theories of patrimonialism seem to imply 
(Bracking, 2003: 12-15). 
 
Citing instances from traditional capitalist Europe, late capitalist Asian ―Tigers‖ such as 
South Korea, and emerging powerhouses China and India, Szeftel (2000) cautions against the 
indiscriminate, ahistorical and ethnocentric conception of neo-patrimonial governance as a 
contemporary phenomenon or peculiar to only Africa. The quest to reform such societies 
according to World Bank prescriptions threatens the legitimate development of a capitalist 
class;  
The nature of underdevelopment makes capital accumulation in the marketplace hazardous and 
relatively unrewarding. The legacy of imperialism excludes the indigenous petty bourgeoisie from 
entry into the most advanced or capital-intensive sectors of the local economy, confining it to the 
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 South Africa established a Black Empowerment program by which the economic inequalities fostered by the 
former apartheid system of governance would be corrected. Bracking notes it application in the mining sector 
with the passage of new mining laws (at the time of writing it was not yet passed) which seeks to transfer 26% 
of the sector into the hands of the ―historically disadvantaged within South Africa in 10 years‖. Additionally, the 
private sector would be expected to support raise capital for the new owners. However, Bracking notes that there 
is a general reticence of the business community to support such empowerment schemes and this has been 
compounded by the rational recourse to reselling by the new owners to cash in on high market incentives. On 
the other hand, Zimbabwe‘s land redistribution programme is a well covered subject in which the government is 
seizing, without compensation, commercial farmlands belonging to white farmers and giving to black farmers 
who are mostly veterans of the liberation war (and inadvertently party members) as well as senior government 
officials.  
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peripheral activities of commerce, artisanship and small-scale or petty commodity production. Without 
access to state office or officials and, thence, to state resources, individual and group prospects are 
extremely limited (Szeftel, 2000: 287). 
 
Mosley et al (1991a) also protest the ethnocentric undertones in the criticism of the 
governance approaches in developing countries. They go further in their critique of the 
characterisation of governance in developing countries as rent-seeking (as a component of 
neo-patrimonialism) on the premise that such attribution was a misapplication of the original 
intent of the concept of rent-seeking. The original concept of rent-seeking was intended to 
identify the welfare cost arising from the activities of interest groups competing for state 
resources. To the extent that this concept was an abstraction of an economic process resulting 
in an impersonal allocation outcome and which did not express a political value, then its new 
interpretation was discordant with the original. Mosley et al (1991a) condemned the 
characterisation of state power in developing countries as rent-seeking policy making only for 
self interest as cynical and pessimistic, and was also very selective in its conceptual approach 
to the variety of interests. Mosley et al (1991a: 11-21) discussed how an economic theory of 
politics framed the neo-liberal view of state-society relations in developing countries within 
the New Political Economy (NPE) approach. They noted the disregard of the NPE‘s approach 
to the influence and effect of international capital – the capital logic – on the local policy 
setting.  
To say, as exponents of the NPE do, that people in political positions are typically motivated only by 
individual self-interest is, and should be, shocking. However one defines the public interest, and 
however much scope one grants to the protection of private interests as part of the definition of public 
interest, the unbridled pursuit of self-interest by rulers belongs to the pathology of politics – to tyranny 
or dictatorship or, ultimately, to anarchy. To attribute individual self-interest as their exclusive motive 
to politicians in developing countries is to deny their sincerity, their merit and, ultimately, their 
legitimate right to govern. Whilst this is appropriate criticism for particular rulers or regimes, in the 
developing no less than in the developed areas of the world, as a general characterization of the state in 
developing countries, it is breathtaking in its scope and pretension (Mosley et al, 1991a: 13). 
Furthermore, the mechanics of the proposed neoclassical reforms are also problematic. 
Olowu (2003: 503–507) argues that these reforms, generated by conditions of economic, 
social and political crisis, were however based on three wrong presumptions that deviated the 
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reforms from accurately diagnosing the problems. Firstly the underlying basis for the public 
sector reforms was the associated cost of maintaining the large-sized civil service rather than 
the quality of their output. The neoclassical economics perspective thus assumed that the civil 
service was too large without recourse to empirical and qualitative assessments. As a result, 
the reforms lost sight of the technical needs and the unequal geographic balance of the public 
sector that appeared tilted towards centralised entities and urban centres rather than 
decentralised or rural-based agencies. Olowu (2003) argues further that the public sector 
problem in Africa was the lack of ―the right incentives for better performance‖ (Olowu, 
2003: 507) and not the size. Contrary to the neoclassical approach, public sector in Africa 
required more staff and increased budgets, not less, in order to attract a higher calibre that 
would deliver better quality.  
If the goal is to build stronger civil service systems that can assist the policy process, regulate and 
stimulate other organisational actors, and ensure the delivery of quality services to a discerning and 
demanding public, increased costs are inevitable (Olowu, 2003: 507).  
Olowu (2003) thus posits that whereas bureaucratic inputs and processes have improved, 
there has not been corresponding success in outcomes and impacts such as ―improved 
services delivered to the people, higher customer / citizen satisfaction and ownership, 
accountability, transparency and good governance‖ (Olowu, 2003: 505). The reforms 
advocated by the neoclassical economists canvassing for the roll back of the state in 
developing countries did little to unravel the true nature of the state. They did not take into 
consideration the mechanisms by which political legitimacy was obtained in developing 
countries (Herbst, 2000; Ndulu & O‘Connel, 1999; Bracking 2003; Szeftel; 2000). Asserting 
political legitimacy requires the persuasion or assuaging of dominant interest groups in 
society to validate the actions of the ruling classes. These dominant interest groups exist 
among many other interests, except they control resources and access to state power. 
Implicitly this infers that the concept of the state as a homogenous entity is analytically 
flawed. Rather it manifests as a platform that is contested for access to the apparatus of state 
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power and resources. In this respect, the neoclassical economic and political reforms 
advocated by the World Bank and its allied partners overlooked the tools to assert political 
legitimacy. However, the lack of attention to the agents and structures of political legitimacy 
did not deny the existence or power of these dominant interest groups. They would not 
disappear just because they were not considered in the reforms. Rather this omission inserted 
a new dynamic in the implementation of the reforms bordering on how these groups reacted 
to the lack of attention to their needs.  
In the light of the foregoing, the reform proffered by advocates of the neoclassical 
counter-revolution was itself problematic and not the logical de-politicised exercise that it 
espoused. It failed to examine the case for interrogating the political nature of the structure of 
the state and the tensions between the constituent interests. Furthermore, the proffered 
solutions of state withdrawal by advocates of the neoclassical reforms were superficial in the 
sense that their primary motive was cost reduction rather than efficiency. Thus the focus on 
the numbers employed by the state leading to the massive labour retrenchment was 
analytically misconceived. More importantly it is clear that the advocates of the neoclassical 
reforms failed to take into account the heterogeneity of the state. 
4.4 Theorising the State and Society 
Clearly, the conceptualisation of the state was analytically problematic in both the 
state-led and market-led narratives of development. The market-led analysis of the state does 
not take into account the dialectical relationship between the constituents of state and society 
at either the macro level or at the sectoral level. Furthermore, both state- and market-led 
analysis do not explore the potentially variable responses of the constituent interest groups to 
dictates for reform that could de-legitimise the instruments used in the quest for domination. 
Thomas (2007) posits government‘s simulation of conformance with reform proposals of 
international agencies only in order to access resources.  
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Few people are likely to ‗own‘ reforms that will land them in gaol (sic) (p.736) ...........Neo-patrimonial 
governments have found that they can obtain more resources for distribution, thereby strengthening 
their own political support (and, as noted above, obviating the need for more fundamental change), by 
agreeing with the Bank. They allow the Bank to stipulate reform of laws and formal processes that 
have little to do with the way government operates or that can be quickly coopted for new purposes. 
(pp. 742 - 743) .......... Most borrower governments would refuse to work with an institution that aims 
to promote the enforcement of laws that would criminalize their method of rule unless they could be 
reasonably sure of being able to control the outcomes. Even the Bank‘s technical assistance for this 
purpose is often grudgingly accepted as an irritating concomitant of loan money (p. 744) 
The conventional analysis of the state masks the inherent heterogeneity of the state and of 
society respectively as it indiscriminately conflates them. Without recognising the 
multiplicity of interests within the state, conventional analysis is deficient in determining the 
mechanisms by which policy decision making evolves as a negotiation process and not just at 
the whims of a patron. The formal and informal rules that guide political behaviour and 
generate bureaucratic competition are important sites of conflicts that influence policy. These 
rules require deeper analysis than the generic conceptualisation of neo-patrimonialism allows.  
Another deficiency of the two narratives of market-led and state centred approaches 
of the state is their oblivious stance towards the influence of resources – intellectual and 
financial – of international development agencies on the behaviour of the constituents of the 
state and society. Whitfield and Jones (2007: 1) capture these arguments succinctly when 
they disagree with the generic application of neo-patrimonialism because it ―… fails to 
acknowledge two key points. First is the interplay between technocratic policymaking, 
political expediency and elite economic interests. Second is the dynamics and logic created 
by the foreign aid system, particularly since the 1980s‖. Skocpol (1979: 31; cited in 
Ramsamy, 2006: 20–21) condemns the mainstream development theories‘ inability to 
conceptualise the state beyond functionalist approach noting how such theories ―managed to 
create a model that simultaneously has given a decisive role to international political 
domination and deprives politics of any independent efficacy, reducing it to vulgar 
expressions of market-related interests‖. Viewed in terms of scale, politics plays a role at the 
transnational level as well as at the national and sub-national levels. This is the failing of the 
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dependency argument put forward by Konadu Agyeman (2001) in explaining the question of 
housing and urban development in Ghana. Konadu-Agyeman‘s (2001) dependency analyses 
of the housing sector at the transnational level did not recognise the influence of national or 
sub-national interests. In expanding Skocpol‘s conceptual formulation of state strength, 
Davidheiser (1992) indicates the need to look at the differential impact of state institutions 
and also the impact of society on the state. By drawing attention to the ―relative autonomy of 
the state‖ and ―replacing the notion of state with state structures‖ Davidheiser (1992: 464) 
posits that researchers examine the ―penetration of the state by societal interests‖ and also the 
―differentiation across policy institutions‖ thereby facilitating the conception of the state as a 
platform for political conflict. Ramsamy (2006:19) points out the lack of attention in the two 
development narratives to an ―elaborate choreography of external influences and domestic 
politics‖. Furthermore, he argues for acknowledgement of the ―countervailing international 
factors‖ that create grounds for the international development agencies to discard their own 
principles. He cites the instance of how an imperative need for supporting a ―strategically 
important client‖ creates the rationale for deviating from an established principle.  
Development theories suffer from not acknowledging the influence of politics in 
relation to how theories and prescriptions originated by international agencies are ―inscribed 
into local structures‖, that is the ―indigenisation process‖. On this basis Ramsamy (2006) 
goes further to make the case that the narratives of development inadequately analyse the 
issue of ―decision calculus‖ and for that reason fail to explain the variable outcomes of the 
interaction of the international agencies with different countries; ―how some countries 
circumvent international pressure, including that of the (World) Bank, while others do not‖ 
(Ramsamy, 2006:24).  
This is an under-researched arena in relation to housing reform policies based on 
principles conceived by the international development agencies such as the World Bank and 
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the UN and which are transferred to developing countries. While Gilbert (2002a, 2002b, 
2004) leads the way in analysing encounters between international agencies such as the 
World Bank and USAID, and the local policy systems in shaping housing policy reforms, he 
does not focus specifically on the experience of implementing the enabling principles. As a 
result, the local and international conditions and context within which housing reforms 
incorporating the enabling principles have been implemented, particularly in Africa, has by 
and large escaped attention of most researchers. Where it has been considered, much of the 
literature on housing reforms based on the enabling principles have focused on the 
overarching neoliberal perspective advocated by the World Bank (Ogu, 1999, Ogu & 
Ogbuozobe, 2001; Mukhija, 2001, 2004; Butcher, 2004; Rojas, 2001; Keivani, Mattingly & 
Majedi, 2005; Zhang, 2000; Lee & Zhu, 2006). The UN has published a broad review of the 
experiences of housing reforms based on enabling principles, outlining general approaches 
from the emerging lessons, but fails to address itself to the indigenisation process (UN-
Habitat, 2006). For the programmes that have been sponsored by either the World Bank or 
the UN, these reviews have not interrogated the experiences on the basis of the distinct power 
relations between and within the international agencies and interest groups within the state, 
falling prey to the notion of state homogeneity and autonomy. Given the nuanced differences 
between the World Bank and the UN in the formulation and general approach to 
implementing housing policy reforms, the encounter with local policy framework must be 
keenly viewed for an understanding of the ―decision calculus‖ in the context of the 
indigenisation process. These encounters are affected by the distinct asymmetries of power 
between and within these multinational agencies and the local policy institutions.  
It is clear from the foregoing as well as from the considerations of the preceding 
Chapter 3 that in respect of housing research in developing countries, especially in Africa, 
there are analytical gaps that have to be rectified; this thesis attempts to make a contribution 
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in this respect. In Chapter 3 I discussed the nuanced differences between the UN and the 
World Bank in their conception of the enabling principles. These differences have to be taken 
into account in analysing housing reforms that inculcated these principles. Housing research 
of the implementation of the enabling principles in the African context have suffered this lack 
of distinction in conceptualisation and its concomitant practice which I am seeking to rectify 
in this thesis. In the preceding sections of this Chapter, I have demonstrated that the analysis 
of policies frequently rest on macro-level conceptions of the state and society as homogenous 
entities. However the shortcoming of this level of analysis is found in the fact that such a 
conception obscures the complex heterogeneity and contestations encountered within state 
and society. It is the recognition given to the pluralism within the state, which this thesis 
adopts to correct the analytical shortcoming of earlier research on housing policies in Ghana 
in particular, and in Africa generally. This plurality is further complicated by the participation 
of international agencies such as the World Bank and the UN in local policies either through 
the funding arrangements or through intellectual support. The intellectual resources of the 
international agencies have led to the development of theories and principles which are 
subjected to local interpretation and adaptation, or what Ramsamy refers to as the 
―indigenisation‖. The indigenisation process of internationally developed principles have 
been overlooked in research on housing and this thesis attempts to rectify this in reviewing 
the implementation of the enabling principles in Ghana‘s housing reforms.  
Following the articulation of the enabling principles, there has been a theoretical 
pause as though the enabling principles have adequately responded to the needs of 
developing countries or for that matter their implementation has been pervasive. Indeed the 
World Bank has presently moved its focus on housing to the broader question of urban 
development (Jenkins et al, 2007). In similar fashion the UN has increasingly focused on the 
urban scale since the 1990s even though housing remain problematic. The housing sector no 
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longer enjoys exclusive focus in respect of theoretical approaches. Perhaps the departure 
from housing-specific theorisation derives from the analytical handicap of previous research 
focusing on a homogenous state and a hegemonic and unproblematic ―international‖ 
dimension discussed in the foregoing. On that basis the next section will elaborate a post-
colonial historical sketch of Ghana taking account of the complex inter-relation of the 
political and institutional elements constituting the state and society. This serves to 
foreground the subsequent discussion of the state in housing from the pre-reform through to 
the post-reform era in Chapters 5 to 7.  I chose to start this stylised sketch in the post-colonial 
era because of colonialism‘s attribution of structure and agency to the metropolitan centre 
and its discounting of the various local strategic actors as well as the indigenisation 
mechanisms by which principles developed within the international realm were adapted. 
Post-independence historical analysis opens up the ―local‖ to research on the politico-
administrative ―decision calculus‖ without foreclosing on the influence of the international. I 
end this historical sketch in 2008 to ensure a comprehensive appreciation of contextual 
setting in which housing policy reforms of the enabling principles kind and its aftermath have 
been implemented.  
4.5 The Political Economy of Post-Colonial Ghana – A Stylised Narrative 
The narration of the post-colonial history of Ghana appears to be anachronistic 
because of the transitional arrangements prior to independence in March 1957. At the end of 
the Second World War the independence aspirations were reinforced by the convergence of 
Ashanti nationalism, returning Western- trained nationalist elites and disaffected ex-service 
soldiers and local intelligentsia that coalesced into a political movement in 1946 when the 
United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed. However, an irreconcilable chasm 
opened up between the radical young intellectuals headed by Kwame Nkrumah on one side 
and the senior intellectuals and merchants aligning with the Ashanti. Nkrumah‘s group 
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became self-declared Marxists and left the UGCC to form their own party, the Convention 
Peoples Party (CPP)
 53
 in 1949. Agitations
54
 engineered by Nkrumah‘s CPP pushed the 
colonialist to accept a joint governance arrangement in 1951 which eventually culminated in 
independence in 1957. A plebiscite to determine the nature of the future independent 
Ghanaian nation as a federal or unitary state pitched the Ashanti in particular
55
 against the 
Nkrumah faction and upon the choice of the unitary state consequently established an 
ideological divide that has influenced the articulation of class interests in Ghana‘s post-
colonial evolution. The transition to independence saw the election of an indigenous 
government headed by Kwame Nkrumah from 1951 up to independence in 1957 when the 
CPP took full reins of power. Therefore although independence was gained in 1957, it is not 
anachronistic to consider public policies from 1951. Arku (2004) and Ansah (2006) have 
catalogued the economic and political traditions of post-colonial Ghana according to different 
perspectives. Arku (2004) classifies the historical narrative of economic policies according to 
the political regimes whereas Ansah (2006) organises the narrative according to the economic 
policy disposition as it related to business groups in particular and other interest groups. 
However both Arku (2004) and Ansah (2006) end their respective categorisation of the 
historical narrative in 2000. I adopt a framework that accommodates both approaches by 
viewing the relationship between the state and the society according to the political 
administration and their relationship with different segments of society. Furthermore I extend 
the periodisation to 2005 to reflect the thesis‘ overview of post-enabling housing reforms. In 
focus group discussions with present and former senior bureaucrats of the Ministry of Works 
and Housing, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, and the Local 
                                                 
53
 UGCC favoured ―self-government in the shortest possible time‖ whilst CPP adopted ―self-government now‖. 
54
 These included mass boycotts of British products and riots following the shooting of three ex-service officers 
engaging in a peaceful protest on the direct orders of a British colonial officer.  
55
 Enriched by cocoa, gold and timber and resentful of the colonial rulers‘ commandeering a disproportionate 
share of the wealth, the Ashanti were not keen for this to continue by nationalist governments. The Cocoa 
Marketing Board had been established by the colonialist in 1946 to extract taxes as the sole marketer of cocoa 
externally through the retention of a proportion of the proceeds. 
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Government Project Coordinating Unit – all of whom had worked on the housing sector 
reforms, directed me to establish the periodisation of this thesis into pre-reforms era of post-
colonial Ghana (1951 to 1985); the housing reform era (1986 to 2000) and post-housing 
reform era (2000 to 2005). The ethos of the pre-reform era aligned to the state-led 
development policies of that period, whereas that of the reform era aligned to the subscription 
of the neo-classical economics-inspired structural adjustment principles. The characterisation 
of the post- reform era derives from the conclusion of the assistance of international agencies 
directly for the reformation of the housing sector, although they remained significant in other 
sectors. Table 4.1 is a summary of the characteristic political economy features of the post-
colonial history of Ghana.  
The discussions that follow indicate that whereas Ghana‘s political economy has four 
major shifts from socialism, liberalism, kleptocracy to neoliberalism, (Periods 1 to 4 in Table 
4.1) their housing policy orientation has manifested three distinct phases characterised in the 
pre-reform, reform and post-reform. In tracing the relationship between the political 
dispositions of the various administrations, the economic policies and the interest groups in 
the polity I argue that core constituencies shifted according to political traditions that 
subsequently shaped economic policies. However, the outcomes of the policies were also 
affected by global political and economic forces which generated new logics, mostly of crisis, 
that subsequently influenced political re-action. 
As a result the penetration of the state by societal interests comprising organised 
labour, business class, intelligentsia, petty bourgeoisie, youth and students, urban and rural 
peasantry, and the bureaucracy was ambiguous, dependent on the government‘s political 
tradition and the state‘s responses to the economic exigencies. In the following section I 
present a narrative of Ghana‘s post-colonial political economy drawing from the substantial 
literature on the subject. In the process I reflect on the ambiguity in interest group relations  
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Table 4.1: List of post-colonial governments and governance tradition 
Period Dates Government Type Political tradition / Economic development stance Housing 
 
1 
1951-
1959 
Dr. K. Nkrumah 
Convention People‘s Party (CPP) 
Civilian  Socialist politics, focused on foreign direct investment and 
joint venture industrialisation. Opposed to domestic capital  
Pre-reform 
1959-
1966 
Dr. K. Nkrumah 
Convention People‘s Party (CPP) 
Civilian Marxist authoritarian; state-led development and 
industrialisation; high public spending;  modernization of 
agriculture, and education 
2 1966-
1968 
Gen. E. Kotoka / Gen. A. Afrifa  
National Liberation Council (NLC) 
Military Market-Liberalism, economic liberalisation, privatisation 
1969-
1972 
Dr. K. A. Busia / 
Progress Party (PP) 
Civilian Market-Oriented; liberal democratic; enhanced 
privatisation, devaluation; radical domestic capitalism; rural 
development focus and agricultural development. 
3 1972-
1975 
Gen. I. K. Acheampong / 
National Redemption Council (NRC) 
Military Protectionist; currency revaluation; foreign debt 
repudiation; state agriculture; 
nationalisation 
 
1975-
1978 
Gen. I. K. Acheampong / 
Supreme Military Council (SMC I) 
Military 
1978-
1979 
Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo / 
Supreme Military Council (SMC II) 
Military 
1979 Fl. Lt. J. J. Rawlings / 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
Military Radical Marxist; populist accountability methods 
1979-
1981 
Dr. H. Limann - 
Peoples National Party (PNP) 
Civilian Socialist administration; Political and economic inertia 
 
1981-
1983 
Fl. Lt. J. J. Rawlings / 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
Military Initial Marxist orientation; rigid price control;   arbitrary 
judicial system 
. 
4 1983-
1992 
Fl. Lt. J. J. Rawlings / 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
Military Socialist laissez faire. Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) - subsidy reduction, price and trade deregulation, 
currency devaluation, public sector reforms, privatisation, 
decentralisation 
Reform 
1993-
2000 
Fl. Lt. J. J. Rawlings / National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) 
Civilian 
2001-
2005 
John Agyekum Kufour  
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
Civilian Market-Liberalism. Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative 
(HIPC); expansion of infrastructure and social programmes 
Post-reform 
Source: Adapted from Arku (2004:148, Table 4.2); Ansah (2006: 150-182) 
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with the ruling classes based on logics created by ideology, economic context and the 
international political economy. 
 
4.5.1 Kwame Nkrumah’s Socialist-Authoritarian Experiment (1951 to 1966) 
The governance style of the first nationalist leader, Kwame Nkrumah can be 
divided into two distinct phases in which the Marxist-socialist ideological rhetoric 
remained the same whilst the economic development approach pivoted from a focus on 
foreign direct investment to state-led industrialisation. Right from the start, Nkrumah 
espoused a variant of Marxism that he labelled as the ―scientific socialism‖ as the way to 
socio-economic development. This ideology and the rift at the formative stages of the 
independence quest made Nkrumah‘s government antagonistic towards domestic capital 
formation. The Ashanti chiefs, cocoa farmers and merchants together with the 
intelligentsia in urban areas formed the majority of the domestic business class and also 
the opposition in alliance with rural peasantry.  
Nkrumah‘s support came from the ―‗upstart class‘ - a lower petty bourgeoisie of 
teachers, civil servants, small businessmen and traders, allied with union workers and an 
urban lumpenproletariat‖ (Ansah, 2006:163). However, limited capital and the dearth of 
local managerial and policy capacity weakened the socialist development approach and 
engendered a disjuncture between political aspirations and economic policies in the first 
period of the Nkrumah regime (1951-1959). It culminated in a ―compromise with 
capitalism‖ (Ansah, 2006:164). A foreign direct investment (FDI) drive56 drew in some 
multinational corporations in commerce, banking, mining and shipping (Hansen et al, 
                                                 
56
 Several initiatives were passed in this quest. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) set up in 
1947 to provide loans to industrialist was restructured in 1953 to establish subsidiaries, associate or joint 
venture companies that would collaborate with the foreign direct investors (Ansah, 2006: 164). 
Subsequently a Capital Investment Board was established for similar purpose in 1963. 
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1989: 5 cited in Ansah, 2006:170)
57
. Esseks (1971) notes that Nkrumah was content to 
have foreign capitalists – Lebanese, Indians and Europeans especially – dominate until 
state enterprises would be strong enough to compete. In spite of the disjuncture between 
ideology and economic policies, the core constituencies of Nkrumah‘s support did not 
question or protest, rather demanding part ownership and representation on the boards of 
such companies
58
 (Ansah, 2006). Aryeetey and Fosu (2000: 45) indicate that organised 
labour had been largely assimilated as an appendage of the ruling party machinery 
whereas the voice of the bureaucracy had been effectively silenced. 
By 1959 it had become clear that the envisaged foreign direct investment was not 
forthcoming. In addition, cocoa export receipts had been or were in the process of being 
extensively dissipated in infrastructure expansion projects, affecting budget surpluses. At 
this juncture, the Nkrumah-led CPP pivoted towards the (former) Soviet Union and allies 
from the communist bloc for financial support that barely materialised in investments and 
more in technical assistance. On the basis of ideology Nkrumah opted for state-led 
industrialisation as opposed to domestic capital partly due to his views of its 
inappropriateness for socialism (Ansah, 2006). The new approach culminated in the 
expansion of the state sector with state-owned enterprises growing from 4 in 1957 to 53 
in 1966 (capitalised by a total investment of £82 million), 12 joint venture initiatives, 23 
public boards and a corresponding growth of the bureaucracy to 31 ministries by 1966 
(Appiah-Kubi, 2001; Arku, 2004; Ansah, 2006). Envisaging agriculture as the base for 
industrialisation led to the establishment of many farming cooperatives (state owned or 
                                                 
57
 The Akosombo Hydroelectric Dam and the Volta Aluminium Company were built through such 
arrangements with Kaiser Aluminium Company from the US as the lead investor. 
58
 However, workers of the mining industry in 1955 and the Ghana Railways Corporation in 1961 went on 
strike which led to the Trade Union Act in 1955 banning strikes and subsequently the arrest of the labour 
leaders together with noted opposition members in 1961.  
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voluntary) that were party-linked. Given the strength of the opposition in the rural area, 
agricultural support also served the political purpose of availing public resources that 
would effectively weaken the opposition
59
. The resort to cooperative approaches in 
agriculture in particular and as a mechanism for business enterprises
60
 in general, 
subsequently incorporated into the ruling party‘s agenda called ―Work and Happiness‖ 
and the 7-Year National Development Plan, is instructive. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, the cooperative approach was reinterpreted in the housing context to suit 
political instead of technical ends. In the case of agriculture, rural cooperatives yielded 
political pay-offs in weakening the opposition that also engendered opportunities for 
local leaders of the ruling party to benefit from the embedded rents (Ansah, 2006).  
The Nkrumah government took actions to neutralise the domestic business class 
and political opponents: the Preventive Detention Act in 1958
61
; the curtailment of 
government funding support for local businesses in 1960
62
; the government acquisition of 
a retail chain, Commonwealth Trust, to preclude domestic business from benefiting in 
1961; and the 7-Year Development Plan (1963 – 1970) debarring domestic shares 
acquisition in large companies (Ansah, 2006: 171). According to Aryeetey and Fosu 
(2000) various interest groups had been compromised or intimidated to ensure the 
supreme authority of the state and the ruling party
63
. The opposition coalition against 
                                                 
59
 The creation of Cocoa Purchasing Company in 1953 as the sole buyer of cocoa from farmers eliminated 
local middlemen, sympathisers of the opposition. 
60
 Nkrumah preferred small scale enterprises which he felt were commensurate with the domestic 
managerial capacity and supported socialist development approach. For a full discussion on this see Esseks 
(1971)  
61
 This gave the government powers to arrest and jail opponents including the business class as subversive 
elements for a maximum of five years without the right to appeal (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild, 1982:65).  
62
 The domestic capitalist class was to ―stand on its own feet and not rely on the Government for its 
development‖ (Ghanaian Times 10th October 1960 cited in Esseks, 1971:21) 
63
 Under colonialism, the indirect rule system gave traditional authorities roles in local civil administration. 
Under Nkrumah these were eroded as some chiefs were removed by government edicts. Laws were passed 
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Nkrumah broadened after he pushed through a plebiscite to turn the country into a one-
party state in 1964 and retired the two top officers of the Ghanaian Army in 1965. In 
February 1966, the Nkrumah government was overthrown by an alliance of army and 
police, supported principally by the main opposition groups
64
. 
4.5.2   The Market-Liberalism Interregnum (1966 – 1972) 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) that took power from the Nkrumah 
government espoused market liberalism and initiated de-regulation programmes to 
reverse the socialist policies of Nkrumah. Ansah (2006: 174) indicates that the 
bureaucracy was reshaped into an anti-socialist and pro-market one by drawing in some 
technocrats disaffected with Nkrumah‘s economic direction. The military administration 
proceeded on a privatisation programme that however had to be curtailed because of 
public protests (Appiah-Kubi, 2001; Aryeetey & Fosu, 2000; Ansah, 2006). In general 
the emphasis of the new administration was to support local private enterprise which was 
demonstrated in the passing of a law to reserve some sectors of the economy for 
indigenous businesses in 1968
65
. The NLC military government promoted private 
participation in housing, agriculture and commerce (Arku, 2004). In 1969 the state 
returned to democratic rule in an election that saw the former opposition alliance to 
Nkrumah‘s rule taking office. The Progress Party government, headed by Dr. K. A. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to allow the government to effectively seize lands which chiefs customarily administered by right on behalf 
of indigenous groups, seen as a sacred duty to their communities. On one occasion Nkrumah declared his 
intention to chase chiefs out of their palaces. The judiciary were also not spared. In 1964, the Chief Justice 
was expelled because of an unfavourable ruling in a treason trial of political opponents. Within the party 
moderates had been alienated or dismissed. 
64
 The military overthrow of Nkrumah also had support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the 
US as part of the global encounters of the Cold War. 
65
 The sectors exclusively reserved for local businesses included small-scale retail, representation of foreign  
businesses, taxi services and any ventures in small scale extractive, processing or manufacturing industry or 
transportation employing thirty people or less‖. Affected firms had to ensure change to Ghanaian 
ownership within five years (Esseks, 1971: 25). 
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Busia, as self-declared liberal democrats was logically inclined to deepening market 
liberalisation and the local capitalist‘s empowerment initiatives of the military 
predecessors, thus continuing with the privatisation drive
66
. The Busia administration 
engineered a radical ―Ghanaianisation‖ of the economy by passing the Alien‘s 
Compliance Order
67
 and the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act of 1970 to open up spaces 
in the economy for the local private sector to thrive and thereby cultivate political support 
(Esseks, 1971: 26–27). The government further expanded initiatives in agriculture and 
rural development, which had been the base of their support since pre-independence. In 
conducting these market liberalisation policies, the government had an ambiguous 
relationship with the bureaucracy. On the one hand, the government initially provided 
generous incentives for the top hierarchy of the civil service in order attract high quality 
personnel (Agyapong, 1990). On the other hand, the government viewed the civil 
servants suspiciously, wanting to put them in their place, which subsequently led to the 
dismissal of 568 civil servants on sometimes very spurious grounds in 1970 
(Goldsworthy, 1973). However, where the Busia market-inclined government favoured 
the local business class, it was adversarial towards organised labour and generally 
intolerant of opposition
68
. When organised labour protested the imposition of a 5% 
national development levy principally on urban wages and cuts in allowances of civil 
servants in 1971, the government seized their assets and, following a rushed Industrial 
Relations Act, banned the Trade Union Congress (Goldsworthy, 1973; Jeffries, 1982). 
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 However, few state enterprises in export, grains and cotton  promotion were also set up (Appiah-Kubi, 
2001) 
67
 This expelled 150,000 foreigners who had been in the country without valid work or stay permits. 
68
 In April 1971 when the National Union of Ghanaian Students condemned the government and legislature 
for delaying compliance with mandatory asset declaration of political appointees and legislators, the 
introduction of student loans in lieu of free education and other actions perceived to be wrong, they were 
roundly criticised by senior government personnel and their leaders hauled before the legislature to 
apologise. 
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The 44% devaluation of the currency in 1971 as part of austerity measures necessitated 
by falls in global cocoa prices and massive foreign debts
69
 triggered sharp rises in 
consumer goods locally and undermined the government‘s core support. Additionally, 
perceived demoralising actions by the government aimed at heads of the military made 
the return of the military to government inevitable, which followed in January 1972 
(Goldsworthy, 1973, Boafo-Arthur, 1999).  
4.5.3   The Decline into Economic and Political Abyss (1972 – 1983) 
The era that followed the overthrow of the Busia administration has been 
described as one of ―complete mismanagement‖ (Huq, 1989 cited in Herbst, 1993) and 
kleptocracy (Sandbrook & Oelbaum, 1997) presided over by five successive governments 
that were all – but one – military regimes. With even more fervour, the National 
Redemption Council military government that took power from the Busia administration 
in 1972 reversed all the market liberalisation policies of the former government to 
legitimise the military overthrow and rationalise their stay in power. Several policy 
measures were implemented to appease the polity disaffected by the previous 
government, but with disastrous economic consequences. The currency was re-valued by 
26%, the import licence regime reinstated and the privatisation policies curtailed. Some 
of the country‘s external debts, especially those owed to British companies and 
amounting to £100 million, were unilaterally repudiated by the military regime triggering 
a freeze on lending by international creditors. This freeze in turn caused the government 
                                                 
69
 Libby (1976) and Boafo-Arthur (1999) discuss extensively the internal strife within Busia‘s government 
on the best way to deal with foreign debts inherited from previous administrations and those accrued from 
taking power in 1969, all of which totalled more than £ 800million. The Finance Minister, J. H. Mensah, 
lost to a cabal of Havard Development Advisory Services (DAS) in the decision to drastically devalue the 
currency.  
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to adopt a self-reliance policy approach such as the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and 
Operation Feed Your Industry (OFYI) programmes (Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Aryeetey & 
Fosu, 2000). Public enterprises were established for this purpose
70
 as well as in other 
industries. In spite of anti-capitalist rhetoric, the participation of foreign owned 
companies in agricultural ventures was encouraged. The expansion of corporate activities 
in agriculture and the large scale activities by the ruling classes induced the rural 
peasantry to convert to petty wage earners (Ansah, 2006). High returns on cocoa exports 
from 1973 to 1974 that masked short-term effects of the credit freeze were however 
wiped out by the global oil crisis of 1975. A famine and another spiral in global oil prices 
in the late 1970s engendered the government‘s regression into worse forms of 
authoritarianism, cronyism, economic mismanagement, patronage and embezzlement. 
Through a number of ―Participation Decrees‖ the government forcibly acquired 
significant shares in nearly all multinational companies and also nationalised some 
foreign owned companies, especially those owned by Lebanese, Syrian and Indian 
families (Appiah-Kubi, 2001). Migration by the rural peasantry and urban professional 
classes were triggered by an economic boom in oil producing countries and Nigeria in 
particular
71
. Artificial price controls created opportunities for the ruling class and top 
bureaucrats to create rents in parallel markets. Import licences, foreign exchange, permits 
and other facilities became sites of competition, patronage and outright graft. Cocoa, 
mineral exports, output of staple foods all halved whereas inflation averaged 58% 
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 Ansah (2006) notes the ruling class direct participation in the agriculture scheme, taking advantage of the 
state-sanctioned cheap credit. 
71
 All segments of the society joined in this wave of migration from the urban professionals to the rural 
peasants. A total of 2 million people, constituting more than 20% of the 1970 population, moved to Nigeria 
during this period with an estimated average daily arrival of 300 people (Aryeetey and Fosu 2000; Anarfi et 
al, 2003). 
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throughout the period between 1974 and 1983. Real wages eroded to 25% of 1970 levels 
by 1983 (Aryeetey & Fosu, 2000). Private sector share of formal employment, with 
110,000 employees engaged in 1970 and rising to 137,000 by 1975, rapidly declined to 
46,000 by 1983, representing 13.6% of formal sector employment (Canagarajah & 
Mazumdar, 1999). The government extracted surpluses from the rural economy to pacify 
urban interest groups, such as organised labour, by maintaining producer prices, 
especially of cocoa, and providing periodic raises in remuneration, leading to increasing 
cases of cocoa smuggling to neighbouring countries where farmers could earn up to six 
times as much (Jeffries, 1982: 312-313). Arising from the economic crisis, virtually all 
segments of the society were disaffected, except for the ruling class and their business 
and bureaucratic collaborators. As the situation degenerated it culminated in changes in 
the leadership and constitution of the government
72
. Eventually junior military officers 
overthrew the ruling cabal and attempted to radically address the crisis by unleashing 
what amounted to a brief class war that, however, did not stop the decline before handing 
over to civilian rule after three months in power. 
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), comprising junior army 
officers professing Marxist ideals, after overthrowing the Supreme Military Council 
government in June 1979, embarked on a ―house cleaning exercise‖. The AFRC meted 
out harsh punishment to perceived ―economic saboteurs‖ in the name of ―probity and 
accountability‖ and ―revolutionary justice‖ that essentially targeted the rich as well as 
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 An attempt to transform from a military to civilian administration was met by significant resistance in the 
polity and galvanised the coalition of the opposition to the military government 
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other traders who were not necessarily rich
73
. These actions were enthusiastically 
supported across the polity and the brutal violence appeared to be the only way to 
appease the masses
74
. After three months the country was returned to civilian democratic 
rule in 1979 without any changes to the structural logic of the state. The People‘s 
National Party led by Dr. Hilla Limann, which was elected into office, was virtually 
paralysed by the impact of the decade of economic mismanagement and internal strife 
within the ruling party. As a result the country went through a period of economic and 
political inertia until the 31
st
 December 1981, when the military returned to power 
through another overthrow.  
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took over from the civilian 
administration on the pretext of undertaking a comprehensive Marxist revolution to rid 
the state of the decline. However, it was compelled by circumstances to reorient itself 
midstream through its administration, resulting in two distinct phases within the same 
regime similar to Nkrumah‘s rule in the 1950s to 1960s. The PNDC government initially 
set out as a radical Marxist regime with a direct link to the short-lived AFRC regime
75
 of 
1979 and policy measures were in the same radical vein. The government proceeded to 
set up structures for the revolution which ran in parallel to the established structures of 
state in the judiciary and local governance. The systems applied by these revolutionary 
organs were often arbitrary but had dire consequential effects. The mobilisation of cadres 
of supporters from the establishment of ―Peoples Defence Committees‖ (PDC) and 
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 This included the execution of 8 former military leaders, the burning of some major markets 
predominantly run by women traders, nationalisation of properties primarily owned by foreigners and the 
former ruling class, and stringent application of price controls. 
74
 Student groups and others of the petty bourgeoisie went on mass demonstrations in support of the 
executions and asking for more with the now infamous ―let the blood flow‖ placards.  
75
 Besides Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings heading both governments, they also had a core of Marxist 
ideologues.  
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―Workers Defence Committees‖ (WDC) enabled the regime to legitimise itself among 
sections of the society. Furthermore the ―Citizens‘ Vetting Committees‖ (CVC) became 
an instrument to mete out revolutionary justice by extracting financial resources from 
perceived economic saboteurs. By August 1982, the CVC had imposed the equivalent of 
approximately $2 million as punitive taxes from 52 people (Ahiakpor, 1985: 544)
 76
. 
Price and exchange rate controls were stringently reinforced and nationalisation 
threatened or implemented without recourse to legal systems (Jeffries, 1982; Ahiakpor, 
1985).  Draconian approaches and populism meshed in the actions of the regime as 
exemplified in PNDC Law 7, which empowered the government to allocate unoccupied 
private residential property to ―every Ghanaian who has nowhere to sleep‖ where the 
ownership could not be ascertained. 
The ideological basis for the PNDC‘s actions was developed by self-declared 
Marxist intellectuals from the universities enamoured with the dependency ideology of 
the 1970s which also resonated with organised labour, students and petty bourgeoisie 
who formed the ruling class‘s support coalition (Hutchful, 2002; Ansah, 2006). The 
business class (foreign and local), the bureaucracy and non-Marxist intelligentsia were 
not viewed favourably in this regard. However, in spite of the ideological and rhetorical 
disposition, the harsh economic realities persisted. By 1982, half of the urban population 
and two-thirds of the rural population fell below the poverty line. The economy was put 
under further strain by protracted drought and bush fires affecting the entire Sahelian 
region from 1982
77
 (New Internationalist, 1984; Sandbrook & Oelbaum, 1997). This 
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 I return to the strategic influence of the leadership of CVC on the housing reforms in Chapter 7. 
77
 ―Famine is not a threat in West Africa. It has arrived. World Bank experts are giving Chad and Upper 
Volta just two months to total collapse barring increased aid, and Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Ghana not 
much longer‖ (New Internationalist 1984).  
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crisis was further accentuated by the sudden influx of Ghanaians deported from Nigeria 
in January 1983. There is no certainty on the exact number of Ghanaians who returned 
but estimates range between 900,000 to 1,500,000 (Gravil, 1985; Peil, 1995; Anarfi et al, 
2003)
78
. Gravil (1985) asserts that the expulsion order of the Nigerian government was 
targeted at Ghanaians in retaliation for the Aliens Compliance Order passed in 1969. 
Tsikata (2001:18) notes that within this short period, there was a 10% addition to the 
country‘s population. After the failing to stimulate economic growth through self-reliance 
and subsequently failing to secure the needed help from Russia and its communist allies, 
the government turned to the World Bank and IMF for assistance. This return to the 
World Bank demonstrated the force of economic reality in imposing a new logic for 
policy change and institutional reforms that undermined political ideology. In return for 
financial assistance from IMF and the World Bank, the country was subjected to fiscal 
and monetary policy conditionalities under the stabilisation and successor economic 
recovery programmes. These programmes in essence intended to structurally adjust 
ownership of the mode of production.  
Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997: 613) note the debilitating effect of the economic 
crises on the ability of various interest groups to effectively protest against the 
adjustment. The collapse in industrial capacity had reduced organised labour‘s capacity to 
protest whilst diffuse alignment and opposition together with political buyout had 
ensured that the leadership was discredited. Urban consumers had naturally gravitated 
and adjusted to obtaining goods and services from the parallel markets in the face of the 
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 Peil (1974:367) notes that of the 200,000 migrants expelled from Ghana under the Aliens Compliance 
Order of November 1969 the majority were Nigerians. 
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protracted economic difficulties, whereas some sections of the bureaucracy had adapted 
by undertaking secondary employment to survive
79
. 
4.5.4   Reforming to (Pseudo-) Neo-Liberalism (1983 – 2008) 
A request from the Secretary of Finance and Economic Planning to the World 
Bank and IMF launched a series of missions starting from November 1982, through to 
June 1983 to assess the general economic situation of the country. Upon completion of 
the assessment, the World Bank and IMF prioritised an economic stabilisation 
programme comprising price re-alignment measures of local currency devaluation, 
interest rates deregulation, and reduction in budget deficits. Subsequently, the structural 
adjustment program (SAP) was initiated which made the provision of loans conditional to 
the implementation of policy reforms in sectors such as cocoa, mining, public service, 
health, education, governance, and the urban sector. The main prescriptions of the 
reforms touched on reducing the state sector in the civil service, reducing indiscriminate 
public subsidies on social services, facilitating the growth and participation of the local 
private sector, investment in infrastructure to attract foreign direct investments and 
divesting the state of its stake in public enterprises. It was noted that prior to the reforms, 
the civil service grew five times more than the annual growth of the labour market. Yet 
the office of the Head of Civil Service was not aware of the full extent of direct public 
employment and the structure in the civil service. Planning and budgeting capacity was 
non-existent and could only be done through task forces. A mission from the World Bank 
in 1987 found that quantitative and qualitative labour rationalisation were necessary in 
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 The motives for some of the methods employed to silence critics were vengeful and the acts were 
criminal as exemplified by the state-sanctioned murder of three high court judges and a retired personnel 
manager by a member of the executive with the connivance of state security apparatus.  
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Ghana‘s case (World Bank, 1987). However, the initial emphasis of these reforms 
appeared to be solely on the quantitative reduction of the public administration staff 
levels. Civil service capacity to effectively design and implement policies had eroded 
over time but could not be addressed until the economy had been stabilised (Ayee, 2001; 
Tsikata, 2001)
80
. The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) was launched in 1987 ―to 
restructure the civil service in such a way as to make it more productive, effective and 
efficient, and strengthen its capacity for the implementation of development 
programmes‖ (Ayee, ibid: 8). The government agreed to the World Bank / IMF 
conditions to reduce the civil service by 45,000 annually for three years starting in 1986. 
In the event, a marginally lower number of retrenchments occurred starting with the 
purging of non-existent, deceased and dismissed workers from staff roll. The retention of 
deceased and dismissed workers was made possible by the corrupt cliques within the 
bureaucracy who set up accounts to receive salaries and share of such ―ghost‖ workers. It 
manifested the weak monitoring systems in the civil service, which rarely had head count 
exercises. 11,000 jobs were shed from the education sector in 1986 followed by a further 
6,740 in 1987 in other sectors. As at March 1992, civil and public service staff levels 
amounted to108, 000, representing a reduction of 28,000. 
These reforms have continued from the PNDC neoliberal phase through two 
successive civilian administrations at the time of writing this thesis. The PNDC military 
administration returned the country to democratic rule in 1992. However the military 
regime metamorphosed into a political party, National Democratic Congress (NDC), and 
won a highly disputed election. In the aftermath of the rancour, the opposition parties 
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 Davis‘ (1990 cited in Ayee, 2001:3) viewed that the civil service reforms in Ghana were occasioned by 
their (perceived or observed) inability to forge effective programmes out of the SAP reforms worthy of 
implementation, giving rise to (donor) frustrations with the service. 
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boycotted the parliamentary elections creating a de-facto one-party civilian state in the 
first parliament of 1993-1996. In 1996, opposition parties returned to contest the elections 
and won 36 seats out of 130 seats. The NDC won the second term of office (1996 to 
2000) in which the neoliberal policies continued. However, in 2000 the opposition New 
Patriotic Party won the elections and assumed power in January 2001, thereby bringing 
about the first ever non-violent change of government in the history of the country. The 
New Patriotic party labelled itself a right of centre government and had its antecedents in 
the anti-Nkrumah Ashanti-resistance and liberal-market-oriented Progress Party regime 
discussed in Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. Indeed, John Kufuor, who led the New Patriotic 
Party to election victory in 2000, had been a Deputy Minister in the Progress Party 
government of 1969 – 1972. 
In the process of implementing the neoliberal reforms, new logics were inserted 
between the ruling class and various interest groups. The government used the onset of 
decentralisation reforms in 1987 to reconstruct its legitimacy and support from the former 
revolutionary cadre groups that had disbanded in 1984. Decentralisation offered the 
government the opportunity to simulate the government‘s populist slogan of ―power to 
the people‖ by establishing structures of local authority that nonetheless remained in the 
stranglehold of the government (Haruna, 2003)
81
. Thus, decentralisation was a re-
interpreted political project and furthermore a means to deflect pressure from foreign and 
domestic pressure for administrative reforms instead of the envisaged rationalised 
bureaucracy and therefore, the quest for comprehensive decentralisation remains 
unfulfilled (Haruna, 2003; Ayee and Asante, 2004). 
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 This has led to the coining of the phrase ―decentralised centralisation‖ (Ayee, 1999 in Haruna 2003) 
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A small circle of technocrats appointed by the government were very instrumental 
in forging the design and implementation of the structural reforms. Their influence was 
secured by the government‘s protection of this group from the pre-existing rent-seeking 
structures in the state. This engendered effectiveness in initiating the reforms
82
 
(Sandbrook & Oelbaum, 1997; Hutchful, 2002). However, it is the case that in 
undertaking this task the institutional layering of this group of politically appointed 
experts over the bureaucracy further deepened the bureaucracy‘s dis-articulation of policy 
capacity already demoralised by unstable policies of the 1970s and negative perception 
held by the government. Hutchful (1995: 305 - 307) notes that this team of local experts, 
with wide ranging ideological postures, were nonetheless pragmatist and shared a 
common suspicion of the bureaucracy. Given their diversity, the reasons ranged from 
perceptions of the bureaucracy as instruments of exploitative classes and ideologically 
opposed to the regime, to their administrative inertia. As a result, failures in the reforms 
were quickly blamed on the bureaucrats irrespective of other mitigating circumstances.  
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government, which took over power in 
December 1981, blamed the civil service for not only sabotaging its policies and footdragging but 
also regarded the top echelons of the service as "allies of imperialism and neo-colonialism which 
should be subjected to revolutionary overthrow and not mere reforms" ............The bureaucracy 
has been blamed for adjusting too slowly to or resisting the decentralization process (Ayee, 2001: 
7) 
The civil service reform component which envisaged improvement in civil service did 
not effectively target the political element embedded in the relationship between the 
political class and the bureaucracy (Haruna, 2003). Haruna (2003) indicates further that 
the primary concerns of civil servants which include ―weakening of civil service 
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 This core was headed by the Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries, P. V. Obeng whose capacity 
made him the equivalent of a prime ministerial role. 
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protections, reduction of labour, and fear of victimisation‖, were not the basis for the 
reforms.  
Reform took the moral, social, cultural, and political context of public administration for granted 
................While pay and grading have eliminated distortions and improved equity in 
compensations, they are not the most effective means of addressing motivational concerns among 
Ghana‘s public employees. For example, Indome (1991, 4) identifies political intrusion and threats 
to tenure of office as factors contributing to what he sees as ―lethargy and apathy‖ in the civil 
service. In interviews conducted with mid- to top-level Ghanaian public-sector executives, 
politicization of the civil service was one of the most frequently cited sources of concern............ 
(Haruna 2003: 346-347).  
Some actions undertaken in the civil service reforms purportedly to strengthen the 
service however, had reverse responses because of the logics they inserted within the 
service. According to Ayee (2001), special arrangements were put in place to also recruit 
higher standards of bureaucrats from the private sector and non-governmental agencies, 
called the Skills Mobilisation Scheme, allowing such persons to be paid remuneration 
equivalent to conditions of their former employment in addition to an ―attraction margin‖ 
ranging from $200 to $3,000 monthly.  In addition, project based special duty allowances 
of $25 to $125 were paid to SAP-related project team members. All of these incentives 
experienced a backlash from those excluded and a penchant for entrenchment for those 
participating thereby inserting new logics of competition and resentment in the 
relationship between bureaucrats and the political class.  
Subsequent reforms also led to political pluralisation at the national level which 
enabled the transfer of power back to civilian administrations from 1992 up to the present 
time. The opening up of the society for competitive electioneering reinstated less 
sophisticated forms of patronage which nonetheless have been accommodated by 
international development agencies. In 1992 prior to the first elections, the government 
increased wages significantly to capture urban votes whereas rural electrification projects 
enabled rural voters to be persuaded by the incumbent administration. Similarly, a rural 
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electrification project carried out in late 1995 into 1996, the election year, was seen as an 
attempt to buy political support from rural regions. Such patterns of political patronage, 
attuned to election cycles have persisted to date with corresponding adverse effect on 
inflation irrespective of the principles for which the reforms were necessitated in the first 
place and also oblivious of the ideological persuasion of the civilian administrations that 
have been in office since 1992 (Whitfield & Jones, 2007). As a result of the new logics of 
patronage
83
, the economy went into crisis from 1991 due to weakened controls in the 
management of the structural adjustment reforms as well as the desire to ―buy‖ political 
support. The sharp wage raise for civil service prior to the 1992 elections precipitated an 
economic malaise that followed the elections and declined gradually until the advent of 
the next election in 1996 (Tsikata, 2001; Aryeetey & Harrigan, 2001; Mensah et al, 
2006)
84
. Table 4.2 below presents the key indicators of the economy from 1991 to 2000. 
Table 4.2: Key financial indicators during reforms (1991 – 2000) 
Rates / 
Year
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Inflation85 18.0 10.1 25.0 24.9 59.5 46.6 27.9 21.186 23.7 29.6 
Depreciation 
(GHC:US$) 
 
12.84 
 
21.95 
 
50.01 
 
21.76 
 
27.33 
 
16.91 
 
22.7 
 
4.1 
 
33.0 
 
49.2 
Source: Constructed from Annual Reports, Bank of Ghana 1994 – 2000, (Sarfoh, 2002) 
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 ―Fiscal trouble began for the government in 1991–1992, as it reduced end of service benefits to public 
servants at just the same moment that the push for elections presented labour unions with new political 
leverage and new political urgency. By 1992 Ghana was beset with major labour unrest, centering on 
demands for increased wages and the reinstatement of end of service benefits. Such was the state of unrest 
that some leading political figures reported feeling that the election itself could be in danger if the unions 
were not placated. Whether such a risk was real, or whether the government was simply eager to shore up 
political support, the outcome was a capitulation to many of the demands of labour, and the opening up of a 
major budget deficit. The IMF and WB interpreted this as discretionary, and reckless, pre-election 
spending, and consequently cancelled aid disbursements, which were only restarted in 1994‖ (Prichard, 
2009: 15) 
84
 According to Aryeetey & Harrigan (2001: 13), the public sector salary increase of 80% led to an overall 
wage bill growth of 38%. 
85
 Inflation figures provided were averaged over the year. In 1995, it peaked well above 60%. 
86
 In 1998 a new series was put in place by the Statistical Service Department to replace the old series. The 
figures shown in the table are extrapolated using the relationship between the new and old series. 
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The apparent contradiction between the implementation and outcome of the 
macro-economic reforms with the principles underlying their design and commissioning 
have been explained severally. On the one hand, the World Bank blamed nationalistic 
tendencies by which the regime tended to resist policy advice from ―outsiders‖, a 
euphemism for foreigners. Secondly, the contradictions were the outcome of the 
entrenchment of vested interest in charge of public sectors whose reforms were being 
resisted by these interests and their collaborators in government, and thus ―these domestic 
interests had proved relatively impervious to conditionality‖. Lastly, the World Bank and 
their partners were faulted for failing to articulate the reform in persuasive terms to the 
Ghanaian establishment (Hutchful, 1995). However, Hutchful proffers other reasons for 
the contradictions that include the underlying motive of state and regime survival for 
subscribing to these reforms in the first place. As a result, pragmatism dictated 
subscription to reforms as the only means to securing resources that maintained the state 
and regime and not the subscription to market principles. Secondly, it is noted the ease 
with which credit became available to the regime as a result of the perceived genuineness 
of their subscription to the principles of neo-liberalism. The test of this genuineness was 
in the uncontested accommodation of numerous conditionalities in the early phase of the 
adjustment. Thirdly, it is argued that compliance was extracted through ―policy rents‖ 
which were resources that compliance to reforms triggered at a time when the state was 
beset by fiscal crisis. In the process, this exchange enabled international agencies greater 
control over the state and construed them as an ―important constituency in the political 
process‖87 (Hutchful, 1995).   
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 Hutchful (1995) cites an evaluation of the SAP detailing how the government used currency devaluation 
to artificially increase the net effect of foreign loans as a means of improving the fiscal balance. 
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Another explanation can be provided for the international agencies‘ contradicting 
accommodation of lapses by examining Ramsamy‘s (2006) argument of the strategic 
interests of international agencies overriding mechanistic application of principles. In 
Ghana‘s case, after the rigorous application of the prescriptions of the structural 
adjustment reforms in the initial stages earned it the accolade of being the ―star pupil‖ of 
adjustment from the international agencies, it could do no wrong  (Hutchful, 1995). As 
the emergent outcomes of structural adjustment diverged from the envisaged results, it 
was in the strategic interest of these international agencies to show semblance of positive 
results to their sponsors, therefore making them more permissive of slippages in Ghana‘s 
case. As a result, the state‘s pervasive presence in production and the lack of an effective 
private sector capacity did not hinder the continued praise for neo-liberalism using Ghana 
as an example (Hutchful, 2002). To that extent, the purported subscription to neo-
liberalism was in fact an outcome of strategic calculations of both the international 
agencies as well as the local policy agents in the indigenisation of the neo-liberal 
principles. Since 1983, ―neoliberal reforms‖ supported by international agencies 
including the World Bank and the IMF have progressed with frequent lapses. The 
profession of these principles persisted from 1992, which was also characterised by the 
transformation of PNDC military regime into a political party to vie and win the elections 
and return the country to civilian rule and through the two conservative terms that it 
served, to 2000, when the New Patriotic Party, a self declared liberal democratic party 
won the elections and took over the ruling of the country.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
In the foregoing, I have sought to demonstrate that the state cannot be considered 
as a homogenous entity, for which reason the rest of the thesis must examine in greater 
detail the constituent elements of the state and how their relationship, shaped by 
differential needs for political legitimacy by the ruling class, influence both choice of 
policies and outcomes. In particular, it becomes clear that the resources of the 
international agencies are drawn into the political considerations of policy agents that 
further complicate the ―decision calculus‖. Ghana‘s post-colonial political economy 
narrative has shown that different governments at different times have had from the onset 
ideological bases for their general stance. However, these ideological principles are 
subsumed under the weight of the political legitimacy question when confronted by the 
objective conditions of the state, as well as, the interaction of the international political 
economy; for these reasons the articulation of ideology masks the critical underlying need 
for regime survival. The context in which housing policies and the concomitant reforms 
were conceived, designed and implemented are clearly complex and would largely be 
driven by the imperatives of political legitimacy.  
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Chapter 5 -The Pre-Reform Period of Housing in Ghana (1951 to 1984) 
5.1 Introduction 
Given the pattern of political, social and economic conditions presiding over the 
post-colonial era of Ghana as set out in the previous chapter, it is imperative to align the 
housing policies in order to establish the patterns in the pre-reform, reform and post-
reform era. In particular, it enables the conceptual rationalisation of the observed 
apparent housing policy reversals which motivated this research. In this regard, this 
chapter initiates the consideration of Ghana‘s post-colonial housing policies by focusing 
on the pre-reform era. This chapter serves as the foreground to the examination of the 
housing reforms based on the enabling principles by reviewing the post-colonial pre-
reform housing policy and conditions. In doing so, this chapter is divided into five 
sections starting off with an outline of the pre-existing housing practices in the Ghanaian 
society. The rationale is to establish the context in which the state framed housing 
reforms. In this regard, the first section identifies the centrality of traditional socio-
religious beliefs revolving around land administration and land use that guided social 
relations in the Ghanaian society. At the core, these beliefs honour deities embodied in 
natural assets like land as the means for collectively guaranteeing the preservation of 
indigenous groups and is a requirement transferred from ancestors to future generations. 
On the basis of this belief, land assumed significant sociological importance intricately 
linking its use to social relations and necessitating communal practices in land 
management. The communal practices expand the notion of family to embrace the 
extended family in all considerations. Deriving from these socio-religious beliefs, four 
traditional housing norms emerge that make the family housing system a mechanism of 
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social welfare. The family house supports family coherence and communal lifestyles; is 
disposed against valorisation of housing and market relations; and lastly generates rent-
free housing tenure. The family housing system and the compound housing form is an 
enduring mechanism providing multi-family accommodation that persists to the present. 
The social welfare ethos combined with the disposition against housing markets produces 
the peculiar housing tenure form described as rent-free tenure. This tenure form grants 
members of the extended family access either by right or by privilege that, in the process, 
allows poorer family members shelter at no cost. 
Juxtaposing these traditional housing norms with discussions outlining the 
modernisation ethos of development policies as well as Ghana‘s post-colonial political 
evolution (see Chapter 4), and the discussions on the notions of appropriate housing 
policies proffered for developing countries from international circles (see Chapter 3), a 
very complex contextual milieu of state housing policies emerges. On that basis, the 
subsequent four sections of this chapter discuss the pre-reform housing policy 
frameworks contextualised within the overarching political dispensations. I establish pre-
reform housing policy patterns and identify the underlying contextual rationale in four 
temporal blocs – Nkrumah‘s Marxist-socialist political legitimacy logic, an intervening 
fiscally-constrained liberalist budget imperative, military-bureaucratic populist-patronage 
petty bourgeoisie logic, and lastly a radicalised Marxist-revolutionary patronage reversal 
imperative. The first bloc spanning 1951 to 1966 is distinctly a state-led housing policy 
setting that is also marked by a complete disregard for the traditional norms in favour of 
modernisation materialising in single household dwellings. It is also characterised by a 
quest for advice from international agencies and experts that is perversely subjected to 
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adaptation in implementation suiting the overarching logic of political legitimacy. The 
second era spans 1966 to 1972 in which the espoused market liberalism meshed with the 
dire fiscal realities to effectively curtail the previous expansive state-led housing policies 
in preference for off-budget housing initiatives. However, the prevailing fiscal realities 
necessitating further austere economic measures, including the withdrawal of housing 
allowances for public servants, triggered the military overthrow that initiated the third 
phase in housing policy patterns from 1972 to 1979. In this era, housing was generally 
used as an instrument for broadly facilitating political legitimacy that also fulfilled 
particularistic clientelistic imperatives. Premised on the logic of ―affordability‖, tools 
used in this period included mass housing construction schemes engineered to achieve, 
albeit superficially, cost reductions; unsustainably high subsidy-laden housing finance 
arrangements; parasitic land and building materials acquisition; politically motivated 
house pricing and allocation decisions. Further colouring this era is the significant 
deteriorated levels of managerial efficiency. The decline in the economy and its 
increasingly corrosive political effect in the third phase legitimised a moralistic house-
cleaning era tinged in Marxist revolutionary rhetoric that ensued from 1979 lasting to 
1984. This period was segmented mid-stream by a brief intervening period of policy 
inertia and political paralysis arising from the violent legacy of the first phase of the 
revolution. This moralistic approach seeking to rapidly reverse the patronage networks 
and deny the beneficiaries of the rewards of the abused system culminated in populist 
housing policies that addressed supply constraint through confiscations and imposed 
constraints through rent control. Inevitably, by the inception of the housing reforms based 
on enabling principles, the sector was in an extremely poor state, dissociated from the 
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traditional norms and international housing discourse deriving its impetus primarily from 
political considerations in the decision calculus. Underlying these considerations was the 
political logic of reinforcing class differences to empower the ruling class. In conclusion, 
housing policy in the pre-reform era was characterised by multi-layered conditions that 
were not always self-evident and masked the dialectical interaction between the 
seemingly wilful strategic acts of policy agents and the deeper lying biased dispositions 
of particular groups in the society. In this pre-reform housing policy setting power is 
unevenly balanced in society and housing remains subjectively instrumental. 
5.2   Socio-religious influences on land ownership, alienation and use  
Traditionally, all Ghanaian societies deified land
88
 and associated the survival of 
primordial or indigenous communities with how their land is used. This cosmological 
association imposed a collective responsibility for the management of land and its 
derivative assets. These beliefs structured an inter-generational framework of 
accountability that guided the management of such communal assets. In this framework, 
the indigenous community comprised three sub-groups with different roles in the 
management of all communal assets. The first sub-group of any indigenous community 
comprised the ancestors who were deemed to have passed on to another level of life, 
where they wielded powers to judge the living in the maintenance of social order 
including the use of communal assets (Assimeng, 1999).  Poor land management 
including its disposal to non-indigenes risked the invocation of calamity by the ancestors 
on purported offenders. The second sub-group of the indigenous community comprised 
the living generation tasked with the contemporary management of communal assets 
                                                 
88
 In the Akan society, the land was deified and named ―Asaase Yaa‖ – meaning Lady of Thursday. In 
reverence of this deity, farming activities were banned on such days and offenders severely sanctioned. 
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including land for the survival of the community. The actions of the living generation 
were critical for what would be passed on. The third sub-group of the indigenous 
community comprised the unborn generations who also had power to judge the living 
similar to the ancestral generation.   
Land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless numbers are 
still unborn (Ollenu, 1962: 4; Cited in Gough and Yankson, 2001: 2490) 
Land was not, therefore, private property; control over and access to land were inextricably linked 
to socio-political relationships and land was not just a physical entity, but had symbolic or 
spiritual significance as the embodiment of a link between the generations (Rakodi, 1997) 
Land is imbued with an element of sacredness. Being the main provider of the means of 
sustenance, land thus becomes a source of wonder and reverence. ...........Land could not be 
alienated. This is because to the traditional Ghanaian, land does not belong to the living; it is 
merely held in trust by the living for the earlier and future generations of the tribal communities as 
a whole (Assimeng, 1999:49) 
Generally, such practices and cultural values were common in indigenous societies of 
West Africa (Rattray, 1929; Lloyd, 1962; Obi, 1963). It is on the strength of such strict 
socio-religious sanctions that the indigenous community were empowered as the only 
group to hold unfettered rights to their communal land. Such powers – referred to as 
―allodial‖ title – granted unrestricted control of land and the powers of alienation solely 
to the collective group and not an individual, although members of the community could 
be allocated land for development but not the power to dispose (Aryeetey et al, 2007). 
The administration of such land was entrusted to tribal chiefs and elders and the sub-
division of such land could be done only with the consensus of community leaders. In 
some Ghanaian societies, the customary power over land was appropriated according to a 
hierarchy of tribal sub-structures. In such circumstances, although the tribal group was  
essentially the highest unit  of social organization that jointly owned the land, the power 
of alienation and management was apportioned according to sub-divisions into clans and 
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families
89
 – a form of decentralised land management. This applied in communities 
where power was diffuse and the social structures federal in character with clan leaders 
equal in power. On the other hand, the centralized communal land ownership and 
management
90
 pertained in societies in which power was hierarchical and the social 
structures unitary in character. In this latter arrangement, the tribal chief assumed 
paramount position over a hierarchy of clan groups. Notwithstanding the type of social 
order – unitary or federal – individual community members had legitimate rights to use of 
the land – usufruct rights –which however barred disposal (Rakodi, 1997; Konadu-
Agyeman, 1991). These beliefs predating colonialism survived the influence of social, 
economic and political forces of colonialism, western education, Christianity and Islam, 
urbanisation and the market economy, maintaining emphasis on the collective (Aryeetey 
et al, 2007: 6). 
5.2.1 Typologies of traditional housing – family housing, compounds, 
anti-market and rent–free tenure 
The principle of communal ownership of assets extended to housing through 
which some facilities assumed status of collective family assets. Reference to family 
went beyond the conventional meaning of the nuclear type to include all members of the 
extended family (Korboe, 1992). This principle allowed the family to internalise an 
informal social welfare system. The family house also created the environment for 
reinforcing traditional values
91
. Family houses were mostly developed incrementally with 
addition of rooms as the family expanded or the means improved. Admittedly, family 
                                                 
89
 Tribal groups in the south, particularly the Ga-Adangme indigenous in the coastal areas practised this 
type of devolved communal ownership which differed only in the level of power to delineate land. 
90
 This was the practice of the Akan tribes who constitute the majority of Ghanaian traditional groups 
91
 Members of the Ga-Adangme tribe from Accra still go back to family houses to conduct ceremonies for 
marriage, child-naming and death. 
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housing was predominant in pre-colonial rural areas although it also existed among 
indigenous groups of the emerging towns and cities in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. The practice also featured among migrants in urban areas whenever opportunity 
emerged to build and own housing. The principle was for better-off members to bear 
extra responsibility for the residential needs of those less well-off leading to joint sharing 
of living spaces as a traditional norm.  
Family members gained access to family housing through processes which 
distinguished between right and privilege (Korboe, 1992). In the first instance, the family 
members became joint owners of the property by right under the ―custodianship and 
authority of the appointed head of family of the larger lineage‖ in matrilineal societies or 
through consensual distribution to constituent nuclear families for non-matrilineal tribes 
(Korboe, 1992: 1162). Ownership became ―dense‖, comprising several joint claimants 
including non-resident family members possessing equal rights that were not diminished 
by their non-resident status (Grant, 2005)
92
. Generally, such rights of family members to 
joint property were perpetual (Korboe, 1992). The rights-based family housing assigned 
access without examining capabilities and left poorer members competing with every 
claimant. Rakodi (1999) notes that ultimately, the better endowed members of the family 
obtained access before the poorer ones. 
The second type of family housing occurred where individual family members 
built property not assigned as a family house and used their discretion to provide access 
                                                 
92
 However the matrilineal system of property rights is inherently discriminatory as the spouse, essentially 
the wife, and children in the nuclear family have no rights upon the death of the husband and father through 
whose relation they become part of the family. The beneficence of the inheriting nephews is the underlying 
presumption of this practice which in reality rarely materialises. As a result in 1985 the government passed 
the Interstate Secession Law to regulate the administration of property rights after the decease of men, 
especially in Akan families, in order to protect the deceased‘s spouse and children. 
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for selected members of the extended family, thereby honouring the social welfare 
imperative. In such instances, even though the property was not communally owned, 
selected members of the extended family were given access through privileged 
assignment. This privilege would not be easily revoked by the benefactor irrespective of 
changes to their spatial needs (Korboe, 1992). The security of this privileged tenure 
arrangement was limited only by the death of the benefactor although good relations with 
the nuclear family could ensure extension of such privilege. The advantage of this type of 
privileged access to family housing is that it gave better opportunities for the poorer 
members of the extended family. In the privilege-based family housing, an informal 
mechanism enabled the subjective means testing of beneficiaries before granting access. 
Admittedly, the selection process was limited by the number of wealthy family members 
capable of developing housing. As a consequence of this norm, the provision of housing 
was inherently a primary function of a relatively wealthy individual or family network 
(Korboe, 1998) and not the responsibility of a third party such as the state or international 
organisations. However, by the mid 1980s there was rising stigmatisation of those 
dependent on family housing, as a result of which wealthier members refrained from 
living there (Grant, 2005: 664).   
Deriving from the family housing system was the development of multi-room 
housing types which provided accommodation for multiple nuclear households forming 
the extended family. Furthermore, the communal living requisites entailed the creation of 
spaces facilitating socialisation and coherence. These considerations materialised in the 
―compound house‖ design typology that responded to the pre-requisites of family 
housing (Malpezzi et al, 1989; Korboe, 1992; Tipple & Korboe, 1998; CHF, 2004). 
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Traditionally, the compound house featured a rectangular shape with sleeping rooms on 
three sides and shared baths and toilets on the fourth side all facing and surrounding an 
open courtyard where cooking and other social activities were organized. Compound 
houses were either built in one operation or progressively built up over time. In some 
instances, the primary compound house unit was further expanded by the addition of an 
attached three sided unit enveloping a second courtyard. In other instances, compound 
housing in two or three storeys were built for very large extended families
93
. 
Conventionally, the compound house would have a single, or more frequently, double 
entry with the courtyard serving as a focal communication space (Schmidt, 2005; Tipple 
et al, 1998, Amole et al, 1993). The compound house with its central courtyard reinforced 
two aspects of the indigenous lifestyles – outdoor based functions and shared activities. 
The courtyard hosted routine activities such as food preparation, dispute resolution and 
family gatherings, as well as occasional events such as marriage, child-naming and 
funeral ceremonies and thus created a space for consolidating social relations. The multi-
family compound housing development has remained a significant contributor of housing 
in Ghana. The 1990 survey of Malpezzi et al of Kumasi found that 50% of all households 
lived in single storey compound units whilst another 25% lived in a two-storey variation 
of the same type of accommodation. In 2000, compound houses accounted for 50% of all 
accommodation types in urban Ghana (GSS, 2005). However, not all compound houses 
are owned by extended family relations, although very little research work has gone into 
distinguishing between family-owned compound housing and those built for rental 
purposes. Andersen, Andreasen and Tipple‘s (2005) study of Kumasi revealed that 
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 Such storey compound houses were often necessitated by the very large nuclear families arising from 
polygamous marriages.  
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although compound housing appeared to be declining amongst new developments, it 
remained a significant provider of housing for low-income households. Furthermore, they 
noticed that even though single-family housings were in the majority of new housing 
developments, their occupation was not restricted to the nuclear family as multiple 
households could be found in occupation of these new single-family houses, thus 
necessitating a review of conceptual foundations of such developments. 
Another feature of family housing manifesting the social welfare ethos of the 
traditional system was the rent-free housing tenure. By this tenure form, poorer members 
of the extended family were able to obtain housing without having to pay for rent, 
notwithstanding the competition for housing between extended family members alluded 
to above. Rent-free tenure inferred the non-payment of rent for the occupation of the 
housing obtained by right as a member of the extended family or by privilege provided 
by a benefactor. The only obligation for the beneficiary was participating in the basic 
upkeep of the house such as cleaning. In return, the benefactor gained an enhanced social 
status for having extended family members living under their sponsorship. 
Social convention does not allow a house owner to resist requests from lineage members for a 
room in the house: they have a right to a room, just as much as if they had already inherited it in 
common with other lineage members. In reciprocation, they would have obligations to their 
benefactor, and an owner‘s status would increase by having them around. (Willis & Tipple, 1991: 
1706) 
Up to the mid 1980s, rent-free tenure was a significant component of housing in the 
country. For instance, by 1986, 25% of the population in Kumasi lived in rent-free 
housing (Sinai, 2001a: 536). Sinai (2001b:112) found that households in rent-free family 
accommodation were disposed to remaining tenure-immobile. This implied that such 
households frequently remained relatively static in respect of housing mobility. Studies in 
the 1980s revealed that rent-free tenure was directly linked to the state of the rent control 
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regime (Malpezzi et al, 1990; Willis & Tipple, 1991). As rent control laws became 
restrictive, availability of rental accommodation declined with house owners unwilling to 
be subjected to excessive control over rent pricing. This resulted in increasing tendencies 
for affected tenants to seek out new accommodation from relatives for rent-free tenure 
(Korboe, 1998). The stringency of rent control depended on the type of political 
administration and the conditions for its legitimacy. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, rent control was used frequently whenever governments wanted to garner 
support and therefore affected the fortunes of the rent-free tenure.  
 The last facet of the traditional housing norms deriving from socio-religious 
practices is the disposition against housing markets. As a result of the socio-religious 
concerns, the disapproval of outright land alienation and sale was extended to all 
developments on the land including housing. Thus commercialisation of housing was 
frowned on in traditional Ghanaian societies. Selling a house amounted to a taboo and 
stringent sanctions could be applied against offenders. Houses became part of the 
obligatory family assets to be passed on to future generations, notwithstanding its status 
as a family house or individually owned property. Selling was stigmatised by the 
community as it signalled financial failure (Mahama & Adarkwa-Antwi, 2006: 4-5)  
Cultural tradition tends to look down upon the selling of property. The selling of property can 
imply to other Ghanaians that the owner is in debt or has had some other misfortune. The tendency 
is for Ghanaians to buy and hold property, then build a second housing and rent the first. The 
intent of many Ghanaians is to accumulate property, rather than to maximize economic returns. 
The idea that land belonged to the ancestors made the Ashanti unwilling to sell his land. There 
was always the dread that the ancestors would summon him to account for such conduct (Busia, 
1958:43 cited in Konadu-Agyeman, 1991: 144). 
Tipple et al (1998: 399 - Footnote 1) note that it would take very dire circumstances for a 
house to be sold. Any house(s) developed on family lands reverted to the family 
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becoming part of the communal assets upon the death of the builder, a practice 
formalised in legal rulings (Korboe, 1998). Thus traditional housing norms barely 
registered a commercial housing market, and where it existed, it catered solely for the 
upper class (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001: 22).  
A small proportion of these owners consider themselves indebted in some way to the extended 
family others are simply trapped into this position as it were having built what were intended as 
personal homes on family-owned land. Case-law precedent suggests that where an individual 
builds his house on "family land" - a minority but by no means uncommon practice - the usufruct 
legally reverts to the larger family on the death of the builder. In Ansah vs Sackey for example, it 
was ruled that "a house which a person builds out of his private means on family land is family 
property" (Ollennu, 1962, p. 40). In a subsequent Court of Appeal ruling – in the case of Biney vs. 
Biney – this interpretation was confirmed with the increasing commercialization of ancestral land, 
however, such private construction on family land may well be on the decline (Korboe, 1998: 7). 
5.3 Dynamics of pre-reform state housing policy  
Although public housing policies existed in Ghana‘s colonial period, they have 
been excluded from consideration in this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, although 
simplistic, it is important to note that the exclusion of colonial housing policies is 
justified on the grounds of the temporal focus of this work on the post-colonial era. Even 
though arguments have been made about strong connection between colonial and post-
colonial housing policies (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001; Jenkins et al, 2007) this is 
contradicted by the focus of the colonial and post-colonial policies. Colonial era housing 
policies were essentially driven by the primary needs of the colonial bureaucracy 
exemplified in the development of racially segregated neighbourhoods. As a result, 
colonial housing policies did not have a national outlook whereas the post-colonial 
housing policies were required to be national in character, in form if not in substance. In 
reviewing colonial housing policies of Ghana, it becomes clear that interventions that 
addressed indigenous society were compelled by crisis conditions – health and political – 
endangering (personally or politically) the expatriate communities. Demolitions and re-
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housing only arose when the bubonic plague struck some settlements in Accra and 
Kumasi in 1907 and 1926 respectively as well as the 1939 earthquake. The passage of 
rent control regimes in 1941, as well as, the initiation of housing for Second World War 
veterans in 1943 arose to forestall anti-colonialism sentiments in the country (Agyapong, 
1990; Konadu-Agyeman, 2001; Owusu, 2005). Housing regulations deriving from 
European public health concerns that changed housing practices in Europe in the 19
th
 
century were subsequently transplanted into colonial building regulations and planning 
codes (Jenkins et al, 2007). Arguably, colonial administrators could be excused on the 
grounds of a lack of familiarity with the socio-religious values in traditional housing 
norms. On the other hand, the same cannot be extended to post-colonial national 
governments given their origination. On the basis of the foregoing, I discounted colonial 
era initiatives in considering post-colonial housing policies.  
The combination of the traditional housing norms of the Ghanaian society, the 
modernisation notions in development theories and the political imperatives generating 
priorities of respective governments discussed in Section 4.5.1 to Section 4.5.3 of 
Chapter 4, and the intellectual discourse on housing approaches for developing countries 
detailed in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, created a complex layered post-colonial housing 
policy calculus. In the following section, I relied on reports commissioned to assess pre-
reform housing policies and also recast new perspectives of published literature which 
were corroborated by primary data gathered from key informants‘ interviews. Some of 
these reports have not emerged in published literature, and I was fortunate in this regard 
to be given access to such information. I also obtained access to two doctoral theses by 
Agyapong (1990) and Arku (2004) on housing policy and practice in Ghana, which 
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looked at the overall policy patterns albeit from economic and project perspectives, 
bearing in mind their few inconsistencies with other data I had gathered. Proceeding from 
this, I extracted pre-reform structural and strategic impetus for the housing policies of the 
respective regimes. 
5.3.1 External advisors, selective policy choices and ambiguity (1951–1966) 
In the early post-colonial era, the government appeared to rely on international 
advisors in forging the state‘s housing policies at both the national and city-specific 
levels. This pattern has been overlooked by most researchers rather taking them as 
isolated incidents. On the national level, the first request went to a company in the 
Netherlands – M.V. Schockbeton of Kampen – to advise on the direction of housing 
policy (Agyapong, 1990). This request was in furtherance of the first Five-Year 
Development Plan‘s (1951-1956) aim of rapid industrialisation in all sectors including 
housing. In 1952, M. V. Schockbeton advised the government to focus on prefabrication, 
which led to the Schockbeton Housing Scheme that imported prefabricated housing 
panels from the same company. The importation was justified under the pretext of fast-
tracking mass housing development. In 1953, the government also invited Charles 
Garrat-Holden, Secretary of the Building Society‘s Association of Britain to advise on 
establishing a housing finance operation (Arku, 2004). Garratt-Holden‘s advice, given in 
1953, was for the formation of a building society with a start-up capital of £2million. In 
1954, following an invitation to advise on housing, the UN constituted a team comprising 
Charles Abrams
94
, Vladimir Bodiansky and Otto Koenigsberger
95
 to undertake a study of 
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 Harris and Arku (2007:5) note Charles Abrams was the most influential expert on housing in the 1960s. 
95
 Koenigsberger has been labelled ―one of the founders of modern urban development planning in the 
rapidly growing cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America‖ (The Guardian, 26th January 1999, obituary). 
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Accra, the capital, to form the basis of the advice that followed.
 
The UN team visited the 
country from 1954 to 1955 and published its final reports in 1957 with several 
recommendations for housing policy
96
. The government was advised to discontinue 
various housing replacement programmes initiated from the colonial era in response to 
bubonic plagues, the 1939 earthquake and the periodic slum demolitions. Furthermore, 
the government was advised to discontinue the Schockbeton housing project because it 
was ―a farcical waste of resources‖97. The UN team objected to the advice for a state-run 
building society, proposing instead the deployment of the £2million in other 
interventions. Furthermore, the UN mission proposed a state housing policy response that 
differentiated affordability within society identifying four distinct categories. The top tier 
4% who earned above £800 annually were capable of affording housing if the 
government ensured ―financial and technical systems to enable them to build for 
themselves‖ (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001: 144). On the other hand, 45% of the populace 
deemed incapable of affording meaningful housing required public subsidy. In between 
these two groups, variable interventions were recommended including hire-purchase and 
mortgage, serviced sites, an incentive-based housing standardisation and a cooperative 
scheme. The incentive scheme – the Roof Loan Scheme – proposed loans of £560 for 
participants to construct roofs and standardised doors and windows of their houses 
provided they accepted to participate in a cooperative arrangement. This was premised on 
the fact that the roof constituted the most expensive housing element ranging from 20% 
to 30%. It was suggested that almost half of the proposed £2million funding for the 
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 Through the studies undertaken during these missions, the UN developed the requisite knowledge for 
proposing good practices in housing policy for governments especially in the developing world (Harris and 
Giles, 2003). 
97
 Abrams (1964) cited in UN-Habitat (2005: 32) ―Financing Urban Shelter Global Report on Human 
Shelter 2005‖ 
135 
 
building society be reallocated for the Roof Loan Scheme and the remainder committed 
to a mortgage bank. Lastly, the mission recommended the establishment of a National 
Housing Authority to develop and implement housing policy. These policy 
recommendations sought to create space for other entities other than the government in 
housing delivery and management (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001; Owusu, 2005).  
The recourse to foreign experts was not limited to the UN or western agencies 
alone. After the Nkrumah administration‘s pivoting to eastern allies from 1961 (see 
Section 4.5.1 of Chapter 4), it requested technical and financial support from the (then) 
Soviet Union to establish a concrete prefabrication plant in the context of the 
industrialisation goals of the Seven–Year Development Plan (1964–1970) (Owusu, 
2005). After the overthrow of the Nkrumah government in 1966 (see Section 4.5.1 of 
Chapter 4), the military regime extended an invitation to a joint team of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and Netherlands Government, 
represented by a mission from the Bouwcentrum in 1967 to study and advise on housing. 
Mirroring the UN mission a decade earlier, the Bouwcentrum mission advised housing 
policy to be focused on three key aspects of directly targeting the poor, systematising 
housing finance, and creating a centralised decision-making inter-ministerial agency for 
managing policy.  
The mission observed that state investment in completely built public housing was 
very expensive. It recommended limiting such funding to 42% of the prevailing housing 
costs for this type of housing. Beyond that, it was better to invest in site and services, 
aided self-help projects as well as mass housing schemes based on industrially produced 
standardised components (Nierstrasz & Hunnik, 1967 cited in Malpezzi et al, 1990: 39; 
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Owusu, 2005: 5). Furthermore, untapped or under-utilised resources from insurance and 
pension agencies should be channelled as capital for housing investments in addition to 
the mobilisation of personal savings.  Lastly, the mission proposed the establishment of a 
Housing Advisory Committee to ensure policy integration and coordination through a 
decentralised framework. In the light of the numerous recommendations proffered by the 
various international agencies, it bears investigating the choices of the government in 
relation to the advice in order to appreciate the underlying logic of state housing policies.  
The Schockbeton advice led to the commissioning of a total of 168 houses of 
which only 64 units were completed at a cost of $7,000.00 each, more than twice the cost 
of traditionally-built housing. Inevitably, this prefabrication policy was halted by the 
Nkrumah government in 1955 due to its high costs (Agyapong, 1990: 265; Konadu-
Agyeman, 2001: 144; Owusu, 2005:3).  Konadu-Agyeman (2001: 142 -144) condemns 
the naivety of the government for accepting such parochial advice given its opportunism. 
The consultants............ recommended prefabrication as the solution to the problem, and went 
further to recommend their own products.......... The company therefore acquired a double role: as 
authors of the report they were the consultants and trusted advisors to the government, and as 
producers they became the suppliers of the commodity on the suitability of which they were to 
advise (Abrams et al, 1956). ............. It was a serious error in judgment on the part of the 
government to have allowed the authors of the report to produce the houses even if the decision 
was made bona fide (Konadu-Agyeman 2001: 142-144). 
On the basis of the advice of Garratt-Holden in 1953 to establish a state-run building 
society, the government indicated the allocation of £2million for the purpose. Although 
subsequently objected to by the UN mission in 1955 led by Charles Abrams, the 
government went ahead to set up the First Ghana Building Society in June 1956 after 
passing the Building Society Ordinance 30 in December 1955 with a capital of £216,000. 
The government subsequently added G₤500,000 for guaranteeing private investments 
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made by the Society
98
. Other state owned non-bank agencies also provided mortgage 
loans, but they focused exclusively on high income clients. One of such organisations 
was the State Insurance Corporation (SIC)
99
, which entered the housing market providing 
mortgage loans as part of an expansion drive of its investment portfolio (Agyapong, 
1990: 285; Konadu-Agyeman, 2001: 193). 
The UN mission-proposed Roof Loan Scheme was initiated from 1956 albeit with 
modification by locating the intervention in rural areas instead of the recommended urban 
areas. In the light of the strength of the opposition in rural areas noted in Section 4.5 of 
Chapter 4, it is arguable that the geographic focus in the implementation served the 
Nkrumah government‘s political goals of providing public resources controlled by local 
allies in areas where the opposition was strong. The UN mission recommendation to 
structure a differentiated system of housing delivery mechanisms was also partially 
adopted. The Nkrumah government did not curtail the slum clearance actions as advised 
but rather pursued an urban redevelopment scheme in the major urban centres that 
spurred demolitions in pursuit of a ―modern‖ city. Buttressing its selectivity of the 
―expert‖ recommendations, the site and services approach was used minimally to 
accommodate households affected by the urban redevelopment programme. The National 
Housing Authority proposed by the UN mission was overlooked in favour of the Gold 
Coast Housing Corporation, set up in 1955 (and subsequently renamed State Housing 
Corporation in 1965) to directly construct housing. The State Housing Corporation (SHC) 
                                                 
98
 There is some discord among various researchers regarding the capital and the purpose of the funding 
from the state to the First Ghana Building Society. Konadu-Agyeman (2001: 146) and Agyapong (1990: 
306) agree on £216,000 and £500,000. On the other hand, Arku (2004:204) states that £260,300 was 
provided as grants and share subscription whereas (Osei Kwame and Anwti, 2004: 54) indicate that the 
state provided an initial grant of  87,000 (equivalent to £ 43,500) and a preference share subscription of 
279,000 (equivalent £139,500).  
99
 SIC was transformed into a public owned limited liability company in 1995. 
138 
 
fulfilled dual goals of housing as a social welfare instrument and a tool for 
modernisation. This social welfare ethos in housing underpinned the earlier-established 
Tema Development Corporation (TDC) by Gold Coast, Ordinance No. 35 of 1952 and 
tasked with constructing and managing the new Tema Township. This new township was 
associated with the construction of the Tema harbour as part of the industrialisation plans. 
Additionally, the Ghana National Construction Corporation (GNCC) – later renamed 
State Construction Corporation (SCC) – was set up by the government in 1958 in 
conjunction with an Israeli partner, Solel Boneh. This partnership, at a time when Israel 
was deemed a pariah state, was driven by political and economic goals nuanced in the 
geopolitics of Africa and the Middle East. Israel used such ventures to divide 
international opposition to its legitimacy, whereas Nkrumah initially used this and other 
ventures to counter Egypt‘s leadership aspirations in the emerging post-colonial 
continental unity agenda (see Rivkin, 1959; Akinsanya, 1976; Levey, 2003). This 
partnership with Israel also served Nkrumah‘s other agenda of securing funds for 
development projects. However, the unanimous condemnation of Israel during the second 
meeting of independent African states held in Casablanca, Morrocco in January 1961, 
nullified Nkrumah‘s geopolitical motive for siding with Israel, culminating in the 
nationalisation of the State Construction Corporation in February 1961 (Osei-Kwame & 
Antwi, 2004). The common feature of all the public housing agencies was the choice of 
single-household units over the traditional compound houses that provided for multiple 
households. 
External advisors were also sought for city level planning with the recruitment of 
international experts such as Otto Koenigsberger and Constantinos A. Doxiadis for new 
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town development projects linked to the Volta River industrialisation project and the 
Tema port city development
100
. Koenigsberger developed proposals for the creation of a 
new town to be created as part of the Volta hydroelectric dam project in 1954
101
. 
Proposals such as the functional zoning and infrastructure improvement were 
implemented whereas others such as the development of participatory community 
governance framework were discarded in favour of a town management agency run by 
the hydroelectric power authority. Doxiadis
102
, on the other hand was engaged in 1961 to 
replace local planners tasked to design a new town concept that would be developed to 
integrate the new Tema Harbour (Kirrchher, 1968)
103. Doxiadis‘ plan for Tema that 
envisaged the development of 24 distinct neighbourhoods or ―Communities‖ to house a 
total population of 250,000 by 1985 was implemented with no changes. 
Typically, such state-led housing was disproportionately lower than envisaged 
and also less than those developed through non-state activities. Furthermore, such state 
houses went to higher income groups than envisaged under the espoused welfare 
ideology. The Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1959 – 1964) aimed to 
construct 6,700 units in the proportion of 200: 1,500: 5,000 units for middle –income, 
lower-income and labourers respectively. However, SHC produced 2,517 units 
representing 38% of the target with this production skewed towards the higher earning 
groups in the ratio of 46% for middle income, 27% for lower income groups, and 27% for 
labourers (Agyapong, 1990: 301; Arku, 2004). The Third Seven-Year Development Plan 
                                                 
100
The Tema Acquisition Area comprising a total of 63 square miles was acquired under Gold Coast 
Ordinance No. 38 of 1952, 'The Tema Town and Port (Acquisition of Land) Ordinance‘.  
101
 The Volta River Project: Report On Housing And Regional And Urban Problems (1954) Submitted to 
the Volta River Project Preparatory Commission, Ghana. 
102
 Doxiadis, renowned Greek Architect, worked extensively in various developing countries on human 
settlements using principles deriving from kinetic energy labelled ekistics (see Doxiades, 1968).  
103
 Subsequently Doxiadis was tasked to develop a regional plan that would link the hydro-electric power 
plant to the new harbour and foster industrialisation of the south eastern corridor of the country. 
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(1964 – 1970) imposed an annual target of 2,000 housing units for SHC (SHC, 2001) yet 
realised only 521 from 1964 to 1966 when the Nkrumah administration was overthrown. 
In total, from inception in 1955 to 1966, SHC produced 3,323 housing units with a total 
allocation approximately equivalent to £4.5million
104
 (Effah Commission of Enquiry, 
1966
105
). Similarly, between 1952 and 1966 Tema Development Corporation (TDC) 
constructed 10,700 housing units in five residential communities
106
. The State 
Construction Corporation set up with a start-up capital of £200,000, built a total of 718 
houses on hire purchase in high class neighbourhoods in Accra, Kumasi and Akosombo 
by 1966
107
. After the overthrow, the military administration abrogated the hire purchase 
scheme and placed all the estates under SHC management (Agyapong, 1990: 282-293). 
The state housing production of less than 10,000 contrasts with the target of 600,000 
housing units envisaged in the Third Seven Year National Development Pan (1964–
1970). As revenue from cocoa proceeds fell in the 1960s, some policy modifications of 
the socialist principles resulted in pragmatic responses. In 1962, the government 
withdrew the subsidies provided for rent for non-state tenants in public housing but 
however maintained them for civil servants (Agyapong, 1990).  
                                                 
104
 At independence the currency of Ghana was the Ghanaian Pound Sterling which experienced variable 
exchange equivalence to other international currencies. In 1965, the government broke its relation with the 
United Kingdom, establishing the Cedi as the new currency which exchanged with the British Pound 
Sterling at £1 to 2.40 Cedis.   
105
 Cited in Agyapong (1990: 300). The Effah Commission of Enquiry was one of many ad-hoc 
investigative bodies set up after the 1966 military overthrow to probe the Nkrumah administration, in this 
case to look specifically into the activities of the State Housing Corporation. 
106
 This was financed from budget of £14 million for importation of materials and £1.8million in local 
currency to cover local costs (Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, 1991). Significantly an audit of TDC‘s 
accounts in 1991 by Coopers Lybrand and Deloitte did not register this transfer from the government, 
perhaps reflecting the poor record keeping in the company.  
107
 The government retained 60% share and the Israeli investor owned 40% share. However, the state made 
land available in lieu of actual financial contributions. The Israeli investor‘s contribution was used to pre-
finance the construction that prospective buyers then repaid through a hire purchase scheme. The estate 
built in Akosombo was to provide housing as part of the Volta River hydroelectric dam project started in 
the 1950s. 
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Overall, it can be deduced that during this era, with a few exceptions, the quest for 
advice from international agencies and experts mirrored a similar pursuit from foreign 
advisors such as Dudley Seers and Arthur Lewis in national development policies 
discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. However, the solicitation of the international 
housing discourse through the advice of experts did not connote the subscription to the 
technical ideals underlying such advice. The subjection of the expert advice to local 
political imperatives and logics culminating in the modification of such advice reflected 
the dilution of international housing policy discourse and its translation embedded in 
local political nous. Arguably, the penchant for such expert advice reflected the ruling 
class‘ doubts of the bureaucracy‘s policy design capacity. The invitation to Doxiadis to 
replace the local bureaucracy in planning the Tema Township is emblematic of this lack 
of belief. In the broader economic sphere, this lack of belief in the bureaucracy was partly 
the basis for the Nkrumah government‘s initial ―compromise with capitalism‖ (Ansah, 
2006) which has been discussed in Section 4.4.1 of Chapter 4. Secondly, this penchant 
for expert advice also limited the need to fall back on local experts, given that the 
intelligentsia formed the core of the opposition. However, as has been discussed, it 
appears that even though the Nkrumah regime had a penchant for inviting expert 
advisors, it was peculiarly selective in adopting the advice. Recommendations adopted by 
the government without modification were those that promoted state-run responses and 
direct construction of housing. Advice that diffused the centrality of the state were either 
modified or ignored. Furthermore, the enduring focus on state housing construction 
whilst ignoring the traditional sector and pursuing urban redevelopment schemes that 
demolished housing embedded in traditional values points to a statist interpretation of 
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modernisation in housing. The implementation of the Roof Loan Scheme in rural areas 
and the joint venture with Israeli company in the formation of the State Construction 
Corporation point to a logic of political legitimacy at work differing over time and space. 
By building state agencies yet denigrating local bureaucracy, privileging foreign advice 
thereby denying the local opposition intelligentsia work opportunity yet failing to adopt 
the recommendations that diffused state power, characterised a paradoxical ambiguity in 
housing policy. It points to a deeper lying logic at work and suggests that the ruling class‘ 
―decision calculus‖ in housing was steeped in the complex milieu of a modernisation 
ethos overlaid with internal and external political legitimacy imperatives. Within this 
calculus is a running theme of a class conflict setting the political class against the 
bureaucracy, intelligentsia, and sections of the urban proletariat class patronising the 
traditional compound housing system. Was this complex logic regime specific or 
symptomatic of the ―state‖ in Ghana in the pre-reform? The next section reviews the 
patterns of state policies after the Nkrumah administration, ending the narrative in the 
mid 1980s when the housing reforms were initiated. 
5.3.2 Market ideology and fiscal pragmatism (1966 – 1972) 
Immediately after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the military regime reduced or 
discontinued housing policy interventions initiated under the previous administration on 
economic and ideological grounds. As noted in Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4, deriving from 
the espoused liberalism ideology, the military regime (1966 – 1969) and its successor 
civilian administration (1969 - 1972) all sought to reverse Nkrumah‘s state-led policies. 
These reversals were reinforced by the dire financial situation of the country after years 
of significant public expenditure unmatched by revenue. As a result, the Soviet-built 
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concrete prefabrication plant which had been completed in 1965 was not given any 
capital for production after the 1966 overthrow. Furthermore, replacement housing 
necessitated by the urban redevelopment programmes was terminated
108
. Reduction in 
public funding to only infrastructure also constrained the state housing agencies 
compelling the agencies to recover other costs directly from clients. Initially, this was 
quite successful as steady advance payments from prospective clients generated a flow of 
funds for production. Nonetheless, under the Two-Year Development Plan (1966-1968) 
SHC‘s actual production levels fell to 764 housing units of which only 2.7% benefited 
the labourer class (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001:149). TDC also suffered a similar fate from 
1966 to 1969. Subsequently, the Busia  administration (1969-1972) with its more 
pronounced market liberalism obliged TDC to sell off some of their rental housing stock 
allowing a margin of 2% over the cost of construction with repayment over 20 years, as 
well as, increase the rent levels in order to recapitalize TDC. TDC was also tasked to 
transform its operations from a direct provider of public housing to providing serviced 
plots (Acquah, 2001). However, most corporate and individual tenants of TDC declined 
to acquire the properties unwilling to accept responsibility for maintaining the 
properties
109
. As a result, from 1969 to January 1972 TDC completed 1,750 houses and 
another 3,750 houses were partially built (Acquah, 2001: 6). The liberal dispensation 
from 1966 to 1972 also laid emphasis on the mobilisation of funds for housing through 
non-budgetary sources as well as private sector participation in housing, listing ―building 
societies, housing cooperatives, banks, insurance companies, private financiers and 
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 As a result 400 residential plots serviced to accommodate 2,000 housing units under this scheme was 
subsequently reclaimed by the indigenous chiefs albeit unlawfully (Agyapong, 1990: 283-284). 
109
 The Ghana Railway and Ports Corporation were the exception as they leased a substantial tract of land 
to develop properties on behalf of their staff.  
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housing consortia‖ as sources for housing finance (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001: 149). 
Nothing practical was done in this regard with the exception of housing cooperatives 
initiatives, although they existed under the Roof Loan Scheme in the Nkrumah era, albeit 
predominantly rural–focused. Following the passage of a new cooperative law by the 
military regime, NLC Decree 252 in 1968, urban housing cooperatives were encouraged 
with the Tema Housing Cooperative Society as the first urban pilot scheme that 
completed 21 housing units under the first phase (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001:202-204) and 
progressively built a total of 105 housing units (personal interview of Cooperative 
President and Welfare officer, May 2007)
 110
. The Busia administration (1969 – 1972) 
also reinstated the previously discontinued urban redevelopment scheme albeit 
emphasising slum upgrading. The government sought the assistance of the World Bank in 
this regard, which led to the design of the Ghana Urban Development Project in 1971. 
This project identified upgrading interventions for selected slum neighbourhoods in the 
five main cities of Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale and Tema and received 
loan pledges from the World Bank in 1971. However, after the January 1972 military 
overthrow, the World Bank withdrew the funding. From this point onwards, succeeding 
governments discontinued the quest for expert advice from international agencies until 
the housing reforms in the 1980s (personal interview of Project Advisor on World Bank 
urban projects; September 2006).  
In summary, the liberal era from 1966 to 1972 was characterised by efforts to 
reverse the state-led socialist policies of Nkrumah‘s government from 1951 to 1966 on 
ideological and fiscal grounds, culminating in significant reductions in public funding for 
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 With loans from the government and technical assistance from the Department of Housing and Planning 
Research of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, the Tema Housing Cooperative 
was established in 1971. 
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housing and a corresponding promotion of cost recovery principles for public housing. 
Related to this, a new emphasis emerged focusing on off-budget financial resource 
mobilisation for housing from banks, insurance companies, private financiers and 
housing cooperatives. Although most of the plans did not materialise, their articulation 
highlighted the government‘s underlying disposition towards its traditional support base, 
as well as, the opposition. By stimulating urban based housing cooperatives with public 
financial and technical assistance, the Busia administration was attempting to pacify 
traditional opposition groups of organised labour and the urban proletariat opposing the 
government‘s market liberalisation policies (see Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4). The attempt 
at placating these groups was articulated in the Prime Minister‘s address to organised 
labour in 1970.  
Industrial development will be hampered unless workers are adequately housed........... We believe 
that economic change and social change go together. The two are integral parts of the process of 
development…We believe that while we are trying to provide industries…we should at the same 
time also try to provide more housing…....
111
 
However, diffusing political opposition, mirroring the political logic underlying the 
implementation of the Roof Loan Scheme, was tempered by the fiscal realities, thus 
limiting the government to mostly rhetoric. 
5.3.3 Unravelling ambiguities into ineptitude and larceny  (1972 – 1979) 
As has been noted in Section 4.5.3 of Chapter 4, the primary basis of the National 
Redemption Council (NRC
112
) military overthrow of the Busia administration was the 
austerity measures necessitated by the high external debt. These austere measures 
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 Daily Graphic: ―Housing: A basic necessity for workers‖ (1970). Address by the Prime Minister to the 
Trade Union Congress cited in Arku (2004: 164-165) 
112
 After the National Redemption Council (NRC) military regime overthrew the Progress Party civilian 
administration in January 1972, it subsequently metamorphosed into two succeeding administrations called 
the Supreme Military Council I and II. These nomenclature changes arose from changes in leadership of the 
Government including the Head of State in the last internal change. The nature of the government 
essentially remained the same in its form as an executive class made up of the senior military class. 
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included the withdrawal of housing allowances and the imposition of special tax on all 
public servants. Expectedly, the new military regime reversed these measures and 
restored publicly-funded mass housing schemes to garner political support. Aided by 
resources garnered from high cocoa export prices in the early 1970s and the 
government‘s unilateral debt repudiation and deferment decision, these resources were 
channelled into several development initiatives that included large scale public housing. 
The NRC regime initiated mass housing – the Low Cost Housing Programme – in 1972 
purportedly for moderate income urban households. The main public housing agencies – 
State Housing Corporation (SHC), Tema Development Corporation (TDC) and the State 
Construction Corporation (SCC) – obtained unprecedented funding for their activities. 
Through this programme TDC built three additional residential communities, in a Home 
Owners Scheme (HOS) in 1974. Similarly, State Construction Corporation was involved 
in the development of several housing estates in Accra (Dansoman Estates), and Tema 
(Ashaiman, Sakumono and Manhean) during this period
113
. Although the Low Cost 
Housing Programme aimed to build a total of 23,000 housing units, its final output of 
6,092 at the end of the first phase in 1974 nonetheless represented the highest level of 
public housing delivery ever (Agyapong, 1990, Konadu-Agyeman, 2001). However, the 
involvement of the state with the inherent subsidies and powers in the sub-markets of 
land, building materials and finance masked several structural challenges in land markets, 
affordability and the building materials industry. The housing programme resulted in a 
growing demand for such properties that was unmatched by the supply, with the public 
housing agencies inevitably accumulating debts to prospective clients who had made full 
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 In the Dansoman Estates in Accra for example SCC constructed 60 and 166 buildings singly and jointly 
with other state developers, in 1972 alone (Osei Kwame & Antwi, 2004: 24). 
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or partial advance payments. Excess demand over supply also created incentives for 
patronage and clientelism among the political class and senior bureaucrats to influence 
the distribution of such properties. Rules guiding allocation procedures were subverted 
for such purpose. For example, in a study of one such estate (Chirapatre) in Kumasi built 
under the Low Cost Housing Programme, Adjei (1976) found that upper limits on 
incomes of targeted beneficiary households were overlooked in 55% of cases studied 
(cited in Agyapong, 1990:305).  
Allied to the military regime‘s populist disposition, a new law, the 1972 Mortgage 
Decree, NRC Decree 96 was passed requiring mortgage providers in general to undertake 
a legal process to recover loans in default. It became mandatory to appoint a receiver to 
conduct mortgage debt recovery through specific procedures including notification, 
negotiation, and application for court approval. This situation culminated in protracted 
and costly mortgage debt recovery and benefitted loan defaulters over the mortgage loan 
providers such as the First Ghana Building Society (FGBS) (Sarfoh, 2002: 49-51). 
Without revoking the detrimental mortgage law, the government subsequently established 
the Bank for Housing and Construction (BHC) in 1973 with the passage of a new law 
NRC Decree 135, to support housing and construction in general. This was at a time 
when virtually all the commercial banks desisted from offering housing finance in any 
form and FGBS was being constrained by the operation of the Mortgage Decree Law. 
BHC was not allowed to function commercially but rather controlled by the state through 
regulatory limits on lending terms and volumes which were expectedly generous to 
borrowers but in the long run unsustainable. Expectedly, the majority of borrowers were 
either from or linked to the ruling class. In 1975, the government passed the NRC Decree 
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319 instituting the Public Servants Housing Loans Scheme and the Armed Forces 
Mortgage Loans Scheme with the objective of facilitating home acquisition by public 
servants. Funds were provided through annual budgetary grants and loaned to 
beneficiaries below-market rates at 10% in lieu of the realistic levels of 30% per annum 
in order to ensure the affordability of housing. However, budgetary allocations for this 
scheme were sporadic and never in sufficient volume to make any meaningful impact, 
processing only 435 loans by 1988. The terms of the Public Servants Housing Loan 
benefitted the upper echelons of the public service although lower level staff made up the 
majority exemplifying the prevailing class conflict. According to Konadu-Agyeman 
(2001:152), 
Under this scheme, only public servants in the upper grades whose incomes were considered 
sufficient to pay back the loan qualified......................... It was a typical case of people at the top 
devising policies to assist their ‗classmates‘ to acquire housing. Most of those who obtained the 
loans at very low interest rates were already living in government accommodation attached to their 
jobs and they ended up letting out the new houses at high rents while paying less than market rents 
for what they occupied. 
Besides the government‘s direct initiatives in establishing housing agencies, other 
public agencies also participated in housing at this time. The Bank for Housing and 
Construction (BHC) expanded its activities in housing through a joint venture with a 
Spanish investor, Teccnicas de Multiconstruction SA (TEMSA) setting up a subsidiary, 
the Real Estate Development Company (REDCO). After a site was ―acquired‖ in Accra 
for the first phase, a bank loan of $12 million was secured from Spain between 1976 and 
1977 to finance the operations of REDCO. However, the funds were not accessed 
because the government failed to provide a guarantee (Daily Graphic, 15
th
 June, 2007). 
As a result of the difficulties in securing finance, REDCO faced interminable delay in the 
realisation of the proposed developments from 1979 to 1988 leading to price escalation of 
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6,900% in 9 years (Konadu-Agyeman, 2001: 128)
114
. The state pension fund, the Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) also engaged in housing from 1974, 
initially for its staff exclusively but later expanded to other groups. 
The confluence of the global oil crisis from 1974, falls in cocoa prices and export 
volumes and revenue, shrinking agricultural base, decline in local building materials 
industrial capacity, declining foreign exchange and sharp rise in inflation, compelled the 
government to curtail its expansive programmes from 1975. Worsening conditions led to 
tightening of the import licensing regime in a purported bid to limit the dissipation of 
foreign exchange. This culminated in severe shortages of key imported building materials 
like cement, reinforcing steel and roofing materials that could last up to three years (SHC, 
2006:7)
115
 and fuelled patronage and corruption in the supply of building materials. In 
this environment, SHC‘s activities were further hampered by delays in securing import 
licenses, not having the political clout to attract priority attention whereas others who 
were politically connected readily obtained such facilities. In some instances, SHC was 
compelled by either government officials or management to acquire materials at 
exorbitant prices from such private importers connected to either government or 
management (personal interviews of Heads of Finance and Planning, SHC, September 
2006). Constrained by the global and local challenges, the government cut back on 
funding for direct public housing construction. The combined effect of high inflation and 
building materials shortages significantly affected the capacity of SHC and TDC to meet 
their obligations and increased the backlog. In time, the government recognised the 
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 Houses expected to sell for 100,000 for a flat and 200,000 for a detached house in 1979, were only 
completed after 1988 with prices ranging between 4 million and 6 million. 
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 See Leith and Soderling (2003) for a discussion on post-colonial import licensing regime 
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challenges and initiated action to extricate itself and diffuse the responsibility for 
housing. 
The present economic position of the country and the competitive demands on public funds from 
the other sectors make it difficult for Government alone to undertake to house every Ghanaian
116
. 
In this regard, recommendations were made to develop proposals that led to the National 
Mortgage Finance and Guarantee Scheme (SMC Decree 23) of 1976. This promoted the 
mobilisation of household savings by the National Savings and Credit Bank, a state bank, 
to be channelled into a secondary mortgage scheme with the involvement of the central 
bank, Bank of Ghana, and the Bank for Housing and Construction (Agyapong, 1990: 
292-297). However it was not implemented. Under the Five-Year Development Plan 
(1975 – 1980), the state pension funds, SNNIT, was expected to expand into mass 
housing and eventually evolve into a secondary mortgage financier providing long term 
funds. However, not much was achieved in this regard and by the close of the 1980s, 
SSNIT had initiated only 910 housing units at different stages of completion. Under the 
Five-Year Plan (1975–1980), the government allocated ¢1 million – approximately 
equivalent to $580,000 – for urban housing co-operatives which facilitated their growth 
(personal interview of Head of Housing Research Centre, October 2006). Inevitably, the 
government ceased financing SHC altogether in 1977, requiring full cost recovery 
directly from clients (personal interview of Head of Finance of SHC). Infrastructure 
grants to TDC became very infrequent in the 1980s
117
. Arising from inflation and 
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 Daily Graphic, June 14 1975, p. 8-9 cited in Arku (2004: 165-166) 
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 Even though infrequent, the state nonetheless did provide TDC with some grants to partially support 
their operations. They became more consistent in the late 1980s with grants of  22,977,365 in 1986; 
4,686,450 in 1988; 5,660,667 in 1989 and 20,000,000 in 1990. Although these grants were purposely 
for servicing industrial sites, they were rather used to cover recurrent expenditure (Coopers and Lybrand 
Deloitte, ibid: Item 452) 
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declining funds from the state, TDC‘s Home Owners Scheme (HOS) was abrogated in 
1981.  
Managerial ineptitude also contributed significantly to the dire state of public 
housing agencies. Despite the rapidly declining volume of work, the public housing 
agencies kept workers on payroll compounding the debts. SHC management plans to 
rectify this were constrained by lack of funds to pay compensation. Retrenchment plans 
were then shelved after workers‘ threats of legal suit. Subsequently, a total of seven loans 
were contracted from SSNIT – the state pension funds; SIC – the state insurance agency; 
and other organisations to refinance the operation of SHC and thereby reduce the waiting 
lists. However, the SHC management capitulated to workers‘ agitation and diverted these 
loans to directly support remuneration. Additionally, SHC was affected by infractions 
ranging from pilfering of building materials to illegal sales of staff accommodation 
(personal interview of Heads of Finance and Planning, SHC). On the other hand, TDC 
took actions preceding the housing sector reforms to resolve the problems and costs 
associated with maintaining large numbers of workers on payroll without corresponding 
volume of work to sustain them. TDC took advantage of the mandatory labour 
rationalization and retrenchment component of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) from 1984 to shed 40% of their staff (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal 
Report, 1990: 55). TDC‘s relative success in this pre-reform labour rationalisation 
derived from the preponderant engagement of the workers in secondary employment and 
other unofficial channels of income generation (personal interview of Head of Quantities, 
TDC).  
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As a result of the high costs of importing building materials which constituted 
60% share of building materials (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1986) and to 
circumvent the restrictions on import licenses, TDC invested in brick and tiles 
production, acquiring 20% shares in the Kpone Clay Products in 1979, and 51,761 shares 
in the Tema Brick and Tile Company in 1988. The Bank for Housing and Construction 
similarly invested in brick and tile production on a very large scale to reduce the housing 
sector‘s dependence on foreign imports. However, the returns on these initiatives were 
essentially minimal. In TDC‘s case, share certificates in the Kpone Clay Products were 
never issued depriving TDC of any compensation when the company collapsed in 1984. 
In the case of the proposed Tema Brick and Tile factory, the factory site did not pass the 
environmental permit requirements thereby stalling the project even though TDC had 
made payments. BHC, on the other hand, secured local and foreign loans to invest in the 
production of building materials. BHC raised $11 million in 1975 through public offer on 
bonds,  $17 million loan from Banco de Brasil  and another DM15 million – equivalent to 
$6.1million – from the (West) German government through its main development 
agency, KfW. The loans were used to establish seven brick and tile factories
118
, many of 
which were in rural locations with significant clay deposits and adequate timber resources 
for firing the bricks. Yet, the case of the Takoradi Brick and Tile Factory highlights 
BHC‘s managerial ineptitude.  
Part of the Brazilian loan used for the Takoradi Brick and Tile factory, was used 
to import the equipment for the factory. Yet when the shipment arrived, no factory 
building had been constructed to house the equipment due to the shortage of building 
                                                 
118
 Other BHC investments included a limestone factory set up in Buipe, Tamale, primarily for road 
stabilization works; several stone quarries; and a plant yard for servicing equipments for the quarries. 
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materials. This was linked to the delay in securing a license to import the materials. After 
eventually acquiring the building materials, the project was delayed due to BHC‘s view 
of submitted quotations from contractors as excessive. The decision to use direct labour 
to construct the facility was foiled by the lack of internal technical capacity to manage the 
construction efficiently. The factory was thus delayed for more than two years (personal 
interview of Special Assistant to BHC Managing Director, November 2006).  
Leasing un-serviced land to individuals and companies to raise funds for clearing 
the housing delivery backlog did not yield expected returns for TDC. Infill developments 
in existing neighbourhoods to reduce the need for new infrastructure and using private 
contractors instead of staff to reduce labour cost overruns achieved marginal success 
(Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, 1991: Item 219). These measures were also undermined 
by under-pricing of houses and preferential treatment for the politically connected and 
staff. The actual cost of land and the actual administrative overheads associated with the 
developments were excluded from the selling price. A 10% notional assessment was 
imposed covering land and administrative overhead costs. Additionally, house prices, 
fixed at the start of the construction, were not always adjusted to take inflation into 
account given the lengthy construction period. Furthermore, 10% price discount and 
interest charges waiver in the hire purchase scheme of the Home Owners Scheme given 
to TDC staff also contributed to the decline. It was found that only 16% of the actual 
development cost was recovered by TDC (Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, 1991: Item 
525).  
Besides the noted ineptitude of the management of the public housing agencies, 
the causes and effect of the actual conditions of land acquisition have not been adequately 
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addressed in examining state housing policies and this has limited the consideration of 
the dynamics within the decision calculus of the pre-reform housing policies. In the 
following section, based on interviews of key informants in the public land and housing 
agencies, I take note of these land acquisition arrangements and argue that, the choices by 
government fostered the superficial quest for affordability that however, masked 
underlying leveraging of public resources for the benefit of the ruling class.  
Repeatedly, land acquired for housing by the state generated tensions between the 
indigenous owners and the public housing agencies with the exception of the Tema 
Development Corporation. As has been noted in Section 5.1.2, communal ownership and 
delegated administration of land engendered non-valorised interests in its use. This 
imposed the requirement of customary consent before its alienation that was obtained by 
the payment of ―drink money‖119 for the lease and use of land, and upon the expiration of 
such lease, reverting to the original owners. Such consent would be obtained from the 
heads of groups owning the land, be it tribe, clan, extended family or household. This 
traditional norm contrasts with the formal civic administration structures by which land 
could be completely alienated and transferred. However, the public expropriation of lands 
generally did not observe these traditional norms with the passage of laws to override 
such demands. The Administration of Lands Act, 1962; State Lands Act, 1962; the Lands 
(Statutory Wayleaves) Act, 1963
 
and the Public Conveyancing Act, 1965 all empowered 
the state to expropriate lands without negotiating for consent but rather compensate the 
owners. The land expropriation process required the attestation of the transfer of the head 
lease title in the land indenture document from the owners by the signature of the chiefs 
                                                 
119
 ―Drink money‖ was a token payment to the chiefs and elders to signify recognition of the undisputed 
rights of the chiefs over the land.  
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and representatives of the land owners on such documents. However, as the government 
continually failed to pay compensation in part or wholly, the community representatives 
refused or failed to sign this head lease. In some instances, establishing the rightful heads 
and representatives of the owners to facilitate the payment of compensation became 
difficult to ascertain because of disputes over these positions. Partly because of the 
lineage based inheritance and partly due to the prospects and payments of compensation, 
complex leadership selection processes ended in disputes. Rapid urbanisation with its 
high demand for residential land brought this issue into sharper focus. As a result, the 
Lands Commission, the public agency responsible for land expropriation on behalf of all 
state agencies, was unable to complete the documentation of the head lease transfer yet 
went ahead to assign such lands. Frequently, governments abused the complex leadership 
selection process to withhold payments interminably. Governments got away with the 
situation because aspects of the various land laws allowed the state to enter and develop 
expropriated lands even though the transaction had not been completed. The acquisition 
of land was frequently exercised under the provisions of the State Lands Act 1962 (Act 
125) on the basis of ―public interest‖. This condition was loosely interpreted by the 
government to downplay the right to compensation for some land acquisitions (personal 
interview of Regional Director of Lands Commission). In some of the compulsory land 
acquisition, this public interest imperative was not ascertained (Agbosu et al, 2007: 76). 
Inevitably, tension arose between the public housing agencies and traditional land-
owning groups who reacted to this situation of incomplete land expropriation transaction 
by re-entering such lands to repossess and resell them to individual developers
120
. As 
                                                 
120
 This situation also prevailed in cases where the land was properly acquired but remained undeveloped 
when such lands were sought by individual developers and speculators. In Accra, facilities such as the 
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urbanisation induced demand increase for residential land, publicly acquired sites that 
remained undeveloped – completed transactions or not – were contested more vigorously 
by land-owning groups through legal suits, but more frequently through recourse to 
illegal repossession methods. The absence of the head lease significantly limited the SHC 
decision to undertake land swapping to reduce the backlog of clients on the waiting list
121
 
(personal interviews of Head of Planning, SHC; Director and Regional Director, Lands 
Commission). Arising from the stalled head lease SHC was unable to issue sub-leases to 
the owners and tenants of their houses. As a result, throughout the 1970s and 1980s SHC 
was increasingly unable to compel clients to pay the requisite ground rents owed on their 
properties due to the reticence of clients to make payment in the face of the insecurity of 
their tenure. This increased the debts for SHC as it was unable to make the requisite 
income tax payments to the state (personal interviews of Head of Planning and Finance, 
SHC). Similarly, the state failed to pay compensation for the 373 hectares of land 
acquired for REDCO, the housing development joint venture of the Bank for Housing 
and Construction
122
. The land owners of the REDCO lands rationalised their action thus: 
When government sees an idle area of land then we are in trouble, they will take it without any 
compensation. They will tell you they are going to use it for development projects which will 
benefit us in the future. So we have decided to lease land to individuals to enable us to get money 
for the development of our community (Gough & Yankson, 2000: 2494). 
It should be noted that Tema Development Corporation (TDC) was the only exception to 
the problems generated by the incomplete land transaction even though the government 
                                                                                                                                                 
proposed Sports Complex and a Police Training College were affected in this manner. 
121
 The majority of such arrangements took place in Accra (Adenta) and Western Region (Sefwi Wiawso) 
(SHC, 2001). 
122
 Arising from the lack of compensation, significant portions of the land were encroached by developers 
who ―illegally‖ acquired the land from original land owners. The Government‘s decision to de-confiscate 
and transfer part of the land back to the original investor, REDCO, was met with significant objection by 
the land owners on the grounds of a pending suit sued against the state since 1988 to recover their lands 
(Ghanaian Times, Tuesday 26
th
 June 2006). 
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failed to continue compensation payments after negotiating annual payments in lieu of 
lump sum payment. Although these payments were initiated, they stalled within a short 
period in spite of the frequent requests from successive Tema chiefs. TDC‘s success in 
protecting its ownership of the Tema lands arose from the enactment of a law – the Tema 
Acquisition Area Ordinance – detailing the specific boundaries of the acquired property 
and the outlining of TDC‘s authority over developments within that territory. Thus, TDC 
had enforcement powers and did not require appropriately signed indentures to assert its 
ownership (personal interviews of Tema Chief, October 2006; Director of Housing, 
Ministry of Works and Housing, September 2006; and Senior Quantity Surveyor, TDC, 
October 2006).  
Besides the problems of land expropriation, directives from political appointees 
were also detrimental to the operations of these agencies. Successive Commissioners for 
Housing regulated selling prices to maintain the populist rhetoric of providing cheap 
housing, even though such properties eventually went to elite groups. Additionally, SHC 
was periodically instructed to release completed properties for state protocol purposes 
without being paid compensation (see Box 5.1). In some instances, ranking on the 
waiting lists were discarded or disregarded through edicts in favour of other people who 
were either unlisted or further down the list even though deserving prospective owners 
had made full or partial payments.  
Land acquisition by the government in combination with the politically directed 
mortgage loan terms of BHC and the Public Servants Housing Loan Scheme, and the 
house pricing methods, were carefully orchestrated to signal the government‘s desire to 
ensure affordability for the masses for whom these were intended. However, these actions 
158 
 
masked the underlying class conflict as they served to engender the restrictive benefit of 
this largesse directly to the ruling class and their collaborators in the bureaucracy and the 
private sector. Public housing was just one of several state instruments for ensuring the 
consolidation of class domination by the elite. This era is well summed up by Hutchful 
(1979) thus:   
The state has been central in the process of primitive accumulation by the petty-bourgeoisie in 
both the private and public sectors. The bureaucracy has, of course, been the main beneficiary of 
the public facilities in housing, education, medical care and transportation developed on such a 
unique scale (for Africa) by the Ghanaian state, and financed on the basis of cocoa surpluses. 
Access to these privileges has been greatly extended upon the SMC, senior civil servants and 
military officers appropriating the bulk of the increasingly scarce supplies channelled through 
state organisations ............ They have even been the main beneficiaries of the system of price 
controls. The truly significant development under the SMC, however, is the extent to which both 
active and retired military and bureaucratic officials have come into possession of capital as 
such, invested typically in agriculture, bulk-haulage, luxury transport systems, real estate, and the 
acquisition of company shares, thus allowing them to diversify from their immediate base in the 
state and taking on the role of kulaks, merchants, and 'entrepreneurs'. Loans from the state banks 
(sometimes never repaid) have been important in this development, but perhaps even more so 
have been the proceeds of bureaucratic corruption - kickbacks on import licences, state 
contracts and purchases, the embezzlement of state funds, even outright extortion - facilitated 
by the unprecedented levels of state intervention in the economy (Hutchful, 1979: 50) emphasis 
added) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.1- Public housing as state protocol without compensation  
 
Periodically, the NRC / SMC military regime gave out houses as awards to individuals and groups who had 
excelled albeit without compensation to the public housing agencies. When D.K. Poison became first Ghanaian 
world boxing champion after winning the World Boxing Council Featherweight title in September 1975, the 
government rewarded him with one SHC‘s estate house in Teshie Nungua Estates in Accra. Similarly, the entire 
cast members of the Osofo Dadzie Drama Troupe, a popular television drama group of the 1970s were each 
rewarded with public houses in 1977. Senior officers of the Special Branch of the Police Service were given 
houses on a similar basis. In other instances, SHC was ordered to develop houses that were then handed over to 
some organs of the state such as the police (Flagstaff House Security Barracks in Accra), soldiers (Wajir 
Barracks in Accra and Air Force Barracks in Takoradi), doctors (Korle Bu) and engineers (of then Water and 
Sewerage Corporation at Kanda, Accra). SHC was also occasionally engaged in infrastructural works that were 
also not paid for. In 1981, the Minister of Works and Housing ordered SHC to undertake civil works in the 
Mamprobi neighbourhood. However, at the time of completion of the works, the PNDC military administration 
that had deposed the civilian government on 31
st
 December 1981 refused to compensate SHC for this work.  
 
Source: Personal interview of Head of Planning, SHC, September 2006 
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5.3.4 Lapsing into deeper populism and policy inertia (1979 to 1984) 
The insurrection led by junior military officers in June 1979 that overthrew the 
SMC military government also marked the inception of government populist housing 
policies and general inertia up to the mid 1980s. As noted in Section 4.5.3 of Chapter 4, 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) of June 1979 espoused a Marxist 
orientation aiming to conduct a ―house cleaning‖ purge of the former senior military 
ruling class and their collaborators in the bureaucracy and private sector. This manifested 
in executions and extreme brutalities, praised by the urban proletariat and organised 
labour, and materialised a pent up class conflict. Populist measures in housing were part 
of the overall disposition towards assuaging the regime‘s class of supporters. The 
traumatic legacy of the AFRC inevitably paralysed the successor People‘s National Party 
(PNP) civilian administration up to December 1981, when it was overthrown by the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). At inception, the PNDC was disposed to 
Marxist ideology and allied to the earlier AFRC military regime. 
As part of the populist measures, the AFRC military regime of 1979 set up the 
State Houses Allocation Policy Implementation Commission (SHAPIC) by AFRC 
Decree 50 to curtail the practice of acquiring multiple publicly developed houses by the 
former ruling class and their collaborators. This decree empowered the state to seize 
publicly built houses from persons owning more than one such property. Section 2 (1 to 
3) of this law stated that 
(1) Subject to section 1 of this Decree, no person shall at any time own more than one house built 
by the State Housing Corporation or Tema Development Corporation.(2) Any person who 
immediately before the commencement of this Decree owns more than one such house as is 
referred to in subsection (1) of the section shall be entitled to own one house only and shall 
accordingly surrender free from all encumbrances the remaining house or houses as the case may 
be, to the State Housing Corporation or Tema Development Corporation.(3)  Unless the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary  Council  otherwise directs in writing the State Housing Corporation or 
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Tema  Development Corporation may refund to the owner of any such house surrendered to it 
under subsection (2) of this section the  purchase price or part thereof paid in respect of that house. 
After the handover of power by the AFRC, the policy paralysis of the civilian PNP 
administration from 1979 to 1981 affected the housing sector inevitably leaving most 
policies of the AFRC intact. Kondau-Agyemang (2001:153) noted that the PNP‘s housing 
policies ―remained at the rhetorical level without being transformed into reality‖. 
Therefore, when the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took power in 31
st
 
December 1981, with its Marxist link to the AFRC, it was inevitable that populism would 
re-emerge. Characterising landlords and property owners generally as ―Shylock‖, the 
regime passed the Rent Control Decree PNDC Law 5 that limited rent levels and 
permitted confiscations of properties and prosecution of owners who failed to comply 
with the law. Subsequently, the sanctions were maintained under the Compulsory Letting 
of Unoccupied Room and Houses Decree PNDC Law 7, which further empowered 
functionaries of the government to allocate privately built accommodation to tenants with 
or without the consent of the owners. However, by 1987 when the housing reforms were 
in the inception phase, these stringent measures were relaxed with the passage of the 
revised rent control law, PNDC Law 138. Under Section 10(a-b) of the new law 138, 
market conditions were permitted to be considered in assessing rent levels (Kufuor, 1993: 
49). However, the rent freeze on publicly built housing persisted until 1991, when TDC 
was able to advance arguments to convince the government to allow a 350% rent increase 
from the 1979 levels. However, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the 
reaction of a section of TDC‘s tenants restrained the effectiveness of the decontrol 
(Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, 1991: Item 411 & 420). 
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5.4   The state of public housing at the verge of reforms  
By 1989, SHC had 200 housing units under construction and held 4,800 units in 
rental (Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 5). Furthermore, it had outstanding debts 
of approximately equivalent to $1.7million comprising unmet obligations to prospective 
clients who had made advance deposits from the 1970s, as well as debts owed other 
agencies (Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990; Konadu-Agyeman, 2001:168). This 
included a debt approximately equivalent to $130,000 owed to SSNIT in loans and 
deferrals of mandatory pension payments. House prices had escalated nominally by 
120,000%
123
 over a period of two decades between the early 1970s and the early 1990s 
(Konadu-Agyeman, 2001). As at 31
st
 December 1986, which was the last time SHC 
published its audited accounts before the reforms, SHC had negative net assets 
approximately equivalent to $2.4 million. Depositors‘ funds partly financed SHC‘s 
annual operating deficit in 1986, approximately equivalent to $580,000 (Urban II Staff 
Appraisal Report, 1990: 54). Similarly, the waiting list of TDC clients grew from 1,000 
depositors by 1981, when the Home Owners Scheme (HOS) was officially abrogated, to 
1,370 depositors by 1990 when Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, a management 
consultancy consortium, undertook an assessment of the reformed ―The Special House 
Ownership Scheme‖. TDC had an outstanding debt approximately equivalent to 
$1.12million whilst creditors owed TDC approximately $280,000 as outstanding 
payments for completed properties. By 1989, TDC had built a total of 16,000 housing 
units and retained 7,520 housing units in its rental portfolio, making it the largest single 
landlord in Ghana. Additionally, TDC‘s net worth was approximately equivalent to 
                                                 
123
 This discounts the effect of inflation, which averaged above 45% over the two decade period and rose 
above 100% in three non-sequential years (derived from Aryeetey and Fosu. 2008). 
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$890,000 – with a working capital approximately equivalent to negative $3.1million – 
and a cumulative loss of the company approximately equivalent to $1.5million – 
(Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte 1991, Items 408–410). Clearly, SHC and TDC were in a 
precarious financial state by the inception of the housing reforms compounded by 
litigations, mismanagement and staff challenges and this reflected a general malaise 
affecting housing developers at the time. Furthermore, due to unavailable materials and 
financial constraints, there were a total of 1,892 abandoned uncompleted houses by 
SSNIT, SIC and REDCO in urban areas and 834 units by the Department for Rural 
Housing and Cottage Industries (DHRCI) abandoned in rural locations by 1988. In 
addition to those abandoned by SHC, TDC and SCC, there were approximately 4,000 
abandoned incomplete houses at the inception of the reforms
124
. 
In the late 1980s, the Bank for Housing and Construction had a real estate credit 
portfolio of ¢71.4million representing 1% of its outstanding credit. Other banks and non-
banking financial institutions – Merchant Bank, National Investment Bank, National 
Savings and Credit Bank, Ghana Commercial Bank, Agriculture Development Bank and 
Barclays Bank – undertook very limited activities in housing finance with similar results. 
The limited activities of such banks targeted formal sector employed high income 
households. Some multinational organisations such as Nestle, Lever Brothers (of the 
Unilever group), British Petroleum, and the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO – 
subsidiary of Kaiser Aluminium) arranged with these banks to replace pre-existing staff 
housing schemes solely financed by such companies. Very few local companies, 
including Aluworks Ltd, also undertook such arrangements. 
                                                 
124
 The World Bank estimated the uncompleted stock to exceed 5,000 units (Urban II Staff Appraisal 
Report, 1990: 132). 
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Table 5.1: Residential Mortgages Provided by Major Financial Institutions, 1974 – 1988 
Year  1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total 
(no.) 
Remarks 
Name  
of 
institution 
BHC 19 109 74 44 16 8 – 6 2 7 7 4 30 3 24 363  
Ghana 
Commercial 
Bank 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
89 
 
 
90 
 
 
– 
 Mortgages to 
customers suspended 
since 1979 
Barclays 
Bank 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
3 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank* 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
  
Social 
Security 
Bank 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
2 
 
44 
 
59 
 
46 
 
29 
 
24 
 
27 
 
16 
 
48 
 
26 
 
– 
 
– 
 
225 
 
SSNIT – – – – – – – – – 1 1 1 – 37 33 75 Employees only 
FGBS – – – – – – 159 217 122 91 31 63 146 105    
Source: Adopted from Konadu-Agyeman (2001:125) 
* - Does not reflect staff loans and special arrangements with multi-national organisations 
 
Table 5.2: State of mortgage lending of selected banks by 1988 
Name of Bank Mortgage portfolio  
(¢ ’000,000) 
Overall credit portfolio  
(¢ ’000,000) 
Proportion of mortgage to 
overall credit portfolio (%) 
Bank for Housing & Construction
125
 318.7 6,370 5 
Standard Chartered Bank
126
 66 7,800 0.85 
Social Security Bank
127
 154 3,000 5 
Source: compiled from Consultant‘s Draft Report; 1988 Urban II Preparatory Study – Housing Finance 
                                                 
125
 Credit position as at 31 October 1988 and included loans given to staff of the Bank 
126
 Credit position as at September 1988 and included loans given to individuals to construct their own houses as well as those given for the purchase of corporate 
real estate. 
127
 Credit position as at September 1988 and included loans given to staff of the Bank 
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These organisations routinely subsidized these mortgage loans in one form or the other, even 
though beneficiaries were predominantly in management positions. A few other banks like 
the Social Security Bank and the National Investment Bank also provided housing loans 
albeit restricted to their own (bank) staff. By September 1988, mortgage and real estate 
lending by the commercial banks was almost non-existent (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
5.5   Conclusion 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that prior to the enabling reforms, state 
housing policy ran on two parallel tracks. On the one hand, there was the pre-existing 
traditional housing delivery and allocation systems that were premised on socio-religious 
customary norms of land ownership which permitted leases in lieu of outright individual 
ownership, promoted housing types based on communal lifestyle and provided opportunities 
for low-income households to obtain access to minimal legitimate shelter. By the traditional 
norms, squatting was not possible because all land was owned by an indigenous group and 
could be procured by consent. In this regard, traditional housing approaches derived from 
structural functionalism. On the other hand, state policy promoted a conventional approach to 
housing that alienated land, developed single family housing by public agencies and adopted 
allocation mechanisms that benefitted mostly formally employed households. In the process, 
several public agencies in housing were established. The logic of modernisation also directly 
facilitated demolition of houses developed on the basis of the traditional norms. The 
existence of the plethora of public organisations provided opportunity for the frequent 
political interference in the use of housing to achieve political goals. The state‘s methods for 
acquiring land without completing the payments of compensation combined with political 
interference in management decisions of the public housing agencies to generate difficulties 
directly for the operations of the agencies, yet enabled the farcical demonstration of cost 
reduction in housing development. It is clear that the state maintained such a perverse 
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relationship with these public agencies compelling them to rely on their own resources in 
facing the brunt of the socio-economic and political difficulties, although some of the 
challenges derived from managerial ineptitude. This general trend was interspersed with 
episodes of state withdrawal from active public housing by reason of constraints imposed by 
realities of fiscal limitations or moralistic tendencies to deconstruct patronage networks. 
Generally, the logic of housing policy decisions privileged local political considerations over 
technical rationality espoused in the expert advice procured in the early post-colonial era 
from international agencies and individuals, as well as the social welfare ethos embedded in 
the traditional housing norms. However, in reviewing how the benefits spread in society, it 
becomes clear that whereas political legitimacy directly formed the basis of most housing 
policy decisions, seeking to ensure that office holders strengthened their hold on office, there 
was an underlying class basis that shaped such decisions. The pattern of pre-reform  housing 
policy shows clearly that underlying the political logic are class differences, conflicts and 
considerations from which the decisions go to empower elite and ruling classes or their 
supporters and deprive their opponents in lieu of the provision of housing as an objective end 
in itself. In conclusion, housing policy in the pre-reform era is characterised by multi-layered 
elements that are not always self-evident and mask the dialectical interaction between the 
seemingly wilful strategic acts of policy agents, and the deeper lying inherent collective 
biased dispositions of particular groups in the society. In this pre-reform housing policy 
framework, power is unevenly balanced in society and housing remains subjectively 
instrumental. 
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CHAPTER 6 – The Housing Sector Reforms: The World Bank, UN and the Local 
Actions 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established that the pre-reform era, beginning from 1951 and 
ending in 1985, clearly manifested a dual trajectory of housing development and allocation. 
The traditional housing practice of the polity was generally dominated by pre-existing socio-
cultural norms that privileged non-commercial development and supported communal 
lifestyle in society. This traditional approach to housing generated the opportunity for low-
income households to afford shelter; often in ways that neutralised economic relations and 
rather highlighted social capital. On the other hand, the formal public policy adopted the 
modernisation ethos underpinning a westernised approach to housing development. This 
approach emphasised nuclear family life-styles at variance with the pre-existing traditional 
socio-cultural norms. As a result, formal housing policies adopted by governments in the pre-
reform era promoted housing development and allocation that favoured business elites, senior 
bureaucrats and the top echelons of those formally employed. However, as has been 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter, the public policy approach to housing was 
overlaid with extensive political considerations of legitimacy, patronage and corruption. 
Finally, the chapter demonstrated that the overarching impetus of public policy on housing 
generated from the class bias of the politicians and bureaucrats designing and implementing 
the housing policies, programmes and projects of the pre-reform era. The preceding chapter 
makes the case that in the pre-reform era, the practice of housing was subjected to, and a 
subject of, uneven power relations in society which needed to be taken in account in 
formulating reforms of the housing sector. 
  In this chapter, I examine the reforms of the housing sector within the context of the 
structural adjustment policies implemented during the period 1985 to 2000. The context of 
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the housing reforms was further overlaid with the respective conceptual perspectives of the 
UN and the World Bank in the design and implementation of the enabling principles for 
housing reforms discussed in Chapter 3. In this regard, the chapter traces the different entry 
approaches and conditions of the World Bank and the UN to supporting the housing sector in 
Ghana. On the one hand, the World Bank was invited by the Housing Ministry and, by 
leveraging its significant funds, the World Bank crafted mandatory reforms for implementing 
the designed intervention. On the other hand, the UN entered the housing sector of Ghana 
through its advocacy for methodological rectitude and without the funding for 
implementation, hence the subscription to its ideals was voluntary. Alongside these 
interventions, reflecting the state‘s preference for a regime of publicly developed mass 
housing (discussed in Chapter 5), the Ghanaian government engineered conditions for the 
deployment of significant state pension funds into housing. This chapter traces the 
trajectories of the three streams of housing programmes led by the World Bank, the UN and 
the state pension fund agency, during the period of the housing sector reforms. It emerges 
that irrespective of the pathways, the experience that evolved during reforms was driven by 
motives outside of the issues of the housing sector. Housing as a sector within the economy 
was a residual priority of the government and therefore was not integrated into the 
overarching structural adjustment goals and activities, although periodically, the government 
used rhetorical devices to simulate this perception. It is found that competition between 
housing sector and local government interests emerged and this manifested the heterogeneity 
of the state discussed in Chapter 4. This state heterogeneity is one of the gaps in the analysis 
of policy – that is the consideration of the variety of interests groups within the state, the 
exploration of which reveals the potential of diverse trajectories in policy outcomes as a 
result of intra-state competition – that has not been applied to housing research in Africa and 
Ghana in particular which validates this thesis‘ attempts at rectifying the analytical lacuna. 
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The competition between the housing sector and local government sector interests was 
decided by the assertiveness of the local government interests and the government‘s desire 
for political legitimacy. The housing sector interests were not helped by frequent political 
changes in personnel and the drive for policy continuity, whereas the local government 
interests maintained political stability that was consolidated by the political influence of the 
head of the Ministry of Local Government throughout the reform era. In this competition 
between housing and local government sector interests it is noted how the quest for 
legitimacy forced the government to draw public funds into direct housing construction, 
contrary to the enabling principles and without regard to admonitions by the World Bank. It 
is noted further that the recourse by the government to adopt recommendations of the World 
Bank for the establishment of a secondary mortgage system using some funds of the public 
pension funds agency, was done to assuage the concerns of the World Bank about the 
government‘s direct housing construction. Ultimately, local government interests transcended 
housing concerns within the central government‘s policy priorities, which was extended into 
the priorities of the World Bank. As a result, the pace and outcome of the housing reforms 
was determined by individual personal interests and the material conditions of the economy 
as well as the changing political context.  
The chapter further discusses the emergence of new actors such as local and 
international private sector housing developers as well as the state pension funds agency in 
upscale housing markets. On the housing demand side, Ghanaians in the Diaspora constituted 
a new and expansive market opportunity whose requirements influenced an inordinate supply 
of upscale housing. Furthermore the chapter notes the effect of the emergence of these new 
actors and dynamics on the government‘s housing delivery programme. The chapter 
concludes by observing how the enabling principles underlying the housing sector reforms 
were subsumed under evolving priorities that bordered on political legitimacy and class 
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considerations. In this respect, the enabling principles developed by international 
development agencies under a hegemonic framework are nonetheless affected by local 
dynamics and strategic actions to the extent of diminishing the perceived relative power of 
the hegemonic order. 
6.2 The World Bank in Housing and Urban Sector Reforms 
As noted in Section 4.5.4 of Chapter 4, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were the first international agencies to engage with the government of 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in initiating the economic reforms in 
Ghana. It is from the urban sector component of these reforms that the (then) evolving 
enabling principles-based housing reforms was conceived, albeit with significant strategic 
actions by key policy agents. By 1984, the urban sector in Ghana was characterised by 
critical physical infrastructure deterioration particularly in Accra (World Bank, 1984: 26). 
The economic decline of the late 1970s (see Section 4.5.3 of Chapter 4) culminated in the 
decay of the comparatively better developed urban services and efficient local administrative 
systems of the late 1960s (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 3-4). For 
example, by 1984 in respect of liquid waste, 23% of Accra‘s residents had no toilets at all and 
the public toilet system operated a mere 20,000 antiquated bucket latrines to serve the city‘s 
population of almost 1 million. Furthermore, in Accra, only 400 properties were connected to 
the municipal sewerage system and the sewage treatment plant was broken resulting in 
untreated sewerage being pumped directly into the sea. The situation was little different in 
other cities of Ghana. Kumasi (population = 1,570,000) operated a public toilet system 
comprising 4,000 bucket latrines. In Tema (population = 209,000), significant portions of the 
sewer lines and the main sewer pumping station had collapsed. Besides sewerage, solid waste 
services did not fare any better. By 1980, only 20% of solid waste generated in the city was 
disposed of by Accra‘s management. Similarly, the road network in Accra had also 
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deteriorated to the extent that vehicular maintenance costs were rising significantly, travel 
time was increasing and generally traffic conditions were worsening. In Sekondi-Takoradi 
and Tamale, only 23% and 27% respectively of the roads were paved; and in Kumasi, only 
20% of the road network was in a serviceable condition.  Property rates had not been adjusted 
since the 1960s and municipal revenue had become insignificant. Reflecting the significant 
dependence of local authorities, central government contribution to the payment of the 
salaries of local authority staff grew from 53% in 1975 to 75% in 1985. The only external 
intervention was supported by (West) German aid agencies engaged in a 2-year programme – 
the Accra Waste Management Project – comprising re-organisation of waste management 
services, construction of sanitary facilities, improving financial management, providing 
equipment and training (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990). The Ministry of 
Works and Housing – with responsibility for housing, drainage and sewerage – approached 
the World Bank in 1984 for assistance primarily to address housing shortages. This approach 
fitted the framework of engagement under the SAP by which individual ministries presented 
their programmes to the World Bank to explore the prospect for securing finance. Underlying 
this request was the desire to restart public housing activities that had collapsed. The request 
to the World Bank was a response to rising demand by organised labour for government 
initiatives in directly providing housing to curtail the excessive rents being paid at the time on 
private tenancies.  
The Ministry of Works and Housing made several representations to the World Bank to provide 
financial support for housing. However the Bank was not inclined to do so for two reasons. In the first 
place the World Bank was not persuaded that there was an effective system in place to manage that 
type of project. Secondly the Bank was of the opinion (successively) that the presence of SHC and 
TDC and the emergence of GREDA
128
 served the same purpose and therefore were better suited to 
undertake the desired housing delivery with some support. It was argued that direct financing of the 
housing targets by the Bank would stifle the private sector‘s growth potential. There was an underlying 
principle of removing the Bank from financing direct housing development although this was not 
(explicitly) stated and the Bank maintained their stand notwithstanding the solicitations of the Ministry 
of Works and Housing (source: Personal interview of Deputy Minister, Ministry of Works and Housing 
– August 2006). 
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 At this point the Ghana Real Estate Developers Association (GREDA) was yet to emerge although a few 
private developers and some private contractors posing as developers undertook limited housing development. 
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The World Bank initially responded tentatively to the Housing Ministry‘s request, preferring 
to conduct an appraisal of the sector reflecting its view that public housing agencies were too 
inefficient to be given the resources being sought by the Ministry of Works and Housing; and 
that the private sector was deemed better suited for mass housing and had to be encouraged. 
However, the World Bank acquiesced eventually, albeit addressing housing at the level of the 
lagging municipal infrastructure. As a result, the initial housing concerns were subsumed 
under urban infrastructure initiatives and framed within the overarching structural adjustment 
goals. Supporting urban initiatives was crafted as a pre-requisite for national economic 
growth. It was argued that with the 30% urban population contributing more than 50% of the 
GDP, investing in infrastructure of urban centres was important because these urban centres 
were; 
Key centres of economic activity, political decision making, administration and learning centres for the 
transmission of technology to the rural areas, providing markets for rural produce. .................. poor 
infrastructure and services, and weak local government institutions impose heavy costs on economic 
activity and drain national resources
 
 (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 1)  
The World Bank agreed (in 1984) to allocate unused funds earlier committed for the Ghana 
Urban Development Project (1970-1971), which had been subsequently revoked after 
government unilaterally decided to repudiate some and defer other outstanding foreign debts 
(see Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5). The World Bank restricted the interventions to fit the scope 
and budget of the curtailed urban project of 1970. This involved upgrading in five slum 
neighbourhoods in four cities – Nima in Accra, Moshie Zongo in Kumasi, Kwesimintsim and 
Afia-Zongo in Sekondi-Takoradi, and Kamina Barracks in Tamale. However, inflation had 
significantly devalued the unused funds of the 1970 project compelling the reduction in the 
scope of works in the 1984 programme. On the basis of the foregoing, the 1984 urban project 
was re-designed to pilot interventions in Accra, culminating in the Accra District 
Rehabilitation Program from 1985 to 1998 (Personal interview of Project Advisor, Urban 
Project Support Unit, August, 2006). Clearly, the Housing Ministry and the World Bank 
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engaged at cross purposes. The Housing Ministry‘s primary quest was to secure finance to 
continue support for public agencies-led housing development. The World Bank‘s response 
was situated in the context of the period when it was transiting from project-based state-led 
interventions to private sector-led housing finance and urban sector-wide reforms (see 
Section 3.4.2). On the strength of the World Bank‘s considerable financial resources, the 
uneven balance of power between the World Bank and the Housing Ministry resulted in the 
selection of the urban over the preferred housing interventions.  
6.2.1. Accra District Rehabilitation Programme (ADRP) – 1985 to 1988 
The Accra District Rehabilitation Programme (ADRP) focused on three interventions, 
namely upgrading of slums, improving municipal revenues, and project management capacity 
building of the Housing Ministry. The slum upgrading interventions targeted the two low-
income communities of Nima and Maamobi in Accra. Although Nima and Maamobi were 
indeed among the most deprived communities in the city, their selection served other political 
ends for the government. Home to migrants mostly from the northern regions of Ghana
129
 and 
predominantly Moslem, the residents in these two neighbourhoods were attracted to the 
populism of the PNDC government and its anti-elite rhetoric. Frequently, Flt. Lt. Rawlings, 
Head of State in the PNDC Government, actively participated in de-silting choked drains and 
sweeping the streets in these neighbourhoods
130
. These interventions consolidated the PNDC 
government‘s political legitimacy among the urban poor. The PNDC leadership was thus 
easily persuaded in the selection of Nima and Maamobi for the proposed urban interventions. 
The infrastructure upgrading component allowed the World Bank to test its integrated 
multi-sector urban upgrading approach labelled the ―Christmas Tree‖ model. In this model, 
different interventions including neighbourhood infrastructure, municipal revenue, transport 
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 Impoverishment of Ghana‘s northern regions had colonial antecedents (see Forde, 1968; Songsore, 1989). 
130
 For accounts of populist acts of the PNDC Head of State see Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild (1982). 
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and local economic development were all combined in a single urban project (Kessides, 
1997). The Indonesian Kampung Improvement Project (KIP)
131
 of the 1970s provided the 
antecedent ‗model‘ for the ADRP. The ADRP‘s upgrading component included improving 
drainage and sanitation, pedestrian and vehicular access in order to potentially benefit 19,000 
residents (World Bank, 2002:10). However, the Bank felt there was inadequate local 
experience or capacity to implement such multi-sectoral interventions. Chris Banes, a 
Municipal Engineer and staff of the Bank on the ADRDP, discussed the perception held by 
the Bank‘s staff on the paucity of local capacity in managing such interventions:  
There was very little knowledge of what could be achieved with the multi-sectoral, integrated approach 
to basic infrastructure provision in these areas. Probably the Bank and/or other donors were saying this 
is what has been done in the KIP. So they said, yes, we'll give it a try, and [sic] the project unit for the 
first Bank project overall, the ADRP, staffed it up with a lot of young, bright guys out of the University 
of Science and Technology, among them architects, planners and engineers. The Bank teams worked 
with them, and they cut their teeth on the pilot project, which was a small, 30 hectares project ............... 
the Ministry of Works and Housing was very weak. Ghana was then a centralist country. Everything 
was directed top-down from the Ministry of Works and Housing. So the Bank latched its project unit, 
the Technical Services Center [sic], onto the Ministry of Works and Housing, and it was driven 
technically (World Bank, 2000
132
). 
Although the project was coordinated and institutionalised through the Technical Services 
Centre (TSC), it required capacity building. However, the World Bank training was tailored 
primarily to make the TSC staff conversant with the World Bank‘s guidelines. These staff 
were also given salary incentives to secure their continued employment in the Housing 
Ministry similar to the conditions enjoyed by those engaged in projects deriving from the 
structural adjustment reforms (see Section 4.5.4 of Chapter 4). Chris Banes (World Bank, 
2000) describes how such incentives helped to maintain the local experts thus: 
Within the Ghana civil service and the local government service, there is some continuity which is 
surprising, given the woeful remuneration they get. But I think the continuity with regard to the 
project unit is that they have had perks. The usual way they are kept on is they all get a new 
vehicle; every new Bank project means a new vehicle. And now there is a move to take people on 
contract. Of course, that upsets the system a bit. We have been tinkering around with civil service and 
local government reform for a long time, but if [sic] we haven't found a solution so far. For the moment 
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 The KIP, often cited as a good example of slum upgrading, was initiated by the Indonesian government in 
1969 and progressively expanded to cover 200 communities and 15 successive projects (World Bank, 2005:62).   
132
 source: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/EXTUSU/0,,content
MDK:20248523~menuPK:512857~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:341387~isCURL:Y,00.html ) 
Date Sourced 15th May 2006 
174 
 
we continue doing other things like contracting staff as consultants or giving them perks so that 
they accept the poor salary situation‖ (World Bank 2000; emphasis added
133
). 
The World Bank‘s wage enhancement for the TSC staff created an elite agency within the 
bureaucracy of the Housing Ministry. Additionally, with the exception of the Director of 
Housing, none of the other staff of the Housing Ministry had direct interaction with TSC. 
Apart from mandatory management meetings of the ministry bringing together all 
departmental and agency heads, TSC was operationally delinked from the Ministry (personal 
interview of former Director, TSC; September 2006). It remains unclear the extent to which 
the ADRP slum upgrading interventions influenced the national housing policy discourse as 
evaluation studies were conducted only by the World Bank. In total, the World Bank granted 
a US$22 million loan for the ADRP (Ewool, 2004) which ran from 1985 until it officially 
closed in 1992. However, by 1988, the main construction works had concluded and attention 
turned to extending similar interventions to other cities earlier excluded as a result of the 
budget limits set by the World Bank. This also coincided with the end of the stabilisation 
phase and the launch of the growth phase of structural adjustment – the Economic Reform 
Programme (ERP). Studies of the dynamics of housing and urbanisation in Ghana and 
primarily undertaken by staff of TSC concluded with the imperative to develop the physical 
and social infrastructure in secondary towns and cities to stem the drift to the primary urban 
centres. Additionally, it was hoped that interventions in the other cities would address 
housing and urban development in a more integrated fashion.  
6.2.2. The Priority Works Programme (PWP) (1988 – 1991) 
Before the proposals for the next phase of urban and housing interventions could be 
fully developed, urgent priorities emerged that compelled a temporary redirection of housing 
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 Source: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/EXTUSU/0,,content
MDK:20248523~menuPK:512857~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:341387~isCURL:Y,00.html ) 
Date Sourced 15th May 2006 
175 
 
policy. From 1986, emerging evidence suggested that the civil service retrenchment under the 
SAP aiming to improve efficiency in public administration (Owusu, 2005:4) was also 
increasing poverty. UNICEF (UNICEF, 1986
134
) observed rising unemployment and 
worsening conditions of the poor and vulnerable groups affected by SAP policies of price de-
regulation, subsidy removal and trade liberalization (World Bank, 1987:54-55). Additionally, 
food production suffered a significant decline following a glut in 1984 that had caused a price 
collapse and impoverished many subsistence farmers. From 1985, reduction in food 
production affected food supply to the urban centres in the subsequent years (World Bank, 
1987)
 135
. In this context, UNICEF proposed that the implementation of SAP required ―a 
human face‖ (UNICEF, 1986; Mosely et al, 1995) implying welfare considerations. The 
Programme to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was designed to 
generate employment for and transfer skills to the retrenched workers in order to alleviate 
poverty and enhance their prospects for sustaining their livelihoods through private sector or 
self-employment. PAMSCAD was operationalised through the Priority Works Project 
(PWP), with housing as an instrument for the employment-generation and skills transfer 
goals. The design of the PWP concluded in 1987 and implementation began in 1988 with a 
credit facility of $10.6 million from the World Bank – Credit 1874-GH, FY88 – to be 
executed in two years. The PWP had three sub-components – infrastructure upgrading and 
rehabilitation in selected communities similar to the ADRP, completing abandoned mass 
housing projects labelled housing consolidation, and the development of a site and service 
scheme for the poor. The public housing projects abandoned from the late 1970s (see Section 
5.4 of Chapter 5) were identified as projects that would fulfil the goals of the PWP. It was 
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 UNICEF (1986) Ghana: Adjustment Policies and Programmes to protect Children and 
Other Vulnerable Groups (Accra: UNICEF) 
135
 The drought and famine of 1982-1983 that affected the entire Sahelian region of Africa (see Section 4.5.3 of 
Chapter 4) spurred massive agricultural activities in Ghana resulting in bumper harvests in 1984. However the 
absence of efficient storage facilities and adequate post-harvest technology led to significant losses for the 
farmers in 1984. Consequently production fell in 1985 compounding the difficulties faced by the urban poor.  
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proposed that 200 of these abandoned properties initiated by the State Housing Corporation 
(SHC) for prospective clients would be transferred to the Bank for Housing and Construction 
(BHC) for completion after the payment of outstanding debts owed the original clients of 
SHC who had made full or partial payments for these properties. One hundred of the 
completed properties would be sold at market rates through mortgages supplied by the BHC 
whilst the other 100 would be rented to civil servants. However, the original price agreed 
between the prospective owners and SHC had significantly eroded through inflation thereby 
devaluing the initial payments made by the original clients. Yet, the compensation for 
expropriating these uncompleted developments did not take into account such inflationary 
effects. Consequently, a number of original clients of SHC whose properties were 
incorporated in the housing consolidation scheme, preferred to retain ownership after the 
completion of construction instead of accepting the compensation. Without resolving this 
impasse between the original owners, SHC and TSC, the incorporation of the properties into 
the housing consolidation programme was perceived as an illegal confiscation and increased 
subsequent litigation for SHC (personal interview of Directors of Planning and Finance, 
SHC; October 2006; and Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works and Housing; 
September 2006). Thus, although funds were secured from the World Bank to pursue an 
agreed set of actions, the government failed to fulfil its side of the agreement in the process 
creating problems for SHC management. In reality half of the interventions aimed to satisfy 
the needs of the senior bureaucratic class, a practice mirroring the previous experience of the 
Low Cost Housing Programme as discussed in section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5. By providing 
funding to the public housing agencies to undertake direct housing development under this 
scheme, the desires of the Housing Ministry, expressed since 1985, were fulfilled. On the 
other hand, the limited number of housing units participating in this scheme reflected the 
wariness of the World Bank towards direct housing construction projects. 
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The proposed site and service scheme anticipated the development of 400 serviced 
plots
136
 in Community 3 in Tema. The funds secured from the World Bank coupled with a 
further loan from the pension fund, SSNIT, was to be lent to BHC for construction loans 
required by the private developers. Subsequently, such loans were to be recycled as mortgage 
loans for the beneficiaries with a 25-year repayment period. These long term loans recognised 
the structural problem of finance in the country which had culminated in the minimal housing 
finance activities of the banks from the 1970s to the late 1980s, as noted in section 5.4 of 
Chapter 5. Evidently, persistent inflation had induced the commercial banks to substantially 
reduce their exposure to risk in long term lending in the 1970s. Thus, the proposed 
arrangement in the housing consolidation and site and service projects of the PWP, pointed 
the way to address the difficulties in construction and mortgage financing. Upon completion, 
the serviced plots were to be leased through BHC to private estate developers who would be 
supported with loans to develop low-income housing ownership and rentals units
137
. The ―site 
and services‖ scheme however, did not prescribe the participatory elements of incremental 
self-build or self-management conventionally associated with its application (see Section 
3.2.1 of Chapter 3) that effectively reduced housing construction costs for low-income 
households (Turner, 1972; 1976; World Bank, 1975). On the contrary, the proposal to use 
corporate developers, standardised housing designs and conventional building technologies 
distorted the conventional ―site and service‖ concept. This effectively precluded user 
participation aspects which had distinguished site and service from conventional approaches. 
The reality of this design was that its characterisation as ―site and service‖ was a rhetorical 
device masking the underlying and enduring preference for a conventional housing approach 
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 The land for the site and service belonged to TDC and was to be ceded to TSC, which would undertake the 
servicing with ―paved roads, bitumen surfaced lanes and footpaths, water supply, electricity, street lighting, 
public sanitary conveniences, paved market and a community centre and playing field‖ (PWP Agreement, 1988) 
137
 The development of the site and services scheme would progress in two phases. The second phase would not 
start unless at least 100 of the envisaged 400 plots had been taken up by developers. TSC developed 
standardised plans though the developers could use their own designs on condition they conformed to the 
permissible standards of (and were developed in consultation with) TSC, BHC and TDC. 
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of building completed houses, albeit replacing the traditional public agency with private 
developers in this case. Eventually, even though the land servicing was implemented, for 
reasons which border on class considerations that are later discussed in Section 6.7 of this 
Chapter, the serviced plots were not released as planned to private developers. 
The PWP project generated substantial employment through the construction sector 
including housing; creating 8,000 jobs purportedly to absorb retrenched civil servants, albeit 
falling short of the envisaged 10,000 positions. The majority of these jobs were entry-level, 
low-skilled and low-paying jobs. Besides the shortfall in achieving the target level of 
employment, the job opportunities were taken up by other people instead of those for whom 
these jobs were created. For example, in one of the major construction schemes in Nima, 
Accra, most of the new recruits were residents from neighbouring areas long unemployed 
before the structural adjustment reforms (personal interview of Project Advisor, Urban 
Project Support Unit; September 2006). The PWP was beset by many problems and generally 
failed to achieve their overarching objectives of mitigating the negative impacts of 
adjustment and reducing poverty (Aryeetey & Tarp, 2000; Aryeetey & Goldstein, 2000). This 
was partly due to the delayed release of donor funds
138
, the complex administrative systems 
for its implementation, the urban bias and the inefficient targeting of the beneficiary groups, 
and the inordinate focus on organizational and logistics support (Harrigan & Younger, 
2000:201).  
It is noteworthy that the PWP coincided with the onset of decentralisation reforms 
that sought to devolve power from central to local government. This led to the reorganization 
of the 65 pre-existing local authorities into 110 District / Municipal / Metropolitan 
Assemblies
139
. In the process, the responsibility for the development of physical and social 
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 Donors pledged up to US$84 million or 6% – 8% of the annual expenditure of donors for the ERP in 
February 1988 but failed to deliver on time (Harrigan and Younger, 2000)   
139
 PNDC Law 207 changed the title of the local authorities from Councils to Assemblies. Subsequent 
legislation differentiated these assemblies according to population; smaller sized Districts to medium sized 
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infrastructure such as waste management, drainage, markets and schools was transferred from 
the Housing Ministry to the new local governments supervised by the Local Government 
Ministry.  
There is debate over the motives for the decentralisation reforms. Tanoh (1996) 
argued that the decentralisation reforms in Ghana were a politically necessary and rational 
choice made by the government at the time to alter the growing incidence of permanent social 
fragmentation. This situation arose from a corrosive relationship between a marginalised and 
disenfranchised majority segment of the society and a minority elite parasitic ruling class. 
The majority suffered from being under-served in respect of their access to socio-economic 
goods generated by the state with extracted resources from this majority segment culminating 
in their delinking from the state. According to Tanoh (1996) this is what ultimately drove the 
country to the brink of political failure in the early 1980s. In this regard, Tanoh (1996) argued 
further that as post-colonial economic crises evolved and generated highly discriminatory 
patronage regimes, the local government system suffered double delinking, with communities 
unhinging from them at the bottom and the state bypassing the local governments from the 
top. On that basis, Tanoh (1996) describes the decentralisation reforms as a pre-emptive 
initiative for re-engaging state-society relationship. The populist structures of the PNDC 
government, namely the People‘s Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence 
Committees (WDCs) and their successor Committee for the Defence of the Revolution 
(CDRs) were envisaged to be instrumental in this process. Thus, decentralisation was linked 
to the government‘s populist refrain of ―power to the masses‖ (Zanu, 1997:355; Asante & 
Aryee, 2004:6).  
The DAs (District Assemblies) are therefore a direct and appropriate outcome of the on-going 
experience of popular empowerment and a reversal of the top-down nature of local government. In this 
                                                                                                                                                        
Municipal Assemblies to the larger sized Metropolitan Assemblies. Further legislations culminated in the 
upgrading of some Assemblies and the re-configuration of others, creating a total of 238 Assemblies as at 
November 2008. 
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sense, the DAs represent both a progressive change and, given their roots in popular aspirations and 
activities, a legitimate and sustainable vehicle for development (Tanoh, 1996). 
the underlying philosophy of the 1988 legislation was that the district assemblies would form a basis 
for a national system of indirect elections to regional and national level assemblies, on the socialist 
―democratic centralism‖ model.‖ (Crook, 1994: 345 cited in Devas & Korboe, 2000:125-126) 
Another argument is that the motives for the decentralisation reforms derived from political 
legitimacy questions facing the PNDC military regime at both the global to the local scale. At 
the global level, the World Bank and other donors took advantage of the government‘s need 
for resources to resuscitate the fragile economy and leveraged their substantial capital to push 
for political reforms premised on ―rational‖ economic logic of reducing wasteful public 
subsidy and enhancing cost recovery of local service delivery. Locally, the decentralisation 
reforms were implemented to cultivate a new support coalition for the government, to 
compensate for the loss of the traditional support coalition of the PNDC government, 
dissolved because of the SAP reform-fuelled hardships. However decentralisation reforms 
lacked government commitment at the onset and were partially implemented with an 
inordinate emphasis being placed on administrative changes and only rhetorical support for 
the political component of the reforms (Ayee, 1994; Mohan, 1996; Ocquaye, 2001). 
Stalling tactics were only reversed when the PNDC felt that its legitimacy was threatened because of 
the pressures engendered by austerity............As Rothchild (1993: 15) observes: ―with domestic and 
international donor community pressures building up for democratization, Rawlings, recognizing the 
need to establish a new support coalition, moved cautiously to link political reform with economic 
reform‖ (see also Herbst, 1993). The PNDC was being squeezed between the donors and key sections 
of Ghanaian society. Therefore, it had to placate two different sets of demands while retaining power. 
This it did through its decentralization programme. 
Crucially, the candidates stood on a nonpartisan basis since it was argued that party politicking 
occluded 'genuine' politics. However, the pledge of the newly elected assembly members included the 
phrase 'I will uphold and defend the revolutionary objectives of the PNDC', which suggests that 
'nonpartisan' meant anything except the PNDC (Mohan, 1996: 82, 84) 
The stalling of the impetus for decentralisation thus suggests that the PNDC military 
government was not truly inclined to decentralise power until its legitimacy was under attack. 
This is buttressed by the subsequent manipulation of the process to generate a new political 
support coalition for the government after the adoption of the decentralisation reforms under 
duress from internal and external sources. This account of decentralisation reforms as a 
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response to political legitimacy imperatives partly explains the growing importance of the 
local governance interests. It is in the context of the evolving decentralisation process, 
embedded in the complex milieu of concerns of limited public finance, and the search for 
political legitimacy that the next phase of housing and urban reforms emerged. 
6.3 The Intermission of Paradoxical Policy Narratives and Political Legitimacy 
Whilst the government sought assistance from the World Bank for the housing sector, 
its pronouncements about resolving challenges in the housing sector barely materialised. The 
pronouncements were important for political effect. In 1986, community-led initiatives in 
housing appeared to be the favoured policy approach, with a budding cooperative self-help 
initiative of the Army set out as exemplary. 
A key dimension of our medium term development efforts should therefore be the continued 
harnessing of community initiatives and, in particular, the demonstrated action of communities, 
including urban communities to contribute labour and other available resources to supplement 
Government‘s limited resources. This will be of tremendous importance ......... ....... in the provision of 
housing at reasonable costs for working people. ..... The initiatives of communities themselves are 
required to generate new levels of activity to augment the housing stock and improve maintenance of 
existing facilities. In this regard it is worth noting that the Armed Forces have started a highly 
commendable housing scheme which other institutions will do well to emulate. Under this scheme, 
officers and men alike make voluntary monthly contributions and provide free labour using whatever 
materials are available to construct core design houses. Resources have therefore been allocated in the 
1987 budget to enable infrastructural support to be provided to communities willing to undertake 
projects to house ordinary working people. Such infrastructural support will include land, equipment 
and water supply, roads, culverts and the basic sewerage system. (Budget Statement and Economic 
Policy, 1987: 29, 37; emphasis added)  
However, nothing was done practically in this regard. This rhetorical device created the 
perception of pre-disposition to self-help initiatives. Arguably, such pronouncements were 
crafted to assuage core supporters disenchanted by the adverse effect of the neoliberal 
reforms. In this regard, the negative characterisation of landlords fits into the populist anti-
landlord narrative discussed in Section 5.3.4 of Chapter 5.  
The stock of houses on the housing market has not increased over the last several years while the 
demand for houses has increased tremendously. This has led to a situation where landlords are charging 
exorbitant rents. It is the aim of the PNDC to reverse this trend (Budget Statement and Economic 
Policy, 1987: 37) 
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Furthermore, the urban proletariat from whom the core support emerged were the only 
interest group mentioned directly – referred to as the ―working people‖. There was also an 
oblique acknowledgement of the bureaucratic – ruling class preference for state built housing 
in the reference to SSNIT, SIC and REDCO. Other proposed interventions allied to the 
structural adjustment goals served to pacify the World Bank. To stimulate local production, 
the government announced a reduction of import duty from 20% to 10% on pig iron to boost 
steel production and clinker for cement production. Sales taxes on key construction materials 
produced locally – cement, roofing sheets and paints – was also reduced to stimulate housing 
supply. Similarly, 20% of formal sector wages was made tax deductible as housing 
allowances to improve housing demand (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
1987). In 1988, more initiatives were announced to engender private participation and framed 
in the logic of neo-liberalism.  
Government has decided that to stimulate investment in real estate development it is necessary to 
provide some incentive to estate developers. Consequently it has been decided that the corporate tax for 
real estate companies be reduced from the 55% to 45%. Additionally, companies and persons who 
invest part of their profits in real estate will be allowed to offset up to 50% of such investment against 
the following year‘s tax liability. Real estate developers will be granted a five-year tax holiday and any 
loss incurred during the tax holiday period may be carried forward for another two years. Purchasers of 
houses from real estate companies are also to be exempted from payment of stamp duty as is currently 
the case with purchasers of houses built by the State Housing Corporation and the Tema Development 
Corporation. Sales tax on locally produced building materials have also been reduced to 10% from 
20% (Budget Statement and Economic Policy, 1988: 16). 
The incentives to induce private sector participation appeared to be aligned with the World 
Bank‘s enabling housing principles. However, the policy was silent on the intended 
beneficiaries of these newly empowered private developers resulting in little regard for the 
housing needs of the poor. Generally, with such incentives for private developers, it would 
appear that government action synchronised with the enabling housing principles privileged 
by the World Bank. Yet, continuing the approach of mixed messages to different audiences, 
the government also noted its aims of channelling public funds in the direct construction of 
housing from the budget, as well as, the pension funds, SSNIT. 
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Government intends to spend over  2.6 billion (approximately equivalent to US$12.8milion) to 
provide these services as well as provide financial support to the State’s Housing Development 
Institutions to complete various projects already initiated by them..................With the increase in 
the interest rates of SSNIT‘s funds from 6% to 16½%, the value of these Social Security Funds has 
been substantially increased. In addition, Government has already indicated in the National Program 
for Economic Development that the regulations governing the Trust will be amended so as to enable 
the investment of a substantial portion of these funds in the development of housing. The Trust is 
expected to invest these substantial resources to be provided by Government into productive 
investments in housing to help secure the future of the people whose contributions have sustained 
the Trust. Government is confident that the new management of the Trust will rise to these challenges. 
We also expect the Trade Union Congress, which is represented on the Board of the Trust, to provide 
the necessary support for these new initiatives of the Trust and to co-operate in the realization of 
benefits to ordinary workers. Central Government will on its part begin the renovation of all 
Government bungalows and complete on-going public housing projects up to a total cost of 1.25 
billion (Budget Statement and Economic Policy, 1988: 16; emphasis added). 
At this time, the national pension funds, SSNIT was under review as part of the structural 
adjustment reforms. Originally, SSNIT had been set up under National Redemption Council 
Decree 127 in November 1972, to manage a public social security scheme with compulsory 
participation for all organisations with more than five employees. At inception, SSNIT 
operated as a provident fund that made a single terminal payment of the total contributions of 
the participant upon retirement with an interest rate of 3% (Kumado & Gockel, 2003). Two 
key features of the SSNIT‘s operations reviewed under the SAP were the type and 
administration of benefits from the scheme and the conditions of investment of funds. The 
reforms under the SAP envisaged a pension scheme that made regular periodic payments up 
to the death of the participant instead of the single payment. Secondly, restrictions on the 
investments of SSNIT funds to only government securities and the regulation of the rate of 
return on such investments were partially lifted. Negotiations with the World Bank led to the 
government acceptance to deregulate the returns on SSNIT investments, increasing from 6% 
to 16½% (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1988). Historically, the restriction of 
SSNIT investments to government securities coupled with the low rate of returns on such 
investments enabled the government to obtain very cheap finance. Although the new 
deregulation measures increased SSNIT‘s operational funds substantially, the government‘s 
direction of a significant portion of the surplus proceeds to public housing, further 
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demonstrated the importance given to state-led housing within the decision calculus of the 
ruling class, at a time when the government was seeking to reconstruct its support coalition. 
Expectedly, the World Bank noted its disapproval of this, albeit to little effect. 
The proposed pilot housing finance scheme provides an alternative to more costly schemes that have 
been proposed. For example, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) is now 
being encouraged to invest in relatively high standard and high cost housing at highly subsidized 
interest rates – a policy which apart from being ineffective will certainly decapitalize the Trust 
(World Bank, Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 7; emphasis added) 
The World Bank‘s criticism of the direct housing option using SSNIT‘s funds and its 
submission of a housing finance alternative was in keeping with the corresponding juncture 
in the evolution of the Bank‘s enabling principles (Kalarickal, 2006). Consequently, 
government made statements backed by some actions to assuage the World Bank‘s concerns 
within the framework of Urban II‘s Housing Sector Reforms discussed in the next section.  
The availability of funds for lending to builders has been restricted principally by lack of 
encouragement for the mobilisation of long-term funds. Government intends to improve this situation 
through the establishment of a Housing Finance Company which will mobilize funds through loans, 
bonds and equity contributions and channel them through primary lending institutions like the Bank for 
Housing and Construction to individuals and corporate bodies. It is expected that through this system 
individuals who have traditionally not had access to funds will be able to borrow at reasonable interest 
rates on long-term basis to build their own houses (Budget Statement and Economic Policy, 1989: 20) 
6.4 The World Bank’s Urban II – The Design  
Urban II represented the formal inception of the Housing Sector Reforms oriented to 
the World Bank‘s variant of the enabling principles. This was prefaced by the fulfilment of 
two World Bank preconditions, namely the assertion of housing as a public policy priority 
and, secondly, an indication of the government‘s commitment to the housing reforms:  
They (World Bank) said that before they could get into it (housing sector support) the government of 
PNDC would have to tell them in some way that this thing is important to them so that they can, you 
know assist (personal interview of Director of Policy, Ministry of Works and Housing, October 2006).  
The Ghanaian government complied with statements of ―prioritisation‖ and ―commitment‖; 
It is a matter of concern to government that housing continues to be unaffordable to the average 
Ghanaian. .......... Serious initiatives will be taken to arrest this unsatisfactory situation (Budget 
Statement and Economic Policy, 1989: 20)  
The improvement of housing conditions is a priority of the Government of Ghana. To this end the 
Government has already taken a number of steps to encourage the development of the Housing Sector. 
In order to accelerate the development of the sector and to strengthen housing institutions, the 
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Government has sought the assistance of the World Bank (IDA
140
)................ The above policies will 
be implemented in consultation with the World Bank (IDA) and on the terms and conditions acceptable 
to the World Bank (IDA). Where necessary the government will, on a timely basis, promulgate 
legislation on other instruments to give effect to the above (Correspondence from Minister of Finance 
to Managing Director of the World Bank, 16
th
 March 1990)
141
 
It bears noting that such assurances of housing ―prioritisation‖ and ―commitment‖ to housing 
reforms were extracted from the government in ways that mirrored the mechanism by which 
the structural adjustment reforms were implemented. That is to say, these so-called 
government commitments were extracted through conditionalities. However, as latter events 
revealed, the government‘s commitment to the housing reforms was questionable. 
For reasons to be adduced later in this section, it is instructive that Urban II was 
designed as two distinct sets of interventions addressing the housing and local government 
sectors respectively.  These distinct components were the ―Housing Sector Reform‖ and the 
―Local Government Rehabilitation‖. The Local Government Rehabilitation project is 
discussed in detail in Section 6.4.2 of this Chapter. The key concerns for the Housing Sector 
Reforms focused on the establishment of a market-based housing finance system to ensure 
full recovery of costs for investors and intermediary institutions, and importantly re-defining 
(and limiting) public sector activities in the sector. The housing reforms would: 
initiate the development of a sustainable housing finance system; reform the housing parastatals, begin 
to relieve the acute housing shortage of affordable houses; improve the environmental conditions and 
provide essential infrastructure and services for the urban poor; and strengthen the MWH‖ (World 
Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report (1990); page 15-16) 
Reforming housing finance was the principal intervention of this component of Urban II, with 
a proposed housing finance agency to run a secondary mortgage system that would finance 
mortgage loans for prospective home owners. The main public housing agencies, State 
Housing Corporation (SHC) and Tema Development Corporation (TDC), were to be 
restructured either by privatisation or, as a last resort, by commercialisation and thereby 
streamline the use of public subsidies in housing. Additionally, although the principal focus 
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 International Development Association. See Chapter 3 for the discussion of the IDA‘s formation.  
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 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Reference SEC / FP / 036. 
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was on reforming housing finance, it did not preclude the conventional menu of site and 
services, as well as slum upgrading. Lastly, the menu of reform interventions also called for 
improved management of the existing housing stock.   
In these circumstances, IDA‘s ―traditional‖ approach to the shelter sector in lower-income developing 
economies would comprise some combination of new low-cost site and services plots, improving land 
titles and registrations, encouraging slum upgrading, and improving the provision of and cost recovery 
for urban infrastructure. ............ However by themselves they will not eliminate any of the litany of 
problems listed…....... It is not necessarily just more urban housing that is needed. More efficient and 
equitable utilization of the existing housing stock is needed as well‖. (World Bank Urban II Staff 
Appraisal Report, 1990:8-9) 
6.4.1 The Housing Sector Reforms - Presumptions, Omissions and Paradoxes  
Under Urban II, the Home Finance Company, (HFC) was established in 1990 under 
the Home Mortgage Finance Law, PNDC Law 329 with shareholding by the Government of 
Ghana and the public pension fund, SSNIT. HFC was set up as a secondary mortgage facility 
to provide long term financing to commercial banks for mortgage lending to fulfil the need 
for long term funds for housing. HFC was financed with $8 million and $16.2 million from 
the government, borrowed from the World Bank and the SSNIT respectively as part equity 
and part loan for working capital in the form of long-term bonds. These bonds provided 
resources for the requisite long-term (30 years) funds used by HFC to offer mortgage loans 
by selected banks serving as primary mortgage lenders. The lenders were responsible for 
generating the demand for mortgage loans from customers and ensuring that the loans were 
repaid to the banks on time and thereby to HFC. This activity referred to as ―origination and 
servicing‖, was used to frame the participating banks as ―Originating and Servicing 
Institutions (OSIs)‖. To ensure that the participating banks were adequately motivated to 
perform their designated role as OSIs, the mortgagee would pay the OSI an interest rate of 
3.5% - 4.5% above inflation for the mortgage loans, of which the OSI would be due a real 
return
142
 of 1.5% to cover the administrative costs for the loans, as well as earning a little 
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 Real returns imply the rates are adjusted for inflation. Since most interest rates were regulated and were 
below the rate of inflation, this was part of the attempt by the state to reform the financial sector in general and 
in particular under the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) initiated in 1987. 
187 
 
profit. The remainder would be passed on to HFC, who would earn 1% - 2% above inflation 
as management fees and profit. Lastly, HFC would pay the bond holders, SSNIT and the 
government, a real return of 1% of each loan. The intention was to ensure that the loans were 
not overly expensive and thus unattractive to OSIs or to mortgagees. An additional incentive 
to the OSIs stipulated a progressive reduction of their liability for the risk of default by 
mortgagees from 50% at the start of a mortgage loan contract to 10% in the event of a long-
term macro-economic decline. If economic conditions worsened, the government was 
expected to bear the rest of the risk of default on mortgage loans rising from 50% to 90%. In 
the event of inflation spiralling beyond reasonable limits, HFC would write off such debts 
with the state absorbing this loss completely. As a result, the World Bank recommended the 
establishment of a budget reserve to take care of non-performing loans. Thus, the government 
had an incentive to manage the economy appropriately to avoid significant long-term losses.  
The new mortgage scheme introduced two novel approaches with the view to 
mitigating the challenges that the Bank for Housing and Construction (BHC) and First Ghana 
Building Society (FGBS) had faced previously. Firstly, the balance of the outstanding loan 
was indexed to inflation in order to protect the actual value of the loan. The repayment level 
of the loans was also indexed to a wage index in order to protect borrowers from excessive 
housing expenditure to the detriment of other critical needs. This design of loan and 
repayment indexation was known as the dual-index mortgage (DIM) concept (Guttentag, 
2004: 58), which was first pioneered in Mexico in 1984 as part of the World Bank conditions 
for structural adjustment reforms (Zearley, 1993; Lea & Bernstein, 1996). Secondly, the 
Urban II scheme applied the Graduated Payment Method (GPM) by which the proportion of 
wages to be committed to repayment of the mortgage loans was graduated from a base 
initially lower than the requisite quantum, thereby making loans accessible to lower income 
workers. This concept was adopted on the presumption that incomes invariably grew and 
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people were able to increase loan repayments proportionally as their incomes grew. In the 
event of inflation seriously outpacing incomes the term of the loan would be adjusted up to a 
maximum of 30 years in order to ensure loan repayments did not exceed 25% of household 
income. It was claimed that this was the first time both DIM and GPM were implemented in 
Africa (Derkyi, 2002). Arguably, this claim is plausible and validates the experimental nature 
of the housing reforms. The World Bank appeared confident that these measures adequately 
addressed all the risks associated with this scheme;  
The major goal of the pilot is to initiate the establishment of a system of financing and repayment 
and a mortgage instrument that will resolve the major barrier to housing finance, high volatile 
inflation rates ........... It introduces a financial instrument capable of withstanding real and 
monetary shocks to the economy while not impairing the banking system or household disposable 
income. (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 14; emphasis added) 
The risk that ERP will slow down significantly and that incomes will suffer a sustained period of 
decline cannot, of course, be ruled out. However, while no project can ensure against such 
catastrophic risks, Urban II is designed to explicitly deal with this kind of problem. It builds on 
IDA’s experience in other countries in which repayment problems have created serious losses for 
mortgage lenders and provides for automatic rescheduling or repayments if real incomes falter. 
 
(World 
Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990: 37; emphasis added) 
Lastly, the design of the new housing finance approach took account of the problems 
encountered in recovering mortgage loan in default experienced by BHC and the FGBS (see 
Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5). As indicated, BHC and FGBS suffered additional costs and 
interminable delay because of the mandatory judicial procedures for recovering their loans in 
default. As a result, the Home Mortgage Finance Law 329 of 1990 was passed in which 
section 5 empowered HFC to recover their loans on demand or in default by repossessing and 
selling mortgaged properties to recover the full costs including administration costs, 
associated with the loan recovery exercise. Significantly, the pre-existing mortgage law, 
National Redemption Council Decree 96 Mortgage Decree of 1972, was not repealed with the 
passage of the new mortgage law. The new law rather restricted its application to HFC and 
properties developed by HFC funds. Although this was paradoxical it also demonstrated, in 
spite of contrary claims, the very limited objectives of the World Bank. 
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In principle, the reforms aspired to enhance the capacity of the private sector to 
assume a leading role in housing and substantially reduce the dependence of public housing 
agencies on the public purse. However, in this pursuit, a critical choice was made by the 
World Bank to exclude construction finance from the financial support provided under Urban 
II. Rather, the Bank preferred to offer its funds for the mortgage loans to be offered by HFC. 
Given the history of consistent lack of construction finance and its adverse effect on the 
public housing agencies, this decision by the World Bank was a curious one. Furthermore, 
the private real estate developers as the ultimate beneficiaries of the reforms had only just 
emerged and were arguably in need of direct funding as construction finance. The World 
Bank presumed that the combined effect of HFC‘s finance, the new mortgage and foreclosure 
laws would assure commercial banks of reliable funding to acquire properties developed 
through HFC‘s mortgage scheme. It was envisaged that the commercial banks would 
therefore be confident about the scheme to offer construction loans to private estate 
developers. Without providing new funds, the presumption that a guaranteed market would 
induce the commercial banks to provide construction finance was overly optimistic and 
severely limited the goal of empowering private developers.  
In respect of institutional change, the Urban II reforms aimed to address two key 
problems namely ―incompetent and technically insolvent public enterprises in housing estate 
development; and absence of a vibrant private sector‖143. The housing consolidation sub-
component of Urban II proposed the public housing agencies to be privatised or their 
operations commercialised to ensure their viability. It was further proposed that part of 
HFC‘s funds would provide mortgage loans for 3,000 houses, 2,000 of which were expected 
to be developed by the private sector, and 1,000 for properties developed by the public 
housing agencies. The public housing agencies were to be subjected to operational and 
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 World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990 page 52 
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financial reviews as a prelude to their divestment of public ownership and de-linkage from 
state management. The 1988 tax waivers for real estate activities would further consolidate 
the security of investing in real estate for the private sector.  
(e) Restructuring of Housing Parastatals and AESC: In order to strengthen the performance 
of the public sector, improve the housing delivery system and improve resource 
utilization, the Government will restructure the State Housing Corporation (SHC) 
and the Tema Development Corporation (TDC), ……..  
(f)  Measures to Encourage the Private Sector: In addition to the tax and other incentives 
recently instituted to encourage the participation of private developers in the provision 
[sic] of affordable housing, the Government will take steps to facilitate, inter alia, the 
timely access by legitimate private developers to land suitable for housing 
development and to development finance (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
letter to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ref SEC/FP/036; 
Date 16
th
 March 1990; emphasis added).    
6.4.2. The Local Government Rehabilitation Programme 
As noted earlier, Urban II separated the Housing Sector Reforms and the Local 
Government Reforms. The Local Government Rehabilitation Programme sought to ―help 
rehabilitate and improve essential infrastructure, services and environmental systems; and to 
strengthen the technical, financial and managerial capacity of local government‖144. The 
interventions included upgrading
145
, land administration, municipal revenue mobilisation, 
institutional support to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MLGRD), and, lastly, institutional support to allied agencies.
146
 The infrastructure and 
environmental systems rehabilitation and maintenance duplicated similar interventions under 
the Housing Sector Reforms. The MLGRD upgrading component comprised rehabilitation 
and new construction of roads and drains, and the establishment of solid waste management 
and environmental sanitation systems in the five primary cities of Accra, Kumasi, Tamale, 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Tema. It also included the rehabilitation of the sewerage system in 
Tema. However, the beneficiary cities operating in the new decentralised system, (see section 
6.2.2 of this chapter), were bereft of the requisite project management capacity. A Local 
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 World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990 page 15-16  
145 Referred to as rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructure and environmental systems in all five primary 
cities of Accra, Kumasi, Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale 
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 These included the Department of Urban Roads; the District Roads Units as well as the Technical 
Departments of the Assemblies, and the Environmental Protection Council. 
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Government Project Support Unit (LGPSU) was thus designed to support the MLGRD to 
manage these projects, playing a similar role as the Technical Service Centre under the 
Housing Ministry. In the interim, Urban II used the TSC to assist MLGRD to manage the 
upgrading projects. Effectively, TSC‘s operations would cover both Housing and Local 
Government Ministries until such time as the proposed LGPSU became fully functional. Staff 
recruitments for senior positions in the LGPSU were advertised internationally, bypassing the 
traditional public service recruitment procedures. It is noteworthy that as a result of this 
recruitment process, the conditions of service varied from their counterparts in the Ministry. 
However, the World Bank-sponsored reforms did not make any effort to provide support for 
the improvement of policy making in the Housing Ministry although identified as a critical 
deficiency in the Ministry. Rather, the World Bank noted the linkage between the Urban II 
that it was supporting and activities of other multi-lateral and bi-lateral organisations
147
 to 
construe its role in the support for policy making in the Housing Ministry as complementary. 
It thus ceded the primary role of funding and technical assistance for policy making in the 
Housing Ministry to the UNDP (see Section 6.6.2);  
The most important (project / studies in preparation) is (sic) …...... (a) UNDP assisted: Shelter Sector 
Project FY 90/91; about eight studies on various aspects of housing, and the establishment of a policy 
unit in MWH [Ministry of Works and Housing]. This project is being closely coordinated with Urban II 
and should greatly strengthen and assist MWH to prepare Urban III (World Bank Urban II Staff 
Appraisal Report 1990: 45)  
MWH itself is quite weak. However, efforts are now being mounted to strengthen its policy, 
programming, and monitoring capability through a UNDP financed Shelter Sector Project. This project 
is expected to begin by June 1990. The Bank has cooperated closely with UNDP in formulating the 
project and will help monitor its implementation (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report 1990: 
135) 
The distinction between the Housing Sector Reforms and the Local Government Reforms 
missed an obvious opportunity for synergy and led to inevitable duplication. Arguably, this 
duplication was prompted by competing interests between the Housing Ministry and the 
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 The West German government through GTZ and KfW – the Accra Waste Management Programme (1985-
86); the East German Government – the Kumasi Roads Project (1986-87); the UNDP – the Accra Planning and 
Development Programme (APDP) since 1985, the Accra Structure Plan (ASP) from 1988-1989, the Kumasi 
Domestic Sanitation Project (KDSP) in 1988-89 and the Mobile Training of Planners project (MTP) in 1987-88. 
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Local Government Ministry. Grounds for this assertion can be found in the institutional and 
operational changes following the decentralization reform of 1988. The responsibility for 
developing municipal infrastructure including secondary and tertiary roads and drains, 
communal sanitation and solid waste management facilities was transferred from the housing 
ministry to local authorities supervised by the Local Government Ministry. This transfer was 
seen as a reduction in the influence and importance of the Housing Ministry
148
. The World 
Bank‘s resources therefore became a site for competing interests to assert influence and 
relevance through project activities between the newly empowered Local Government 
Ministry and the Housing Ministry. The decision by the World Bank to implement upgrading 
projects in both Housing and Local Government reform components of Urban II was thus an 
attempt to placate these competing interests. The advantage of this duplication was the 
expansion in the coverage of the upgrading interventions. Under the Housing Sector Reforms, 
upgrading was implemented in Kumasi and Tema whereas upgrading under the Local 
Government Rehabilitation Programme comprised similar interventions implemented in all 
the five primary cities of Accra, Kumasi, Tema, Takoradi and Tamale.  
6.5 The abortive Local Housing Strategy of 1987 
As identified previously, a locally generated housing policy trajectory emerged after 
1985 when the government felt frustrated with the World Bank‘s reluctance to provide 
support to housing after the initial request. This locally driven policy initiative ran in parallel 
with the first World Bank intervention, the Accra District Rehabilitation Project (ADRP), and 
occasionally intersected albeit to minimal effect. As the World Bank appeared to delay in its 
decision to support the housing sector, the Housing Ministry was instructed by the PNDC 
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 This was seen as a continuation of the reduction in the influence of the Ministry of Works and Housing. In 
1974-75, the Ministry of Roads and Transport was created to undertake the construction of roads which had also 
been the function of the Ministry of Works and Housing.  
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Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries
149
 to develop a national housing policy
150
. This 
decision was taken partly in response to the pressure put on the government by civil servants 
and organised labour, due to the shortage of accommodation and corresponding effect of high 
housing costs and rents
151
 (Hutchful, 2002; Bawumia, 1998:55).  In response to the directive, 
the Ministry set up a committee drawn from stakeholders with the exception of private sector 
developers. The draft policy entitled ―The National Housing Policy and Action Plan: 1987 – 
1990‖ was published by the Ministry in November 1986 and it detailed a work programme 
for the period. In addition to consultations with local stakeholders, the draft policy was also 
presented to an international audience at the Nairobi meeting of the UN in April 1987 
commemorating the 10
th
 anniversary of the establishment of Commission on Human 
Settlements. The goals for presenting and drawing attention to the government‘s efforts at 
resolving the housing problems of the country at that meeting was achieved with the UN 
indication of its desire to support the efforts. The discussions identified opportunities for the 
UN‘s participation in the implementation of the policy and a pledge was made in that respect. 
Furthermore, the UN indicated its support for the involvement of the World Bank and offered 
to join efforts to convince the World Bank of this need (personal interview of former Deputy 
Minister of Housing, August 2006). However it must be noted that this presentation at the 
Nairobi conference did not permit a thorough review of the draft policy document by experts 
and the discussions held over it were on the basis of what had been presented.  
The draft housing policy attempted to establish the scale of the housing challenges 
facing the country estimating an annual need of 70,000 and an accumulated delivery deficit 
of 250,000‖ (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1986: 3). The draft policy also pointed to the 
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 Memo from Office of the Chairman of PNDC Committee of Secretaries to Secretary for Works and Housing 
dated 2
nd
 of June 1986. 
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 Housing costs in Ghana was relatively very high, assessed to be one of the highest in the world, with the ratio 
of house price to annual income  estimated to be 12:1.  
194 
 
correlation between national development priorities and the government‘s increasing 
residualisation of housing as economic conditions worsened. Furthermore, the lack of growth 
in the housing sector was attributed to limited finance:  
The lack of adequate funding has been identified as a major constraint to housing development in the 
country. Budgetary allocations towards housing have never been sufficient and due to the current 
economic circumstances housing has tended to be considered as a low priority and has for a long time 
been relegated to the background in national development planning.‖ (Ministry of Works and Housing, 
1986:9)  
In pursuance of the goal of rapid housing development, the committee determined that the 
private sector presented a more effective agent to achieve the aims of the policy. For the first 
time, the private sector, instead of government agencies, was placed in the lead position and 
at the same time the state‘s limited capacity to directly meet the housing need of the country 
was also recognized. This new posture aligned to both the tenets of the broader economic 
aspirations set out in the SAP, as well as, the emerging paradigm of ―enabling housing 
markets‖. The 1986 draft housing policy emphatically laid out the pathway to achieving the 
reform goals through ―a shift in emphasis by the government from the construction of houses 
to the provision of infrastructure and serviced sites‖ and also ―ensuring easy access to 
housing land, security of tenure and effective land use management‖ (Ministry of Works and 
Housing, 1986: 14). On this foundation, a number of strategies were outlined to achieve the 
policy aims within the period 1987 to 1990. Among the initiatives was the establishment of a 
National Housing Board with a secretariat run by an Executive Secretary seconded from the 
public service. The proposed Housing Board would administer a dedicated fund, the National 
Housing Fund, to finance its operations. Contributions to the proposed National Housing 
Fund was expected from multiple sources – mandatory annual government budget 
allocations, and mandatory 5% deduction from formal sector wages, a 5% tax on the gross 
profits of a consortium of financial institutions and mostly multinational manufacturing 
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enterprises
 152
, and revenue from the sale of some public housing built under the 1972 Low 
Cost Housing Programme (see Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5). It was expected that the 
mandatory annual allocations from the budget would consolidate whatever the government 
already spent on housing and infrastructure through various ministries and public agencies. It 
was also proposed that levies be charged on building materials – primarily cement, roofing 
sheets and paints. However, as such materials were imported and were relatively more 
expensive than local materials, this strategy would compound the problem of high costs of 
construction, thus contradicting the goal of lowering costs. Lastly, contributions were 
expected from proceeds from a proposed lottery scheme, ―Own a house‖, by the Department 
of National Lottery. The draft policy projected that between 1987 and 1990 a total of 115,000 
units would be produced in the proportion of 9:7:2 for low, middle and high income 
households respectively. Of this number, the public sector would provide only 2% and the 
remaining 98% would come from private sector. However, the public sector would finance 
the development of the requisite infrastructure for all new housing from the annual budget 
allocation. It was envisaged that there would be two streams of funding – one-time 
contribution of 800 million (equivalent to approximately $8.8million) and a recurrent 
contribution of 2,330 million (equivalent to approximately $25.9million) with the 
government‘s total budget contribution expected to be 200 million (equivalent to 
approximately ($2.2million). 
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implementation of the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) in 1987. Private sector organisations 
included multinationals – Shell; Mobil; Texaco; UAC Group and Kumasi Breweries (local subsidiaries of 
Unilever); Pioneer Tobacco Company (subsidiary of British American Tobacco); and VALCO Fund (the 
corporate social responsibility arm of Volta Aluminium Company, the local subsidiary of Kaiser Aluminium). 
Parastatals included the Volta River Authority; Ghana Oil (GOIL) Ltd.; GHAIP Oil Company; and the 
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However, the Housing Ministry‘s draft housing policy was not well received by some 
strong elements within the government, particularly in the Ministry of Finance, because of 
the obligation to commit public funds annually from the budget to a Housing Fund that was 
not exclusively managed by these agents of the state. The opposition to the Fund was also 
based on the argument that there would be difficulties in raising contributions from other 
designated agencies. Opposition to the National Housing Fund proposal was highest from the 
small circle of technocrats and functionaries of the Ministry of Finance who managed the 
structural adjustment reforms (see Section 4.5.4 of Chapter 4). Given their level of influence 
as managers of the SAP agenda, they held significant clout in the government. The World 
Bank, as external advisors of the government on the overall adjustment programme, was also 
not keen on the establishment of a fund that would be (partly) dependent on government 
finances. Inevitably, this opposition to the National Housing Fund by the influential 
operatives of the Ministry of Finance was adopted by the government machinery and stalled 
the implementation of the draft housing policy. Thus the policy was not formally adopted or 
backed by any legislation to give it effect. From interviews of some participants in the 
housing policy committee and other senior housing policy advisors, reasons for this stalled 
housing policy can be catalogued under three headings: residualisation of housing in 
government priorities, World Bank opposition based on fear of inflation, contradictory effect 
on housing costs. 
There were some provisions in that policy that government even at the draft stage from the feelings we 
were getting, were not going  to probably work. One of the key issues or suggestions was the setting up 
of a national fund because that was going to be the engine to drive any housing reform or let us say any 
attempt to increase the stock and it played around contributions from workers and a whole lot of other 
suggestions. At that time government felt that this was very sensitive and such an idea will not fly. It 
will also grow things like taxes and building materials; I mean cement and iron rods and a whole lot of 
things which we thought could bring in money. The argument was that these will go to increase the 
cost of the houses. So eventually it was found out that the national housing fund that we were 
suggesting will not be sustainable apart from finance it will not be able to take off (personal interview 
of Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry for Works and Housing, September 2006) 
The problems that were identified and solutions that were thrown up I don‘t think were taken seriously 
beyond the documentation (personal interview of former Deputy Minister for Works and Housing; 
August 2006) 
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The idea was to establish a national housing authority so the board would be the overall overseer of all 
housing programmes, activities in Ghana. Under board certain institutions were to be established and 
the board was to see to the establishment of national housing fund. The national housing fund could 
have been sought from local or foreign to build up a fund which can be accessed by banks or by 
individuals or private developers not only to buy houses or get mortgage but you have construction 
finance from it where individuals or real estate developers could get access to a short term credit to 
build their houses. We could also have developed other portfolios like home improvement where we 
have a short term credit either to add one room to your house or to buy doors or windows or to 
refurbish your house or that sort of thing. But that one could have done a lot of things but at the same 
time World Bank was thinking that once you establish this fund it means that you will create more 
avenues for people to get access to funding and therefore money in circulation will increase and that 
will always fuel inflation. I think that was the argument but also restricted funding in the housing 
sector (personal interview of former Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing, emphasis 
added; September 2006). 
Generally, the stalling of the locally developed housing policy was a reflection of the uneven 
power relations within the state, in particular, between the technocrats in the Housing 
Ministry and the economic management team at the Ministry of Finance in charge of the 
structural adjustment reforms backed by the World Bank. The World Bank thus contributed 
to distorting the balance of power in local policy setting. It further points to the superficial 
relationship between policy sectors; in this case between state housing policy aspirations and 
the broader goals of the macro-economy. A former Deputy Minister of Housing notes this 
disjuncture between housing and the broader macro-economy thus, 
When PNDC came there was just that, for about three years not any serious attempt to look at housing 
as a major policy especially because I think under the economic recovery programme housing was 
not considered a priority there were looking at the infrastructure, structure of the economy and 
so on (personal interview of former Deputy Minister, Ministry of Works and Housing; emphasis 
added). 
I don‘t think the housing sector reform was part of the national economic reform programme. That is 
the mistake advancing on our policy and the economic reform. ...........The reform was looked at as a 
project under Ministry of Works and Housing. The Ministry Of Finance was just to supervise the 
resources which were given to the ministry to implement the programme. It wasn‘t part of the 
economic programme. If it were to be part of the economic programme, at any point in time we could 
have seen its linkage with other sectors of the economy and even could have seen what was happening 
in the construction sector especially the importation of building materials. .................... Ministry of 
Works and Housing was just collaborating with ministry of local government. And as a functional role 
ministry of finance was being mandated by government to oversee the usage of the resources so that 
they report back for accountability purpose. Whatever they did was to find out that if ‗A‘ was allocated 
to say ‗B‘ they make sure the resources are in actual fact utilized to get ‗B‘. (personal interview of 
former Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing, September 2006)  
This shows different layers of interests and sometimes conflicting motives at play in the 
context of the implementation of the enabling principles. Certainly, the state‘s posture 
towards the enabling principles can be characterised as ambiguous and conflicted, further 
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complicated by the World Bank‘s own subjective priorities. The reasons for opposing the 
National Housing Fund belied the government‘s purported commitment to housing. The 
demise of the locally produced housing policy coincided with the rise of the UN and the 
national pension funds, SSNIT, into the mainstream activities of the housing sector. In the 
next sections, these experiences are presented, starting with the UN efforts, to further review 
the decision calculus underlying policy choices and actions in housing during the reform era. 
6.6 The UN Involvement in the Housing Reforms  
The UN entered into the housing reforms in Ghana by proffering its technical 
assistance to the government in a series of planning and later housing projects. This approach 
differed from the process adopted by the World Bank. In the case of the latter, the 
government took several actions canvassing the World Bank to secure funds for the housing 
sector, which evolved into a reform programme. In the following section I discuss the 
proactive approach of the UN in the context of the overarching housing reforms and the 
strategic calculation of local policy agents.  
6.6.1 The Accra Planning and Development Programme (APDP) and the Accra 
Structure Plan (1985 – 1994) 
Following the inception of the structural adjustment programme in Ghana in 1983, the 
UN offered its services to the government in 1984 through a United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) technical assistance programme (Hutchful, 2002). Subsequently, different 
departments of the UN partnered the government in different roles. The UN Centre for 
Human Settlements got involved in 1987 after the Nairobi meeting (discussed in Section 6.5). 
The offer of assistance was extended to the housing and urban sectors and generated a 
number of studies on the state of planning in Accra (see Annex 3). This ended with the 
signing of a technical assistance agreement in 1987 between the UN and the Government of 
Ghana for the purpose of supporting the city in the preparation of a long term development 
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plan, the Accra Planning and Development Programme (APDP –Contract 
UNDP/GHA/87/005). The ADPD project would plan for the growth of the emerging Accra-
Tema conurbation on a sustainable basis taking into account social, economic and 
environmental aspects. Even though the World Bank‘s Accra District Rehabilitation 
Programme (ADRP) preceded the UN‘s APDP project, opportunities for synergy between the 
ADRP and APDP emerged as both focused on the (then) Accra City Council,  and worked 
with some common departments in planning and engineering. However, collaboration was 
minimal. Even though I could not ascertain the reason for this lack of collaboration directly 
from the officials from these two agencies who were engaged in these two projects, I can 
proffer an explanation based on reference to the general relationship between the World Bank 
and UN in a personal interview and another interview from secondary literature:  
UNDP initiative was mainly towards getting the policy document .But at the same time World Bank 
also had its own set, indeed there was actually in those days very serious conflict between the World 
Bank and UNDP as to the approach to development in the Third World. In fact they almost clashed at 
the conference so it took quite a while before they started working together in the housing sector 
(personal interview of former Deputy Minister for Works and Housing, August 2006) 
We got a little upgrading project going on there. It was a local government development project. We 
did that in Ndirande area, in Blantyre which is the biggest slum area in Malawi. We put the basic ring 
road in and a few improvements. The UN were also doing a bit there. ……….. We managed to 
persuade the government to do an upgrading project because the UN had done one in Dar es 
Salaam. (World Bank, 2000; emphasis added) 
Whereas the first quote speaks to the absence of collaboration between the two agencies in 
Ghana, the second quote draws attention to the sense of competition held by some staff of the 
two agencies. Given the indications of institutional rivalry alluded to by Cohen (2005) and 
McAuslan (1997) – see Section 3.8 of Chapter 3 -  these further comments above reinforce 
the issue of rivalry and competition as the underlying rationale for the lack of collaboration 
between the UN and World Bank. The UN‘s APDP aimed to establish a framework of inter-
governmental collaboration in planning through an integrated approach to local development. 
The APDP conceptualised the metropolitan conurbation of Accra and the neighbouring 
districts of Tema and Ga as a coherent administrative region it labelled the Greater Accra 
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Metropolitan Area (GAMA)
153
. General guidelines were proposed for land use planning in 
GAMA and a subsequent programme was envisaged that would generate studies and 
consultations for the formulation of specific guidelines. This quest evolved into the design of 
the Accra Strategic Plan project to succeed the APDP. The thrust of the Accra Strategic Plan 
was the development of a 20-year plan for the city to be implemented in 5-year phases. The 
Accra Strategic Plan aimed to reform an outdated master planning framework established in 
the colonial era and undertake a comprehensive study of the existing land use and the urban 
sprawl in Accra. By 1990, the average density of the metropolis was 65 persons per hectare 
occupying a total area of 26,350 hectares. This was equivalent to an average of 8 dwellings 
per hectare. This average masked the imbalance between different residential zones with 
high-density areas recording 18 dwellings per hectare compared to newly developing areas 
with 5 dwellings per hectare densities. The dominant feature of the peripheral developments 
was the single dwelling houses adopted by middle and upper classes. There was vacant and 
under-utilized land resulting, in part, from the absence of regulatory restrictions on land 
speculation, a situation which barely existed in other countries where land use laws taxed 
vacant land especially in central locations (Angel, 2000).  
Large areas of the inner city are held in small holdings by private, corporate business, government and 
state corporations. Much of this land is underutilized or surplus to need (MLGRD, 1992:38) 
The studies of Accra revealed that by 1990, 6,000 plots of land within the Accra metropolis 
were vacant or under-utilized. At the same time, land development at the fringes of the city 
was intensifying. Larbi (1996) estimated that land use change at the periphery of the city was 
occurring at the rate of 2,100 hectares per year
154
 between 1990 and 1993 (cited in Maxwell 
et al, 1998). The Accra study by the UN projected that maintaining the prevailing sprawl 
growth would lead to the incorporation of 50% of the land in the metropolis under 
                                                 
153
 This entity was not conterminous with the local government administration and was a creation of the APDP 
project with no legal basis, administrative structure or financial resources. Personal interview – K. D. Osei 
154
 It is noted that this peri-urban land use change grew to 2,600 hectares per year between 1993 and 1997.  
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development by 2010. The combined effect of speculation in central locations of the city and 
the middle class-fuelled sprawl developments in the peripheral locations restricted housing 
opportunities for the low-income to the pre-existing inner city areas and pockets in middle 
class neighbourhoods. Consequently, the primary concern for the Accra Strategic Plan was 
addressing the city‘s sprawl. The Plan‘s alternative strategy targeted a density of 90 persons 
per hectare by 2010 which translated into an average of 20 dwellings per hectare
155
. This 
would generate a potential reduction of 32% from the projections based on the prevailing 
growth rate. To achieve this target, the Accra Strategic Plan identified tools such as infill 
development, urban consolidation, redevelopment and upgrading, as well as new 
developments in green areas. The Plan project also advocated the creation of land banks 
through acquiring under-utilized or surplus land held by the state and other groups
156
. It is 
instructive that the Accra Strategic Plan identified the existence of 13,600 ―illegal residential 
developments‖. Given the frequency of incomplete land expropriation transactions, due to the 
non-payment of compensation, a significant proportion of such illegal residential 
developments were on ―public‖ lands that had been ―repossessed‖ and resold by the original 
owners (see section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5). Buyers of such ―repossessed‖ lands often did not 
undertake titling and building permits as they were bound to encounter difficulties 
reconciling their ―ownership‖ with records in the public registries. Indeed, some indigenous 
claimants who re-sold such lands were known to use coercion including threat of re-sale to 
ensure that buyers would undertake quick construction. On several occasions, this was done 
in concert with some officials in the land agencies. The reason for employing coercion was 
the belief that the state would not demolish a completed house for fears of being sued. Some 
traditional authorities and families privately employed surveyors (who worked for the Survey 
Department and other land agencies) to undertake the mapping and planning of their land. 
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 Strategic Plan for Greater Accra op cit pages 23 and 45 
156
 These were lands acquired under Act 123 that empowered land expropriation by the state as well as other 
lands not used for the original purpose that were to be repossessed. 
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There was evidence of some land owners using some public officials to fraudulently amend 
public records or create false documents such as indentures and titles to authenticate the 
resale of such lands (personal interviews of Director and Regional Director, Lands 
Commission; and senior policy advisor, Ministry of Works and Housing). Admittedly, non-
payment of compensation was not always the case for land repossession claims. Sometimes, 
repossessions occurred in spite of compensation payment, with fraudsters taking advantage of 
the chaotic land markets. As a result, the land market was characterised by litigation, with 
17,300 cases affecting lands in GAMA by 1990 (MLGRD, 1992: 32-42). Although the 
studies generated significant volume of information on Accra, nothing practical was done 
beyond the publication of the research work. The entire process took 10 years to conclude 
and yet had only documentation to show. The government‘s expectation that the UN would 
commit resources to implement the designed interventions did not materialise. This project, 
which produced significant research prior to designing the requisite interventions, provided 
the context in which the UN engaged in the housing reforms which followed next. 
6.6.2. The National Shelter Strategy and the UN 
Successive studies under the Accra District Rehabilitation Programme, the Priority 
Works Programme (see sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), and the Accra Planning and Development 
Programme noted the weakness in housing policy-making and implementation at the Ministry 
of Works and Housing that resulted in the lack of a coherent policy framework. This was in 
spite of the policy work by the local network of technocrats between 1986 and 1987 (see 
section 6.5). Conflicting accounts are provided to explain the nature of the UN‘s entry into 
the housing sector reforms. Some respondents indicate that the UN injected itself into the 
reform process during the 1987 Donors‘ Conference157, after the presentation of the locally 
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 The Donors Conferences were annual events that brought together the government and donor agencies from 
mostly Western countries as well as the multi-lateral countries to review the progress in the management of the 
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developed strategy at the UNCHS meeting in January 1987 in Nairobi (see section 6.5). 
According to these respondents, the UN joined the government‘s efforts to induce the World 
Bank to support the sector, which it did during the 1987 Donor‘s conference. On that basis, 
the government agreed for the UN to review the locally developed housing policy to make it 
relevant and workable in the light of the government‘s misgivings. Other respondents 
interviewed note that the UN entered the housing policy reforms after being formally invited 
by the government. This view posits that as a result of the initial reluctance of the World 
Bank to engage directly in housing and the unwillingness of the government to implement the 
locally developed housing policy, the government invited the UN in 1987 to assist in the 
development of a new housing policy and the building of policy expertise in the Housing 
Ministry. However, this invitation masked the real motive for attracting the UN, namely to 
secure funds to continue public housing. Be that as it may, there is agreement that the review 
of the 1986 locally developed draft housing policy, earlier presented at the UN conference in 
Nairobi, gave the UN the platform to engage in the housing sector in Ghana. Even though 
well received at its presentation at the conference in April 1987, the locally developed 
housing policy was later criticised by the UN in its review of the policy after it had formally 
initiated supporting the government to develop a new policy. As noted in Section 6.5 the 
discussions of the locally developed policy at the Nairobi conference was limited and on the 
basis of what had been presented only. Thus the subsequent review of the policy between 
April and November 1987 afforded the UN the opportunity to thoroughly assess its content 
and basis for its design. After the review, the UN opined that the policy‘s prospects for 
making a positive impact were poor although the language of the critique discussed actual in 
instead of envisaged impact.  
The 1987-1990 programme ended with very little impact and indeed non-measurable performance 
evaluation (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1993:36) 
                                                                                                                                                        
economy and seek funding commitments of donors to planned programs. These events were part of the 
monitoring controls established during the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme.  
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The locally developed housing policy was deemed unsuccessful by the UN team because the 
policy failed to elicit government‘s commitment to funding the designed actions. This failure 
was attributed to the high cost of the proposed actions and the disproportionate quantum such 
allocations would command from the public budget. In this regard, the requisite actions to 
enable the implementation of the policy were curtailed.  
The public sector – policy makers – commitment to the programme in ensuring that the necessary 
institutional and regulatory support systems were put in place were never met to any appreciable extent 
(Ministry of Works and Housing,  1993:37) 
Secondly, the locally developed housing policy was criticised based on its methodology:   
Richard Acquah Harrison, member of the UNCHS team on the Ghana housing policy project 
asserts that ―the policy and action plan were not based on a housing sector study and needs 
assessment‖ (Acquah-Harrison, 2004:31). Further, it was noted that the locally developed 
policy  
 did not incorporate measurable input-output targets that could facilitate effective monitoring or 
performance …….There was no comparison of the estimated resource needs with that of projected 
input resources that could be effectively mobilized (during the planned period) in establishing the size, 
quantity, quality and cost of housing facility output under the programme‖ (Ministry of Works and 
Housing,  1993:36).  
The condemnation of the locally developed housing policy on the basis of methodological 
weakness affirms the UN‘s penchant for methodological compliance. Thus, in spite of the 
fact that the locally developed policy and action plan was comprehensive in its coverage of 
the problems and the proffered solutions for the housing sector, the methodological reliance 
on anecdotal evidence
158
 was viewed by the UN as its undoing. 
After the review of the locally developed policy, the UN fielded an Institutional 
Needs Assessment Mission from November to December 1987. The mission advocated as a 
pre-requisite, a number of in-depth studies in constituent sectors of housing – building 
materials, construction, finance and land markets as the basis for developing a new housing 
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 During the UN mission of 1987 requests by the team of experts for evidential basis for the policy choices 
could not be answered by the local team. It became obvious that the evidential basis for the locally developed 
housing policy was weak (Personal interview of former deputy Minister of Works and Housing).  
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policy, building policy capacity in the Housing Ministry and formulating a pilot programme 
to test proposed policy interventions. It is instructive that the mission was categorical that the 
studies leading to the formulation of the housing policy had to conform to the outline of the 
generic policy framework, the Global Strategy for Shelter.    
In-depth studies to be carried out by Ghanaian sub-contractors in conformity with issues identified 
under the Global Strategy for Shelter‖ (UNCHS, 1988: 4) 
The findings and recommendations made by the Institutional Needs Assessment Mission led 
to the formulation of the project for developing a national shelter policy framework and the 
building of institutional capacity of MWH – ―Institutional Development Training and 
Operational Studies for the Shelter Sector (Contract Number GHA/87/023)‖. These studies 
were conducted in parallel to those that were being done by the UN for the Accra Strategic 
Plan and those undertaken by the World Bank prior to Urban II (see section 6.4). The UN‘s 
emphasis on conformity to its normative methodology generated a different process and 
outcome from that adopted by the local housing policy network that had developed the 1986 
draft housing policy. The draft housing policy by the latter group took less than a year to 
complete using extrapolation methods to generate estimates of housing needs. This approach 
of the local network of technocrats was developed with minimal consultations until the end of 
the drafting. On the other hand, the UN sponsored policy process was very elaborate using 
the results of multiple surveys and comprehensive literature review to develop a profile of the 
national housing demand. The overall housing deficit was estimated to be 2,480,400 made up 
of 894,100 units in urban areas and 1,586,200 units in rural areas. This data was 
disaggregated into those which required de-crowding (546,300 urban and 651,700 rural), 
replacement of completely degraded existing housing stock (22,957 urban and 149,280 rural), 
and upgrading of partially degraded dwellings (171,409 urban and 599,903 rural). However, 
the quest for accuracy in the UN approach was achieved at the expense of timely completion 
as it took five years to complete the policy development exercise. The policy development 
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process that started in late 1987, concluded in 1993 with the launch
159
 of the National Shelter 
Strategy, albeit not as a formal policy document but rather to mark the end of the exercise and 
present the outcome. Following this meeting, the report was to be submitted to cabinet for 
assent; this never happened but a five-year action plan was developed for 1993 to 1997. 
However, like the locally developed housing policy of 1986, this action plan was never 
implemented and only referred to for effect, to create the impression that the government was 
engaged in the sector. 
6.7 The Rise of the State Pension Funds, SSNIT, in Mass Housing 
As has been indicated in section 6.5, the demise of the locally developed housing 
policy did not hinder the quest for alternative sources of funding for the housing sector. This 
underlined the government‘s declaration in the 1988 budget statement to commit resources 
from the pension funds, SSNIT, which had been enhanced by the deregulation of its 
investment portfolio (see Section 6.3), to housing. Although SSNIT had been involved in 
housing in the 1970s, this had been largely limited to staff housing needs which had been 
abandoned by the end of the 1980s with 910 units at different stages of completion (see 
Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5). The re-entry of SSNIT in housing and the substantial resources it 
held, generated by the improved terms of its investments, created new dynamics in the 
housing sector. SSNIT‘s new financial means elevated it to the position of a power broker in 
the housing sector. The negotiations with the World Bank over the terms of SSNIT‘s 
investment (see Section 6.3) had ensured a degree of management independence for SSNIT. 
In the context of the overarching structural adjustment reforms that aimed at curtailing state 
activities in production in favour of the private sector, the choice to use a state agency and 
public funds to directly construct houses, and not private developers, contradicted the ethos 
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 The Ministry of Works and Housing organized a national workshop and seminar from March 3
rd
 to 4
th
 1993 
at the Golden Tulip Hotel, Accra at which the draft report was discussed among a cross section of invited 
stakeholders (Owusu, 2005:12-13) 
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of the structural reforms. However, this decision also elevated SSNIT strategically in its 
relationship with the government. Given the pressures encountered by the government from 
organised labour for housing, SSNIT‘s developments and the associated powers of allocation 
made it susceptible to political influence for the purpose of appeasing critical political 
constituencies and maintaining patronage networks, notwithstanding the so called 
management ―independence‖ of the SSNIT.  In total, SSNIT developed 7,923 housing units 
in a mix of low-rise apartment blocks, detached and semi-detached single family houses 
across the urban centres of the country with nearly 80% started after 1988 (personal interview 
of Senior Project Manager, SSNIT; October 2006). Most of the mass housing schemes that 
SSNIT started in 1988 were located in peripheral urban locations
160
. The peripheral locations 
of the SSNIT developments often tasked them to develop infrastructure from primary to 
tertiary level and extend connections to the municipal networks that had yet to reach these 
new locations. SSNIT‘s post-1988 housing developments were initially only rental units and 
were mostly allocated to public ministries, departments and agencies, as well as parastatals. 
SSNIT also rented a few of the housing units to private sector agencies and directly to 
individuals. Whereas the housing consolidation under the Priority Works Project (PWP) (see 
Section 6.2.2) claimed to be oriented towards poverty reduction and therefore targeted low-
income households in its limited interventions, SSNIT‘s housing programme rather focused 
on ―workers‖ (personal interview of Senior Project Manager, SSNIT, October 2006). The 
poverty reduction goals under the Priority Works Programme (PWP) – ―the demonstration of 
appropriate and cost-effective approaches to providing shelter for the urban poor
161‖ – 
transformed into a concern for an amorphous conception of ―workers‖ housing: 
The Trust is expected to invest these substantial resources........ to help secure the future of the people 
whose contributions have sustained the Trust ....... in the realization of benefits to ordinary workers 
(Budget Statement and Economic Policy, 1988 :16)  
                                                 
160
 Annex 4 lists SSNIT‘s housing developments and their locations across the country from the 1970s to 2000. 
161
 World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report (1990: 34) 
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under the PWP a pilot site and services scheme was initiated in Tema to deliver 400 serviced plots for 
workers‘ housing (Budget Statement and Economic Policy, 1990 :21) 
In the light of the type of households that actually benefited from these developments, this 
reference to ―workers‖ was in reality a euphemism for middle class formal sector households 
predominantly engaged by the public service. 
Highlighting the underlying class differentiation and bias in the decision calculus of 
the policy makers, the site and services scheme initiated under the PWP was curtailed in 1989 
after the servicing had been completed and redesigned under circumstances that are 
undeniably class-based. As has been indicated in Section 6.2.2, the PWP earmarked a site in 
Tema Community 3 for a low-income housing scheme using the site and service approach. 
However, after the inception of SSNIT‘s housing programme, TSC was instructed by the 
Chairman of the PNDC Committee of Secretaries, the de facto Prime Minister, to release the 
serviced plots financed by the World Bank‘s PWP to SSNIT for a ―workers‖ housing scheme. 
By this time in 1989, 230 of the envisaged 400 plots had been fully serviced
162
. The argument 
was that the location of the site and service scheme was deemed very strategic as the gateway 
into Tema. Furthermore, it was felt that the image of the city as a ―modern harbour city‖ 
would be tarnished if low-income households occupied that site as a result of their perceived 
lifestyles. This perception of low-income households held that they had relatively larger 
household sizes, favoured out-door activities, practised poor maintenance, and served as entry 
for new migrants from rural areas. All of this combined to make low-income settlements 
unacceptable for this particular location (personal interviews of Chief Technical Advisor and 
Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing; September 2006; and Project Advisor, 
Urban Project Support Unit; September 2006). After the land re-allocation, SSNIT developed 
15 medium rise blocks, housing 156 apartments at this location in the first phase in 1990. In 
the subsequent phases, SSNIT resorted to single family housing, building 336 units in 
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(starting in 1993) and 380 units (starting in 1996) in phases 2 and 3 respectively. The 
developments were allocated to the public ministries, departments and agencies and some of 
the better performing parastatal organisations such as the Volta River Authority and the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation. Within these agencies, the accommodation was 
given to staff in management positions first even though some occupied their own privately 
developed properties. Further underlining its elite character, this newly created 
neighbourhood did not have public transport terminals typically patronised by the urban poor, 
yet had sports facilities for games such as badminton, squash and tennis, traditionally 
aspirational middle class activities. 
6.7.1. Expanding from “Workers” to Upscale Housing 
The government‘s decision to host the thirtieth anniversary meeting of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) in September 1991 induced SSNIT into upscale housing 
developments. Following the decision to host the conference, the government agreed for 
SSNIT to pre-finance high quality residential properties in a former colonial-era expatriate 
residential neighbourhood in Accra, to house presidents and heads of governments expected 
to attend the conference. This area had a low residential density of approximately one house 
per acre and was occupied by mostly civil servants (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1993). 
The land was transferred from the state to SSNIT without compensation on the premise that 
the properties would be transferred to the state after the conference, and SSNIT would be 
reimbursed for the pre-financing. Under a neighbourhood redevelopment scheme, a total of 
75 high class properties were constructed in this area. However, after the NAM conference in 
1991, the government failed to reimburse SSNIT for the pre-financing and agreed for SSNIT 
to sell the developments on the open market for the reimbursement (personal interview of 
Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing, September 2006). The 75 houses were 
offered on the open market in 1992 and were all bought within two months of the initial sale. 
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The buyers included diplomatic missions, multinational corporations and some Ghanaians 
resident abroad. The rapid acquisition of these upper scale developments drew attention to the 
pent-up demand for such properties and the capacity of the market to afford them. SSNIT 
subsequently expanded its investments in upscale residential developments in high class 
neighbourhoods of Accra (personal interview of Senior Project Manager, SSNIT; October 
2006). Thus, SSNIT‘s involvement enabled a break from the past practices in which the state 
deployed rhetorical devices to mask its privileging of upper class housing.  
6.7.2. Political Patronage, Interest Groups Competition, and Corruption  
The scale of housing developments by SSNIT from 1988 (of over 7,000 dwellings) 
created opportunities for corruption and political patronage in procurement, and allocation 
subjecting SSNIT‘s decision-making to interest group competition and manipulation. SSNIT 
chose to procure building materials for the housing projects through bulk suppliers which 
made economic sense, but increased the stakes for corruption and patronage being competed 
for. Although state corruption is difficult to establish, contextual evidence raises doubts about 
the transparency of such transactions. The case of SSNIT‘s Sakumono development in Tema 
is a case in point. In 1989, the contract for supplying sandcrete blocks for the project 
comprising 1,778 houses was awarded to Azumah Nelson, Ghana‘s second world boxing 
champion
163
, although he had no prior experience in the production of these materials. It was 
not uncommon for beneficiaries of such supply contracts to set up their production plants 
only after contracts had been awarded. According to a Quantity Surveyor Consultant with 
SSNIT (personal interview, October 2006) such awards to inexperienced suppliers were rife 
and were often ―orders from above‖ inferring the government.  
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 His boxing activities had galvanised nationalism when he won the world title in 1985 at a time when the 
PNDC military government was negotiating legitimacy in transiting from Marxism to neo-liberalism (see 
Section 4.5.3). 
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SSNIT‘s development of large estates, averaging 230 houses per construction phase, 
made land also attractive for corruption and patronage. Inevitably, a variety of interests, 
including land speculators and politically-connected associates of government members in 
liaison with ―land brokers‖ frequently engaged SSNIT in dubious land transactions. Several 
instances of such fraudulent practices later came to light in the late 1990s. For example, in the 
late 1990s, one of SSNIT‘s Directors who was also a major financier of the ruling party from 
1992, had acquired 570 acres of land for $3,000 and induced SSNIT to acquire the same 
property for $150,000 in the same year without any enhancements of the land. Public 
enquiries
164
 revealed that members of SSNIT‘s Board agreed to this deal under coercion 
(Ghanaian Times, 2001; RSA, 2005; Daily Dispatch, 2000)
165
. Two facts strengthen this 
suggestion of the culpability of the government – firstly, almost all board members of SSNIT 
were appointed by the government and secondly, the activities of SSNIT fell under the sole 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. The subordination of SSNIT by the Ministry of 
Finance over SSNIT‘s decision-making in questionable deals manifested frequently. In one 
instance, SSNIT was compelled by the Ministry of Finance to bail out a private entity, 
International Generics Ltd, in a hotel project that failed to materialise after a loan from the 
Royal Bank of Scotland guaranteed by the UK Export Credit Guarantee Department had been 
misapplied by the borrowers. In this instance, it came to light that the founder of the borrower 
company, Sir Leon Tamman, was the godfather of Ghana‘s First Lady at the time (Hawley, 
2003; Murray, 2009). Another example of interest group manipulation and corrupt tendencies 
of SSNIT in housing was the ―Obotan Garden of Eden‖, a 29-unit executive housing 
development in Accra in 1998. SSNIT paid $2.244 million as equity to the promoters of this 
                                                 
164
 By the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ) similar to the Office of Ombudsman 
165
 A similar conflict of interest arrangement reported was the appropriation of some of SSNIT‘s developments 
in the Ridge Residential Area with two Board Members including the same one implicated in the first deal, 
being the main beneficiaries. The Director General who was retiring was also given a share of the largesse (The 
Ghanaian Chronicle, October 09 2000). Anecdotal evidence suggests links between the said Director instigating 
this corrupt practice and leading members of the government, particularly the Minister of Finance. 
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project, who also acted as investment advisors to SSNIT. An audit report later found the 
Director–General of SSNIT fraudulently complicit with the promoters and recommended their 
prosecution (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2002; Gye Nyame Concord, 2003).  
Similar problems of political patronage and corruption pertained in the allocation of 
SSNIT‘s workers‘ housing. Some interest groups used all sorts of means to manipulate the 
allocation process to their own advantage. From the onset, the rents for the ―workers‖ housing 
were set below market levels in pursuit of the government‘s quest to make housing affordable. 
As inflation spiralled in the 1990s, SSNIT was initially restrained by the government from 
making corresponding upward adjustments in rents which adversely affected SSNIT‘s 
finances. However, SSNIT continuously pressed the government until it yielded to the 
suggestion to sell these rental units to the sitting tenants (personal interview of Senior Project 
Manager, SSNIT; October 2006). To maintain affordability, sale prices were set below open 
market prices. However, this was met by vehement protests from various worker groups of 
mostly residents arguing that the selling price was exorbitant (Ghana News Agency 1999). 
Sitting and former members of parliament who occupied some of these flats also joined these 
protests and lobbied extensively for the inclusion of their residence in the sales, although 
originally they had been excluded. The premise for the exclusion was the peculiar nature of 
housing need in which the parliamentary election cycle generated the need to provide 
members of parliament duty stations in the capital, Accra every four years. In this regard, the 
Office of Parliament had been allocated a total of 40 flats in 1993. However, parliamentarians 
defeated in the 1996 elections and entirely from the ruling party, failed to vacate the flats 
citing relocation difficulties. As a result, they lobbied SSNIT through the government to 
allocate official houses as duty posts for members of parliament in order to acquire the 
existing duty posts as private property. Subsequently, SSNIT gave the Office of Parliament 
160 apartments in 10 new residential blocks in 1996. SSNIT sold the 40 flats to the former 
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and some sitting parliamentarians for approximately $6,750 for a two-bedroom flat that was 
selling on the market in 1997 for $12,500. Within six months of sale, evidence emerged that 
beneficiaries re-sold these flats at prices ranging from $13,500 to $15,000 (Free Press, 29 
November, 1997). SSNIT‘s price remained fixed even when open market prices rose to 
$17,000 in 1998. This practice of exerting group pressure to acquire SSNIT‘s properties 
cheaply followed by private extraction of profit on the open market was rife. Through this 
practice, SSNIT suffered significant losses and curtailed its workers‘ housing investments by 
2000. After 2000, the government tried to induce SSNIT to re-engage in mass housing, but 
this did not progress beyond discussions. 
6.7.3. SSNIT and the Growth of the Private Sector 
As has been noted in Section 6.3 and 6.4.1, one of the key objectives of the World 
Bank‘s support for the housing sector was the increased participation of the private sector in 
housing delivery resulting in the announcement of incentives
166
 for private sector investment 
in the housing sector in the 1988 Budget. Consequently, the Housing Ministry held a meeting 
in February 1988 to mobilise all private ―developers‖ for the purpose of formalising their role 
in housing. The majority of private developers at the time were building contractors venturing 
occasionally into real estate housing on an insignificant scale (Tweneboa, 2006). Among the 
few who were bona fide private developers, the majority were businesses owned by Arabs, 
reflecting the novelty of the private real estate in the indigenous Ghanaian society
167
. This 
culminated in the launching of the Ghana Real Estate Developers Association (GREDA) in 
July 1988 with 40 members. GREDA‘s emergence in 1988 reinforced the World Bank‘s 
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 These incentives included a five-year tax moratorium for private real estate developers on incomes generated 
from sale or letting of residential real estate with the possibility of a further two-year extension in the event of 
the developer incurring losses during the five year period. Additionally, private developers were granted 
permission to fully repatriate all profits earned from their real estate investments.  
167
 The Arab community in Ghana, beginning from the 1940s and 1950s were known for their presence in 
commerce in Accra and the timber industry in the forest zones. They established construction divisions to their 
enterprises which evolved into real estate operations. The main private real estate companies had been set up in 
the 1970s and included the likes of Zagloul Group of Companies, Dakmak Group of Companies, Kuottam 
Construction and CS Construction and their principals originated from Lebanon and Syria. 
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reluctance to provide funds for public housing development agencies as desired by the 
government. As a result of the World Bank‘s advocacy for enhancing the role of the private 
sector in housing development, an expectation was built up among GREDA members of 
financial support through construction finance loans from the World Bank for private sector 
housing activities under Urban II (personal interview of former Project Director, and Project 
Advisor, Urban Project Support Unit; September 2006). Chronologically, GREDA‘s 
formation preceded the conclusion of the design of Urban II in 1990 (discussed in Section 
6.4). It can be inferred that the limited support given to the private sector under Urban II was 
not due to a lack of time for such consideration.  
Following GREDA‘s set up, SSNIT‘s housing initiatives significantly facilitated 
GREDA‘s growth by the decision of pioneer GREDA members, to locate their developments 
close to SSNIT‘s housing estates to take advantage of SSNIT‘s investment in municipal 
infrastructure networks. Through this arrangement, GREDA members reduced their own 
investment in infrastructure. However, this further compounded SSNIT‘s financial challenge 
as it was unable to recover its investments with no contributions from the public utility 
agencies, the local authorities, or land owners that leased out the land to SSNIT.  
As a result of the GREDA co-location decision, the sites where SSNIT‘s housing 
estates were located, mostly in the peripheries of the city, were rapidly populated. Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2
168
 provide an analysis of the ―neighbourhood growth effect‖ of some of 
SSNIT‘s housing estates arising from GREDA‘s co-location choices and population increase. 
Table 6.1 presents the results of an observational survey conducted for this dissertation on the 
largest SSNIT estate, Sakumono Estate in Tema to identify the extent of private sector co-
location. A demographic growth analysis extrapolated from the published data of the last 
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 As noted in Chapter 2, the observational survey of these estates was necessitated by the need to examine the 
effect of SSSNIT‘s developments on the emerging private sector developers who were just emerging. SSNIT‘s 
development in Sakumono was the first mass housing scheme carried out in the course of the housing sector 
reforms although its link to the reforms were tenuous. The survey in Table 6.1 shows how important SSNIT‘s 
investment in infrastructure was in determining the location of the private real estate developers.  
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population census in 2000 is presented in Table 6.2. In lieu of a housing count to establish the 
extent of private sector co-location, as a result of the inaccessibility of some of the properties 
built on privately sub-divided land, I extrapolated the population growth in the SSNIT 
housing estate neighbourhoods as a proxy estimate in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.1: Developments adjoining SSNIT Developments in Sakumono environs 
Name of  Estate Name of Developer Development Year  Location 
"SSNIT Phase I" SSNIT Block of Flats  1989 Comm. 13 
"SSNIT Phase II" SSNIT Semi-detached 1990 Ditto 
"Ghacem Estate" Individual staff Semi-detached 1992 Ditto 
 SSNIT Phase 3 SSNIT 
Semi-detached/ 
Block of Flats 
 
1996 Comm. 14 
GSB Estate Individual staff Semi-detached 1992 Ditto 
TDC Serviced Plots Individual developers Detached 1991 Ditto 
 NTHC Estates NTHC Properties Ltd. Detached /Terrace  1995 Ditto 
Regimanuel Phase 1 Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Semi-detached 1993 Ditto 
Buena Vista Homes Buena Vista Homes Detached 1999 Ditto 
 N/A Parakuo Ltd. Detached 1992 Comm. 15 
Regimanuel Estates Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Detached 1992 Ditto 
Regimanuel Estates Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Detached 1997 Comm. 18 
Regimanuel Estates Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Detached 2001 Comm. 19 
―Chinese‖ Estates TDC Detached 1997 Ditto 
Regimanuel Estates Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Detached 1997 Comm. 20 
MDCL Estates Medium Dwelling Detached 1998 Ditto 
NTHC Estates NTHC Properties Ltd. Detached 1997 Ditto 
 N/A Optimum Shelter Detached 1998 Ditto 
 N/A Winipak Ltd Detached 1997 Ditto 
 N/A Parakuo Ltd. Detached 1997 Ditto 
HFC Estates HFC-ISL Detached 1999 Ditto 
HFC estates HFC-ISL Semi-detached 1999 Ditto 
HOS Estate TDC Detached 1995 Ditto 
 N/A Edgegate Realty Detached 1994 Ditto 
Devtraco Villa Devtraco Ltd Detached 2002 Ditto 
Boye Villa Bonsu Brothers Estate Detached 1999 Ditto 
Tieso Homes Tieso Homes Detached 2002 Ditto 
Lagoon View Estates Emefs Development Detached 2000 Lashibi 
Source: Author Survey (April 2007) 
Table 6.2: Impact of SSNIT housing on populations of peripheral locations  
Neighbourhood 
Population Dwelling units  
(2000 Census) 
SSNIT 
houses 
Houses built 
by others 1970 1984 2000 
Adenta   Housing 55 587 43,629 6,885 1,272 5,613 
Ashongman   Housing 0 0 4,640 1,069 627 442 
Sakumono     724 1,386 20,172 3,082 1,778 1,250 
Tema  Community 3 
0 0 5,516 1,212 1,008 204 
Tema  Community 5 0 7,404 14,305 1,749 144 1,605 
Source: Extrapolated from 2000 Housing and Population Census (GSS, 2005); and Sarfoh (2002) 
216 
 
Two issues emerge from this analysis on the effect on the private sector and the demographic 
change in those neighbourhoods of SSNIT‘s estates. After the inception of SSNIT‘s estate in 
Sakumono, 25 estates were built by 16 developers in the following ten years, clearly 
demonstrating the effect of SSNIT‘s developments in incubating the private sector estate 
developers. Again, SSNIT‘s housing developments led to the substantial growth of their 
neighbourhoods.  
6.8 GREDA and the “Diaspora” Market 
Persistent dependence on imported materials challenged the prospects of the local 
building industry and was further worsened by inflation
169
 and devaluation of the local 
currency. These increased costs inevitably affected housing projects by all providers – public 
housing agencies, SSNIT and the private sector. With incomes not matching the rise in 
prices, the capacity of the local market to afford privately developed housing reduced and 
substantially constrained the returns on the investments by the private sector. The Housing 
Ministry in partnership with GREDA sought new markets elsewhere for the newly built 
houses as the local market declined. Subsequently, the Housing Ministry initiated an investor 
drive in 1993 to source new home buyers. Some private real estate developers were mobilised 
to accompany senior officials of the Housing Ministry in a series of ―Housing Road Show‖ 
events in several western countries.  The first events took place in London, Amsterdam, 
Hamburg, and Atlanta. These cities had very high concentrations of Ghanaians in Europe and 
North America. Hitherto, such foreign-based Ghanaians (also referred to as the ―Diaspora 
market‖) used informal channels to remit funds to relatives to build houses on their behalf. 
Such channels had increasingly proved problematic, with widespread incidence of fraud by 
family members and local associates in respect of location, costs and quality of the houses 
(Tipple et al, 1998; Peil, 1995; Smith & Mazzucatto, 2003; Grant, 2005).  The emergence of 
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 The cause and effects of inflation on housing in the 1990s are discussed in later sections of this chapter. 
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GREDA and the Diaspora market thus created a synergised relationship for both parties. 
Non-resident Ghanaians obtained a more reliable agent for the construction of their desired 
houses whereas private developers were able to build upmarket developments without 
difficulty in selling. Subsequently, houses were priced in foreign exchange with a local 
equivalent that changed in tandem with devaluation of the local currency (Konadu-Agyeman, 
2001; Yeboah, 2001). The housing road shows by the private sector became annual events 
expanding to other cities with high concentrations of Ghanaian populations such as Toronto, 
the Hague, Manchester, Paris, and New York. Furthermore, GREDA took over the 
organisation of these road shows and only occasionally included the Housing Ministry. 
As Grant (2005) has noted, the activities of private developers targeting the Diaspora 
market grew considerably from the 1990s with premium increasingly placed on exclusivity. 
This has led to the phenomenal growth of gated residential enclaves in the post-millennium. 
For example, as of June 2004, Grant (2005: 669) identified 23 gated communities in the 
Accra metropolis alone with one located in Cantonments and three in the Airport Residential 
Area. In April 2007, a similar survey I undertook of the Accra metropolis revealed 64 gated 
developments (see Annex 5). In the aforementioned neighbourhoods of Cantonments and 
Airport Residential Area surveyed earlier by Grant (2005), I found that gated communities 
had increased to thirteen in Cantonments and ten in the Airport Residential Area. The rise of 
the upscale market promoted diversification among the private developers, increasingly 
drawing in operators originating from foreign countries. My field survey revealed an 
emerging presence of foreign owned real estate developers which is presented in Table 6.3 
below. Although nascent, this trend in international participation in local housing 
development is a pointer to the penetration of global capital into the local housing market. 
The presence of the international estate developers is impacting the dynamics of the housing 
sector with their access to global sources of capital for construction finance; coupled with 
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their exclusive focus on upscale housing which gives them an upper hand against local 
developers. Given their enhanced access to financial resources, the case was made that the 
international real estate companies adversely influence the land markets by acquisitions at 
highly inflated prices thereby fuelling speculation. 
Table 6.3 Emerging trend of International housing development companies 
Name of Developer Origin Structure of business 
Royal PF Construction U.K. Foreign direct investor 
Taysec U.K. Subsidiary of Taylor Woodrow 
PW Ghana U.K. Subsidiary of PW Group 
Royal Estate Group USA Joint venture with local developer 
Regimanuel-Grey
170
  USA Joint venture with local developer 
Srithru SDN BHD
171
 Malaysia Foreign direct investor 
Jude Estates South Korea Foreign investor 
Red Sea Housing Saudi Arabia Free zone operator
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99 China Construction Company China Foreign direct investor 
ACP Estates India Acquired majority shares of local developer 
Ghana Libya Arab Holding  Libya Joint venture with Ghana government  
D‘Afrique Nigeria  External shareholders-local management  
Y. Kummey Nigeria External shareholders-local management 
Source: Author Field survey, December 2007; validated by GREDA focus group, January 2008  
For example, ―local‖ developers were of the view that the practice of land acquisition by 
―foreign‖ developers in prime neighbourhoods of Accra at prices exceeding US$500,000 per 
acre was ‗abnormal‘ and affected land owners‘ dismissal of negotiated settlements preferred 
by local developers (personal interview of GREDA President; October 2006). Yet, ―foreign‖ 
developers appear unfazed by such speculative prices as the market for developments on such 
prime land remains very high (personal interview of former Regional Director of Lands 
Commission). Evidence suggests that the market for such developments include the local 
high income households besides the ―Diaspora‖ market. Whereas Grant (2005) found that 
70% of Regimanuel‘s properties were acquired by non-resident clients, my survey of 
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 Started out as a local developer, Regimanuel at the inception of the reforms and changed to Regimanuel – 
Grey after going into partnership with US investor. 
171
 This company originally ventured into the Ghanaian market as part of a consortium of Malaysian firms, 
Metro Ikram SDN BHD, entering into a joint venture partnership with SSNIT for the development of a housing 
estate – Meridian Housing Project. Even though the joint venture deal fell through Srithru SDN BHD remained 
and has completed a 30 flat apartment block.  
172
 Began operations manufacturing demountable housing components from shipping containers for export but is 
gradually turning to the local market as well.  
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properties developed by British-owned Taysec, one of the three leading developers of high 
end market (personal interview of GREDA President; October 2006) revealed that 90% of 
their clients were resident Ghanaians (See Table 6.4 below). Furthermore, 95% of these 
properties were acquired outright and the remainder bought with mortgage loans. This 
contrasts with Grant‘s (2005) finding of 59% and 74% direct purchases of developments by 
Regimanuel-Grey Ltd and Trasacco Ltd, respectively, the other two leading prime property 
developers (personal interview of GREDA President; October 2006). 
Table 6.4: Snapshot of emerging local upper class 
Estate Year 
Completed 
Type of 
Development 
Units Selling     
Price 
Outright 
Sale 
Mortgage 
Sale 
Alema Court   May 2001 3-bedroom 12 $ 180,000 10 2 
2-bedroom 12 $ 150,000 11 1 
Cantonments 
Gardens 
December 2003 3-bedroom semi-
detached 
 
20 
 
$ 300,000 
 
19 
 
1 
Palm Court December 2004 3-Bedroom Flats 24 $ 250,000 24 0 
Cedar Court July 2005 3-Bedroom Flats 18 $ 250,000 17 1 
Orchid 
Garden 
January 2007 3-bedroom semi-
detached 
 
36 
 
£ 180,000 
 
35 
 
1 
Source: Estate Department, Taysec Ltd. 
6.9 Capacity Building Aspirations and Contradictions, Ministerial Tenure and 
Policy Consistency  
As has been noted in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.6.2, the weakness of the Housing Ministry 
in policy design and implementation had been noted by both the World Bank and the UN. 
The UN tried to address this within the ―Institutional Development Training and Operational 
Studies for the Shelter Sector (GHA/87/023)‖ programme noted in Section 6.6.2, and 
established a new directorate, the Policy Planning Evaluation Unit (PPEU) in the Ministry of 
Work and Housing. Staffing the new directorate was constrained by a freeze on public sector 
employment instituted under the structural adjustment reforms (discussed in Section 4.5.4 of 
Chapter 4). A singular exemption from the recruitment freeze was obtained to recruit the 
head of the PPEU culminating in the appointment of a policy expert in 1990
173
. The other 
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 Dr.Thomas F. Agyapong had just concluded his PhD on housing policy in 1990.  
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PPEU staff were recruited by exploiting the finding of an organisational audit that the 
Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation (AESC) was under-staffed and needed 
bolstering
174
. In all, four additional staff with backgrounds in civil engineering, development 
planning and sociology were recruited by AESC and assigned to the Housing Ministry. To 
sustain the policy capacity in the PPEU, staff periodically participated in international 
courses on housing policy. The UN agreed with the government to provide financial bonuses 
to supplement the low wages
175
 of the PPEU staff in order to ensure that the staff stayed at 
post, and the Housing Ministry sustained its policy capacity. A similar arrangement pertained 
for Technical Services Centre (TSC) staff sponsored by the World Bank under the Accra 
District Rehabilitation Project (ADRP) as discussed in Section 6.4.1. However, the salary 
support from the UN‘s was relatively lower than the World Bank‘s.176 It was noted; 
UNDP was very modest in the incentives they gave for those (staff from Housing Ministry) engaged in 
their work. Of course some of our people (the bureaucrats) who were required to do some work for 
them (UN) were not too keen. We were aware of how much the World Bank was paying for those 
(from TSC, Housing Ministry; and Local Government projects) working on their projects. The UNDP‘s 
incentives did not match what the World Bank was paying. Also the (UNDP) work was entirely 
focused on just policy work whilst SSNIT and the World Bank were implementing (construction) 
projects (personal interview of former PPEU staff; explanations inserted in parenthesis; October 2006). 
The differences in salary support also generated different effects on the public servants‘ 
approach to their work with greater incentives induced by the World Bank than the UN. The 
salary support differences thus generated unequal power relations between the Housing 
Ministry and the Local Government Ministry, on the one hand. On the other hand, there were 
unequal effects between TSC and PPEU, all within the Housing Ministry. The effects of the 
uneven power relations were also complicated by the personal disposition of political 
appointees heading the housing and local government sectors. Political appointees‘ 
disposition affected the pace of policy design and implementation, including reforms. The 
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 AESC was a public agency for architectural and engineering services reviewed under the SAP. 
175
 In 1988 the difference between public and private sector wages ranged between 28% and 41% (Merode and 
Thomas, 1994:164). 
176
 One staff member left in 1994 to work with Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) because 
the salary supplement was discontinued. Others worked with private firms to supplement their salaries.  
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personal disposition of political appointees became even more critical when their tenure was 
taken into consideration. The longer a Minister stayed on, the higher the chances of a 
particular policy remaining dominant. This relative power of the political heads is attributed 
to the structure of governance in Ghana; 
I believe it has to do with our structure of government more than politics because it leaves so much 
(power) in the hands of whoever is leading the ministry at that point. After some work is done and (the 
appointee) leaves, another person comes and does not continue. So it is the structure of government 
that I think there‘s something faulty about. Policies are not taken through parliament, even if they went 
through parliament, and became some act or bill then the next person, no matter who he is, will have to 
go by that way (personal interview of former Deputy Minister of Works and Housing; August 2006)  
The discretionary power of political office holders was complicated by their varying motives 
and the respective influence of their security of tenure. Tables 6.5a and 6.5b present the 
record of the tenure of the political and administrative heads of the housing and local 
governance sectors involved in the reforms. It shows that in the period of the housing reforms 
from 1988 to 2000, the Housing Ministry had eight Ministers and five Chief Directors, 
whereas the Local Government Ministry had two Ministers and one Chief Director. 
Significantly, one of the Local Government Ministers had a twelve-year tenure. One effect of 
this frequent change in leadership in the Housing Ministry was the quest for short term goals. 
As a result of the rapid turnover, each political appointee sought quick results to demonstrate 
competence and foster longevity. Political survival thus underpinned decision making in the 
Housing Ministry with a minimal tolerance for long-term policy choices that did not deliver 
the desired results.  
For politicians the new physical thing coming out is more visible, for them is something like... ‗this is 
what I did‘ but if you are really taking about the realistic level of addressing this I think I will imagine 
that part of the funds going into all these houses some portion of it ought to go into slum upgrading, 
improvement but as I said a politician wants you to be able to see that he built so many houses, ‗go and 
see, it show it‘ he will prefer to sweep this one under the carpet but it‘s there. But it doesn‘t necessarily 
have to be. If the politician at the top is sufficiently aware of the other problems down there and 
prepared to confront them there is no need for that, there wouldn‘t be any need for any disconnection. 
Is just that he is addressing a whole range of issues that‘s what I‘m saying. In the case of Works and 
Housing maybe it is because of the transitory tenure of these people. You find that if you had 
somebody there who stayed in the place for four years for instance, then you can actually educate him. 
He will not be in a hurry to tackle the situation and enforce. If a guy comes there...he forgets that 
planning is crucial to any, you have to plan before you move on. But when people are there knowing 
very well that this thing that I‘m putting in there is not going to take too long and I‘d not be there for a 
year or that issue comes in, then they don‘t have time; they don‘t listen to anything. But where they 
have time to really study the situation then you will agree. But when they come in personally there is so 
222 
 
much in front of them. Most of them come with their own ideas; ‗how do I make a good impact‘ he 
doesn‘t want to know about what will really happen. I mean that is the whole thing; but there are 
sometimes some people who don‘t have any idea of what to do as managers so they just sit there and 
do not have a clue as to what to do (personal interview of Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works 
and Housing; September 2006) 
Table 6.5a MWH – Tenure of Ministers and Chief Directors (1985 - 2008) 
Minister Period Chief Director Period  
Dr. Kofi Sam 1985 – 1987 W.K. Alomatu 1984 – 1993 
Appiah Korang 1987 – 1988  
Dr. Charles Boadu 1988 – 1989 
Naval Captain Butah 1989 – 1992 
Sq. Leader Clend Sowu 1991 – 1992 
David Amankwah 1992 
Kenneth Ampratwum 1992 – 1993 
Ebenezer Kwabena Fosu 1993 – 1997 Victoria  Oku 1993 – 1997 
Isaac Agyei Mensah     1997 –2001 Dr. J.K.A.B.A. Atta 1997 – 1999 
S. Q. Barnor 1999 – 2000 
Kwamena Bartels 2001  Ohene Okine 2000 – 2003 
Yaw Barima 2001 – 2003 
Alhaji Mustapha Idris Ali 2003 – 2005 Rebecca Beecham 2003 – 2004 
Hackman Owusu Agyeman 2005 – 2007 K. A. Gyarten 2004 – 2008 
Boniface Abubakr Saddique 2007 – 2008 
Source: Compiled from Human Resource Directorate, MWH 
 
Table 6.5b MLGRD – Tenure of Ministers and Chief Directors (1985- 2008) 
Minister Period Chief Director Period  
F. A. Jantuah 1984 – 1986 R. Ampah 1985 – 1986 
Kofi Acquah Harrison 1986 S. Y. M. Zanu 1986 – 1987 
Dr. E. A. Ayirebi Acquah 1986 – 1987 S. Y. M. Zanu 1988 – 2001 
W. H. Yeboah 1987 – 1988 
Kwamena Ahwoi 1988 – 2000 
Cecilia Johnson 2000 – 2001 
Kwadwo Baah Wiredu 2001 – 2003 Addae Kyeremeh 2001 – 2003 
Kwadwo Adjei Darko 2003 – 2005 Francis Andoh 2003 – 2005 
Charles Bimpong Bintim 2005 – 2006 E. P. Ansah 2005 – 2006 
Stephen Asamoah Boateng 2006 – 2007 Daniel Nyankamawu 2006 – 2008 
Kwadwo Adjei Darko 2007 – 2008 
Source: Compiled from Human Resource Directorate, MLGRD 
This penchant for short-term goals in turn generated a culture of sycophancy, as some staff 
conducted themselves only in ways agreeable to politicians. In the event of disagreement 
between politicians and bureaucrats, technocratic expertise was no guarantee for continued 
stay in a ministry with very high risk of transfer to isolated and inconsequential assignments. 
Because of the high turnover (of political heads) bureaucrats acted on survival instincts. A lot of my 
colleagues were seeking to ingratiate themselves with the (new) Secretaries. This promoted a culture of 
political correctness. It did not matter how competent one was (personal interview of former staff of 
PPEU Ministry of Works and Housing; explanatory comments inserted in parenthesis; October 2006) 
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Following the removal of the Secretary (and his Deputy) for Works and Housing in 1987, a 
number of staff transfers took place upon the appointment of the new Secretary. These 
changes were attributed to the new appointee, even though there was no evidence of this. The 
transfers reinforced the claim of political vindictiveness as a consequence of disagreements 
with political appointees
177
 that arguably could influence the attitude of some bureaucrats to 
favour expediency above candour. 
Another demonstration of differential power within the state creating peculiar 
outcomes in the housing reforms materialised in the PPEU‘s evolution after the staff 
recruitment when they, like all civil servants, were placed under the management of the 
Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS
178
). This contrasts with conditions enjoyed by 
TSC staff, managing the World Bank-sponsored housing and urban projects. The latter were 
shielded from control of the OHCS by the World Bank‘s agreement with the government. As 
a result of this centralised arrangement affecting PPEU staff, the OHCS effectively 
neutralised the capacity building goals by transferring two PPEU staff members to other 
ministries without corresponding replacement. The transfers manifested the non-coherence of 
state power in the housing sector reform (see Box 6.1). The policy planning capacity of the 
Ministry of Works and Housing, promoted by the UN was thus nullified through non-
converging actions of the political and bureaucrat classes, as well as the effects of the 
differential power relations of the international agencies. This outcome is similar to 
Hutchful‘s (2002) findings and conclusions regarding the broader adjustment programme‘s 
aims in undertaking labour reform thus, ―while there was progress in redeployment and in 
capacity building, actual efficiency gains seem to have been limited‖ (Hutchful, 2001: 108). 
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 A member of staff of MWH was transferred to the Kadjebi District, an extremely remote and poor district 
after being accused of instigating the dismissal of the Secretaries of the MWH. This followed the staff member‘s 
protest to the PNDC Head of State regarding the allocation of state built houses which was under the control of 
the Under-Secretary of Housing. The dismissal took place when the Secretary and his deputy had both travelled 
outside the country.  
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 The OHCS manages the entire civil service, a role reinforced by the SAP (Haruna, 2001). 
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6.10. Reforming the Public Housing Agencies–The Tenants, the Colonel and 
the Inertia Effect of Residualised Housing Policy Prioritisation 
The implementation of the reforms of the public housing agencies – State Housing 
Corporation (SHC) and Tema Development Corporation (TDC) – as required under the 
World Bank-sponsored Urban II was also complicated by local elements. In April 1991, the 
government commissioned an organisational review of TDC by Coopers and Lybrand 
Box 6.1: Contradicting Capacity building aspirations –The Case of Yaa Osei-Brimpong 
Yaa Osei-Brimpong completed her Bachelor‘s programme in Planning at the University of Science and 
Technology (now called Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology), in Kumasi, Ghana. She 
entered into private practice and worked in consulting firms as a professional planner. Under the auspices of the 
capacity building for policy development project in the Ministry of Works and Housing sponsored by the UN, she 
was recruited by the Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation (AESC) and seconded to the Ministry of 
Works and Housing. She was placed in the newly created Policy Planning and Evaluation Unit (PPEU) of the 
Ministry as an Assistant Director. In 1990, she was sponsored to the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague, 
Netherlands where she read a Master‘s course in Development Studies. Her focus in this programme including her 
long essay was on public policy with emphasis on housing. Following her completion of the course she returned 
to work with the PPEU unit on the ongoing UN-sponsored policy reforms. As part of the continuous professional 
development, she also attended a short course at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development (IHS) in 
Rotterdam, Netherlands, again focusing on housing policy. In 1997, the Office of the Head of Civil Service 
transferred her from the Ministry of Works and Housing to the Ministry of Communications. The OHCS 
rationalized that civil servants were supposed to be administrators and not policy experts and therefore could fit 
anywhere within the service. Mrs. Bimpong was sent to the Ministry of Communication as part of the broader 
reorganization in the civil service that had become necessary due to the creation of the new Ministry of 
Communications and Technology carved out of the former Ministry of Transport and Communication. As a new 
ministry, there was urgency in staffing at all levels which validated the transfer. In so doing, the OHCS discounted 
the sector-specific training in policy making that the UN assistance had engendered. Further reflecting the 
nonchalance towards the UN-supported capacity building, no replacement was sent to the Ministry of Works and 
Housing. The situation was worsened further by the freeze on recruitments in the civil service except with the 
express permission of the Minister of Finance, a condition set by the SAP arrangement. 
Personal interviews of Chief Technical Advisor and Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing; Habitat 
Programme Manager, UN-Habitat Ghana Office, September 2006 
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Deloitte
179
. Before the completion of the review, the government acquiesced to TDC‘s 
pressure for rents to be raised. Against serious protest from tenants, rents were raised by 
350%. The proposed rent increases however, galvanised a section of the aggrieved tenants to 
mobilise into a group – TDC Tenants Association – that subsequently secured a court 
injunction against the implementation of the rent increase. The court‘s judgment was 
premised on TDC‘s failure to maintain the properties as required in the rent agreement. 
Additionally, TDC‘s departure from its original social basis as a non-commercial public 
housing agency was cited
180
 (Acquah, 2001; Djokoto-Asem, 2003: 189). TDC tried to 
leverage state power to induce the tenants to withdraw the case from court thus: 
There are a lot of external controls on us. There are a lot of things we do not have absolute control 
over. For instance, we have houses, rental houses and we have tenants who have come together calling 
themselves tenants association and they can decide (how much rent they want to pay and under what 
conditions. We can‘t even sell our own property….. Based on expert advice (our houses) were valued 
so much. Anybody who wants to buy will have to buy it at this price… …. For certain reasons we can 
not even collect our rent from tenants. Courts can also put an injunction on our actions and it can delay 
us. You send cases to court and the courts will never dispose of the case and once the injunction still 
stands you cannot act……We have even gone to report to our sector Ministry and the Minister 
concerned is taking steps to try to resolve the problem out of court. But we have to agree with the 
tenants association that we are going to do this and that…… but we have not agreed with the tenants 
association yet (Djokoto-Asem, 2003: 188-189) 
However the government‘s resistance to TDC‘s instigations, left TDC feeling 
―isolated and abandoned in …...... implementing a major restructuring objective‖ (Djokoto-
Asem, 2003:191). Djokoto-Asem (2003) further argues that the government was politically 
motivated in its actions given the imminence of the 1992 elections in which the PNDC 
military regime was contesting as a political party. She viewed the actions of the Tenants 
Association as a form of resistance to the hegemonic power of the World Bank (Djokoto-
Asem, 2003). This hegemonic power materialised through the neo-liberal discourse of 
structural adjustment employing rationalisation of organisational efficiency, commercial 
viability and managerial autonomy to discipline the state into conformity. On one hand, this 
argument is too optimistic of the goal of the tenant‘s resistance. As noted by Asabere (2007: 
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 A Joint venture of the two international management companies. 
180
 The latter claim was backed by the conventional practice of rent control (Malpezzi, Tipple and Willis, 1989). 
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1931), the tenants‘ actions were a manifestation of the concept of ―tenant lock-in‖ behaviour 
which emerged in reaction to an unresponsive housing market. Long periods of extremely 
low rents generated ―complete immobilisation of tenants, to the extent that there is practically 
no turnover or vacancies available‖. A proposed out-of-court settlement in 1996 failed 
although TDC re-offered to sell the properties to the sitting tenants (Acquah, ibid: 11) (see 
Annex 6). 
In the case of the SHC, the proposed organisational review was not well received, 
especially by the Managing Director, Colonel Seth Obeng. The PNDC military regime (1981 
1992) maintained the practice of appointing serving military officers to head SHC. Prior to 
his appointment in October 1989, the Colonel was Chief Staff Officer at the Army 
headquarters, a position which made him very influential among the military class
181
, a 
critical constituency of the military government. The Colonel‘s disapproval of the review 
affected the implementation and outcomes of the proposed reform of SHC:  
The man (Managing Director) had no time for all these studies. All he wanted to do was build houses 
since we had a backlog to meet. Because of his stature in the military, the releases from the Ministry of 
Finance were much better than before and we also had the new clients giving us new deposits still 
coming in. So we kept building whilst the studies were on-going (personal interview of Director of 
Planning, SHC; explanatory comments inserted in parenthesis; October 2006) 
 Brigadier (then Colonel) Obeng was not someone to be toyed with. We (TSC) just made our proposals 
and left it to them (SHC) to decide if they will take our advice or not. Initially they (SHC) worked with 
us (TSC) well but after some time they appeared not to be interested any longer. This happened after 
the initial assessment of State Housing had been completed. Alternative arrangements we (TSC) put in 
place did not seem acceptable to him so eventually we (TSC) concluded the Urban II project without 
finishing the rationalization of SHC. It all boiled down to the M.D.‘s preference (personal interview of 
Director, TSC; explanatory comments inserted in parenthesis; September 2006) 
As a result, although SHC management agreed in principle to host three experts to help 
rationalize its operations, they were generally ignored as SHC focused exclusively on 
reducing the backlog of depositors, partly through new deposits. Not surprisingly, the 
Colonel‘s tenure in SHC experienced growth in housing production compared to the earlier 
                                                 
181
 Colonel Obeng‘s appointment to head SHC was in part an attempt by the PNDC regime to diffuse his 
personal influence among the military. During his tenure at SHC, he was compelled to undertake a Master‘s 
degree in India for a year after which he returned to head SHC in December 1992 (personal interview of 
Director of Planning, SHC). In December 1993 he was recalled to the Army Headquarters and re-assigned the 
ECOWAS Force Commander in Liberia in August 1994. 
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periods when SHC was producing fewer than 200 units annually (see Table 6.6 below). This 
steady rise in housing production during the tenure of the Colonel can be attributed to his 
personal influence within the existing political regime, which made it easy to gain access to 
public resources in the budget and also foreign exchange (personal interview of Director of 
Planning, SHC). However, after the Colonel was recalled to the Army Headquarters in 
December 1993, SHC‘s production gradually declined once more. 
Table 6.6: SHC post-reform housing production activities  
Year     1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of Houses 450 593 537 768 607 548 348 153 142 159 
Source: SHC, 2000 
Another setback experienced by SHC was the bloated staff roll and the challenges 
encountered in attempting to address this problem. As noted in Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5, the 
resistance by staff to proposed reforms significantly contributed to its indebtedness. 
However, given the government‘s interminable deferment of its responsibility for making the 
redundancy payments of the SHC staff, the management of SHC was left to grapple with an 
issue that it was inadequately structured to address. This occurrence during the 
implementation of the structural adjustment reforms from the late 1980s into the 1990s, when 
many public agencies were being successfully divested, points to a deeper-lying rationale. To 
account for this anomaly, Appiah-Kubi (2001) rationalises that SHC‘s failed divestiture arose 
from the negative image of the agency created by the institution of its divestiture:  
Notwithstanding these positive effects, the long process of divestiture has had negative effects on some 
enterprises and has not helped to increase their value. In some cases it has made them un-saleable. 
Owing to the negative connotation associated with divestiture, …......... enterprises find it extremely 
difficult to conduct normal business once put on the divestiture list. Banks become unwilling to offer 
credits to such firms, workers become insecure and de-motivated, and normal business is disrupted, 
since implementation of corporate plans becomes uncertain and conditional upon divestiture. As the 
divestiture process drags on, such enterprises begin to lose their best employees, and those who remain 
decide to ‗manage‘ themselves through corrupt business practices and the enterprises become run 
down. Examples of such practices can be found in the once large …….State Housing Corporations, 
which have had to be liquidated at reduced value (Appiah-Kubi, 2001: 214 – 216) 
However, this argument is problematic in the light of other aspects of the divestiture process. 
Firstly, some public organisations in the mining and cocoa sectors were characterised as 
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―primary‖ and ―competitive‖, which commanded top priority in the divestiture process. 
Further, although virtually all public organisations had accrued debts before the onset of the 
divestiture programme in 1988 (Appiah-Kubi, 2001), SHC‘s debts were neither the largest 
nor the most inflexible and yet the government chose to defer payments of some of the debts 
including the proposed redundancy benefits for the staff.  
The government‘s failure to expedite action on the World Bank proposed options to 
rationalise SHC – privatisation, commercialisation or liquidation – coupled with its other 
actions that adversely affected SHC, such as the incomplete land compensation payment and 
the inconclusive land title documentation as discussed in Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5, point to 
another rationale for the specific problem facing SHC. However, coupling the disposition of 
the government to this specific problem of SHC with the government‘s reaction to TDC‘s 
solicitation for assistance in its problems with its tenants discussed earlier in this section, 
reflects a state of inertia. Arguably, this state of inertia was an effect manifesting the 
underlying residualisation of housing in the government‘s priorities. This disposition had 
been earlier noted by the technical committee that locally developed the 1987 draft housing 
policy discussed in Section 6.5. However, this disposition was not obvious to all, including 
the World Bank in its account of the challenges of SHC‘s rationalisation:  
The uncertainty with regard to GOG‘s intended divestiture of the Corporation continued to adversely 
affect SHC‘s ability to implement its 1995 planned projects. The payment for rental units offered for 
sale to legal sitting tenants continued to be slow……….. SHC continued to face problems in obtaining 
head leases from Lands Commission Secretariat despite relentless efforts of Management over the past 
several quarters (Ghana Urban II Project–Aide Memoire October 1995 Item 62 Page 14). 
Eventually, funds were made available for the retrenchment of 1,251 SHC workers at a cost 
approximately equivalent to US$1.46 million in December 1994. This was set against the 
finances of SHC significantly impacting their working capital and their divestiture prospects.  
Although SHC was converted from a public corporation in July 1995 to a limited liability 
company, its prospects for divestiture remained poor as a result of frequent legal suits by un-
compensated land owners, depositors owed long-held advances and dissatisfied customers: 
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There were a lot of court cases when we were running the place (in the 1990s). There were times that 
bailiffs were just sent to us because somebody had won a case in court or CHRAJ and they just [sic] 
come and collect all the vehicles away. That is [sic] happening so people felt that if you came in as a 
strategic investor or partner put funds into this and build [sic] houses the next day they are [sic] taken 
over by debtors, what do you do? (personal interview of former Board Member, SHC; explanatory 
comments inserted in parenthesis; October 2006) 
Therefore, the government‘s assurance of its commitments to the divestiture of public 
housing agencies, SHC and TDC, to the IMF in 1998 and the indication to accelerate the 
process in fulfilment of the conditions of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAF) – another phase of the structural reforms – was in reality a rhetorical sleight of 
hand.
182
 The conclusion of Djokoto-Asem (2003) is pertinent in that with respect to the 
proposed reforms of the public housing agencies, the evidence points to local contextual 
factors combining to distort the ethos of structural adjustment and the hegemony of the 
multinationals. Certainly, the conclusion that ―hegemony is more unstable, vulnerable, and 
contested than previously thought‖ (Djokoto-Asem, 2003: 192), holds true in Ghana‘s 
experience of housing reforms. 
6.11. The implementation of the housing finance reforms 
The proposed housing finance reforms, expected to enhance access to mortgage 
finance and indirectly construction finance and contribute to the creation of a vibrant housing 
market, also experienced outcomes differing from what was planned. The key outputs such as 
the establishment of the Home Finance Company (HFC
183
), the passage of the foreclosure 
laws and the emergence of the private sector as a significant player in housing development 
were all achieved. However, the implementation of the housing finance reforms also 
encountered challenges which affected the other goals of the reforms.  
Shortly after the inception of the HFC‘s secondary mortgage operations in 1991, 
challenges emerged from the general macro-economic context to question the presumptions 
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 By 2000, SHC estimated that outstanding debts were owed to 500 depositors and equivalent to US$700,000. 
183
 Home Finance Company, (HFC) was established in 1990 under the Home Mortgage Finance Law, PNDC 
Law 329. 
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underlining the design of the housing finance reform. As has been noted in Section 4.5.4 of 
Chapter 4, the imminence of the 1992 elections precipitated excessive government spending 
on public sector wage increases to garner political support during the elections. This triggered 
a downward spiral of the economy in the years that followed, labelled as the ―oscillating‖ 
phase of the structural adjustment reforms (Tsikata, 2001; Mensah et al, 2006). The trends in 
inflation and devaluation as a result of the government‘s policies from 1991 are presented in 
Table 4.2. 
In response to the economic challenges, the government borrowed substantially from 
the financial market to finance public expenditure using treasury bills. The central bank, 
Bank of Ghana, also put on the financial market a number of high-return financial 
instruments to attract excess supply of money in the system in order to address inflation 
(Aryeetey, 1996). Inevitably, the rise in public borrowing through treasury bills induced 
banks, public parastatals and individuals to react in ways that contradicted the presumptions 
underlining the housing finance reforms. Rather than participate in mortgage loans, virtually 
all banks, including those selected to participate in the Urban II mortgage scheme known as 
―Originating and Servicing Institutions‖ (OSIs), invested in the treasury bills:  
Treasury bills became an important instrument for saving by the private sector as the government and 
the monetary authorities attempted to mop up high levels of liquidity from the system using high rates 
on Treasury bills and other stocks. After the previously low share in the decade prior to 1989, their 
share shot up to an average of 18% of financial savings. Other government and Bank of Ghana stocks 
also became important.‖ (Aryeetey, 1996: 17) 
Treasury bills had less risk yet paid higher returns than returns from mortgages and other 
conventional financial instruments as shown in Table 6.7. According to Bawumia (2007), the 
commercial banks developed an aversion to lending. In 1989, twice as much of the total 
assets of the commercial banks (24%) were invested in these treasury bills as were channeled 
into lending operations (12%). Mckay and Sowa (2005) noted that, ―On the money market 
Government of Ghana Treasury bills offer the easiest opportunity to hedge against inflation.‖ 
(Mckay & Sowa, 2005: 8) 
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Table 6.7 – Financial sector indicators 1991 - 2000 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Treasury Bill rate 18.0 25.4 32.0 29.5 40.5 42.8 42.5 26.8 31.5 38.0 
Savings 15.5 13.5 18.3 18.1 26.3 27.0 27.3 16.5 13.0 18.0 
Average lending-
construction 
 
26.2 
 
26.1 
 
33.5 
 
33.25 
 
43.25 
 
44.25 
 
45.25 
 
38.75 
 
37.5 
 
47.0 
OSI interest on 
mortgage  loan* 
 
22.0 
 
14.1 
 
29.0 
 
28.9 
 
63.5 
 
50.6 
 
31.9 
 
25.1 
 
27.7 
 
33.6 
Yield on Treasury 
Bill investment** 
 
3.5 
 
11.9 
 
11.7 
 
11.4 
 
14.2 
 
15.8 
 
15.2 
 
10.3 
 
18.5 
 
20.0 
Source: Constructed from Annual Reports, Bank of Ghana 1994 – 2000, (Sarfoh, 2002);  
* - Extrapolated from proposals to limit return on HFC mortgage funds of average of 4% 
** - Extrapolated from difference in savings and Treasury Bill rate 
Although construction finance yielded relatively higher returns, lending for this purpose was 
very limited due to perceived risks. The views of a senior bureaucrat interviewed for this 
thesis align with those of Ansah (1999) who was the Chief Executive of HFC from inception: 
One of the reasons was that there were other (financial) instruments which were more lucrative on the 
market so they (the commercial banks) felt that this was a crazy deal. As a result, for a long time HFC 
did not have a lot of customers; people to take up the mortgages. That assumption and its outcome 
showed that there were other things that had not been considered in the decision
 
(personal interview of 
Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works and Housing, September 2006) 
A few banks give construction finance to developers at the highest interest rates on the market, with the 
excuse that this is a very risky business despite HFC's undertaking to issue checks in the joint names of 
the developer and the bank extending the credit (Ansah, 1999: 3)  
Whereas the proposed returns on mortgage loan origination and servicing activities was fixed 
at 1.5%, the earnings from investing in Treasury Bills changed with the fortunes of the 
economy. As shown in Table 6.9 above, from 1991 to 2000 the commercial banks stood to 
earn substantially more from investing depositors funds into government Treasury Bills than 
from mortgage activities, with yields rising from 3.5% in 1991 to 20% in 2000. Clearly, the 
proposed 1.5% return on investment in mortgage was an inadequate incentive from the 
commercial banks‘ perspective:  
The other expectation which did not materialize again was that the assumption or observation was 
made that long term credit for mortgage purposes was not very available in Ghana at the time. Because 
[sic] if you remember in those days the longest dated instrument you could buy was about two years. 
Bank of Ghana didn‘t go beyond two years because the financial system was so volatile that no one 
was prepared to project beyond a certain length of time. So the assumption was made that if HFC will 
provide long time funding to the banks, then they the (commercial) banks, having the certainty of 
whatever (interest margin) quote HFC will be giving for its long term fund, would be happy and slap 
on a reasonable margin and provide housing finance to Ghanaians. Unfortunately the margin was 
predetermined for them. I think it was 2.5% margin of whatever the cost of money HFC was providing 
will be. It did not again happen in a sense that banks were not interested in doing business with HFC. 
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From what maybe I gathered I think that essentially it was case of the banks wanting to have a margin 
that was greater than the 2.5 that was prescribed. A survey that we did we realized the margin the 
banks would have preferred ranged between 5% to as high as 12% from bank to bank over and 
above what we employed. Because indeed that was the kind of margin they were making on the 
profits that they were raising. So it was simply not attractive to them to accept HFC at that price. 
……….. There had been other similarly designed schemes such as the EDIF fund which effectively 
was of the same basis as the whole HFC scheme was structured. EDIF is a fund manager which as it 
were warehouses a certain percentage of government revenue from I think from custom revenue or 
whatever and in turn lend to banks. I think they lend at 2.5 and the banks have a margin of close to 7.5 
and less than 12.5 maximum and that will work. With that knowledge I am inclined to believe that the 
margin issue was very key to the failure of the (HFC) scheme to attract a level of patronage from the 
banks resulting in HFC eventually having to operate as a quasi-primary lender and to be directly with 
the borrowers as against passing credit through other banks (personal interview of former Deputy 
Managing Director, HFC, emphasis added, parenthesis inserted for clarification; October 2006).  
The presumptions underlying the World Bank‘s setting of the return on investment in 
mortgage lending and the contrary reaction of the local operators, reflect the uneven power 
relations and the complex dynamics at work in the design and implementation of the housing 
finance reforms. The resulting actions of HFC reflect a self-preservation response of local 
agents to the outcomes of the uneven power relations. In the face of the commercial bank‘s 
unwillingness to lend for construction, the ―Diaspora‖ market, discussed in Section 6.8, 
became an alternative source of construction finance through the advance payments made by 
prospective clients for proposed developments. However, the resources from this source were 
inadequate for the needs of the private developers. The constrained access to funding risked 
substantial reduction in the construction of middle-income properties, targeted under the HFC 
mortgage loan scheme, thus threatened the viability of HFC. HFC was compelled to set up a 
construction finance scheme to lend directly to private developers in order to sustain the 
agency through continued downstream mortgage lending activities.  
Management of HFC recognized very early in the life of the HFC project that a strict adherence to the 
intended structure would lead to failure. ......the concept of HFC being a secondary mortgage finance 
company providing long-term liquidity to commercial banks (primary market) was not feasible because 
the primary market was not developed and the commercial banks at the time did not consider the 
margin of 1.5% offered by the scheme attractive enough to commit resources to it (Akuffo: 2006: 10) 
HFC‘s decision to lend directly to private developers ran against the World Bank‘s principled 
disapproval of applying its funds to finance housing construction, communicated during 
informal discussions with the HFC management (personal interview of former Deputy 
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Managing Director, HFC; October 2006). Yet, when HFC applied formally for approval from 
the World Bank for the purpose of lending directly to private developers, the World Bank did 
not object. It is arguable that the World Bank‘s acquiescence was a concession in favour of 
goal of greater priority. However, in spite of these changes, HFC‘s experience in construction 
finance was not entirely successful. Initially, private developers were able to borrow from 
HFC because of the relatively cheaper funds. However, the rise in inflation in subsequent 
years, as shown in Table 4.2 coupled with the indexation of HFC loans to inflation made 
borrowing from HFC increasingly expensive. Inevitably, lending for construction finance by 
HFC also waned. 
There was further departure from the presumptions of the housing finance reforms at 
the demand side of the mortgage activities. As the commercial banks declined to participate 
in the mortgage origination, some insurance companies were approached to take over that 
activity. Potentially, the origination of mortgage loans was a lucrative business for the 
insurance companies as it also gave them access to sell prospective borrowers property 
insurance mandatorily linked to the HFC mortgage loan. However, only three insurance 
organizations
184
 accepted to participate in the mortgage origination business but they were 
constrained by their low capacity in credit appraisal and loan administration to be effective as 
primary mortgage agencies. Again to maintain their operational viability, HFC‘s management 
decided to undertake mortgage loan origination directly to borrowers. Similar to the 
construction finance experience, HFC got approval from the World Bank in spite of the 
disquiet verbally communicated by the World Bank (personal interview of former Deputy 
Managing Director, HFC; October 2006). By 2001, HFC was the highest originator of 
mortgage loans, directly providing 47% of mortgage loans whereas 30% had been originated 
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 State Insurance Corporation (SIC), Ghana Union Assurance and Vanguard Insurance Company. 
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by State Insurance Corporation (SIC), and 14% by the Social Security Bank
185
. The rest of 
the loans (9%) were originated by other commercial banks initially designated as OSIs, as 
well as, other insurance companies (Sarfoh, 2002).  
The same conditions that obstructed the commercial banks from participating in the 
designed housing finance reforms also threatened SSNIT as the main investor in the bonds 
floated to finance HFC. The real rate of return of 1% was too low compared to the returns 
from other instruments such as government Treasury bills, and SSNIT risked very poor 
performance on this investment in HFC. As a result, HFC was faced with the double jeopardy 
of loss of business at the mortgage loan level and loss of capital through disinvestment by 
SSNIT. HFC had to devise actions to forestall this potential calamity. As inflation exceeded 
35%, the management of HFC agreed with SSNIT, to a ―cap and floor‖ arrangement to 
ensure that its funds were not too expensive for borrowers and at the same time that the return 
on investment by SSNIT remained viable.  By this arrangement, a cap was placed on the 
interest on bonds and loans during peak inflation periods, and a floor interest rate was set as 
inflation fell to allow for the recovery of earnings lost during the peak inflation periods. This 
arrangement was set in motion beginning in late 1995 when inflation exceeded 60% and the 
cap was set at 38% (HFC, 2001).  As a result, during the periods from 1997 to 1999 when 
inflation rates declined (refer to Table 4.2), HFC was obliged to retain relatively higher 
interest rates on its mortgage loans in order to recover and repay the deferred earnings on 
bonds. Although these actions were deemed to be prudent business practices, they 
nonetheless had other unintended consequences.  
When financial products from commercial banks were experiencing declining interest 
rates as a result of reduction in inflation, HFC persistently had high interest rates. This 
created the perception of HFC‘s loans being inordinately expensive. In this regard, it was 
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 The Social Security Bank was the only commercial bank, initially selected to participate in the secondary 
mortgage scheme that continued to do so after inflation started spiking from 1994.  
235 
 
inevitable that the reputation of HFC was significantly undermined. The introduction of the 
novel approaches of dual indexed mortgages (DIM) and the graduated payment method 
(GPM) that has been discussed in Section 6.4.1 in this Chapter, further exacerbated HFC‘s 
reputation problem. The indexation to inflation affected the outstanding balances on the 
principal of the loans, increasing the length of the repayment period. Partly as a result of the 
perception fuelled by the statements of government officials and partly because of the 
misunderstanding of how the new mortgage system worked, borrowers had difficulties in 
fully appreciating the design of the new mortgage system:  
There‘s another culture issue that is even more serious and has to do with buying on commercial terms 
to own a house. You realize that Ghanaians have not been used to that. We came face to face with that 
difficulty when on one occasion I was confronted at one of these companies‘ plant at Takoradi where 
the employees who took the loans were lamenting the rate of interest and wanted us to come and 
explain to them why the rate was like that. Even before I would settle and begin, somebody just raised 
his hand and asked ‗Sir don‘t come and convince us, all that we want to know is that is your scheme 
the same as the State Housing one or not?‘ You know they have been used to buying a house with a 
loan at fixed interest rate, fixed unreasonably low such that after a couple of years the monthly 
instalments become peanuts and they literally take the house for nothing (personal interview of former 
Deputy Managing Director of HFC, October 2006) 
The lack of comprehension of the differences between the new mortgage system and the 
former systems for mortgage loans affected even the middle class targeted by HFC‘s 
operations. Although HFC makes an oblique reference to the misconception of the of the 
inflation indexation, the point is made explicit in an interview of the former Director of the 
Housing Ministry through the narration of a personal experience as exemplary of the 
difficulties borrowers faced participating in HFC‘s mortgage scheme:  
Due to issues of risk and affordability, the introduction of indexed mortgages has experienced problems 
of acceptability by both existing and potential mortgagers. (HFC: 1999) 
If only government had mobilized the seed capital locally right from the beginning those people 
accessing the loan from HFC would not have paid very expensive mortgages for it. For example I took 
a mortgage in 1992 from HFC. I bought one of the small houses that was being built at that time. The 
full cost for the building was Eighteen million Cedis (¢18,000,000
186
). I paid Eight million 
(¢8,000,000
187
) as down payment and I took a loan of Ten million (¢10,000,000
188
). Now I ended up 
paying fifty million (¢50,000,000
189
) for the ten million loan that I took. At a point I had twenty 
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 Equivalent to approximately US$ 39,500. 
187
 Representing 45% and equivalent to approximately US$ 17,500. 
188
 Representing 55% and equivalent to approximately US$ 22,000. 
189
 Representing an increase of 500% of the original outstanding debt. 
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million left as my balance to pay but this balance again grew by almost ten million because of the 
interest rate. My total debt with HFC amounted to about Fifty-Eight million. So at a certain point I 
decided to look for a loan from somewhere else to just pay off my debt which was becoming 
unbearable. So I found a loan somewhere from the private sector to pay it up (personal interview of 
former Director of Housing, Ministry of Works and Housing; September 2006) 
There was the indexed-linked mortgage thing. People (who were) served said they were not good 
enough and a lot of people were always criticizing but I don‘t think it really stopped people from going 
for it. Because I know there were many cases where they really needed the housing. People (however) 
complained that you never finish paying but all the same they took them (personal interview of Chief 
Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works and Housing; September 2006) 
Inevitably, this misconception fuelled animosity towards HFC from existing and prospective 
clients, feeling cheated by HFC and culminating in abortive attempts, to secure legal redress: 
There was an attempt at mobilizing our customers in order to institute some court proceedings against 
us. It began with the formation of an association of HFC borrowers by some of the customers. You 
may not have heard of it as it was not a formally registered organization. They had the first meeting at 
Sakumono at the new estates. We got wind of this meeting and also the proceedings of the meeting. It 
was clear these people were disgruntled and would cause us some problems. And so at the second 
meeting we also turned up to attend so that we could explain any misunderstanding of our products. 
When we got there it was total pandemonium. The convener of the meeting did not want us in the 
meeting and ordered us out on the grounds that it was for customers only. We defended our right to 
participate on the grounds that all of us from the management who were there were also customers of 
HFC and so had every right to be there. Some people did not take kindly to our presence and left. But 
more people stayed anyway. We eventually got the opportunity to address them and you know at the 
end one of their members just got up and left the meeting without complaints about our operations. 
They could see we were not out to cheat them. That‘s how we managed to survive (personal interview 
of Deputy Managing Director of HFC; October 2006) 
Besides the effect of the economic downturn, the government also had a direct hand in 
fuelling the misconceptions that undermined HFC‘s reputation:  
A lot of wrong publicity was made by politicians when they mounted platforms as though HFC has 
come to solve A-Z housing troubles in Ghana. HFC [sic] focus was on the middle income group, those 
in regular earning employment, a regular income that could be assessed and against which a loan could 
be expected. There were no interventions for those below the middle income (personal interview of 
Deputy Managing Director of HFC; October 2006) 
This confirms Tipple et al (1998: 404) position that ―Policy-makers, on the other hand, have 
often advertised HFC as the long-awaited solution to the problems of low-income housing 
finance‖. Arguably underlying the fuelling of the misconception by the government was a 
cynical view characterised as a lack of good faith towards HFC: 
The company did not have the ―good faith‖ of the Government behind it directly or indirectly.  In fact 
the Government sold its entire equity holdings on the Ghana Stock Exchange in 1998.  Also HFC did 
not receive any regulatory concessions from the Central Bank.‖  (Akuffo 2006:11) 
―We were shocked to hear that the government‘s shares were being offloaded without being given a 
prior hint. I can only guess that some people in the government were not too keen about our activities‖ 
(personal interview of Deputy Managing Director of HFC; October 2006) 
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Although it is difficult to establish why the government would be accused of loosing faith in 
HFC, it is arguable that HFC and the issues compelling the reforms had lost the urgency it 
earlier carried. In the light of the other developments in the housing sector after the inception 
of the housing reforms, such as the emergence of SSNIT and the private sector discussed in 
previous sections of this chapter, the conditions necessitating the reforms from the 
government‘s perspective had changed and therefore lost the priority accorded it. In the 
context of the power relations constructed through the implementation of the enabling 
principles in housing reforms, the divergence in motivations between the international 
agencies such as the World Bank and the UN on the one hand, and the government on the 
other, manifested in the expected and actual experience of the commitment to the reforms. 
Clearly, the priorities differed between the government and the international agencies. 
Given all of the foregoing, it is not surprising that HFC‘s performance in mortgage 
has not been impressive providing only 4,195 mortgages from 1992 to 2005 and 
characterized by sharp decline in client numbers as shown in Figure 6.1 below. HFC‘s 
performance rose steadily in the first three years, peaking at 824 new clients, after which the 
demand stabilized over the next six years, averaging a little over 400 new clients annually. In 
the subsequent five-year period, HFC‘s activities declined considerably fuelled by public 
pessimism, high cost and alternate mechanisms for accessing housing. 
Inevitably, HFC‘s management took a radical yet rational decision in order to remain viable. 
In November 2003, HFC obtained a banking license to operate as a universal bank, 
undertaking other banking activities such as commercial and investment banking in addition 
to the mortgage business. These other banking businesses are growing significantly in the 
business portfolio of HFC. Two years after its inception, commercial lending and investment 
banking grew by 400% and 50% respectively, whereas mortgage activities did not change. 
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Figure 6.1: Number of mortgages from HFC between 1992 and 2005 
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Source: Abstracted from HFC Annual Reports (1996-2002), Akuffo (2006) and Mahama and Adarkwa (2006)  
At inception, mortgage activities exceeded commercial lending activities in a 6:1 ratio 
but this changed by 2005 to a ratio of 5:3. Again, in respect of contribution to HFC‘s funds, 
whereas mortgage activities contributed the equivalent of $33.3 million compared to $13.3 
million by commercial lending activities in 2003, this gap reduced substantially in two years 
with both types of activities contributed $ 36.7 million respectively, reflecting a tremendous 
growth in the deposits by clients. This growth in deposits enabled HFC to grow significantly 
in investment banking, significantly outstripping mortgage activities from the onset, with the 
gap widening further in two years which are shown in Figure 6.2 (a) and (b) below. The 
customers who made up the base that substantially increased the funds of HFC were fairly 
balanced between individual depositors and corporate organisations. This trend in funding 
and asset growth demonstrated above thus reflected the declining interest in mortgage 
activities and the preference for assessing more favourable investment instruments including 
government Treasury bills. Thus, similar to the experience of the pre-reform era of the 1970s 
and late 1980s, the structure of the macro-economy created conditions destabilised mortgage 
activities in spite of the role of international agencies such as the World Bank and the 
resources including finances and ―expert‖ advice. That the design of the housing finance 
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reforms was led by the World Bank and yet its implementation was reshaped by forces 
outside the control of the World Bank is demonstrative of the dynamics within the uneven 
power relations. 
 Figure 6.2(a) HFC Funding Structure and (b) Asset Structure 
FUNDING STRUCTURE
-
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
CUSTOMER
DEPOSITS
BONDS TERM LOANS
FUNDING SOURCE
IN
 B
IL
L
IO
N
S
 O
F
 C
E
D
IS
2003
2005
  
 Source: Adopted from Akuffo (2006:16) 
In spite of the contrary outcomes as narrated above, the World Bank expressed satisfaction 
with the housing finance reforms in its Implementation Completion Report (World Bank 
2001). The structural constraints to the housing finance reforms were partly underestimated 
by the World Bank and partly instigated by government‘s actions and reactions. Furthermore, 
the changes to the designed interventions were occasioned by the ingenuity of the 
management of HFC in their pursuit of organisational survival. Clearly, the technocratic 
motivations for the reform were not embedded in primary concerns of the government. The 
housing finance reforms were invariably driven by individuals whose own livelihoods 
depended on its sustainability:  
By 1998, when the Urban II project officially closed, HFC was confronted with declining mortgage 
applications (because of the precarious financial situation of the country). The management resorted to 
various strategies to remain in business and this led to the eventual expansion of the business from a 
dedicated mortgage business only to universal banking as they are presently. They still have a lot of 
houses on their portfolio but as you can see they are doing other banking business as well. Selection of 
such innovative practices was the only way the management was able to continue the mortgage 
business as they would have otherwise collapsed and it is to the credit of Stephanie, Derkyi and Asare 
Akuffo [the management] that this did not happen (personal interview of former Director, TSC; 
September 2006; explanatory comments inserted in parenthesis) 
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The change of the underlying principles of the housing finance reforms during 
implementation was a response to the reality of government‘s changing priorities. Thus, in 
the housing finance reforms pre-existing structural constraints to the enabling principles 
persisted and remained the true drivers of reforms. The World Bank support for the housing 
finance reforms ended in 1999 and with it ended the formal engagement of the World Bank in 
the housing policy reforms as it expanded its interactions in the local governance sector.  
6.12. Diverting the World Bank from Housing Reforms to Local Governance 
Prior to the inception of Urban II, the intention was expressed to use Urban II as a 
precursor to a comprehensive housing sector reform initiative in a follow-up programme 
referred to as the Urban III project (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990):  
―The housing objectives under Urban II are quite limited. The strategic objective is to begin to lay the 
foundation for a more comprehensive approach in Urban III which would be a fully fledged housing 
project. However in keeping with the complex nature of the housing problem, the foundation would be 
properly laid. An integrated approach will be taken in the related areas of parastatal reform, land 
administration reform, urban upgrading and housing consolidation, housing finance, private sector 
development and regulatory reform‖ (World Bank Urban II Staff Appraisal Report, 1990:11) 
Urban III was expected to be the conclusive change from the previous public sector-led and 
patronage-ridden isolated sector to a private-sector led and market-determining integrated 
sector functioning on the ethos of neo-liberalism. However, by the time of the design of the 
Urban III project, these considerations had been subsumed under the weight of new priorities 
generated by political legitimacy imperatives. In particular, by 1992 the priority of the state 
was on decentralisation and democratic elections because this focus guaranteed further donor 
aid in the structural adjustment process. As has been discussed in Section 6.2.2, the 
government found decentralisation to be a critical instrument through which it was able to 
cultivate a new support coalition and secure political legitimacy even as it transformed itself 
from an autocratic military entity to a democratically elected political party. The apparatus of 
decentralisation including the implementing agents and advocates therefore commanded high 
regard from the top echelons of the government. The rise in the government priority accorded 
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to local governance also underlined its success to garner public resources in the context of the 
inter-sectoral competition with the housing sector agents and advocates.  Eventually, when 
Urban III was initiated in 1994 its focus on local governance was reflected in its title, the 
Local Government Development Project (LGDP). Urban III was designed to expand urban 
infrastructure and also address critical institutional gaps of the decentralization programme 
that had been identified in a preceding urban sector study: 
The proposed project, the third urban operation, reflects GOG's strong interest in two objectives: (a) to 
extend urban infrastructure investment and institutional development to the next ―tier‖ of the urban 
hierarchy and (b) to build institutional capacity at the central and local levels to support its new 
decentralization program (Local Government Development Project, Staff Appraisal Report, 1993:9; 
emphasis added) 
The indication of the government‘s ―strong interest‖ is instructive in the context of the 
competition for World Bank resources between local government interests and housing sector 
interests. As noted earlier in Section 6.4.2, this competition between the housing and local 
government interests led to the duplication of the upgrading activities under the Urban II 
project or the two sectors. Furthermore, following the inception of Urban II, the Housing 
Ministry had been bedevilled by frequent changes in the political and administrative 
leadership whereas conversely, the Local Government Ministry experienced a stable political 
and bureaucratic leadership during this period as has been shown in Table 6.5 (b). This 
relative stability gave an opportunity for Local Government agents to deliver a consistent 
message in the encounters with the World Bank which was not the case for the Housing 
Ministry. This was instrumental in drawing the World Bank to local government activities. In 
as much as the influence of the Secretary (or Sector Minister), Kwamena Ahwoi appears to 
be catalytic, it begs the question of how such personal influence accrued to the extent of 
derailing the World Bank‘s articulated intent to expand the Housing Sector Reforms. In order 
to understand the power wielded by Ahwoi as Secretary, cognisance has to be taken of his 
role in the antecedent ―revolutionary‖ PNDC regime (1981 to 1992), as well as that of his 
brother, Ato Ahwoi. During that era, Kwamena Ahwoi was the Coordinator for 
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Investigations, Revenue and Tribunals
190
, a position that made him one of the leading 
prosecutors of people and organisations perceived as ―saboteurs‖ of the revolution because of 
(purported) tax evasion.  In the early days of the revolution, this was extremely crucial as the 
PNDC military government needed funds urgently in the face of the accumulated economic 
crises of the 1970s and early 1980s discussed in Section 4.5.3 in Chapter 4. Kwamena 
Ahwoi‘s image as an influential person within the government was bolstered by his role as 
one of the key thinkers providing intellectual validation of the non-democratic regime, having 
been drawn into the government from the Law School of the University of Ghana. Lastly, his 
political influence was consolidated by the role of his brother, Ato Ahwoi, who was the 
PNDC Secretary in charge of the National Revenue Secretariat. Their positions evolved from 
their respective roles in the former National Investigation Committee (NIC), and the Citizens 
Vetting Committee (CVC), instruments of ―revolutionary justice‖ set up to examine 
corruption and tax evasion cases respectively (Gocking, 2005: 190; Agyeman-Duah, 1987: 
625 – 628). Commentators note, 
Energetic tax collection provided the key element of continuity between the three phases of Jerry 
Rawlings' rule, from the AFRC to the "radical phase" in 1982-83 to the phase of macroeconomic 
reform. Under Ato Ahwoi, one of the "revolutionaries" in the regime, the enthusiasm of the former 
Central Revenue Department (now the National Revenue Secretariat) was almost legendary, and it 
came to be feared for its tax raids. (Hutchful 1995: 309) 
These citizens‘ committees, reflecting the ideological radicalism of the early Rawlings years, identified 
citizens of conspicuous wealth who were suspected of tax evasion. Where that wealth could not be 
accounted for and/or taxes had not been paid, the CVCs enforced tax compliance in a somewhat ad hoc 
and extra-legal manner, collecting not only annual taxes, but also substantial tax arrears, which 
accounted for the dramatic surge in revenue from 1983–85. While many elites resent the events of this 
period, and the methods employed to pursue these revenues, there is no question about the short-term 
effectiveness of the strategy. (Prichard, 2009: 12) 
This underlines the views of a former colleague Minister, as well as a senior bureaucrat who 
discussed the power of the Secretary and the Chief Director of MLGRD thus; 
 ―Now the government did not have the funds (for housing) and when they went to where funds could 
be obtained they had different views on (how) the housing sector should be handled........ I don‘t know 
how much money UNDP put in this, but they all remained documents with recommendations for 
implementation and the (World) Bank decided this is the way they will go about it. In our (MWH) case 
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 Agyeman-Duah (1987: 627) refers to the position as the Coordinator of Vetting, Investigations and Tribunal 
(COVIT) 
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it was even a more fundamental thing. Appiah Korang stayed there for only one year (as Minister) and 
also Brooke (as Deputy). I remember the one who took over from him was Dr. Boadu. (He) was in (the 
Ministry of) Health before he came. ........ Boadu had handled the health sector and at some point he 
was handling a lot of donor (funds and projects) and they were all up against him ........  So when Boadu 
came back to Works and Housing he decided that as for World Bank project he didn‘t want to touch 
them. So eventually I think Kwamena (Secretary for Local Government) managed to move most of the 
projects to local government. So he managed to move most of the emphasis to local government. So in 
fact the urban projects which were silent (not prominent) under TSC and under Works and Housing 
actually moved practically to local government. ........................ If Kwamena (Secretary of Local 
Government) wasn‘t such a strong minister it (the World Bank support) would probably not have gone 
to local government at all (from the Ministry of Works and Housing) (personal interview of former 
Deputy Minister for Works and Housing; explanatory comments inserted in parenthesis; August 2006)  
Yes, he was such a powerful man; he was the Chief Director of Local Government. What happened 
was that most of the Chief Directors that I‘ve come across; Roads and Highways, Works and Housing, 
Transport and Communication, at that time and even at Finance, this was one powerful person who 
understood project very well and coordinated everything singlehandedly. So he had a way of steering 
the project and he also had a very powerful secretary, Kwamena Ahwoi. Kwamena Ahwoi also 
understood the project very well and gave him all the support. So between (the Chief Director) and his 
minister, because he was able to direct affairs, he could say they want this, they want that. It was very 
difficult to change Zanu‘s desire or demand ......... but Zanu was powerful, he understood the project 
well and coordinates it very well (personal interview of Project Advisor, Urban Project Support Unit; 
September 2006)  
Urban III (1994 to 2003) and successor urban programmes sponsored by the World Bank can 
be described as a capitulation to local government interests in their capture of the World 
Bank resources. Under Urban III the government aimed to ―replicate the lessons (of ADRP 
and Urban II) for the development of 11 District headquarters that were next in the order of 
size and economic importance
191‖. The designed interventions addressed infrastructure 
rehabilitation, improvement of environmental sanitation systems, property revaluation, 
revenue mobilization and institutional strengthening. The infrastructure projects included the 
rehabilitation of old and construction of new solid and liquid waste disposal sites, public 
toilets and domestic toilets
192
, access roads and car parks, the rehabilitation of sheds and 
markets.  
At the start of Urban III in 1994, the Local Government Ministry did not have the 
requisite project management capacity, in spite of the commitment made under the Urban II 
discussed in Section 6.4.2. As a result, the Technical Services Centre (TSC) under the 
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 LGDP - Implementation Completion Report (IDA – 25680). Accra and the other four primary cities were 
omitted from this project.  
192
 Households were required to make down payments as contributions to the construction of domestic toilets. 
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Housing Ministry was mandated to assist the Local Government Ministry to manage the 
Urban III projects, even though TSC worked under the Housing Ministry. The World Bank 
maintained the enhanced conditions of service for the TSC staff instituted in the first urban 
intervention discussed in Section 6.2.1. Eventually, the Local Government Project Support 
Unit (LGPSU) was set up in 1996 for the purpose. Three of the core of the professional staff 
of TSC of seven, voluntarily joined the LGPSU after the transfer of the project management 
responsibilities. The new head of LGPSU was an engineer recruited from the World Bank 
office and had been part of the team working on the Ghana projects. Thereafter, the salary 
enhancements for TSC staff ceased and its influence declined considerably (personal 
interview of Director of Housing, MWH). On the other hand, the LGPSU staff enjoyed 
conditions of service far above the civil service and supplemented by the World Bank. 
Clearly the resources of the World Bank determined the survival of these institutions.  
After the inception of Urban III in 1994, the government and the World Bank jointly 
undertook a comprehensive urban sector review. The Urban Sector Strategy Review (1994) 
agreed that the waste management and sanitation situation in the country required urgent 
attention. As a result of the Urban Sector Strategy review, the Urban Environmental 
Sanitation Project (UESP) was formulated, which was implemented in two phases starting 
from 1996 with support from the World Bank and other donors and focused once again on the 
five primary cities. The UESP addressed drainage improvement, domestic and public 
sanitation for low and middle income households, solid waste management, upgrading of 
community infrastructure and lastly strengthening key institutions at the local and sectoral 
level. The second phase of UESP is still ongoing in various cities and the World Bank has not 
returned to housing in a direct way as it did under the Housing Sector Reforms of Urban II. 
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6.13. Conclusion  
Similar to the experience in the pre-reform era of the 1970s and late 1980s discussed 
in Section 5.3.3, the conditions within the economy coupled with the competing interests 
between different sectors and overlaid by the uneven power relations between the multiple 
parties to the reforms were critical to the trajectory of the reforms. Yet, it is evident that 
individual agents such as the management of HFC, the colonel in State Housing, the Tenants 
of the Tema Development Corporation, and long-serving Local Government Minister during 
the reforms proved significantly instrumental in this trajectory. The tensions between the 
strategic calculations of individual agents and the structural constraints of the state‘s 
residualised priority accorded to housing point to the duality of both structure and agency as 
compelling conditions for the trajectory of the Housing Sector Reforms. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that within the ambit of the structural adjustment 
reforms, housing, planning and urban development became a policy site attracting local and 
international interests and agencies. However, the motives, rationale and actions of the 
various actors and interests at this site did not always converge, sometimes running in parallel 
and at other times contradicting each other. The actors converging at this policy site had 
different socio-political backgrounds, conceptions, ideologies and praxis and brought such 
divergent contexts into the discourse on the Housing Sector Reforms. As has been discussed 
the actors such as the government and the World Bank were themselves undergoing 
significant political transformation that determined their respective priorities, which were 
then brought to bear on their actions in the housing reforms. Besides the political dynamics at 
the executive level, inter-sectoral competition between the Housing Ministry and the Local 
Government Ministry further complicated the issues. This complex policy milieu is far 
different from the perspective of uncontested acceptance of the enabling principles in the 
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implementation of the housing sector reforms as presented distinctly by the World Bank and 
the UN.  
Decision making is determined by a set of complex variables such as: the personal 
disposition of political office holders to particular ideas, the coherence between the political 
office holders and their bureaucrats, the conjunction between the objectives of a particular 
sectoral interest and the broader goals of the state, and the motive and relative power of 
interest groups in framing policy actions. Additionally, the extent of bureaucratic 
competition, clarity of institutional powers in overlapping sectors with dual controls, and the 
relative latitude of political appointees within the governing structures, all contribute 
significantly to decision-making outcomes. The interactions of these variables create multiple 
loci of power with the potential to produce different outcomes. Concurrently, whereas the 
normative ideological and methodological principles framing the actions of global actors 
such as the UN and the World Bank are important factors in shaping reforms, they are not 
sufficient to assure the achievement of pre-designed goals as has become evident from 
Ghana‘s experience. It is clear from the foregoing that the existence and ease of access to the 
technical and financial resources of these multilateral institutions shape the relative priority 
accorded by local actors. The juxtaposition and inter-penetration of the local and global 
interests produces even more complex decision making arrangements that further distort the 
predictability of outcomes. It is in such a complex field of actors, interests, actions and 
resources that the enabling framework was conceived and implemented. It is important 
therefore to appreciate this nuanced field of interests that forge the paths of state power. In 
this respect, the evidence of the parallel implementation of facets of the enabling principles 
materialising in the housing finance reforms as well as the operational reforms of TDC and 
the evidence of reversionism characterised by SSNIT‘s engagement in direct development 
attests to the heterogeneity of the state.  
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In the following chapter, I will discuss how public housing has come full circle with 
the Affordable Housing Program initiated in 2005, and raise issues with how differential 
power was articulated in the implementation of housing reforms in Ghana and how that 
influenced the present state of housing policy.  
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Chapter 7 – Repeating Patterns in the Post- Reform Period 
7.1 Introduction 
The narration in Chapter 6 has drawn out the material conditions and the strategic 
actions through which the housing sector reforms were designed and implemented. It has 
been observed that the reforms as implemented in Ghana were complicated by the structural 
framework and context of decision making within the housing sector as well as the overall 
macro-economic framework. At the same time the direct influence of the agency of strategic 
individuals and interest-group competitions were evident. The structural relations between 
the housing sector and the macro-economic framework were very critical in shaping the 
choices of the various actors in housing and other competing sectors. The same conditions 
affected the nature of the decision making of the commercial banks and the private 
developers. In addition, the dialectical relationship between the actions of local actors and the 
material conditions regulating the terms of engagement of important actors such as the World 
Bank and UN portrayed a complex milieu in which policies were shaped and implemented. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the housing reforms officially concluded in 2000 when 
the World Bank assistance for the Urban II ended
193
.  
This chapter presents the post-reform housing policy activities culminating in the 
Affordable Housing Programme. In this chapter I pay attention to the material conditions 
affecting decision making in housing and the broader macro-economic framework as well as 
the strategic actions of the key actors. As has been noted in Chapter 4, the end of the 
implementation of the housing sector reforms coincided with the change in government in 
2000. At that time,  Ghana underwent a significant political change as a national election in 
December saw the removal of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) administration  - 
which had ruled in different guises, first as a military and later as civilian regime, since 
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 The focus of Urban III was exclusively on local governance omitting housing interventions. 
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December 1981 – and the installation of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration. The 
NPP government, in principle, was ideologically a centre-right party favouring markets and 
the private sector, a position that was reiterated at the inauguration of the new President when 
he announced that the advent of his administration heralded ―a golden age for business‖.194 
This begs the question of how a market-oriented administration would resort to anti-market 
public housing strategy to contradict its espoused philosophy.
195
 This chapter deals with this 
question by reviewing both the context and the actions of key policy actors. It is observed 
that earlier attempts by the previous NDC government from 1997 to induce the public 
pension funds, the SSNIT, back into housing development continued under the new 
administration from 2001 at a time when the SSNIT was curtailing its investment in the 
housing sector. This action by the new government, which appeared to contradict its 
advocacy of a market philosophy, mirrored the reform era experience of various government 
actions contradicting the enabling principles. Such contradictions derived from the enduring 
disposition of the political class to the notion of the government‘s frontline role in housing 
development and occurred despite professed philosophical preference for the private sector 
and market-led housing solutions. This deeper lying class disposition preferring a frontline 
role for government in direct housing development is evident in the housing discourse 
prevailing at the time. The chapter proceeds to outline and discuss the discourse utilised to 
validate the NPP government‘s contradictory stance. Referencing several public 
pronouncements, I find that the government made a case for state intervention by alluding to 
specific numbers of housing units to be developed thus framing the ―housing problem‖ and 
policy agenda as one of inadequate numbers. Interwoven in this discourse of numbers, I find 
rhetorical moves in the identification of causes for such inadequate numbers: principally the 
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 President John. A. Kuffour, Inaugural speech on 7
th
 January 2001. 
195
 This claim has been opposed by some, with Killick and Abugre (2002:5) citing an unnamed NGO official 
whose reaction to this claim by the NPP as being pro-markets and pro-private sector was that this was only ―a 
bias not a dogma‖.   
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lack of finance to develop the requisite number of houses and the house pricing by landlords 
and private developers. In this respect, I also observe the use of public announcement of 
secured funds for housing to create the perception of government engagement in finding 
solutions to the housing problem, conceptualised as one of inadequate numbers. Additionally, 
it is observed that the post-reform discourse of housing is littered with the rhetoric of 
―blaming others‖ for the persistence of the housing problem, particularly landlords and 
private developers. In elevating these issues to the fore, it is clear that the rhetorical moves in 
discourse –focusing on inadequate numbers, promising funds for housing, blaming landlords 
and private developers – aim to persuade the society of  the government‘s engagement and 
responsiveness to the housing challenges of society and to neutralise criticisms. 
The chapter establishes that in spite of the solicitations by the NPP government to 
induce the public pension funds, SSNIT, into direct housing development, the initiative 
collapsed as a result of the political calculations of a Malaysian investor, Metro Ikram Sdn. 
Bhd, who was invited into a housing joint venture project headed by the SSNIT. It emerges 
that the sense of insecurity felt by Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd could not be assuaged by the 
acquisition of a political risk guarantee from the World Bank, consequently leading to the 
withdrawal of the investor from the joint venture arrangements. It is observed that the Metro 
Ikram Sdn. Bhd subsequently, albeit paradoxically, undertook a housing project without any 
partnership with state institutions. It is thus rationalised that the action of the investor in 
withdrawing from the housing joint venture project in spite of the availability of a political 
risk guarantee reflects the decision calculus that translated the investor‘s perception of the 
hierarchies of power into subsequent action of withdrawing from the joint venture. It is also 
deduced that the subsequent sole investment by Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd in the development of 
a housing project was a response to the positive investment climate in the country which had 
also drawn other international investors into upscale housing, as shown in field survey 
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findings presented in Table 6.3. Thus the economic context of the country at this time was 
critical in influencing the actions of the investor, further consolidating the evidence of a 
dialectical relationship between structure and agency.   
Having briefly discussed the design of the Affordable Housing Programme in Section 
1.2 of Chapter 1, this chapter goes further to elaborate on the precedent activities that led to 
this programme and the implementation activities that followed. In doing so it is observed 
that a significant amount of personal power and leverage accrued to the Housing Minister, 
which he used to forge the Affordable Housing Programme, especially from 2005 onwards. 
The power of the Housing Minister is found to have derived from the earlier extension of his 
personal fortune to finance the ruling party during their earlier decade in opposition. With 
such clout, the Housing Minister was able to subsequently extract resources from the state to 
initiate the Affordable Housing Programme. Furthermore, he secured approval for 
procurement activities, in the recruitment of consultant and contractors and the bulk purchase 
of critical materials, such as cement and sand, that created the potential for extracting 
personal gain, although direct evidence for such gains were not available. Notwithstanding 
the absence of evidence of corruption, the subsequent use of the Affordable Housing 
Programme as the cornerstone of the Housing Minister‘s campaign for presidential 
candidature of the ruling party is examined to explore the use of state policy actions to pursue 
personal political goals in the post-reform era. The chapter also notes how the design and 
implementation of the Affordable Housing Programme evolved in the context of worsening 
personal relations between the Minister and the bureaucratic class of the Housing Ministry. 
This worsening relationship helped to neutralise the prospects for opposition to the 
Affordable Housing Programme and its underlying principle of state re-engagement in direct 
housing development by the bureaucrats given their training in the enabling principles. The 
chapter concludes that the post-reform era in general and the Affordable Housing Programme 
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in particular displayed the dialectical relationship between structure and agency ; a dialectic 
that reflects the dynamism of the power relations in housing policy making in Ghana and 
makes a compelling case for accommodating that perspective in interpreting policies and 
researching housing in developing countries. 
7.2 Contextual Changes in the Politico-Economic Framework at the End Stage of 
Housing Reforms  
The long stay in office of the military government of the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) and its successor political party National Democratic Congress 
came to an end in December 2000 when a new party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) was 
voted into office. The NPP traced its roots from the colonial era anti-Nkrumah forces made 
up of Ashanti cocoa farmers, the intelligentsia, the domestic business class and other elite 
groups which had continued after independence as the political opposition in the first 
administration (see Section 4.5.1). As has been shown in Section 4.5.2, it is this opposition 
coalition that benefitted most from the overthrow of the first post-independence government 
of Kwame Nkrumah and ultimately coming into power from 1969 to be terminated in 1972 
by another military uprising. This coalition espoused market-liberal ideologies although their 
shortened reign was affected by such significant national debts that their market-liberal 
credentials barely materialised in their policies. After nearly thirty years out of power, this 
market-liberal coalition was inaugurated into office from January 7
th
 2001. However, whereas 
the previous stay in office of the liberal-market coalition occurred in the context of a 
pervasive socialist ideology following nine years of pseudo-Marxism in the first post-
independence administration of Kwame Nkrumah (see Section 4.5.1), the coalition‘s new 
term from 2001 was situated in a more conducive political context. The NPP came into office 
at a time when neo-liberalism had taken root through the implementation of the structural 
adjustment reforms by the former Marxist-military-turned-democratic-capitalist regime of 
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1981 – 2000. In this context, the liberal-market ideology had an opportunity to manoeuvre in 
the political space. However, by 2000 the country was going through significant financial 
distress. As Table 4.2 shows, the country experienced worsening conditions with inflation 
growing from 21% in 1998, 23% in 1999 to 29% in 2000. At the same time, the value of the 
country‘s  currency went into serious decline, falling by 33% in 1999 and a further 49% in 
2000, as compared to the US dollar (US$). The country‘s debts stood at US$ 7.5 billion of 
which US$ 5.8 billion represented debts owed to international organisations and foreign 
countries, with US$1.7 billion owed to domestic creditors. Significantly, 43% of the domestic 
debts derived from obligations to holders of government Treasury bills (2001 Budget 
Statement and Economic Policy, Item 58 and 59). The new government characterised the 
state of the economy thus: 
The crux of our economic difficulties is that our expenditures are more than our revenue with debt 
service being our single largest expenditure item. Personnel expenditures and debt service alone eat up 
about 75% of our revenue. Huge foreign and domestic debts stare us in the face. This means we have 
very limited financial wiggle room… As you are aware, Mr. Speaker, the situation we inherited was a 
fragile economy, which manifests itself in excessive domestic and external debt, high inflation, weak 
currency, excess liquidity in the system and high unemployment. ……Mr. Speaker, the new 
administration has inherited economic and financial crises of serious dimensions. The actual order of 
magnitude still eludes us. There is a critical lack of adequate and reliable data on the state of the 
national economy. Public finances are in chaos. Over the past two years, the NDC government failed 
systematically to meet performance benchmarks and policy requirements agreed upon as conditions for 
collaboration with our international development partners. In order for the NPP administration to put 
together a realistic action programme for attaining the national quest to re-establish macro-economic 
stability and re-establish credible and sustainable policy framework for co-operation and development, 
it is imperative that we be given room to operate. (2001 Budget Statement and Economic Policy, Items 
6, 8 and 12) 
Parallel to these economic developments, the initiatives conceptualised as the housing sector 
reforms supported by the World Bank under Urban II, and by the UN in the development of a 
comprehensive policy, had concluded with varying degrees of success as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Similarly, the initiative of the NDC government (1992 – 2000) in using 
resources of the public pension funds, SSNIT, was also drawing to an end as a result of the 
decision to terminate its loss making venture (see Section 6.7.2). Thus, the political transition 
at the end of 2000 was characterised by a significantly weakened economy, closure of World 
Bank programmes of reforms for the housing sector, failure to implement UN sponsored 
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housing policy, and withdrawal of public pension funds from housing development activities. 
This is the context of the administration of the New Patriotic Party‘s housing interventions. 
7.3 The Enduring Discourse of Numbers and Public Initiatives 
A typical approach by all governments, especially in developing countries, is to frame 
housing policy within a discourse of numbers or quantitative measures thereby generating an 
impetus for public sector intervention in housing provision. Historically, such actions derive 
from political motives to fuel perceptions of an effective and engaged government through 
the tangible symbolism of the housing projects, irrespective of their actual impact. 
Public housing projects are politically useful as tangible proof that the government is doing something 
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989:37) 
Impact and visibility are the yearning of all practitioners and politicians. To be seen to be effective 
politicians and professionals must produce tangible results. The word ‗tangible‘ is here defined in the 
most literal sense, to mean something that can be seen and touched.....Numbers on the other hand are 
easily grasped even by the most thick-headed and impossible of the electorate.‖ (Kamete, 2006: 992) 
Kamete‘s (2006) comment above is instructive in pointing to the underlying political 
calculations and considerations for this fixation on quantitative measures in public housing 
policies. The tangibility of such housing policies and interventions is deemed to engender a 
positive image for the government. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, this rationale pertained 
in the Ghanaian government‘s housing policy during the pre-reform period. Indeed, the 
situation persisted during the reform period with the use of public pension funds, SSNIT, in 
housing production. It is significant that this quest for public housing persisted at a time 
(from mid-1990s) when SSNIT was disinvesting from public housing because of the poor 
returns on the investments. Furthermore, in spite of the reality, politicians were making 
pronouncements of new housing targets based on SSNIT‘s continued housing activities. For 
example, President Rawlings in his 1997 Sessional Address to Parliament promised the 
delivery of 15,000 units with SSNIT as the primary agent, a claim reiterated by the Minister 
for Works and Housing during a visit to a SSNIT financed land servicing scheme (Modern 
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Ghana News, September 18, 1997). The New Patriotic Party (NPP), then in opposition, was 
also engaged in the discourse of numbers and quantitative measures as they engaged the 
ruling NDC government in debates on the requisite numbers to solve the housing problem. In 
a follow-up debate on the 1999 Presidential Sessional Address to Parliament, the opposition 
party‘s ranking member on housing criticised the government thus: 
Since 1997, the government's policy on Works and Housing, has been characterised by a total lack of 
definitive focus, substance and honesty. Indeed, the government of the NDC, headed by President 
Rawlings, has fed this honourable House, through the medium of the Sessional Address, nothing more 
than empty promises….Mr. Speaker, 1997 has come and gone, 1998 has come and gone. Where are the 
15,000 housing units or part of them which were planned for Accra? ........ If SSNIT with all the 
resources available to it has been able to deliver only 6,228 units over these years, then, the housing 
problem is quite enormous and it requires very drastic but pragmatic measures to address, not promises 
which are forgotten (Hon. Kwamena Bartels, NPP Ranking Member on Works and Housing; 
―Government’s housing policy lacks focus‖ Daily Graphic 22nd January 1999)  
In this discourse of quantitative solutions, minimal consideration was given to qualitative 
measures that could improve housing conditions of the society. Furthermore, the discourse on 
quantitative solutions focused exclusively on state activity in spite of the contributions of 
private sector initiatives. When the NPP administration took office in 2001 it also resorted to 
this preference for quantitative measures of state-led housing albeit at the rhetorical level 
until 2005, when the Affordable Housing Program was initiated. Prior to this initiative, 
government pronouncements at different fora promised impending state-led housing 
programmes with expected outputs ranging from 3,000 to 450,000 housing units
196
. This 
quest saw the new government attempt to induce the public pension funds, SSNIT, to re-
engage in public housing
197
. The political considerations underlying the push to induce 
SSNIT into public housing crystallised in 2004 when the opposition party used the 
                                                 
196
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government‘s lack of actual results in housing as part of the election campaign and 
consequently kept up this critique of government
198
. 
Housing in the country is a big issue, especially in urban areas and even rural areas too, and is it not out 
of place that the President did not find it worthy to address
199
. 
Thus in the post-reform era the discourse of numbers and quantitative measures of state-led 
interventions was maintained and reinforced, notwithstanding the reality of the minimal 
actual interventions, and occasionally engendered rhetorical debates in the context of the 
partisan political arena. 
7.4 Rhetorical Moves in Discourse - Finance, Landlords and Private Developers 
In addition to the focus on the discourse of numbers, the public policy discourse on 
housing had another aspect to it – namely the identification of the causes for the housing 
problem. In this regard, two issues were identified as the main generative causes that justified 
the government‘s direct interventions in housing development through the Affordable 
Housing programme. These were the lack of finance for mortgage loans and the high cost of 
houses developed by the private sector. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989: 38) note that 
generally, governments‘ approach is to ―often reduce the problem of building and managing 
cities to one of lack of funds for projects. Money is seen as the universal solution – money to 
build more houses and infrastructure‖. Mirroring Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989), Ghana‘s 
Ambassador to Canada was the most explicit in labelling the lack of finance as the housing 
problem. In a meeting of property developers and prospective clients in Toronto during an 
investor drive he noted that ―housing is a social service which baffles all governments around 
the world. And in Ghana, housing Ghanaians has frustrated successive government since 
independence. The problem lies with money.‖ (H.E. Odoi Sykes, address to GREDA 
Housing Road Show, 26
th
 July 2003; source www.ghanaweb.com Diaspora News of 10
th
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August 2003; date sourced 15
th
 April 2007). The solution was to look for funds to undertake 
the direct investment in public housing. This typical solution applied in the case of Ghana, 
exemplified by the address of the NPP‘s Minister of Works and Housing to the UN on the 
nature of the problem and the requisite solutions:  
In the case of Ghana, our commitment to meeting our objectives of sustainable human settlements 
remains at the centre of our national planning objectives…. ………. We remain committed to the 
efforts that have been made of the past five years to improve access to housing and better living 
conditions in human settlements through direct investment and by facilitating and promoting 
partnerships with the private sector. Since the houses built by the formal private estate developers 
are largely out of the reach of many Ghanaians, the Government is addressing the main 
contributory factors to the high cost of housing; namely, the high cost of land, building materials, 
lack of long-term construction finance and the multi-layered title to land. .............  
The country is also exploring various sources of long term concessionary funding to support low-
income housing and service delivery and, so far, over US$250 million has been obtained to deliver 
over 20,000 housing units within the next 3 years. We are working towards extending access to 
infrastructure and basic services, especially water, sanitation and electricity, by all of our citizens. 
Our ability to monitor the implementation of the Habitat Agenda has also suffered from 
inadequate resources. My Ministry is, however, systemically building data on the key indicators 
identified under the indication Programme.
 200
 
The government‘s statement was vague as to how the funds would be appropriated, whether 
directly by the state or through the private sector. As shown in Table 7.1 below, the quest for 
finance appeared to be an ongoing pursuit of the government with numerous announcements 
of funds secured for housing although none of these proved fruitful. The continued attempts 
to secured finance for housing signalled the limited ability of the state to realise the rhetoric 
of delivering public housing. Yet, it also enabled the government to expand the rhetoric and 
fuel the perception in society of the government‘s continual engagement in devising 
solutions. This expanded rhetoric helped the government to deflect criticism whenever called 
upon to account for its poor performance in housing. It is important to note the site of 
majority of the pronouncements was parliament, where the government‘s critics (the main 
opposition NDC party) had equal access to the media. Thus the floor of parliament 
represented a site of conflict in the rhetoric of government actions in housing. Implicit in the 
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governments‘ justification for public housing is the embedded discourse of blaming ―others‖. 
As noted at the start of this section, private developers and landlords, identified as a second 
reason for the housing problems of society, were used to validate the public housing 
aspirations by the government. 
Table 7.1: Government policy rhetoric focused on finance for housing  
Date Speaker Amount Source of funds Audience 
 
09/03/2001 
 
Minister, Finance 
 
US$100 million 
 
Not indicated 
Parliament – 
Budget 
30/04/2001 Vice President US$100 million Not indicated GREDA, HFC 
 
06/06/2001 
Minister, Works 
and Housing 
 
US$130 million 
EURO-AM Corp. 
Delaware, USA 
 
Parliament 
 
08/06/2001 
Minister, Works 
and Housing 
 
US$250 million 
 
Not indicated 
UN General 
Assembly 
 
09/07/2001 
Minister, Works 
and Housing 
 
US$50 million 
 
USA Bank 
Public 
Exhibition 
 
20/12/2001 
Minister, Works 
and Housing 
 
US$41 million 
 
Czech Developer 
 
Parliament 
10/01/2002 M.P. (NPP) US$126 million No indication Seminar 
 
27/03/2003 
Director, 
PPBMEU, MWH 
 
US$ 120 million 
 
Czech Government 
 
Press interview 
 
27/03/2003 
 
Minister, Finance 
US$ 41.35 million Slovakia Construction 
Company 
Parliament – 
Budget 
 
 
05/02/2004 
 
 
Minister, Finance 
 
MoU for sourcing 
funds 
USA, China, UK, 
Slovakia, Korea, 
Switzerland, Australia 
 
Parliament – 
Budget 
 
05/02/2004 
 
Minister, Finance 
 
US$200 million 
 
Capital Market 
Parliament– 
Budget 
14/05/2005 M. P. (NPP) US$ 12 million Japanese Government Constituency 
Source: compiled from surveys of Daily Graphic, Ghanaian Times newspapers, Hansard of Parliament 
The political rhetoric painted these agents as adversaries of the housing interests of the 
―people‖. In particular, landlords were viewed as extortionists, extracting inordinately high 
rents from tenants, a situation that could only be corrected through the use of rent control 
legislation. However, studies had proved that rent control generally was an ineffective tool 
for regulating rents or improving access to, and quality of, housing (Malpezzi et al, 1990; 
Mayo et al, 1986; Rakodi, 1995). It is for this reason that both variants of the enabling 
principles of housing reforms supported by the World Bank and the UN aspired to remove 
such legislation that constrained new investments by the private sector in rental 
accommodation. The history of rent control in Ghana is well catalogued by Malpezzi et al, 
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(1990). Although no specific action was taken during the housing sector reforms, the rigid 
application of rent control laws gradually declined with time. However, at the rhetorical level 
landlords were continually lambasted in spite of the decline in the application of the rent 
control law. The critical rhetoric against landlords persisted in the post reform:   
During the NDC's next term of office, attention will be given to a re-examination of rent policies, 
including the obligation of landlords to provide basic amenities in rented premises, whilst we continue 
to pursue our 1992 housing objectives. Those objectives include making truly affordable housing a 
reality, encouraging the production of more rental units, providing tax incentives for estate developers 
catering for urban low income units and forming housing cooperatives in the rural areas.
201
 
It has become increasingly clear that, the practice of landlords/landladies demanding two to 
three years rent advance is a problem for ordinary workers as well as prospective foreign 
investors. Government has, therefore, decided that the Rent Law should be updated and enforced 
to protect workers and also to promote business in this country. In this regard, proposals will soon 
be presented to this House for consideration.
202
 
Laws governing accommodation and rents in the country are outmoded and needed to be 
reviewed to instil some discipline among housing agents, tenants and landlords. Litigations, 
double sale of lands and double house rentals, dubious landlords and tenants as well as crook housing 
agents coupled with outmoded rent control laws have given the housing sector a bad image that needs 
to be redeemed.
203
  
The Ministry will continue with the process initiated to revise the existing rent law by submitting a 
draft bill to Parliament later in the year. In addition the Ministry of Works and Housing is making 
strenuous efforts to increase low income housing supply, in order to make housing more accessible, 
and affordable to the workers of this country; and force down or eliminate the high rent advances 
currently being demanded by landlords.
204
 
I personally think that the rent control division is continuing to let prospective tenants down in the 
capital. What the landlords do is that seeing the weaknesses on the part of people who are in need 
of accommodation they play on their weaknesses and take a lot of money from these people by 
taking the rent in advance.
205
 
Rent is the most difficult problem of the ordinary Ghanaian and other investors because they have to 
pay huge sums of money as advance to home owners before they can acquire a decent place of abode. 
….. If the review of rent control law is before cabinet as they make us believe, then I am appealing to 
them to send it quickly to this House for it to be passed.
206
 
 
This pillorying of landlords led to calls for stricter rent control which in substance was a 
punishment of landlords and was contrary to the commitment to the enabling principles
207
. In 
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2004, the Minister of Housing sought the assistance of the Centre for Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), an international non-governmental organization, to assist in the review 
of the rent control regulations
208
. The review of rent control regulations was expected to lead 
to the new rent guidelines. However, COHRE‘s work did not lead to any change in the rent 
law. The attempt to review the rent control regulations can be attributed to the immediate 
political gains this action engendered as it helped to deflect opposition criticism. 
Additionally, given the effort required to complete a legislation review cycle, the subsequent 
lack of enthusiasm for concluding the review of the rent regulations reflects the relatively low 
political priority accorded to the housing sector
209
.   
As noted above, to justify public re-engagement in direct housing, private developers 
were also cast as villains in the political rhetoric of blaming ―others‖. Whereas some 
commentators, especially with neoliberal beliefs, blame the imperfections of the market for 
the poor performance of the sector (World Bank, 1993; Angel, 2000; Ball, 2005), the political 
rhetoric of the new NPP government prominently features the activities of private developers 
as one key identifiable agency obstructing the housing aspirations of the ―people‖. In the 
discourse of blaming others, the reasons given for the private sector‘s behaviour ranged from 
non-incorporation of local building material
210
, non-cooperation with other stakeholders
211
, 
inordinate profit motives
212
 and sometimes even for no identifiable tangible reason
213
. It is 
                                                                                                                                                        
cares for the poor‖, Public Agenda, September 20 2004; ―MPs want rent laws reviewed‖ Joy FM News 
((http://www.myjoyonline.com/ghananews.asp?p=3&a=22073) Date sourced: February 16, 2006. 
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noteworthy that by blaming private developers, the government was engaged in an implicit 
denouncement of the World Bank‘s variant of the enabling principles. It is arguable that no 
such blame was placed on the UN variant of the enabling strategies as a result of the lack of 
tangible outputs of their projects, with the exception of the draft National Shelter Strategy 
which was not implemented.   
Inevitably, the ―blaming ‗others‘‖ discourse penetrated the media as they also took up 
the mantra of blaming the private sector for the constraints on workers in meeting their 
shelter needs
214
. This continuous critique of the private sector thus permitted and 
consequently set the grounds for the state‘s re-engagement in direct housing construction in 
spite of the aspirations of the enabling principles of the housing reforms. The reform 
experience whereby the state departed from the enabling principles in using SSNIT funds was 
the historical precedent validating the return to public housing construction. Clearly, the use 
of rhetoric in discourse is advantageous for the ruling government as it has the power to 
frame the agenda – things that are considered in the public domain and things that are omitted 
– as well as shape public perceptions. For example, in the discourse of blame, no reference 
was ever made to the traditional housing approach to multi-family habitation, the dominant 
post-colonial housing methodology that still housed the majority poor (discussed in Section 
5.2.1). In these rhetorical moves, the government had opportunity to deflect attention from 
the lack of appropriate and adequate response. 
7.5 Subverting Foreign Private Investment Interest by Political Partisanship 
According to the focus group of bureaucrats in the housing sector (interviewed in 
August 2006), the main instigator of the attempts to induce SSNIT into public housing by the 
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NPP government was the new Minister of Finance, who happened to have been the managing 
director of the Bank for Housing and Construction (BHC) in the late 1980s, when the housing 
sector reforms were initiated.
215
 However, in spite of his level of political influence, SSNIT‘s 
earlier experience during the housing sector reform era that had adversely affected its 
finances, generated a tentative response by the SSNIT to the government‘s attempts at 
inducing its involvement: 
There was a decision by SSNIT Management to evaluate the government‘s suggestion before proceeding, 
that is, to take stock of problems encountered earlier as the returns had been negative. It was important to 
at least break- even if this was for socially oriented investments. Because a new Board of Directors had 
been put in place after (President) Kufuor came to power, they had an input in restructuring the system. 
This was also (sic) at a period where agitation (for accountability) in this direction by the public and 
media (because of the excesses of the past management).
216
 The new objective was to be profit oriented. 
The major role of the institution to pay pensions was re-emphasized (personal interview of Senior 
Architect, SSNIT Project Department; October 2006) 
Mr. Osafo Marfo (Minister of Finance) was talking to SSNIT to get involved in housing. But SSNIT did 
not want to go through a similar experience as the earlier investment as they made losses on their projects 
whilst others benefitted (personal interview of Chief Technical Advisor, Ministry of Works and Housing; 
August 2006) 
Invariably, when the SSNIT responded to the government‘s request, it took precautions to 
protect its funds from being extended as largesse in the government‘s patronage systems 
aimed at placating supporters or in securing new support for the ruling party. SSNIT‘s 
protection of its funds was achieved by drawing in other entities to share in the risk. SSNIT 
partnered with the Tema Development Company (TDC) to jointly acquire land, sought 
partnership with a Malaysian investment consortium - Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd. - for the 
finance and construction work, and partnered with HFC for the sales. In spite of the 
preparations made for the proposed joint venture housing project, it failed to materialise as 
the Malaysian consortium withdrew from the partnership. This withdrawal was surprising as, 
according to a former World Bank Senior Urban Development Specialist (Personal interview, 
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June 2006), the Malaysian investors had approached the World Bank‘s Multi-lateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 2005 for a guarantee that would protect its 
investment
217
. After a risk assessment of the proposed joint venture project in 2006, MIGA 
offered the Malaysian consortium the guarantee it sought. However, the Malaysian 
consortium decided not to take up the offer. As a result, the status of the guarantee remains 
idle as of the time of the writing of this thesis (source: 
http://www.miga.org/projects/index_sv.cfm?pid=670 date sourced: 20
th
 January, 2010). 
Paradoxically, the Malaysian consortium proceeded to construct a number of flats in another 
location in Accra without any guarantee to cover their investment. This paradox can be 
rationalised by observing the negative attitude of the NPP government towards Malaysian 
investors in general;  an animosity that derived from the conditions under which they entered 
the Ghanaian market. It was felt by the NPP administration that the previous NDC 
administration had fraudulently sold off prime public enterprises to the investors from 
Malaysia at cheap prices in order extract bribes for senior members of the ruling party. Ansah 
(2006) depicts the genesis of this privileged relationship between the NDC administration and 
Malaysian capitalist class, conceptualised as a ―look east‖ policy, as based on the NDC 
administration‘s need for new sources of financial support. This was in the light of the World 
Bank‘s dissatisfaction with the government‘s decision to set up an agency, the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC
218
), to be in charge of long term economic 
planning and reduce the Ministry of Finance to a manager of annual budgets. The World 
Bank threatened to withdraw its financial support as it viewed the government‘s decision as 
tantamount to reverting to market interference. Ansah (2006: 232) notes how this decision 
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 MIGA was established as an agency of the World Bank group to promote private sector foreign direct 
investments in developing countries by providing guarantees against the political risks associated with such 
investments (source: http://www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1736 date sourced: 10
th
 January, 2010). 
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 NDPC has operated as an agency under the office of the President to coordinate government policies. 
However it has suffered from a lack of resources and been ineffective. As indicated in page 36, I consulted the 
NDPC for directions on the policy process in Ghana. 
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had the power to potentially erode the influence of bureaucrats-turned power brokers in the 
Ministry of Finance who had developed their careers through the implementation of the 
structural adjustment reforms. The aspiration of the NDC government was to model the 
growth of the country along a similar path to some East Asian countries such as Malaysia, 
Thailand and Singapore. Inevitably, the pursuit of this ―look east‖ policy opened up spaces 
for corruption and patronage as individual and corporate interests submerged national 
financial rationale in the selection and sale of the public enterprises. The various groups that 
vehemently protested the sale of the state enterprises by NDC government during the 1990s 
coalesced into an opposition to the Malaysian interests which included the NPP and local 
business classes hurt by the ―look east‖ policy. The opposition to privatisation from the NPP, 
an espoused market-liberal adherent party, points to the privileging of partisanship over 
subscription to purported philosophies. As a result, it was predictable that after the NPP took 
up office in January 2001, it refused to cooperate with the Malaysian investors. For example, 
in 2002, the NPP government decided against extending the initial contract period of the 
Malaysian investors in charge of the national telecom operator after it had expired. The 
relationship between the NPP government and the Malaysians deteriorated further after the 
telecom investor sued the government for abrogating the agreement after the expiry of the 
initial lease period. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that the SSNIT‘s invitation 
to the Malaysian investor, Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd, would not be approved by the NPP 
executive. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd and its non-acceptance of 
the guarantee from MIGA, was a decision designed to avoid any direct encounter with the 
government. However, the decision of Metro Ikram Sdn. Bhd to undertake its own 
investment in housing without the involvement of any state agency is indicative of the 
attractiveness of the real estate market in Ghana (see Section 6.8 of Chapter 6). Thus, 
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political considerations interfered with decisions based on commercial logic for public and 
private sector entities in the post-reform era.  
7.6 The Power of One – The Strategic Instrumentality of the “Action Man” 
As has been indicated in Chapter 2, the realist research approach takes cognisance of the 
duality of agency and structure. In this regard, a very visible aspect of the reforms that have 
been discussed in Chapter 6 and that persisted in the post-reform period is the strategic use of 
power by political appointees to determine the path of housing policy. As noted in Chapter 6, 
the outcome of the housing reforms was critically affected by the conduct and influence of 
Kwamena Ahwoi, the Local Government Minister at the time. In similar vein, the post-
reform re-engagement of the state in direct construction of housing can be primarily 
attributed to Hackman Owusu Agyeman, Housing Minister from 2005 to 2007 (a perspective 
derived from focus group discussions with bureaucrats of the Housing Ministry, August 
2006). The Minister‘s substantial influence in the NPP administration derived from his role in 
the party during the earlier days of opposition. Prior to the formal return to democratic rule in 
1992, all party political activities had been banned under the PNDC military regime from 
1981. In 1991, the ban was lifted and the NPP was registered as one of the parties contesting 
the elections. However, after the lifting of the ban on party politics there was considerable 
coercion of, and self-regulation by, private businesses to remain in the good books of the 
military administration which was transforming into a political party. As a result, the 
opposing parties were in financial difficulties constrained by their supporters‘ aversion to be 
openly associated with these parties. As a result, opposition parties had to rely extensively on 
a few sponsors and for the NPP, Hackman Owusu Agyeman provided that sponsorship; his 
personal wealth
219
 was critical to their fortunes. Agyeman was elected as Party Treasurer and 
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 Having retired from more than twenty years working in the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), he 
set up a string of businesses and became very successful. Among his business interests were local representation 
of global conglomerates such as Proctor and Gamble, and ICI of UK. 
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subsequently was Chairman of the party‘s Finance Committee, a position he resigned from in 
2001 to take up a ministerial appointment
220
 in the newly elected NPP government. In several 
instances, Agyeman singlehandedly or with a few others donated personal funds to support 
party activities
221
 (personal interview of two NPP former members of parliament; October 
2006). Upon his appointment, Agyeman as the Minister for Housing was particularly critical 
of private developers and consultants, establishing a technical committee to investigate the 
cause for rising construction costs
222
. However, this critique of the private developers had 
antecedents in the personal experience of the Minister in the housing reform era as reflected 
on by a former Director of Housing:   
When we (Housing Ministry) were going to undertake the Teshie-Nungua developments (in 1988) with 
SSNIT and BHC supporting the developers in the provision of finance for infrastructure and mortgages 
[as part of the Priority Work Project – see Chapter 6], Hackman [i.e Agyeman] ….. approached the 
project for assistance so that he could participate. He had just registered a construction company. We told 
him that there was no money for construction finance but the project would give a mortgage loan to 
anyone who would buy the property he would be developing so he could recover his costs. He was not 
happy and accused us of helping others. After that he was not involved in real estate again. (Personal 
interview, September 2006)  
Replicating the reform era experience of depletion of policy capacity, the Minister contrived 
the transfer of the Director of Policy Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation, in 
spite of his significant qualification in housing policy and substantial experience in the sector 
(personal interview of Chief Technical Advisor, Housing Ministry; September 2006).
223
 
Similar to the experience in the reform era, recounted in Box 6.1, this transfer was executed 
by the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) without explanation and equivalent 
replacement. Even though no official reason was given for the transfer, the Director‘s failed 
bid as a parliamentary candidate of the opposition NDC party in the elections of 2000 is 
believed to have been the underlying rationale (Source: focus group discussions with 
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 He was appointed as Foreign Minister initially and then subsequently served as Interior Minister before he 
was appointed as Housing Minister. 
221
 In 1991, he provided significant financial support for the NPP to acquire its National Headquarters building 
(Ghanaian Journal, 2007). After the electoral loss in 1992, he singlehandedly bailed out the party after creditors 
sued the party for defaulting in the payment of motorcycles acquired for the election campaign. 
222
 ―Desire for abnormal profit killing housing sector – Minister” Ghana News Agency 30/01/2007. 
223
 This Director had been recruited as part of the UN capacity building support for the Ministry of Works and 
Housing in 1989 after his Phd studies. He was transferred to the Ministry of Fisheries. 
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bureaucrats in the housing sector; August 2006). The technical capacity of the Ministry was 
significantly decimated by this transfer as it left the Ministry with only two technical staff 
and with the Chief Technical Advisor on Housing on a post-retirement contract. In November 
2005, the Minister bypassed the civil service recruitment procedures to appoint a Special 
Advisor and a Special Assistant, a process not subject to the mandate of the Office of the 
Head of the Civil Service
224
. The merits for and against the effect of such political 
appointments over bureaucratic positions have been debated, albeit inconclusively:  
…. a merit system should not preclude the appointment of political advisers to the government to 
provide alternative advice to that from the civil service and also to promote advocacy …(Olowu, 
1999:17) 
Concomitantly, high reliance on special advisers external to the civil service, who stay for relatively 
short periods of time and frequently leave with Ministers, leads to a lack of institutional memory about 
previous negotiations and informal donor commitments. Extensive use of special advisers (also on 
differential pay scales, in order to get anyone willing to leave their private sector job) also leads to the 
further marginalisation and demoralisation of civil servants (Whitfield and Jones, 2007:23). 
Discussions with the focus group of housing sector bureaucrats (August 2006) revealed a dim 
view of  the appointments of the special assistant and special advisor, citing them as the cause 
of the lack of constructive consultation between the Minister and the technical staff prior to 
the inception of the Affordable Housing Programme. This culminated in a poor relationship 
between the Minister and the bureaucrats of the Housing Ministry (personal interview, Chief 
Technical Advisor of Ministry of Works and Housing, April 2007). The worsening 
relationship between the Housing Minister and the bureaucrats had the effect of opening the 
space for political manoeuvring by the Minister to undertake the public direct housing project 
without being subjected to rigorous internal debates within the Ministry. The senior 
bureaucrats in particular had played roles in the design of the locally developed housing 
policy of 1986 in which the enabling principles had been articulated, implying that they were 
conversant with the concept (see Section 6.5). Furthermore, others had acquired their 
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 Curiously this Special Advisor had previously worked as a member of staff of the Technical Services Centre 
that managed the World Bank urban projects including the housing reforms component. He had later left in 
2000 to work with the African Development Bank on urban infrastructure projects. 
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knowledge of the enabling principles through the periodic short courses they had attended 
under the sponsorship of the UN (see Section 6.9). The effective sidelining of the housing 
ministry bureaucrats by the Minister, thereby ensured that the enabling principles lost their 
local ―voice‖ in the conception of the Affordable Housing Programme. Thus the 
government‘s re-entry into direct housing construction through the Affordable Housing 
Programme was significantly facilitated by the combination of the leverage of the personal 
power of the Housing Minister, acquired by his personal financial resources and his role in 
the ruling party, and aided by the loss of articulation of the bureaucrats in the Housing 
Ministry. Further evidence emerged from the design and implementation of the Affordable 
Housing Programme to point to the extent of discretion exercised by the Minister and this is 
discussed in the next section. 
7.7 Coming full circle under the cloud of the Affordable Housing Programme 
The evolution of the Affordable Housing Programme (see Section 1.2) underlines the 
instrumentality of the Housing Minister during the post reform period. The focus group of 
housing bureaucrats (August, 2006), expressed the following views about the origination of 
the programme: 
An American investor approached us to do a housing programme and we asked him to submit his proposals. 
He wanted us to sign a MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] but the [Minister] said he should bring his 
design first.  We also told him that we were looking at something in the range of US10,000 to US15,000. 
After he brought it, the [Minister] told him he has to get cabinet approval before he signs a MoU. But we 
didn‘t sign anything. Hackman used the man‘s drawings and was going about saying he can build for 
US$10,000 and blaming consultants [for the high cost of construction]. 
He [The Housing Minister] didn‘t consult us [bureaucrats]. He called Banning [a private architect who was 
appointed to manage the project]
225
 and the two of them decided on what to do. He went to Baah Wiredu 
[Finance Minister] and pushed him to get some of the HIPC money.
226
 Kwamena Bartels [first Housing 
Minister in the NPP administration in 2001 – see Table 6.5a] had been pushing for that money for a long 
time but Hackman was able to get the money. 
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 Architect Banning was named as the lead consultant from the architectural firm, Modula Grupp overseeing 
the project when it was launched (Ghanaian Times, 2
nd
 January 2006; Accra Daily Mail, 15
th
 January 2006). 
226
 The Minister confirmed to Parliament on Thursday 8
th
 December 2005 that funds for the Affordable Housing 
Programme came from receipts from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative – the initiative 
established to relieve countries volunteering to undergo another round of austerity measures. (Ghanaian Times, 
8
th
 December 2005).  
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I was called to Castle [seat of the Presidency] and asked to explain why SHC [State Housing Corporation] 
was not part of the Affordable Housing project. The [Minister] defended himself seriously. They [Cabinet] 
were worried that someone [from the opposition or media] would raise this issue. But Hackman defended 
himself …. 
….the Minister was able to secure a waiver from the Procurement laws and he was able to justify the 
request. So this project did not go through the normal channels of procurement. 
I told Hackman to look into institutional development of the Ministry because the Ministry had only five 
technical staff. But he was not interested. It is a governance issue. All the ministers want to do is [sic] 
implement projects. So there is no accountability in policy implementation. The electorate also don‘t 
question politicians on policy promises. There is no understanding of the complexity of the housing 
problem. We have lost on all counts and found a politically convenient solution called the Affordable 
Housing Programme. 
As a pointer to the manipulation of the design and implementation of the programme 
to suit the Minister‘s desires, the Affordable Housing Programme did not go through the 
normal procurement procedures as the Minister personally secured approval from the Public 
Procurement Authority to waive the mandatory processes of open bidding for services and 
works. As a result, neither the selection of the consulting team to design and monitor the 
implementation nor the selection of contractors for the works was opened to tendering. 
Rather the Consultant, Modula Grupp, was selected directly by the Minister without any 
input by the bureaucrats of the Housing Ministry (personal interview of Director of Budget 
and Monitoring, Public Procurement Authority; April 2007). Furthermore, the Minister 
furnished the Consultant with a list of contractors to be invited for negotiation prior to 
inception of works (personal interview of Senior Quantity Surveyor of Project Consultants, 
Modula Grupp; October 2006). Further, the Minister personally had meetings with the sole 
cement producer in Ghana, GHACEM, to negotiate for discounts for the cement to be 
supplied for the works. The Minister subsequently directed sand excavated from an ongoing 
river basin desilting project to be supplied to contractors working on the Affordable Housing 
Programme. However, the sand was sold to the contractors at market rates although it was a 
saving to the desilting project in lieu of paying for disposal. Thus, through the actions of the 
Minister, the Affordable Housing Programme was a contradiction in terms as none of the 
actions taken made it affordable for the purported target low-income households. It is 
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indisputable that the Minister was very instrumental in the formulation and implementation of 
the Programme. Such individual instrumentality served the ruling NPP government well and 
also the political fortunes of the Minister. For the party, the Affordable Housing Programme 
helped to deflect opposition criticism providing tangible evidence of government‘s concern 
for housing. In the 2007 budget, the Minister of Finance indicated a total of 100,000 units 
would be ready in five years (Government of Ghana, 2007: 161). Whilst the main opposition 
NDC party listed the reform era SSNIT developments as evidence of its concern for housing 
in their 2008 Election Campaign Manifesto (NDC, 2008: 84), the NPP administration 
countered in their manifesto by touting the Affordable Housing Programme as 
―unprecedented‖ and committing to expand the programme (NPP, 2008:11, 56). For the 
Minister, the Affordable Housing Programme became the highlight of his campaign in his 
subsequent quest for the party‘s presidential candidature from July 2007227. He was labelled 
the ―Action Man‖, a euphemism for his purported ability to deliver on promises, with the 
Affordable Housing Programme listed as example of this ability after the ―successful‖ 
inception of the housing scheme (source: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=131196 date 
sourced: 23
rd
 April, 2009).  Thus, the implementation of the Affordable Housing Programme 
served personal and collective interest of the Minister and the ruling party respectively. For 
the Minister it allowed him to mount a (failed) presidential campaign. For the ruling NPP, the 
Affordable Housing Programme enabled it to counter accusations by the opposition NDC 
party that the government was not interested in the welfare of the wider society, particularly 
in relation to the housing needs. Whereas these collective benefits were obvious and 
predictable, the personal interests were not immediately visible and only became obvious 
when the material conditions were examined carefully. Given the questionable procurement 
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 ―Meet the action man – Uncle Hackman‖ – The Statesman, 1st June 2007; ―I am the largest investor in NPP‖ 
– Ghana New Agency, 23rd October 2007;  
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arrangements through which the Minister directly appointed consultants and contractors and 
negotiated the supply of some building materials such as cement for this project, an 
opportunity was created for private benefits to the Minister personally. In the discussions 
with the focus group of housing bureaucrats (August 2006), local euphemisms for corruption 
were inferred in respect of the role of the Minister without direct accusations being 
articulated. Given the insecurity of some respondents in participating in the interviews 
because of the fear of political victimisation, I decided against seeking evidence of corruption 
in the Affordable Housing Programme through the interviews, as such questions could stall 
my interviews especially for those very close to the political class. I chose to identify the 
implicit opportunities for corruption to suffice as evidence that the strategic calculations of 
some actors such as the Minister were not always premised on collective interests. Inevitably 
the Affordable Housing Programme, initiated with great fanfare in 2005 and expected to be 
completed in two years, remained incomplete as at the time of concluding this thesis in 2010. 
It is not surprising that reports emerged in 2009, after the NPP had lost power to the NDC in 
the December 2008 elections, that 719 units in the yet-to-be-completed Affordable Housing 
Programme had been allocated by the Minister and his successor (who took over when 
Hackman Owusu Agyeman resigned to pursue the party‘s presidential candidature) to cronies 
of the ruling party (Daily Graphic, 8
th
 February 2009). 
7.8 Conclusion 
The political change from the NDC administration – which had initiated the structural 
adjustment reforms - to the NPP administration – which historically subscribed to market-
liberal ideology – potentially created the opportunity for inculcating the market-oriented 
enabling principles for housing preferred by the World Bank into Ghana‘s housing policy in 
the post-reform era. Furthermore, the country‘s experience of worsening economic fortunes 
supported the minimalist state role espoused in this variant of the enabling principles. In this 
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regard, it would appear that the structural conditions legitimated the implementation of 
policies that were based on the enabling principles. However, the paradoxical act of the new 
NPP government in directly intervening in housing development through the Affordable 
Housing Programme suggests that another reality that was more enduring but perhaps deeper-
lying than the evident material conditions and had to be unravelled in order to understand the 
government‘s actions. In the case of the previous NDC government the underlying rationale 
was the quest for political legitimacy. In the narration of this chapter, it was observed that in 
the post-reform era, the government frequently deployed rhetorical devices in its discourse on 
housing to portray its commitment and engagement in responding to the housing needs of the 
society. This discourse featured a focus on numbers of houses that were required to be 
developed, the blaming of inadequate finance as well as private developers and landlords for 
the housing problems, and the government‘s acquisition of funds for housing projects. Given 
the intention to persuade the society of engagement through such rhetorical devices it is the 
case that in the post-reform era, the government‘s actions in the housing sector were also 
dictated by the quest for political legitimacy. The rhetorical devices served two main 
purposes in this respect. Firstly they were a tool for advocacy for maintaining support for the 
government. Secondly they served to deflect criticisms of the government periodically 
launched by the opposition party. To this extent the fact that the majority of such 
pronouncements were made in parliament (see Table 7.1) is an important consideration 
because it showed the government‘s desire to overwhelm their critics with the quantum of 
pronouncements on the platforms where the critics had equal access to the media. 
In conclusion this chapter has presented a post-reform narrative of the housing 
activities of the state in Ghana. It reveals the dual influence of the changing material 
conditions of the state and the housing sector on the actions of policy actors on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the choices made by policy actors regarding the conditions and outcomes of 
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policies. The foregoing review of the post-reforms period in Ghana suggests the 
pervasiveness of the structure and agency dialectical relationship in shaping housing policies 
and outcomes. This chapter has demonstrated how this dialectical relationship plays out in the 
power relations of housing policy in Ghana. This is relevant not only for the case of Ghana 
but also for research on housing in developing countries, particularly in Africa, because of the 
comparable conditions and contexts as well as the similarity in the types of actors. In the 
Ghanaian case, this chapter has demonstrated how at this point in the power relationships 
during the post-reform era, the absence of the World Bank and the UN as primary advocates 
of the enabling principles, minimised the opportunity to apply these principles, which 
reinforced the incidence of reversionism. Furthermore, this constraint in applying the 
enabling principles was reinforced by the poor relations between the Minister of Housing and 
the bureaucratic class of the Housing Ministry. This emerges from the fact that the senior 
bureaucrats were aware of the enabling principles through their earlier participation in the 
housing reforms and the locally developed housing policy of 1986 which had also enunciated 
the enabling principles. Additionally the disposition of the political class to direct housing 
development by the government - notwithstanding claims of political ideologies and 
philosophies - premised on the rationale of the political symbolism of tangible public housing 
projects is significant in validating the impetus for reversionism. This recourse to state re-
engagement in public housing in the absence of the coercive force of hegemony (as exercised 
by the World Bank in particular) belies the purported subscription to the enabling principles 
in the first place and points to the manipulative effect of the presence of the international 
agencies such as the World Bank and the UN in structuring the context, motives and priorities 
in policy choices. Thus the behavioural practices of some of the local policy actors in the 
post-reform era changed, partly as a result of the changed conditions of engagement between 
the state and the international development agencies in housing policy. Subsequently the 
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Affordable Housing Programme, as evidence of reversionism, emerged as a matter of course. 
This suggests that in the post-reform era in Ghana, the enabling principles found no 
resonance in housing policy actions partly because the subscription to the principles was 
superficial, even during the reform era itself. It can also be partly attributed to the erosion of 
the anchors of the enabling principles within the housing policy framework through the 
organisational absence of the World Bank and UN in decision making as well as the loss of 
the critical perspective of the bureaucratic class. Thus notwithstanding the dominant view of 
the primacy of the enabling principles over last twenty years through the hegemonic 
framework of the UN and the World Bank (World Bank 1993; UN-Habitat, 2006; Buckley & 
Kalarickal, 2005), the evidence suggests that the indigenisation of these principles requires 
more than claims of subscription and compliance with policy conditionalities.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion and Discussion 
8.1 Conclusion 
I was drawn to undertake this academic journey in 2005 by my observation of the 
implementation of reversionist housing policies that went against what I had been led to 
believe throughout my educational career as good policy practice framed as the enabling 
principles and developed by the UN and the World Bank. One key lesson I had imbibed was 
that these principles were ―good‖ policy practices to be aspired to by all well-intentioned 
policy makers, especially in the developing world. Given the limited resources available to 
developing countries, especially in Africa, and the consequent significant constraints on 
public housing as a policy option, it made sense to me that every country would adopt these 
―rational‖ and ―neutral‖ principles in order to achieve the equitable housing outcomes. To my 
naïve mind, this aspiration had nothing to do with political partisanship which was my only 
measure of bias. However, as I started working and interacted with local, national and 
international policy actors and as I observed the material conditions of my own country in 
relation to the public pronouncements by government officials, I became aware that policy is 
also about politics. This perception came into sharper relief after I started my field work for 
this dissertation and sought through interviews and documentary reviews to understand the 
motives and compelling contexts of housing policy in Ghana and the enabling principles. 
Having completed my research I certainly do not have all the answers to the question of the 
persisting challenges in housing especially for the poor, but the process of study has made me 
very much aware of the expansive and complex array of interests, rationales, resources and 
structures, operating from the local to the international level and intersecting in unpredictable 
patterns which confront policy makers, practitioners and researchers as they attempt to craft 
policy responses. I come to this point of the thesis bearing this in mind. At the start of the 
thesis I set out to question why the New Patriotic Party, a party that supposedly believed in 
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the market system, would conceive and initiate a housing project that put the state - acting 
through its policy agency the Ministry of Works and Housing, and not through its allied 
parastatal agencies – at the heart of re-engagement with direct housing construction. This 
question seemed all the more pertinent given the  prevailing primacy of the enabling 
principles of housing policy originated by the World Bank and the UN, and that Ghana has 
experienced almost two decades of housing reforms which espoused these principles. 
Consequently, my primary quest in this thesis was to identify and examine the conditions and 
dynamics that generated this incidence of what I conceived as housing policy reversionism.  
The enabling principles had been proffered by the main originators and advocates – 
the World Bank and the UN – to developing countries in general since the late 1980s. These 
principles were advanced as the only mechanism through which the housing sector would be 
reformed in order to generate an equitable and systemic response to meeting the housing 
needs of the society. Given the conventional notions of the hegemonic influence of the World 
Bank and the UN in local policy outcomes, and the decisive roles of these two agencies in the 
formulation and advocacy of the enabling principles, the research was designed to enhance an 
understanding of the relationship between local and global policy actors and the framework 
that drew them together in housing policy reform. In this regard it was expected that the 
research would assist in the unravelling of the mechanisms by which the orthodoxies and 
principles developed by these international agencies were adapted and translated into the 
local policy setting. Housing research, particularly in African countries, has failed to 
formulate and adequate analytical perspective on the implementation of the enabling 
principles. Indeed there was (and still is) inadequate research on the contemporary experience 
of housing sector enabling reforms in African countries. Furthermore, most research work 
that has discussed public housing, has failed to take into consideration the episodic juncture 
of the adoption of the enabling principles in the trajectory of African housing policies. Yet 
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most countries in Africa have subscribed to the enabling principles in one form or the other in 
part through the sponsorship of either the World Bank or the UN. For this reason, this thesis – 
based on a case study of Ghana – has served a useful purpose in contributing to knowledge 
regarding the housing policy making process within the context of the enabling principles and 
its indigenisation into local policy framework. Additionally, this research has provided the 
opportunity to develop a new analytical perspective on the trajectory of housing policy by 
explicitly recognising and incorporating the junctures of the enabling principles as well as the 
incidence of reversionism in the continuum of post independence housing policy. This 
perspective supports the consideration of the framework drawing in local and international 
entities, thus focusing on the state of their relations during and after the implementation of the 
enabling principles. Given that reversionism is apparent in other African countries such as 
Zimbabwe (which remains under-researched), this thesis contributes to the establishment of a 
basis for comparing housing policy reforms in African countries based on the enabling 
principles. 
The thesis has employed a qualitative approach and a critical realist perspective (see 
Chapter 2). This perspective acknowledges the potential of an underlying rationale that may 
not be immediately evident as causal factors for observed outcomes and recognises the 
interaction of  both context (structure) and actions (agency),  culminating in observed 
outcomes. This perspective was also adopted because of the paradox of reversionism in 
Ghana emerging during the administration of a market-liberal administration. This paradox 
indeed suggested the existence of a deeper-lying rationale that would be revealed only after 
removing the observable layers of material conditions, context and strategic actions to 
understand the incidence of reversionism. In conducting the field work, two things stood out 
as lessons to be learnt. Firstly, the researcher‘s credentials and previous association with 
listed respondents can influence the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the 
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research subject. Having previously worked as a Consultant on behalf of the UN and come 
into prior contact with some of the respondents, it became evident that my so called expert 
knowledge of the subject as a result of my former position had the potential to inhibit some of 
the respondents and therefore tailored their responses to the prevailing conventional wisdom. 
As noted in Section 2.5 this uneven power relation in the research process was diffused 
through preliminary discussions prior to the actual interviews in a bid to deconstruct the 
―expert‖ image. The second lesson from the data gathering exercise relates to the fear of 
political victimisation by respondents because of the political nature of policy research, even 
for policies older than ten years as was the case in Ghana. In this respect, I observed the 
importance of being flexible to the demands of the respondents in order to provide the 
requisite assurances necessary for the divulging of the required information. As noted in 
Section 2.4, I was asked to meet some respondents in different locations from their normal 
working environment and/or outside their designated working hours. Other respondents asked 
for the tape recorder to be turned off for some segments of the interviews that the respondent 
deemed to be too politically sensitive. For such sessions, I took notes in lieu of the tape 
recording. I also resorted to ―anonymising‖ all my sources in my citations of the interviews in 
order to protect their identities partly in response to direct requests by some of the 
respondents as the fear of victimisation was not easily assuaged by verbal assurances only or 
the limitation of recorded speech. This fear of victimisation compelled me to utilise data 
triangulation in order to gather and validate any data I received, thus my use of newspaper 
archival sources and secondary data to complement the primary data. However, I recognise 
that trying to mitigate respondents‘ fear of victimisation can present a dilemma to the 
researcher. Some respondents‘ need for protection may impose excessive costs or time 
constraints on the researcher or can compromise the ethical dimension of the research 
through acts such as paying money to respondents for their participation. Therefore requests 
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for protection by respondents must be carefully evaluated by the researcher before 
committing to any specific mitigation arrangements.   
Having gathered the data from the field the next phase of the research required the 
establishment of an appropriate analytical framework which I presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The analysis of my field data took cognisance of the vast range of actors involved in the 
housing sector reforms. The analytical approach I adopted enlisted two important 
perspectives frequently overlooked in the analysis of housing policies involving international 
development agencies and national housing policy framework. The first perspective, 
presented in Chapter 3, identified nuanced differences between the World Bank and the UN 
in respect of the methodological and operational approach to the design and implementation 
of the enabling principles. Without recognising these differences most research work on 
housing policies loses the opportunity to unravel the different policy trajectories that emerge 
based on these distinct approaches. The World Bank‘s neo-classical economics antecedents 
framed its perspective of the enabling principles to privilege market relations and thereby 
restricted intervention in the implementation of the enabling principles to instruments such as 
privatisation, commercialisation, deregulation and decentralisation. Furthermore, the 
intellectual and political contexts within which the World Bank‘s perspective of the enabling 
principles emerged were closely associated with the conditional policy reform regime of 
structural adjustment, thus further limiting the range of interventions to market-oriented 
instruments; the World Bank had, of course, considerable financial resources to induce 
developing countries to accept the reforms based on enabling principles. In contrast, the UN‘s 
perspective of the enabling principles was more expansive with the state, markets and 
communities having roles to play in the delivery of housing. In fact, contrary to conventional 
narratives, it was found that the UN permitted the intervention of the state in directly 
developing housing especially for the poor if market failure persisted. Another aspect of the 
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UN perspective was its development of a specific methodological approach to the housing 
policy design process which insisted on the development of National Shelter Strategies in 
which the specific steps would be undertaken to arriving at the enabling principles.  In 
contrast to the World Bank‘s conditionality mechanism for engendering the subscription to 
the enabling principles, the UN proselytised these principles through conferences and 
flagship reports, urging voluntary subscription through technical rationalisation and moral 
suasion.   
The second perspective of my analytical framework (discussed in Chapter 4) 
countered the conventional housing policy analysis approach that viewed the state apparatus 
governing the policy framework as a homogenous and harmonious entity. I contest this 
conventional narrative drawing attention to the variety of interests inherent in the concept of 
―state‖. Without recognising this constellation of interest groups, the structural effects of the 
competition and contestations at the intra-state and supra-state (relating to the relations 
between the country and the international agencies) levels would be missed. This view frames 
the policy space as a platform for interests competing for attention and resources to set the 
policy agenda and drive social practice. The perspective of the state as a heterogeneous 
constellation of diverse and competing interests permitted the exploration of the ―decision 
calculus‖ of the policy actors, the ―indigenisation‖ process of translating policies and 
knowledge developed by international agencies into the local policy framework, and the 
power relations that shape motives and rationale for policy choices. This analytical approach 
crystallised the underlying rationale of political legitimacy and class considerations for 
observed policy outcomes. In this respect political legitimacy is defined as the imperative 
condition that permits and validates the articulation and assertion of power by the ruling class 
over the ruled. Political legitimacy can be negotiated between the ruling class and the 
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dominant interest groups in society through engagement or, as happens frequently, coerced 
from the society through acts of patronage by the ruling class.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the findings of my research based on the analysis of the 
data collected, assessment of the documentary evidence and the review of the literature. 
Deriving from advice I received from focus group discussions I categorised the research data 
into three distinct periods of pre-reform, reform and post-reform eras
228
.  In Chapter 5 the 
focus is on the pre-reform era of the post-colonial period of Ghana in which I found two 
parallel streams of housing activities. On the one hand, a trajectory of traditional housing 
practices driven by socio-cultural values that pre-dated the colonial enterprise and persisted in 
the post-colonial era prevailed. This practice was also premised on the ethos of 
communitarian welfare and constrained market relations in housing. This type of housing 
practice was organic in the sense that it supported evolving relational networks and allowed 
for the adaption of property in accordance with household changes by the periodic 
construction of additional rooms. In the process the interest of the poor in society were 
protected. On the other hand, a trajectory of conventional housing practice driven by state 
organisations based on standards and practices deriving from norms transferred from the 
colonial enterprise emerged from the colonial era. Its benefits accrued to the elite in society 
even though the resources for these types of housing practices were extracted from all 
segments of the society. The latter trajectory of housing practice generated the establishment 
of diverse public housing institutions which were often used by respective governments for 
purposes other than meeting the objective housing needs in the society. I observed that there 
was an early preponderance for advice from experts from international organisations 
including the UN, although such advice was either discarded or adapted in significant ways 
as to misconstrue its original intent. Furthermore, most of the pre-reform governments 
                                                 
228
 Annex 7 is a chronology of the housing initiatives in the pre-reform, reform and post-reform eras.  
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undertook actions on public housing projects such as under-pricing the housing projects and 
deferring the payments of compensation for expropriated land in order to fuel the farcical 
perception of a benevolent government providing affordable houses and therefore being 
responsive to the needs of the society. However such actions inevitably endangered the 
financial capacity of the public housing institutions responsible for the provision of this 
housing in exposing them to the risk of default and bankruptcy. Inevitably the viability of 
many of these public housing institutions were critically jeopardised, and a few ultimately 
became moribund. Given that the majority beneficiaries of the pubic housing projects were 
either from, or linked to, the political establishment and the top civil servants, this pattern of 
housing policies suggests that government actions privileged political concerns over the so 
called technical rationality of the advice of the international experts and the social welfare 
ethos embedded in the traditional housing norms: these housing policies were thus designed 
to  secure the  political legitimacy of these governments in the wider society through 
symbolism.  
Housing policy in the pre-reform era was characterised by multi-layered dimensions 
that were not always self-evident and masked the dialectical interaction between the 
seemingly wilful strategic acts of policy agents and the deeper lying inherent collective 
biased dispositions of the ruling class in the society. In this framework, power is unevenly 
balanced in society and housing remained a subjectively instrumental tool of class 
differentiation. The other considerations such as the viability of the public housing 
institutions were subsumed under these class concerns. Nonetheless the worsening of the 
material conditions of the country eventually ensured a pause in this housing policy trend. As 
the economy grew worse and political instability heightened, the quest for resources 
culminated in the subscription to the structural adjustment reforms in the overarching macro-
economy which included housing sector reforms. In conclusion, the pattern of pre-reform 
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housing policy showed clearly that its underlying logic was the enforcement of class 
differences that served to empower the ruling classes and their supporters. 
It is in this context that Chapter 6 elaborates the trajectory of the design and 
implementation   of the housing sector reforms in Ghana from 1985. During this reform 
period which concluded in 2000, several interventions were initiated which were grouped 
into three distinct trajectories led by the World Bank, the UN and a set of local housing 
policy agents. It was observed that these trajectories intersected in variable ways that were 
not always clear–cut. The complexities of these trajectories were fostered by multiple layers 
of structural relations, among which the most significant were: the structural adjustment 
reforms and their prerequisites for other sectors of the economy; the terms of engagement 
between the state and the World Bank and the UN guiding their participation in the housing 
reforms as well as in other interventions; the framework of inter-sectoral relations in the 
administration of the state apparatus such as that between the Local Government and Housing 
Sectors respectively as well as the Office of the Head of Civil Service; the material socio-
economic conditions at the time;  the enabling principles themselves; and lastly the norms (or 
lack thereof) regulating the powers of political appointees and the approval framework for the 
use of such powers. Similarly, the terms of employment established for staff of the Technical 
Services Centre (TSC) working on the World Bank projects and the terms for the staff of the 
Housing Ministry‘s Policy Planning Unit supported by the UN, the demand for 
decentralisation reforms and the imminence of the first democratic elections 1992 elections 
after a long reign of the military class, plus the purchasing power and the housing preferences 
of the Ghanaian Diaspora market, all combined to condition the environment in which the 
reforms were implemented. This complex policy milieu was further complicated by the 
strategic actions of key policy actors including the long-serving Local Government Minister, 
the military appointee heading the State Housing Corporation, the PNDC Chairman of the 
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Committee of Secretaries, the TDC Tenants‘ Association, the managers of the structural 
adjustment reforms in the Ministry of Finance, the emerging class of local private developers 
and the international housing development agencies, the corps of senior civil servants of the 
Housing Ministry,  and lastly the management of HFC. This plethora of strategic policy 
actors took actions that had variable impacts on the design and outcomes of the housing 
reforms. The interactions of these variables created multiple loci of power with the potential 
to produce variable outcomes. At this intersection of the multi-layered structural framework 
with the strategic considerations and actions of the policy actors, a dynamic and complex 
platform of dialectical power relations emerged during the housing reform period in Ghana, 
making the attribution of the reform outcomes to either structural conditions or strategic 
actions increasingly difficult. Additionally, the injection of the scaled considerations of the 
local and global perspectives into the contested construct of power relations in the local 
policy setting further advanced the case for a careful and nuanced dissection of the reforms. 
The power relations construct dictated the reaction to the locally developed draft housing 
policy of 1986 by power brokers in Ministry of Finance who felt threatened by its 
recommendations. It is this power relations construct that drove the keen competition 
between the local government interests and housing sector interests to secure the World Bank 
resources and ultimately led to the local government‘s capture of the World Bank urban 
policy agenda for Ghana in Urban III, contrary to the World Bank‘s own expressed 
intentions. Similarly, the variable power relations shaped the lackadaisical reaction to the UN 
sponsored National Shelter Strategy even though it was a holistic development of policy 
based on the UN‘s interpretation of the enabling principles. In this regard, the enabling 
principles assume political values assigned by local interests groups and these values 
depending on who the promoters of these principles were – the World Bank or the UN. The 
National Shelter Strategy developed with the assistance of the UN and inculcating the UN‘s 
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perspective of the enabling principles was never implemented. On the other hand, the Urban 
II implemented some facets of the World Bank‘s perspective of the enabling principles 
although a comprehensive policy was not outlined. This selectivity is a political outcome and 
therefore to conceive of the enabling principles as a package of value-neutral knowledge 
concepts is to deny the assignment of political values to these principles by the local interest 
groups. The chapter concluded by observing the paradox – and citing it as evidence of the 
heterogeneity of the state – of the housing finance reforms and the operational reforms of 
TDC proceeding as envisaged under the reform design emanating from the application of  the 
enabling principles, whereas SHC was joined by SSNIT in continuing direct housing 
construction with public funds.  
In Chapter 7, the context of the change in government in 2000 from the NDC 
administration with antecedents in pseudo-Marxist ideology, to the NPP administration that 
espoused market-liberal values, set the tone for the discussion of the paradoxical ‗Affordable 
Housing Programme‘ that followed. The Chapter throws light on the strategies of the new 
government as it pushed and failed to secure the re-entry of SSNIT into direct housing 
development. These strategies materialised in the use of rhetorical devices in the prevalent 
discourse to secure the legitimacy of the new government and in the process deflect 
criticisms. The discourse consisted of a focus on the inordinate numbers of houses required 
and the implicit accusation of the inability of the private sector to meet these needs. It also 
included an explicit blaming of the private developers and landlords for the rising costs of 
housing. Additionally, the identification of the lack of capital to explain government‘s 
inaction in housing was coupled with frequent pronouncements of the successful acquisition 
of funding for housing. Altogether these rhetorical moves reinforced the perception of an 
engaged and responsive government. In spite of the new government‘s claims of market-
liberal ideology, the use of these rhetorical devices indicates the privileging of the symbolism 
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associated with public housing projects over philosophical beliefs. This preference for 
symbolism emanates from the quest for political legitimacy which is an underlying 
disposition of the political class. 
Furthermore it is observed in this chapter the elevation of partisan political 
considerations in the decision calculus of the private investor from Malaysia brought into the 
country by SSNIT as part of the measures it took to protect it from losses due to the new 
government‘s quest to induce SSNIT‘s return to housing development. It is noted how the 
partisan considerations influenced the nature of the investor‘s activities as it declined the 
partnership with the government agency in spite of guarantees secured from the Multi-lateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an affiliate of the World Bank. Paradoxically the 
Malaysian investor went ahead with the construction of a housing estate without partnering 
any organisation. This paradox points to investor response to logics of the uneven power 
relations as experienced by the investor. The security provided by the World Bank affiliate 
was clearly deemed to be inadequate by the Malaysian investor in the face of the hostile 
environment occasioned by the NPP‘s government‘s historical antagonism towards the 
participation of Malaysian businesses in state enterprises. However, in the perception of the 
investor, this structural constraint of government antagonism did not extend to the activities 
of Malaysian investors operating in the private sector.  
Besides the inducement of the political gains to be made from the symbolism of 
support for public housing, the chapter also identified the framework of partisan political 
encounters through which the government and the opposition party manoeuvred to control the 
policy agenda and media coverage as a major contributor to the environment in which the 
NPP administration introduced the Affordable Housing Programme. In that respect, the 
frequent use of the floor of parliament for the announcement of the acquisition of funds for 
housing was an important tactic. The facilitative environment for the implementation of the 
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Affordable Housing Programme was further boosted by the worsening relationship between 
the Housing Minister and the bureaucrats working in the Ministry. However the role, and 
therefore power, of the Housing Minister in almost singlehandedly conceiving, designing and 
presiding over the implementation of the housing programme speaks volumes of the power of 
agency. The acquisition by the Minister of waivers from public procurement rules, the 
selection of consultants and contractors, and the negotiation for the bulk supply of key 
building materials are some of the critical actions that influenced the trajectory of the 
Affordable Housing Programme. Thus, by juxtaposing the facilitative structural environment 
with the strategic instrumentality of the Minister, the dialectical relationship of structure and 
agency emerged as an important mechanism of the power relations.  
8.2 Reversionism in the context of contemporary perspectives 
Given the foregoing it is important to relate this thesis to some of the contemporary 
perspectives expressed about the enabling principles and implicitly its corollary, 
reversionism. Angel (2000) makes curious arguments regarding state (re-)engagement in 
public housing:  
… many of the housing policies which have turned their back on the market, or proceeded as if it did 
not exist, have been abandoned or laid to rest. Many others still survive, by bureaucratic inertia and 
political cowardice on the one hand, or by maniacal despotism and corrupted visions of grandeur on the 
other. Be that as it may, we can safely say that new housing policies will have no choice but to face the 
housing market, to take it by the horns, so to speak, and make it behave (page 14, emphasis added) 
Enabling policies do not call for the deregulation of the housing sector in the spirit of laissez faire 
(page 16)  
Enabling policies in the housing sector call for a style of governance based on intelligence, on 
gathering information about the housing system, and on the evolution of a sensitive rule system that 
can effectively guide the sector in a manner that promotes, in as broad a way as possible, the interests 
of stakeholders in the system (page 17)  
The present appeal of the more pluralist enabling regimes can be attributed to the greater influence of 
broad based market forces, to the amplified voices of smaller political constituencies in modern 
societies, and to the general retreat of governments from undertaking bold unpopular measures in the 
face of organised and decentralised resistance (page 19;) 
This smacks of market triumphalism in housing policy and flies in the face of the evidence 
from the Ghana case study presented in this thesis of the partial reversionism that occurred 
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during a period of enabling principle reforms and of the more determined reversionism that 
was implemented post 2000 in  the aftermath of the enabling reforms. Indeed this thesis has 
shown that Angel‘s (2000) assumptions are flawed, certainly when they are applied to the 
Ghanaian narrative. The assumption that within the housing sector all interests converge, that 
there is homogeneity of interests, is not supported by the evidence of the paradoxical 
occurrence of reversionism during the reforms. Angel‘s perspective, at the very least, does 
not take into account the intra-sector heterogeneity as evidenced in this thesis. 
 The UN (2006) propositions the injection of a political dimension as a pre-requisite 
for achieving success in implementing the enabling principles:  
The key to success lies in the mobilisation of the potential and capacity of all stakeholders in the shelter 
sector, particularly the people themselves, and the implementation of sustainable interventions with 
local ownership and leadership. Political will is fundamental to achieving this… Achieving the goal of 
adequate shelter for all … will not be possible without national programmes that require, above all, 
consistent political will (UN-Habitat, 2006: 209-210; emphasis added).  
Even though the UN goes further to elaborate the imperative for political will and suggests 
strategies to generate this (UN-Habitat, 2006:210; 218), it fails to show who should take the 
lead in mobilising such political will. The UN‘s suggested approach to use small scale pilot 
projects, research findings, intellectual arguments favouring the human rights approach as 
well as the media and NGOs – while possibly having some merit -  are essentially appeals to 
conventional notions that have not been successful in mobilising and sustaining political will 
in the past. In the light of the dialectical structure-agent relationship, the heterogeneity of the 
state and the underlying penchant for political legitimacy, the notion of mobilising political 
will as posited by the UN can be criticised as deficient in so far as it retains a focus on a 
conventional and hitherto largely unsuccessful approach. This thesis shows that the 
heterogeneity of the state in the application of the enabling principles can generate the 
paradoxical occurrence of reversionism and enablement. The mechanisms for mobilising 
political will to implement the enabling principles are a critical gap that is not addressed by 
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the UN in its review of the experiences of enabling principles and is an area for future 
research.    
Lastly there remains an inconclusive debate as to the extent of the influence of the 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the UN on housing policy making 
epitomised by the contrasting perspectives of Zanetta (2004) and Ramsamy (2006), based on 
research of housing sector performance in Argentina and Mexico and Zimbabwe 
respectively: 
Instead of the all powerful image of the World Bank often portrayed by critics, this analysis identifies 
clear limits to the ability of the Bank to influence the national sector policies (Zanetta, 2004: 291) 
If the World Bank were truly interested in the development of people, and not just markets, it would 
emphasise the catalytic role that states can play in development, rather than diminish those public 
functions…in fact the World Bank has undermined the state‘s capacity to act on behalf of the poor 
(Ramsamy, 2006:189) 
Whereas this thesis has shown that the international agencies can be instrumental to the 
housing sector of countries, it goes further to reveal that the resources of these agencies can 
turn them into a site for competition. In that respect, the agenda of the international agencies 
can become manipulated as an outcome of the intra-state competition.  
8.3  Expanding our understanding of reversionism 
The thesis has so far brought to the fore a number of critical insights that expand our 
understanding of housing policy process in the context of the enabling principles and as 
applied to the case of Ghana. These insights set the grounds for the elaboration of further 
research work towards the expansion of our understanding of reversionism based on evidence 
from more country case studies.  
Conceptually reversionism has a dual perspective. On the one hand, reversionism as 
construed from the UN viewpoint of the enabling principles will refer to the occurrence of 
state re-engagement in housing for people who are not poor. This is because, as indicated in 
Chapter 3, the UN – while advocating enabling principles – permits the state to intervene on 
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behalf of the poor in the case of market failure. This definition sets in motion a subjective 
imperative in the housing policy environment in the sense that the decision for the state to re-
engage in housing becomes subject to political interpretation of what constitutes market 
failure. Any attempt to deconstruct political manipulation of this interpretation imposes a 
capacity building imperative for governments of developing countries to develop accurate 
housing indicators that can be used to determine the extent of housing market penetration. On 
the other hand, the World Bank‘s perspective of the enabling principles views all encounters 
of state re-engagement in housing to be reversionist and thus engenders objective criteria for 
assessment.  
The incidence of reversionism is a function of the degree of resonance or traction of 
the enabling principles on the policy spectrum. The recourse to state re-engagement in 
housing depends on whether the enabling principles that are implemented produced the 
desired results to the extent that it can constrain the disposition for public housing deriving 
from the political capital implicit in the symbolism of public housing. Successful outcomes of 
the enabling principles rely less on conditionalities and more on voluntary subscription. This 
compels advocates of the enabling principles to invest more in advocacy, public sensitisation 
and capacity building in order to disseminate awareness of the principles and deepen the 
traction of practice to overcome the potential of recourse to public housing in response to 
political legitimacy imperatives. To this end the UN conferences and flagship reports have a 
significant role to play. However, it is arguable to what extent these conferences have 
effectively diffused knowledge of the enabling principles to date.  
Angel (2000) has developed an ―enabling index‖ to measure the extent to which 
housing policies of any country adopt the enabling principles. In this index, he accommodates 
the effect of the political context  (that implicitly measures the extent of the political will for 
enabling principles) by inserting a sub-index, the Freedom Index – developed by Freedom 
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House, a non-governmental organisation originating from the United States of America – as a 
correlate of civil liberties to the potential for enabling principles thus;  
The Freedom Index…. is a composite measure of the absence of political freedoms (free elections, de 
facto opposition, minority rights) and civil liberties (free press, the freedom to organise, equality under 
the law, independent judiciary). It can be expected to affect the housing policy environment by making 
housing policy less, rather than more, enabling (Angel, 2000: 182)   
However this Freedom Index suffers from the lack of appreciation of the degree of 
heterogeneity of the state and therefore loses the perspective of intra-state competition 
affecting the application of the enabling principles or for that matter reversionism. The 
measures of political freedom and civil liberty in the Freedom Index alone are therefore not 
sufficient to determine the degree of enablement or the potential for reversionism. Given the 
complexity of the dialectical structure-agent relationship occurring within the multi-layered 
intra- and supra-state framework, the Freedom Index is a positivist and rather crude measure 
incapable of revealing the layered reality of reversionism. The potential for reversionism 
thrives in the environment when the design and implementation of the enabling principles 
does not obtain the strategic support of actors in control of elements by which the 
government asserts legitimacy. In the case of Ghana, the resources deriving from the 
structural adjustment reforms helped the government to retain political control and therefore 
imputed strategic power to the technocrats in charge of the reforms. This is a function of the 
degree of integration of housing and the overall economy particularly at the policy level. As 
the distance between housing and the economy increases at the policy level through weak 
linkages to economic development and social welfare, it permits increased autonomy of 
interest groups and the assertion of power by a variety of interests as the intra-sector and 
supra-state competition evolves.  
Lastly reversionism has an accompanying discourse that frames the characterisation 
of the housing problem in society and creates the space for the subsequent emergence of this 
concept. This discourse contains an adverse perspective of actors other than the state involved 
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in the development of housing and does not enunciate a supportive agenda for the efforts of 
these other actors but rather casts the state as the sole benevolent agent. The discourse is 
laced with periodic enunciations of solutions such as the acquisition of funds to resolve the 
housing problem without necessarily having to prove it. In this respect, the degree of 
accountability inherent in any society determines the degree of political rhetoric in the 
housing discourse. Where political classes are taken to task for the pronouncements, 
reversionist discourses may feature less than has been observed in the Ghanaian case. 
8.4 Future research 
This thesis has focused on one aspect of the concept of reversionism, namely state re-
engagement in direct housing construction. However as noted in Chapter 1, government re-
engagement in direct housing construction is only one of several features of the enabling 
principles. As noted in the discussions of the limits of this study in section 1.5 of Chapter 1 
another essential feature of the enabling principles is the quest for secure tenure of housing, 
especially for the poor, which requires reduction in evictions of such households. Although 
governments were encouraged to support the guarantee of secure tenure of poor households 
living in slums and squatter communities, it was observed in Chapter 1 that evictions in 
Ghana were increasingly either being threatened or undertaken. In this respect, it is proposed 
that subsequent research on Ghana‘s housing sector focus on evictions to determine if the 
conditions and dynamics driving occurrences in the post-reform era had any link with the 
other elements of reversionism manifesting as government re-engagement in direct housing 
construction.  It is proposed that additional research look into the incidence of reversionism 
in other countries, especially in Africa, in order to expand our understanding of the conditions 
and dynamics generating reversionism which has been established in the case of Ghana. 
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Annex 1– Key Informants (Interviews and Focus Group Discussions) 
List of Interviewees  
Name Position Agency 
Edusei Derkyi Former Deputy Managing 
Director 
HFC Bank Ltd. 
Steve Akuffo  
 
Former Under Secretary (1983 – 
1987) 
Ministry of Works and Housing  
Solomon S. K. Sarfoh  Member of Parliament, Asante 
Mampong (1996 – 2004) 
Office of Parliament 
Frank Tackie Director / President The Consortium for Innovations in 
Human Settlement Development / Ghana 
Institute of Planners 
Farouk Braimah Director People’s Dialogue on Human Settlements 
Allan Okomeng Mensah Senior Quantity Surveyor REDCO (1985 – 1993) 
Robert Opoku Kyei Former, Special Assistant to 
BHC Managing Director 
Bank for Housing and Construction 
Fred Pappoe Senior Programmes Officer Danish International Development 
Agency 
Robert Buckley Senior Economist World Bank (Washington) 
Charles Boakye Senior Municipal Engineer World Bank (Ghana) 
Victoria Abankwa Country Programme Manager UN Habitat Ghana Office 
Abena Mansa Ntori Human Settlements Officer UN Habitat Ghana Office 
Michael Mutter Team Leader UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading Facility 
Dr. Alex Tweneboah President GREDA 
William Opare  Executive Secretary GREDA 
Kwabena Mensah Nyarko Director Buena Vista Homes 
Peter Watermburg Former Director / Consultant Technical Services Centre / LGPSU 
(1994 – 2005) 
Prof. Ralph Mills Tetteh Registrar, Architects’ Registration Council 
Fosu Appiah Director of Planning State Housing Corporation 
Jeffrey Afful Quantity Surveying Consultant SSNIT Housing projects 
Laud S. Ashun Quantity Surveying Consultant Affordable Housing Programme 
Mawuse Agyemfra Programme Officer Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions 
 
List of anonymous interviewees – (identities not supplied by request) 
Position Thematic area of organisation  
Former Director Local Government Projects 
Urban Development Advisor Local Government Projects 
Regional Director Local Government Spatial Planning  
Head of Unit  Local Government Development Planning 
Senior Technical Advisor Housing policy 
Director of Policy Planning  Housing policy 
Director, Budgeting, Monitoring & Evaluation Housing policy 
Senior Accountant (Public) Housing development 
Technical Director Land Administration 
Regional Director Land Administration  
Senior Project Manager Social Security Investments 
Director Procurement 
Consultant  Urban infrastructure development 
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List of Focus Groups 
Thematic subject of group Period Number Constituent 
Housing Policy August 2006 6 Current and former bureaucrats 
from Housing Ministry 
Housing Finance September 2006 5 Representatives from Ghana 
Association of Housing Finance  
Local Governance August 2006 5 Current and former Bureaucrats 
from Local Government Ministry 
Land Management and 
Administration 
September 2006 4 Staff of Lands Ministry (2) 
Consultants (2) 
World Bank Projects September 2006 6 Staff (3) Consultants (3) 
UN Projects September 2006 7 Staff (2) Former consultants (5) 
Private Real Estate 
Developers 
September 2006; 
January 2008 
6 Executives of GREDA 
Planners in Central and 
Local Government 
August 2006 6 District Planning Coordinating Unit 
General Policy Experts August 2006 5 Representatives from NDPC (1), 
Parliament (1), Policy Think Tank 
(3) 
Low-Income Community 
Group 
September 2006 5 Executives of Ashaiman Branch of 
Ghana Federation of the Urban 
Poor 
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Annex 2 – General interview guide (adapted to key informant) 
 
The Housing Sector Reform Programme  
1. How was the Housing Sector Reform Programme framed?  
a. What were the key components?  
b. How were they originated within the reform framework? 
i. Design? Implementation? Institutionalization? 
c. What was the envisaged time frame from inception to completion and how did 
that compare to the actual time frame? What milestones were achieved? 
i. Envisaged and actual beneficiaries? 
2. What organizational framework presided over the Housing Sector Reform 
Programme? 
a. Who was involved in the programme and who were the stakeholders? 
b. Were there any consultations with stakeholders before the inception of the 
programme? How often were these consultations held? What were the 
outcomes of the consultations? 
c. What were stakeholders’ contributions and how did these contributions affect 
the original reform plan? 
d. Were there any particular (recognizable) group(s) that were not part of the 
reform programme? Why were they not included in the programme? 
3. What were the problems identified by the Housing Sector Reform Programme? 
a. Why & How were they selected as problems? 
4. Which problems identified by the programme were addressed? 
a. How were they addressed? 
5. Which problems identified by the programme were not addressed? 
a. Why were they not addressed? 
b. Were there any changes to the original design or implementation plan? 
6. What new issues emerged in the housing sector after the formal closure of reform 
project and how did they originate? 
7. What was the effect of the housing reform programme on  
a. The culture and preferences in housing by the various segments of the urban 
society  
b. Institutional roles in housing development  
i. Public sector (civil and public services), private sector, traditional 
sector, professional bodies, NGOs, CBOs 
c. Production and affordability of housing 
d. The role of housing within context of  
i. urban development  
ii. national development 
e. Inter-governmental relationship (multi-national agencies, central and local 
governments) 
f. Sectoral and inter-sectoral policy environment 
g. The relationship between the political class and the bureaucrats 
h. The planning framework 
8. Conversely what was the effect of the following on the reform plan? 
a. The culture and preferences in housing by the various segments of the urban 
society 
b. Institutional roles in housing development  
i. Public sector (civil and public services), private sector, traditional 
sector, professional bodies, NGOs, CBOs 
c. Production and affordability of housing 
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d. The role of housing within context of  
i. urban development  
ii. national development 
e. Inter-governmental relationship (multi-national agencies, central and local 
governments) 
f. Sectoral and inter-sectoral policy environment  
g. The relationship between the politicians and the bureaucrats 
h. The planning framework 
9.  What elements of the reform programme were maintained after the reform 
programme ended? 
10.  What elements of the reforms did not survive beyond the end of the project? 
11. Are there any legacies of the reforms that are actively influencing the present state of 
the housing sector? 
 
 
Post-reform era - 2001 
1. Characterize the post-reform state of the urban housing sector 
a. Who is providing housing for the 
i. upper income  
ii. middle – income  
iii. low – income  
iv. formally employed  
v. informally employed groups 
b. How are these being produced? Who is organising the processes? 
c. Who is involved in other aspects of the housing sector? 
i. Land 
ii. Finance 
iii. Building materials / industry 
iv. Infrastructure  
v. Planning 
vi. Labour  
2. How is the government addressing the housing needs of the different groups in the 
country? 
3. What are the most critical difficulties in the housing sector? 
4. What has the government been doing to address these difficulties? 
5. What is the state of the Housing Ministry’s capacity to meet the challenges of the 
sector? 
6. What is the strength of the Housing Ministry’s technical directorate in charge of 
housing? 
7. What is the level of the capacity of the technical directorate? 
8. Has there been any capacity building for the Ministry’s technical directorate? 
9. How often has these capacity building exercises taken place? 
10. Who has benefited from the capacity building? 
11. Who sponsored these capacity building exercises?  
12. On the average, how long have the staff of the Ministry (especially housing technical 
directorate) stayed in the employment of the Ministry? 
13. Why has the government re-entered the direct construction of houses?  
14. What is the aim of these interventions? 
15. Who was consulted prior to the inception of this project? 
16. How has these projects been formulated? 
17. What pre-disposing factors account for these interventions?  
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18. How strong is the role of the policy community on the activities occurring in the 
housing sector?  
19. Are there any identifiable institutions or entities that are excluded from the policy 
community?  
20. What accounts for their exclusion? 
21. What is the state of engagement within the policy community?  
a. Are there any platforms – formal or informal – promoting the engagement 
processes? 
b. Are there any obstructions to the engagement process within the policy 
community? 
c. What are these respective interest groups doing to achieve their objectives?  
d. Are there any conflicts in the different interests of the respective groups?  
e. Are there any forces that mobilize, coordinate or network the various interest 
groups in the housing sector? 
22.  What is the effect of the technocrats / bureaucrats on the present state of affairs in the 
housing sector?  
23. What is the state of the planning framework and what is its impact on the current state 
of the housing sector?  
24. What is the level of integration of the policies being pursued within the housing sub-
sectors  land, finance, building materials, infrastructure, planning, labour, etc?  
25. How often has the government been involved in projects developed by external 
agents? 
26. Is there any legacy of the reforms influencing the present state of the urban housing 
sector? Is there any experience from the implementation of the reforms that are being 
carried over into how housing is being delivered? 
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Annex 3: Zoning of Accra neighbourhoods in the Accra Structure Plan (1990) 
Zone Classification Typical 
neighbourhoods 
Pre-dominant 
Characteristic 
01 High density indigenous 
sector 
Osu, Jamestown, La Coastal settlements, 
indigenous Ga tribe, low-
income, moderate 
infrastructure, family housing 
02 Low-density high class 
sector 
Airport Residential, 
Roman Ridge, Ringway 
Estate, North Labone, 
Community 6 (Tema) 
Former colonial residential 
area, planned 
neighbourhoods, high 
infrastructure level, single 
family detached housing 
03 Medium-density middle 
class sector  
Achimota, Tesano, 
Assylum Down, 
Cantonments* 
Organic layout, owner-
provided infrastructure (& 
late public infrastructure 
support)  
04 Low-density middle 
class sector 
Dansoman Estates, 
Kaneshie Estates, South 
Odorkor, North Teshie, 
Community 4 & 9 
(Tema) 
Planned neighbourhoods, 
public developed estates, 
good infrastructure levels, 
detached and semi-detached 
housing  
05 Low-density newly 
developing sector 
Sports Complex Area, 
East Legon Extension, 
Adenta, Haatso 
Development of pubic lands 
by encroachment or class 
interest allocation, organic 
layouts, owner-provided 
infrastructure 
06 Medium-density 
indigenous sector 
Mataheko, Mamprobi, 
Darkuman, Abeka 
Organic layout, settlement of 
indigenous tribe with rapid 
entry for immigrants, mixed 
family, compound and 
detached housing  
07 High-density low class 
sector 
Sabon Zongo, Accra 
New Town, Nima, 
Maamobi, Madina, Tema 
New Town, Ashaiman 
Migrant settler communities, 
poor infrastructure 
Source: compiled from Housing Needs Assessment Study, HUDA (1990) 
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Classification of neighbourhoods of Accra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Map by Survey Department, Ghana 
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Annex 3B: Conceptual differences between UN and World Bank 
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Annex 4 – SSNIT Urban Housing Development Programme (1974 to 2000) 
Project  Location & Name 
Inception 
Date  
Date  
Completed Bed-sit 1--Br
1
 2--Br 3--Br 4—Br 5--Br Total Remarks 
Greater  Accra           
Dansoman  Housing 1974 1992 370 144 97       -          -         - 611      19 blocks 
Adenta   Housing           
        1) Phase  I 1989 1991   360    360      30 blocks 
        2) Phase  II 1992 1994   832    832      52 blocks 
        3)  Phase II  1993 1995    80   80        5 blocks   
Ashongman   Housing 1992 1997   544 65  18 627  
Cantonments  Redevelopment 1990 1995   3 69 3  75     75 houses 
Independence  Avenue  1989 1992    18   18        3 blocks 
        Tema           
Sakumono  Phase  I  1989 1992   429    429 Semi-detached 
Sakumono  Phase  II           
        1) Series  I 1990 1995  273 462    735      60 blocks 
        2) Series  II 1992 1993   228 6   234      16 blocks 
Sakumono  Phase  III 1996                 -   320 60   380  
 Tema  Comm. 3A 1990 1992   136    136  
 Tema  Comm. 3B           
             Phase  I 1990 1992  72 84    156      15 blocks 
             Phase  II 1993 1996   336    336  
             Phase  III 1996 1999   320 60   380  
  Tema  Comm. 5           
           1) Phase  I 1974 1989   80    80       4 blocks 
           2) Phase  II 1993 1996   64    64  
Central  Region           
 Cape  Coast  Workers 
Housing 1992 1994  120 38 36   194       6 blocks 
Eastern  Region           
   Adweso   Housing           
                                                 
1
 Br refers to Bedroom 
x 
 
        1 ) Phase I 1993 1993   110    110 55 Semi-detached  
        2) Phase  II 1997 1998   92    92    Semi-detached 
Workers  Housing            
     Koforidua 1996 1998   160    160      10 blocks 
    Galloway  Housing           
      Koforidua 1996                  -  9 36    45  
Volta  Region           
Ho  Workers Housing           
         1) Phase  I 1975 1977 168 96 24    288        9 blocks 
         2) Phase  II 1996 1998  160     160     10 blocks 
Western  Region           
Anaji  Workers Housing           
        1) Phase  I 1975 1977 48 16 68 18   150       9 blocks 
        2) Phase   II 1996                  -   128    128 3blocks ic**  
Ashanti  Region           
Asuoyeboa  Housing           
          1) Phase  I 1976 1978  152 195 49   396      39 blocks 
          2) Phase  II 1996 1998   160    160  
Brong  Ahafo Region          
 Sunyani  Workers  Housing 1975 1988   96    96       6 blocks 
Northern  Region           
   Tamale  Housing           
          Phase I 1991 1992   104    104 52 Semi-Detached 
Upper East Region           
 Bolgatanga  Housing           
        1) Phase I 1990 1993   78    78 39 Semi-Detached  
        2) Phase II 1995 1997   80    80 40 Semi-Detached  
Upper West Region           
       Wa  Housing           
           Phase  I 1991 1993   75    75  
         2) Phase II 1993 1994   74    74  
Source: Adopted from Sarfoh (2002)  **ic refers to incomplete building 
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Annex 5: List of Gated developments in Accra metropolis by private developers
2
 
                                                 
2
 As per Grant (2005:669-670) these are developments comprising 15 to 600 units. All developments less than 15 
have been onnitted. 
No. Name of Estates Developer Location 
1. Devtraco Villa Devtraco Ltd Community 20 
2. Tieso Homes Tieso Homes ditto 
3. Regimanuel Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Community 19 
4. TDC TDC Ditto 
5. Regimanuel Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Community 18 
6. Lagoon View Estates Emefs Development Lashibi 
7. Buena Vista Homes Buena Vista Homes Sakumono 
8. Parakuo Estates Parakuo Ltd. Community 15 
9. Regimanuel Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Ditto 
10. Maritime View Estate T & T Developers Nungua 
11. Mansonia Green Akuaba Ltd Baatsona 
12. Manet Cottage Manet Housing Ltd. Ditto 
13. Devtraco Villas  Devtraco Ltd. Baatsonaa 
14. Bougainville Estate  N/A Ditto 
15. Tracof  
 
Bawalishie 
16. (Tracof)  
 
Spintex 
17. Manet Court Manet Housing Ltd. Agbliza 
18. Casa Bella  N/A Ditto 
19. Mariville Homes Mariville Estates Ditto 
20. Kasaglobal Villas Kasaglobal Estates Ditto 
21. Royal Palm Estates VP Developments Ditto 
22. Oasis Homes AD Construction Ltd Ditto 
23. Manet Ville Manet Housing Ltd. East Airport 
24. Golden Gate Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Ditto 
Silver Bells I & II Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Ditto 
Platinum Place Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Ditto 
Phase IV Regimanuel-Grey Ltd. Ditto 
25. Airport Hills  Finali Ltd. Ditto 
26. Manet Palm Estate Manet Housing Ltd. Ogbojo 
27. Trasaaco Valley  Trasaaco Estate Development Ltd East Legon Extension 
28.  NTHC NTHC Properties Ltd. Ditto 
29. Extee Prestige Homes Extee Prestige Estates Ditto 
30. Salem Estates Salem Investments Ltd Ditto 
31. Ayensu Estates Ayensu River Estates Ltd. Maajor 
32. Lakeside Estates Agri-Cattle Lakeside Estate Ltd. Ashaale Botwe 
33. Commercial Estate  Commercial Investment Ltd. Akatamanso 
34. N/A Dar Es Salaam Group Kanda 
35. Meridian Apartments  Zagloul Enterprise Cantonments 
36. Cantonments Gardens Taysec Const. Ltd Ditto 
37. Kaiser Court  N/A Ditto 
38. Glahco Estates Ghana Libya Arab Holding Ltd. Ditto 
39. K. O. Homes Kwabena Owusu Construction Ltd. Ditto 
40. The Hamptons Purple Oak Ltd.  Ditto 
41. Yaa Kobe Gardens  N/A Ditto 
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N/A = Not available 
Source: Field survey 20
th
 – 22nd April 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. Orchid Gardens Taysec Const. Ltd Ditto 
43. Hansen Court Taysec Const. Ltd Ditto 
44. Krypton Garden Purple Oak Ltd. Ditto 
45. Gold Key N/A Ditto 
46. Granite Court N/A Ditto 
47. Ivy Court N/A Spintex 
48. Kwabenya Estates Regimanuel-Grey Ltd North Legon 
49. Earls Court AFSR Real Estate Ltd Airport 
50. Palladio Estates N/A Ditto 
51. Palm Court Taysec Ltd. Ditto 
52. Cedar Court Taysec Ditto 
53. Alema Court Taysec Ditto 
54. Royal Airport Plaza Royal PF Construction Ditto 
55. Polo Court N/A Ditto 
56. Rivonia Gate N/A Ditto 
57. N/A Frank Nelson Ditto 
58. Airport Flats Japan Motors Ditto 
59. Meridian Apartments Zagloul Real Estate Ditto 
60. ACP Estates ACP Estates Ltd Pokuase 
61.  “AU” Minister’s 
Village Various developers Labone 
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Annex 6: The media wars between TDC and TDC Tenants Association 
 
―Review 4,000 Cedis Rent - TDC Workers‖ 
Workers of the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) have called for an increase in rent paid 
by tenants of the Corporations’ rental units to reflect the present economic realities. 
 
This follows the revelation that some tenants pay 4,000 cedis a month as rent. A worker, who 
expressed these sentiments at a durbar held in honour of the Minister of Works and Housing, 
Yaw Barimah, said the Corporation had faced interference from politicians any time it made the 
attempt to increase the rent. 
 
The worker compared the rent charged to the price of a bottle of beer and urged the Corporation 
to take the initiative to increase the rent to enable it to stay in business. 
 
Another worker expressed concern about the numerous land title cases pending before the courts 
and said if care was not taken all the Corporation's lands would be taken over by illegal 
claimants. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that compensation was paid during the government acquisition of the 
lands from the Nungua, Tema and Kpone stools in 1952, individuals have instituted legal action 
to claim portions of the land. 
 
Mr Barimah, who was accompanied by a team of technical personnel from the Ministry, was 
paying his maiden-working visit to the TDC. He toured the Kpone Car Market and flood prone 
areas at Lashibi in Community 19 and Community 20. 
 
Mr Barimah indicated that government was concerned about the housing needs of the people and 
was, therefore, sourcing funding to support medium and long-term projects. 
 
He said TDC and Real Estate Development organisations would be the beneficiaries. Mr 
Barimah asked the TDC to act within the confines of the law to get used car dealers to move 
back to the Kpone Car Market. 
 
He formed a committee and charged it to initiate action to solve the problem of flooding at 
Community 19, Community 20 and Lashibi. 
Source: Ghana News Agency, February 6 2002 
 
“TDC tenants protest rent increase, want sale of houses” 
Tenants of the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) houses at sites One and Two, Community 
One, Tema, on Tuesday protested against the proposed increase in rent from 2,000 to 30,000 
Cedis. They expressed their desire to buy the houses in accordance with an agreement reached 
between them and the TDC in 1986 that allowed sitting tenants a five-year moratorium to own 
the houses. 
 
Addressing a press conference at Tema, Mr Douglas Spencer, General Secretary of the Tema 
Tenants Association (TTA), said in May the TDC came out with rent increases that members 
could not afford to pay because they were high. 
 
He said the struggle for the ownership of rental units, which the TDC continuously refuses to 
maintain, started in 1981 when the tenants sought redress from the court. 
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However, upon an agreement signed between the TDC and the tenants that the houses would be 
sold to them the case was withdrawn from court. Based upon that, Mr Spencer said, they were 
made to fill occupancy forms costing 10,000 cedis each but the TDC had since not honoured its 
obligation until now ''only to hear of the proposed increment in rent which we object to.'' 
 
Mr Spencer said the association is prepared to negotiate with the TDC for "a fair rent on the 
rental units and the subsequent outright sale of the houses including the institutional ones." 
 
Source: Ghana News Agency, 13 August 2003 
 
“Statement of Tenants Association is untrue- TDC” 
“The Tema Development Corporation (TDC) has described as "untrue", a statement by the Tema 
Tenants Association that TDC had refused to sell its houses at sites one and two, as well as, 
institutional and multi-tenanted houses to them. A statement issued by the management of TDC 
on Wednesday explained that legal tenants have been given the opportunity to own their units at 
very low and uneconomic prices under an agreement signed in 1996 between the two parties. 
It said the agreement also stipulated that "TDC revises the rent and selling prices to market levels 
and this is what the corporation has tried to do even though the rates are still chasing the actual 
market rates". The statement said sites one and two houses had been special cases, because they 
were supposed to be temporary structures.  
On institutional houses, the management said the Ministry of Works and Housing decided that 
their status should not change, hence TDC's refusal to sell the institutional houses to individuals, 
except with the express request of the institution to do so. "The institutions or companies are the 
legal tenants and not the staff who are occupying the rental units." 
It said under the 1996 agreement the multi-tenanted houses where some units could have taken 
between two and four legal tenants, it was agreed that if the multiple tenants could come together 
to purchase the rental unit, TDC will sell to them as joint tenants, and this had been done in a 
number of cases. 
The Tema Tenants Association has refused to pay a new rent being demanded by the TDC for 
the rental units. The association considered the new rent of 30,000 cedis from the previous 2,000 
cedis with effect from May this year, as "very astronomical". Members are rather demanding 
outright sale of the houses as stipulated in the 1996 agreement.  
 
Source: Ghana News Agency 20 August, 2003 
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Annex 7: Key housing initiatives in Pre-reform, Reform and Post-Reform eras in Ghana 
Stage Dates / Period Programmes and Projects 
Pre-reform 1952 Tema Development Corporation (later Company) (TDC) 
established and initiates development of residential estates in Tema 
 Schockbetton Housing Scheme 
 First Ghana Building Society (FGBS) established 
1954-1955;  
1957 
UN Missions on housing,  
Reports published  
1950s to 1970s  Construction of housing estates by public housing agencies 
1955 State Housing Corporation (later Company) (SHC) established 
1956 Roof Loan Scheme initiated 
1958 State Construction Corporation (SCC) established 
1967 ECA / Bouwcentrum Mission  
1969 Tema Housing Cooperative society established 
1971 Ghana Urban Development Project agreed on between World 
Bank and Government. Project curtailed after 1972.  
1972 Mortgage Decree, NRC Decree 96 passed 
1972-1974 Low-Cost Housing Scheme implemented 
1973 Bank for Housing and Construction (BHC) established 
1975 Public Servants Housing Loans Scheme / Armed Forces Mortgage 
Loans Scheme 
1976 BHC’s Real Estate Development Company (REDCO) established 
1979 State Housing Allocation Implementation Committee (SHAPIC) 
established 
1982 PNDC Law 5 – Rent Control Decree, 
PNDC Law 7 – Compulsory Letting of Unoccupied Rooms and 
Houses Decree 
   
1987 PNDC Law 138 Rent Control Law 
   
Reform 1986  National Housing Policy and Action Plan (1987 – 1990) 
completed but not passed 
1985 – 1994 Accra Planning and Development Programme; and 
Accra Structure Plan 
1985 – 1992 Kumasi Waste and Sanitation Project  
1985 – 1992 Accra District Rehabilitation Project; key measures done by 1988 
1987 – 1992 National Shelter Strategy   
1988 – 1991 Priority Works Project including pilot housing consolidation 
programme 
1988 GREDA formed 
1988 – 2000 SSNIT Mass Housing Estates  
1990 PNDC Law 329 - Home Mortgage Finance Law passed and 
secondary mortgage scheme initiated  
HFC established, 
1990 Inception of SSNIT upscale developments for 1991 NAM 
Conference 
1990 – 2000 Urban II – Housing Sector Reforms Programme; and 
 Local Government Rehabilitation Project   
  
1991 Management and financial audit of TDC awarded to Coopers and 
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Lybrand Deloitte consortium 
1993 Housing road show initiated by Government and GREDA to attract 
“diaspora” market 
1994 – 2003 Urban III – Local Government Development Programme  
1994 – 1995 Conversion of TDC and SHC to limited liability organisations 
1996 – on-going Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP) I and  II  
1999 – 2000 Revision of draft National Shelter Strategy  
Post-reform 2004 – 2006 SSNIT joint venture mass housing initiative; aborted 
2005 – on-going Review of National Shelter Strategy 
2005 – on-going UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading Facility  
2005 – on-going Affordable Housing Program  
2007 – on-going Ghana Primary Mortgage Market Initiative  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
